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S in ce  the m i d - f i f t i e s ,  I r e la n d  has d r a s t i c a l l y  
a l t e r e d  her trade  p o l i c y  i n  fa v ou r  o f  f r e e r  t r a d e .
T h is  has been  accompanied by a m ass ive  programme of  
i n c e n t i v e s  to  a t t r a c t  F o r e ig n  D i r e c t  Investment (F B I) ,
T h is  t h e s i s  documents the magnitude and s t r u c t u r a l  
co m p o s i t io n  of  FBI. A d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  i s  made o f  
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s ,  t h e i r  
impact on the development o f  the d om e st ic  s e c t o r  and on 
the e x t e r n a l  trade o f  the h o s t  c o u n tr y .  The share o f  
the f o r e i g n  f i r m s ’ v a lu e  added which remains i n  I r e la n d  
(Reta ined  V alue)  i s  c a l c u l a t e d .  T his  i s  supplemented by 
.two methods o f  c o s t  b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  5 Dom estic  Resource  
Cost a n a l y s i s ,  which v a l u e s  a l l  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  i n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e  e q u i v a l e n t s  and a c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  
the net  r e t u r n  on the input  o f  Government fu n d s .
The major b e n e f i t s  o f  FDI are the c r e a t i o n  o f  new 
employment (over  ^0 ,0 0 0  j o b s  up to  1 9 7 2 ) and the  
in c r e a s e  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r t s  (^6  ^ o f^manufactured e x p o r t s  
were from f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  i n  1 9 7 0 ) ,  Other secondary  
b e n e f i t s  have been sm al l  but FDI has c o n t r ib u t e d  p o s i t i v e l y  
t o  the I r i s h  balance  o f  payments. Costs  have a r i s e n  from 
payment of  s u b s i d i e s  and c o n s t r a i n t s  p la c ed  on the growth  
o f  the d om est ic  s e c t o r  by the c o m p e t i t io n  f o r  r e s o u r c e s .
The i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  a l a r g e  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r  has r e s u l t e d  
i n  d u a l i s t i c  development and the weakness o f  l in k a g e  
e f f e c t s  makes t h i s  endemic.
P o l i c y  c o n c lu s io n s  are tha t  a more formal and 
s tr u c tu r a l '  system o f  a p p r a i s a l ,  p r o p e r ly  v a lu in g  b e n e f i t s  
should be implemented. The in f lo w  of  FDI would be some­
what reduced and r e s o u r c e s  should be devoted  to  d e v e lo p in g  
the  dom est ic  s e c t o r ,  through both p u b l i c  and p r iv a te  
e n t e r p r i s e ,  FDI should be regarded as a ’b r id g in g  l o a n ’ 
f o r  those  s e c t o r s  where m o b i l i s i n g  d o m est ic  r e s o u r c e s  
i s  d i f f i c u l t .  More e f f o r t  should be made to  e x p l o i t  
the b e n e f i t s  o f  FDI by in c r e a s e d  s e l e c t i v i t y  and c l o s e r  
i n t e g r a t i o n  w ith  the d o m est ic  economy.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
O b j e c t i v e s  o f  the  E n q u i r y
The p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  t o  i d e n t i f y  and 
where p o s s i b l e ,  t o  q u a n t i f y  the  e f f e c t  o f  F o r e i g n  
D i r e c t  In v e s tm e n t  (FDI) i n  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r y  
on th e  economy o f  the  R e p u b l i c  o f  I r e l a n d *  The 
s t u d y  t h e r e f o r e  i n v o l v e s  th e  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  
key a r e a s  o f  the  I r i s h  economy and the  im p ac t  o f  FDI 
on such a r e a s *  The u l t i m a t e  aim i s  t o  e s t i m a t e  the  
change i n  I r i s h  r e a l  income b ro u g h t  a b o u t  by f o r e i g n  
in v e s tm e n t  and the  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  f o r e ig n - o w n e d  f i r m s .
I r i s h  deve lopm ent  p o l i c y  h a s  r e l i e d  h e a v i l y  on 
a c h i e v i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  g row th  th r o u g h  a t t r a c t i n g  f o r e i g n -  
owned i n d u s t r i a l  p r o j e c t s  t o  I r e l a n d ,  S u b s t a n t i a l  
i n c e n t i v e s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  t o  such  p r o j e c t s  i n c l u d i n g  an  
e x t e n s i v e  scheme o f  n o n - r e p a y a b l e  c a s h  g r a n t s .  I n  v iew  
o f  t h i s  deve lopm en t  p o l i c y ,  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  e f f e c t s  on 
the  economy i s  o f  p r e s s i n g  i n t e r e s t .
The a n a l y s i s  o f  FDI r e q u i r e s  a f ram ework  r a t h e r  
d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  needed  t o  a n a l y s e  d o m e s t i c  i n v e s t ­
m en t .  F o r e i g n  o w n e r s h i p ,  w i t h  i t s  r e s u l t a n t  e f f e c t s  on 
th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  g a i n s  f rom p r o d u c t i o n  and i t s  
c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  f i r m s ,  must be a n a ly s e d  
w i t h i n  t h e  f ram ework  o f  th e  t h e o r y  o f  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t
i n v e s t m e n t  and th e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  f i r m .  The d e r i v a t i o n  of  
m etho do lo g y  i s  the  s u b j e c t  o f  the  r e m a in d e r  o f  t h i s  
I n t r o d u c t i o n .
The Theory, o f  F o r e i g n  D i r e c t  I n v e s tm e n t  and the  
F o r mula t i o n o f  M ethodology
F o r e i g n  I n v e s tm e n t  i s  the  a c t  o f  e s t a b l i s h i n g  income 
e a r n i n g  a s s e t s  i n  a c o u n t r y  o t h e r  t h a n  th e  c o u n t r y  of  
o w n e r sh ip  o f  the f i r m  ( o r  i n d i v i d u a l )  c a r r y i n g  ou t  the  
i n v e s t m e n t .  T h i s  t h e s i s  i s  co n ce rn ed  o n ly  w i t h  d i r e c t  
f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  p o r t f o l i o  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t ­
m en t ,  the  l a t t e r  b e in g  th e  p u rc h a se  o f  f o r e i g n  s e c u r i t i e s  
which  d o es  n o t  e n t a i l  c o n t r o l  o f  th e  e n t e r p r i s e  whose
s h a r e s  a re  p u r c h a s e d .  The m a jo r  c o n d u i t  o f  FDI i s  the
m u l t i - n a t i o n a l  e n t e r p r i s e  (MNE), d e f i n e d  s im p ly  a s  a  f i r m
which  owns o r  c o n t r o l s  i n c o m e - g e n e r a t i n g  a s s e t s  i n  more
t h a n  one c o u n t r y . ^  The c o n c e r n  o f  th e  t h e s i s  i s  the  
a g g r e g a t e  e f f e c t  on the  h o s t  economy of  a l l  i n v e s t m e n t s  
made by KNEs i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  C o n s e q u e n t ly  the  t e r m i n ­
o lo g y  ’’F o r e i g n  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t ” i s  most  f r e q u e n t l y  u s e d .  
T h i s  d oes  n o t  mean however  t h a t  i n t r a - f i r m  d e c i s i o n
v a r i a b l e s  c an  be i g n o r e d  and s e v e r a l  s e c t i o n s  o f  the  t h e s i s
P
a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  c o n ce rn e d  w i t h  t h i s  a s p e c t  o f  FDI.
The s t a n d a r d  t h e o r y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e ,  the  
H e e k s h e r - C h l i n - S t o l p e r - S a m u e l s o n  a p p r o a c h ,  was n o t  d e s ig n e d  
t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  c a p i t a l  movements and su ch  movements were 
f i r s t  e x p l a i n e d  i n  a m o n e ta r y  f ram ework  i n  t e rm s  of  i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  T h is  i s  a  more 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  a p p ro ach  t o  p o r t f o l i o  i n v e s t m e n t ,  where 
c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i s  no t  i n v o l v e d  and 
where c a p i t a l  i s  t r a n s f e r r e d  i n  a p u re  form r a t h e r  t h a n  
t o  FDI which  i n v o l v e s  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  a package  of  
r e s o u r c e s  ( c a p i t a l ,  s k i l l s ,  t e c h n o l o g y ) .
The f i r s t  t h e o r e t i c a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  p o s s i b l e
e f f e c t s  o f  FDI on the h o s t  economy was t h a t  o f
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MacDougall ( I 9 6 0 ) .  FDI was viewed as an a d d i t i o n  to  
the c a p i t a l  s t o c k  o f  the h o s t  country and the a n a l y t i c a l  
d e v ic e  used was the m arginal  p h y s i c a l  product o f  
c a p i t a l  s c h e d u le .  This  s u g g e s t s  that  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  
i s  homogeneous with h o s t  country  c a p i t a l  and that  the  
t r a n s f e r r e d  resource  c o n s i s t s  o f  a s i n g l e  f a c t o r  -  both  
assum ptions which the modern theory  would r e f u t e .  As a 
guide f o r  methodology,  MacDougall*s c o n t r i b u t i o n  s u g g e s t s  
th a t  the areas  of  b e n e f i t  and c o s t  to  t h e  h o s t  country  
from FDI w i l l  be from t a x e s  and s u b s i d i e s  on f o r e i g n  
c a p i t a l ,  e x t e r n a l  economies and changes i n  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  income ( f o r  a move a long  w ith  marginal  p h y s i c a l  product  
curve w i th  an in f lo w  of f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  w i l l  d i s t r i b u t e  
income away from dom est ic  c a p i t a l i s t s  towards dom est ic  
l a b o u r ) .  MacDougallfc a n a l y s i s  a l s o  a l lo w s  f o r  improvements  
i n  the tec h n o lo g y  of  p r o d u ct io n  brought about by f o r e i g n  
in v e s t m e n t .  In the a n a l y s i s  there must be some mechanism 
o f  t r a n s m i s s io n  o f  such know-how to  h o s t  country  f a c t o r s  
i f  a g a in  i s  to  r e s u l t .
x x i
A m a jo r  advance  i n  th e  t h e o r y  of  d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t
came w i t h  th e  H y m e r /K in d le b e r g e r  " m o n o p o l i s t i c  a d v a n ta g e s "
th e o ry *  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n v e s tm e n t  was p l a c e d  f i r m l y
w i t h i n  th e  r e a lm  o f  the t h e o r y  of  i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n
£
and m ark e t  s t r u c t u r e T h e  b a s i s  o f  th e  t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  
any i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r  (MNE.) must p o s s e s s  c e r t a i n  
m o n o p o l i s t i c  a d v a n ta g e s  t o  be a b le  to  compete w i t h  d o m e s t i c  
f i r m s  i n  the  h o s t  m arke t*  Such a d v a n ta g e s  can  be a c q u i r e d  
i n  b o t h  th e  f a c t o r  and p r o d u c t  m arke t*  Technology  anu 
m a n a g e r i a l  e x p e r t i s e  have lo n g  b e e n  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  f a c t o r s  
o f  p r o d u c t i o n  and the  a b i l i t y  t o  draw on knowledge ( i n c l u d ­
in g  the  a b i l i t y  t o  i n n o v a t e  and a d a p t  q u i c k l y )  i s  v i t a l  
t o  modern p r o d u c t io n *  Such a d v a n ta g e s  c a n  be com­
pounded by the  p r o d u c t  m a r k e t ,  as  we s h a l l  s e e .
The t h e o r y  must go on t o  show e i t h e r  t h a t  t h e  
a d v a n t a g e s ,  when d i v e s t e d  from p r o d u c t i o n  a r e  non 
m a r k e t a b l e  o r  t h a t  the  m ark e t  v a lu e  of  such  a d v a n ta g e s  i s  
f a r  be low the  n e t  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t .  The 
p r o d u c e r  o f  knowledge i n  th e  modern w o r ld  economy i s  
rew ard e d  by a tem pora ry  monopoly p o s i t i o n  and a l t h o u g h  
th e  knowledge a c q u i r e s  the  s t a t u s  of a p u b l i c  good ( i . e .  
i t  c a n  be e x p l o i t e d  a t  v e r y  low m a r g i n a l  c o s t )  w i t h i n  
th e  i n v e n t i n g  f i r m ,  o u t s i d e r s  a re  f a c e d  w i t h  a c q u i s i t i o n  
c o s t s *  The m o t i v a t i o n  f o r  d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t  i s  p o s t u ­
l a t e d  t o  be e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  t e m p o ra ry  monopoly p o s i t i o n .  
The p o s s e s s i o n  o f  such a monopoly p o s i t i o n  i s  a n e c e s s a r y  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  d i r e c t  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  t o  t ak e  p l a c e .
I f  the  r e t u r n  t o  su ch  a " p a t e n t "  dep en d s  t o  some e x t e n t  
on l o c a l  p r o d u c t i o n  and th e  h o l d e r  i s  a p r o f i t  m a x im is e r ,  
t h e n  t h i s  i s  a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  FDI t o  t a k e  
p l a c e .  The r e t u r n  may depend  on l o c a l  p r o d u c t i o n  (and 
on the  c o n t r o l  o f  t h a t  p r o d u c t i o n )  i f  t h e r e  i s  no m ark e t  
i n  e x i s t e n c e  f o r  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  ty p e  o f  knowledge b e in g  
e x p l o i t e d .  I f  such  a m a rk e t  d o es  e x i s t ,  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  
t h a t  a m ark e t  v a l u e ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g  an  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  to  
th e  c a p i t a l i s e d  f u t u r e  r e t u r n  on th e  " p a t e n t " ,  would 
c o r r e c t l y  a s s e s s  the  w o r th  o f  the  a d v a n ta g e  t o  th e  f i r m ,  
g i v e n  the  i n t e r - d e p e n d e n c y  o f  r e n t s  w hich  i s  a r e s u l t  o f  
t h e  i n t e g r a t e d  n a t u r e  o f  modern p r o d u c t i o n .  T h is  i s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  i f  the  a d v a n ta g e  i s  i n  m a n a g e r i a l  
e x p e r t i s e ;  w hich  must be e x e r c i s e d  i n  a n  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
s e t t i n g ,  o r  i n  a t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n  r e l a t e d  to  
o n - s t r e a m  p r o d u c t i o n .
I n  many c a s e s ,  the  g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n  i n  th e  f a c t o r
m a rk e t  i s  compounded by d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  i n  the  p r o d u c t
m a r k e t .  F o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t  i s  en co u rag e d  by the
e x i s t e n c e  o f  two s e t s  o f  e n t r y  b a r r i e r s  t o  the  p r o d u c t
7m a rk e t  o f  the  " h o s t "  c o u n t r y .  The f i r s t  b a r r i e r  c o n ­
c e r n s  n a t i o n a l  m a r k e t s .  B a r r i e r s  t o  s e r v i c i n g  n a t i o n a l  
m a r k e t s  t h r o u g h  e x p o r t s  -  such  a s  t a r i f f s ,  q u o t a s  and 
s u b s i d i e s  t o  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c e r s ,  e n c o u ra g e  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  
t o  e s t a b l i s h  p r o d u c t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  p r o t e c t e d  
m a r k e t .  Such b a r r i e r s  enhance  a  l o c a t i o n a l  a d v a n ta g e  t o  
p ro d u ce  i n  t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y .  The second  b a r r i e r  i s  a 
r e l a t i v e  one -  i t  c o n c e rn s  the  i n a b i l i t y  o f  i n d ig e n o u s
‘x x i i i
f i r m s  t o  p roduce  a c o m p e t i t i v e  p ro d u c t*  Thus an 
" o w n e rsh ip  e f f e c t ” e x i s t s  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  a " l o c a t i o n  
e f f e c t ” * T h is  ow n ersh ip  e f f e c t  a r i s e s  t h r o u g h  th e  
m o n o p o l i s t i c  ad v an tag e  o f  th e  MNE o r  b e c a u s e  o f  economies  
o f  s i z e  o r  i n t e g r a t i o n .  I n  th e  same l o c a t i o n  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s  e n jo y  a c o m p e t i t i v e  edge and t h e y  c an  more e a s i l y  
overcome " th e  c o s t s  o f  f o r e i g n e r s ” where su c h  c o n d i t i o n s  
apply*
A l l  th e  above d i s c u s s i o n  i s  c o n c e rn e d  w i t h  " h o r i z ­
o n t a l ” d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t s  -  where the  f o r e i g n  f i r m  
c a r r i e s  ou t  th e  same s t a g e  of  p r o d u c t i o n  a b ro a d  a s  a t  
home. However " v e r t i c a l ” f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  i s  a l s o  a 
p r e v a l e n t  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  o p e r a t i o n s  o f  MNEs. Such 
i n v e s tm e n t  i s  i n t e n d e d  t o  g iv e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  "dow nstream ” 
raw m a t e r i a l  o r  o t h e r  f a c t o r  i n p u t  o r  o f  a fo rw a rd  
s t a g e  o f  p r o d u c t io n .®  The a v o id a n ce  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  
( g i v e n  the  absence  of  f u t u r e  m a r k e t s )  and the  c r e a t i o n  of  
b a r r i e r s  t o  e n t r y  a re  th e  m a jo r  m o t i v a t i n g  f a c t o r s  h e r e .
T h i s  m o n o p o l i s t i c  a d v a n t a g e s  t h e o r y  h a s  b e e n  f r u i t ­
f u l  i n  s t i m u l a t i n g  the  deve lopm en t  o f  academ ic  r e s e a r c h *  
H o r s t ^  h a s  shown t h a t  i t  p r o v i d e s  a f ram ew ork  f o r  
a n a l y s i n g  th e  f i r m ’ s c h o ic e  b e tw een  e x p o r t s ,  l i c e n s i n g  
and d i r e c t  i n v e s tm e n t  a s  th e  b e s t  means o f  se rv ic ing  a 
f o r e i g n  m a r k e t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  r i v a l  m odels  o f  the  in v e s tm e n t  
b e h a v i o u r  o f  MNEs have b e e n  p o s t u l a t e d ,  w h ich  w i l l  have
i m p o r t a n t  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  on  t h e  h o s t  economy. Barlow
1LILand V e n d e r^ 0 and P en ro se  * have s u g g e s t e d  a "G am ble r ’ s
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E a r n i n g s  H y p o t h e s i s " ' o f  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  b e h a v i o u r .
I n  e s s e n c e ,  th e  h y p o t h e s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  the  MHB w i l l  
r e i n v e s t  p r o f i t s ,  l i k e  a com pu ls ive  g a m b l e r ,  u n t i l  a 
r e a l  k i l l i n g  i s  made, a t  w h ich  p o i n t  a  lump sum g a i n  
w i l l  be t r a n s f e r r e d  a c r o s s  the  e x ch a n g es  t o  t h e  so u rc e  
c o u n t r y .  C o n v e r s e l y ,  S t e v e n s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  the  i n v e s t ­
ment and d i v i d e n d  ( r e m i t t a n c e )  b e h a v i o u r  o f  KWEs i s  
governed  by e x a c t l y  th e  same c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a s  any
o t h e r  f i r m  and t h a t  g l o b a l  p r o f i t  m a x i m i s a t i o n  i s  the
12norm.
The P r o d u c t  Cycle  H y p o t h e s i s  o f  Raymond Vernon i s
1^a f u r t h e r  development#  The h y p o t h e s i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
th e  l o c a t i o n  b e h a v i o u r  o f  the  KHE w i l l  v a r y  a c c o r d i n g  to  
the  deve lopm en t  o f  the  p r o d u c t  and the  t e c h n o lo g y  u n d e r  
which i t  i s  p r o d u c e d .  Vernon  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  f o r  two 
r e a s o n s  th e  p r e s s u r e  t o  i n n o v a t e  i s  g r e a t e s t  i n  the  U .S .A .  
F i r s t l y ,  the  v e r y  h i g h  l a b o u r  c o s t s  i n d u c e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  
t o  s u b s t i t u t e  new equipm ent  and t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  h i g h  c o s t  
l a b o u r .  S e c o n d ly ,  b e c a u s e  o f  h i g h  income l e v e l s ,  new 
w a n ts  f i r s t  a p p e a r  i n  the  U .S .A .  and b e c a u s e  the  t r a n s ­
m i s s i o n  of  such  w an ts  t o  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  
g e o g r a p h i c a l  p r o x i m i t y ,  t h e s e  demands w i l l  f i r s t  be met 
by U .S .  f i r m s .  C o n se q u e n t ly  U .S .  f i r m s  w i l l  f i r s t  c r e a t e  
new p r o d u c t s .  However,  a s  p r o d u c t i o n  becomes more s t a n d ­
a r d i s e d  and t e c h n i q u e s  more s t a b l e ,  t h e  p r o d u c e r s  w i l l  be 
a t t r a c t e d  by em erg ing  m a r k e t s  e l s e w h e r e  and FBI w i l l  o c c u r  
b e c a u s e  of  c o s t  a d v a n t a g e s  (and p e r h a p s  demand s t i m u l a t i n g  
a d v a n t a g e s )  o f  b e in g  p r e s e n t  i n  a m a r k e t .  ‘ I n  the  f i n a l ,
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"m a tu re  p r o d u c t "  s t a g e  t e c h n o lo g y  i s  s t a b i l i s e d  and the  
m ain  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  l o c a t i o n  i s  l a b o u r  c o s t  ( th e  p r o d u c t  
i s  by now much more l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  t h a n  i n  the  e a r l i e r  
s t a g e s )  and th e  i n v e s t m e n t s  w i l l  be l o c a t e d  where low 
c o s t  l a b o u r  can  be o b t a i n e d .  T h is  may mean t h a t  p r o d ­
u c t i o n  w i l l  be s p l i t  i n t o  s e p a r a t e  s t a g e s ,  e a c h  w i t h  a 
d i f f e r e n t  l o c a t i o n  d e t e r m i n a n t .
As a gu ide  f o r  t h e  m ethodo logy  f o r  the  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
o f  the e f f e c t s  of  FDI on the  h o s t  economy, th e  above 
t h e o r y  i s  most i l l u m i n a t i n g .  A t t e n t i o n  i s  d i r e c t e d  to  
th e  e x i s t e n c e  and means o f  e x p l o i t i n g  m o n o p o l i s t i c  a d v a n t ­
a g e s  and so t o  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  h o s t  
c o u n t r y  and t o  the  f a c t o r  and p r o d u c t  m ark e t  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p s  d i s p l a y e d  t h e r e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  the  f i e l d s  of  t e c h ­
n o l o g i c a l  g a i n  and l o s s  ( d i f f u s i o n  and c o s t s ) ,  e f f i c i e n c y  
g a i n s ,  m a n a g e r i a l  and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  im provem ent ,  e x t e r n a l  
c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s ,  l o s s e s  from m o n o p o l i s t i c  e x p l o i t a t i o n  
and e f f e c t s  on the  i n t e r n a l  and e x t e r n a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  
incom e,  a r e  h i g h l i g h t e d .  A t t e n t i o n  i s  a l s o  fo c u s e d  on the  
b a l a n c e  o f  payments  and on r e a l  incomes .(and p o t e n t i a l  
in c o m e ) .
However,  o t h e r  a r e a s  o f  economic t h e o r y  a re  o f  g r e a t  
im p o r t a n c e  i n  the  f o r m u l a t i o n  of  m e th o d o lo g y .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r a d e  t h e o r y  and th e  econom ics  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  a re  
o b v i o u s l y  r e l e v a n t .  A f u r t h e r  a r e a  i s  t h a t  o f  development  
e c o n o m ic s .  Kany o f  th e  c e n t r a l  i s s u e s  o f  development
econom ics  a re  i n v o lv e d  i n  a s s e s s i n g  th e  im pac t  of  FBI 
o n ;  s a v i n g s ,  employment g row th  and d i s t r i b u t i o n *  Many 
o f  the  c o n c e p t s  o f  deve lop m en t  econom ics  a r e  o f  use i n  
i l l u m i n a t i n g  th e  impact  o f  FDI; d u a l i s t i c  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  
l i n k a g e  e f f e c t s  and o t h e r  ’’g rowth  s t i m u l i ” a re  such 
c o n c e p t s .
One ap p ro a ch  t o  FDI which  i s  u s e f u l  i n  c a t e g o r ­
i s i n g  th e  e f f e c t s  on the  h o s t  i s  C o r d e n 1s ’’e n c l a v e ”
.  ll+a p p r o a c h .  The f o r e i g n  f i r m s  a re  r e g a r d e d  a s  
c o n s t i t u t i n g  an ’’e n c l a v e ” which  can  f o r  a n a l y t i c a l  
p u r p o s e s  be c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  s e p a r a t e  ’’economy” .
Corden s u g g e s t s  t h a t  the  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw e e n  t h i s  ’’economy” 
and the h o s t  economy a re  v i t a l .  The MNE-rest  o f  the  
w o r ld  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  u n im p o r t a n t  compared t o  e n c l a v e -  
h o s t  r e l a t i o n s .  Given t h i s ,  Corden s u g g e s t s  t h a t  f o u r  
m a jo r  c o n n e c t i n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a re  t o  be a n a l y s e d ;
( 1 )  t r a d e  r e l a t i o n s  b o t h  ways -  th e  two way movement of 
g oo d s ,  (2 )  f a c t o r  movements ,  which w i l l  n o r m a l ly  be o n ly  
one way, from th e  h o s t  t o  t h e  e n c l a v e ,  (3 )  t r a n s f e r s  
( t a x e s  and s u b s i d i e s )  which  c an  go b o t h  ways ,  (k)  e x t e r n ­
a l i t i e s ,  b o t h  p o s i t i v e  and n e g a t i v e ,  which  c an  be 
d e s c r i b e d  a s  u n p r i c e d  s e r v i c e s .  The a p p ro a c h  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  w e l f a r e  g a i n s  and l o s s e s  can  be d e s c r i b e d  i n  s t a n d a r d
’’g a i n s  from t r a d e ” t e rm s  b e tw een  h o s t  and e n c l a v e  ( t h e r e+
i s  t h u s  a lw ays  a p o t e n t i a l  g a i n  from the  MI®), p l u s  g a i n s  
from em ploying  l a b o u r  a t  a wage g r e a t e r  t h a n  s o c i a l  
o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t .
+ Here Corden means t h a t  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  ( h o s t  c o u n t r y  
t o  Mb®) i s  a non z e r o  sum game.
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S e v e r a l  areas  of  economic theory can thus he 
brought t o g e t h e r  to  provide  the m e th o d o lo g ic a l  frame­
work f o r  the a n a l y s i s  o f  the  e f f e c t s  o f  FDI on a h o s t  
country  such as I r e la n d .  An in t e g r a t e d  framework i s  
adopted h e r e .  The s t r u c tu r e  of  t h e  t h e s i s  w i th  a t ten d an t  
methodology i s  now o u t l i n e d .
Chapter I p rov ides  the e s s e n t i a l  background by 
a n a ly s in g  the s tr u c tu r e  of  the I r i s h  economy. Chapter I I  
o u t l i n e s  i n  d e t a i l  the development of  I r i s h  p o l i c y  
towards FDI and prov ides  a rev iew o f  the development  
s t r a t e g y  o f  the I r i s h  R e p u b l ic .  The f o l l o w i n g  Chapter  
p r o v id e s  a q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  of  the amount o f  FDI i n  Ire la n d  
i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s .  I t  goes on to  c a t e g o r i s e  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  
i n  v a r io u s  ways i n  order to  provide an o v e r a l l  p ic tu r e  of  
the nature o f  repent FDI. The i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c tu r e  of  
FDI i s  a n a ly sed  us ing c o n cep ts  der iv ed  from the theory  of  
i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and the t h e o r i e s  o f  FDI r e l a t e d  
t o  t h i s  approach. The Chapter q u a n t i f i e s  and e v a lu a t e s  
the importance of  the f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r  o f  I r i s h  
i n d u s t r y .
The f i r s t  part of  Chapter IV i s  l a r g e l y  concerned  
w ith  t a r i f f s  and t r a d e ,  and so i t  r e l i e s  h e a v i l y  on 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  trade t h e o r y ,  the theory  o f  e f f e c t i v e  p ro ­
t e c t i o n  and the theory  of  tb,g-. MI®, p a r t i c u l a r l y  as regards  
methods o f  market s e r v i c i n g .  In the l a t t e r  part o f  the 
Chapter ,  the theory  o f  the MI® i s  used i n  a n a ly s in g  the 
economic f u n c t i o n s  performed by . th e  I r i s h  s u b s id ia r y  of
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the  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  The f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r  o f  
I r i s h  in d u s tr y  i s  a n a ly s e d  i n  an attempt to  d i s c o v e r  
i f  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  has c o n t r ib u t e d  to  d u a l i s t i c  d e v e lo p ­
ment o f  the economy. The ’’e n c la v e  approach” r e fe r r e d  to  
above ,  i s  f u r t h e r  r e f i n e d  by the c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  ’’Retained  
V a lu e” which i s  the p r o p o r t io n  o f  the output of  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  a ccru ing  t o  I r i s h  f a c t o r s .  T his  Chapter
i n c l u d e s  a r e - a p p r a i s a l  o f  the a n a l y s i s  o f  FDI c a r r ie d  out
15by Cooper and Whelan; a ta s k  which i s  cont inued  i n  
Chapter V I I .
Chapter V e v a l u a t e s  the impact o f  FDI on the prod­
u c t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  the h o s t  economy, bo th  a t  the micro  
and macro l e v e l .  The Chapter a n a l y s e s  the comparative  
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  the f o r e i g n  owned and the d o m e s t i c a l l y  
owned s e c t o r s .  The s t r e n g t h  o f  the mechanisms o f  t r a n s ­
m i s s i o n  of  e f f i c i e n c y  from the f o r e i g n  t o  th6 dom est ic  
s e c t o r  are e v a lu a t e d .  This  Chapter a l s o  f o c u s e s  on the  
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  and i n v e s t i ­
g a t e s  the t e c h n o l o g i c a l  impact o f  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  in v e s t m e n t .
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  between FDI and the h o s t  c o u n t r y ’ s 
e x t e r n a l  ba lan ce  of  payments i s  brought out i n  Chapter VI ,  
which r e l i e s  on an a n a l y t i c a l  model d e r iv e d  o r i g i n a l l y  
from the a n a l y s i s  o f  p r o j e c t  a p p r a i s a l  i n  LDCs and from 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  trade t h e o r y .  The Chapter a l s o  in t r o d u c e s  
a model r e l e v a n t  f o r  the d i s c u s s i o n  o f  e x t e r n a l  adjustment  
where FDI i s  a major i n f l u e n c e  i n  the d o m e st ic  economy.
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Chapters  VI and VII u t i l i s e  a system o f  shadow p r i c i n g ,  
r e l y i n g  on v a l u e s  g i v e n  by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d in g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  i n  order to  d e f i n e  a sys tem  which more 
c l o s e l y  r e f l e c t s  s o c i a l  v a l u a t i o n s *
Chapter VII r e p r e s e n t s  an attampt to  o r g a n is e  the  
e f f e c t s  o f  FDI i n t o  a co h e re n t  s o c i a l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  
framework, and two such schemes are su g g e s te d *  One 
r e l i e s  on a techn ique  o f  a p p r a i s a l  dependent on i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  p r i c e  v a l u a t i o n s ,  the o th e r  e x p r e s s e s  net  
b e n e f i t  per £ o f  p u b l i c  in v e s t m e n t .  T h is  Chapter r e l i e s  
on r e c e n t  advances  made i n  the f i e l d  o f  c o s t  b e n e f i t  
a n a l y s i s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  as  a p p l i e d  t o  LDCs.
The c o n c l u s i o n ,  Chapter V I I I ,  a t t e m p ts  to  c o d i f y  
the a r e a s  o f  impact
There are three  i n i t i a l  problems o f  methodology  
which sh ou ld  be p o in te d  o u t ,  two g e n e r a l  ones  and the  
t h i r d  a problem p e c u l i a r  to  the a n a l y s i s  o f  FDI.
( 1 )  Methodology must be c o n ta in e d  by d ata  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  
Lack o f  d a t a ,  here as  e l s e w h e r e ,  c a u se s  the u t i l i s a t i o n  
o f  s e c o n d - b e s t  and tr u n c a te d  methods* An example o f  
t h i s  a r i s e s  i n  Chapters VI and V I I ,  where the a n a l y s i s  
c o u ld  be c a r r i e d  out f o r  one year  o n l y .
( 2 )  The a n a l y s t  i s  f a c e d  w i t h  the problem o f  i s o l a t i n g  
the e f f e c t s  o f  FDI from o t h e r  changes o c c u r in g  i n  the  
economy. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  c a u s a l i t y  i s  a p e r e n n i a l  
problem o f  economic a n a l y s i s .  Theory c an ,  a s  above ,  d i r e c t
a t t e n t i o n  to  the p o s s i b l e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  c a u s a l i t y  but 
then  the s k i l l s  o f  the a p p l i e d  econom is t  must take  
o v e r .  Thus methodology must s t e e r  a course  between  
p a r t i a l  e q u i l ib r iu m  a n a l y s i s ,  where to o  much may be 
h e ld  c o n s t a n t ,  and g e n e r a l  e q u i l ib r iu m  a n a l y s i s  where 
a l l  but the most t r i v i a l  e f f e c t s  may be n u l l i f i e d .
( 3 )  The problem p e c u l i a r  to  (or perhaps most acute  i n )  
the a n a l y s i s  o f  FDI i s  the " a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n "  
a ssu m p t io n .  This  assum ption  i s  a d d ressed  to  the q u e s t io n  
o f  the s t a t e  o f  the economy i f  the p a r t i c u l a r  f o r e i g n  
in v e s tm en t  had not taken  p l a c e .  Any a n a l y s i s  i s  s e n s i ­
t i v e  to  the ch o ice  o f  the a l t e r n a t i v e  a g a i n s t  which to  
s e t  the "with-FDI" s i t u a t i o n  -  w i t n e s s  the Reddaway and
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H ufb auer /A d ler  r e p o r t s .  °  General  th e o r y  can be o f  l i t t l e  
h e l p  h e r e .  An a n a l y s i s  o f  the h o s t  economy i s  an 
e s s e n t i a l  p r e - r e q u i s i t e  to  an a p p ro p r ia te  answer. T h is  
p r e s e n t  work, i n  g e n e r a l  makes the assum ption  th a t  th e re  
has  been  l i t t l e  rep lacem ent  o f  do m est ic  I r i s h  owned 
I n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  and that  FDI has r e p r e s e n t e d  a net  
a d d i t i o n  to  I r i s h  r e s o u r c e s .  However, i n  many p l a c e s ,  
the  c o n seq u en ces  of ta k in g  a d i f f e r e n t  v ie w  are made 
e x p l i c i t  and s e v e r a l  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s u l t s  are su b je c te d  
t o  s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a l y s i s ,  v a r y in g  the a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s i t i o n .  The insurmountable  f a c t  i s  t h a t ,  f o r  the sake 
o f  l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s ,  t h i s  a ssum ption  must be s p e l l e d  out  
and at  a l l  t im es  the consequ en ces  o f  t a k in g  one a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s i t i o n  r a t h e r  than an o th er  must be made e x p l i c i t .  In  
r e l a t i o n  t o  t h i s  work, the hope i s  th a t  the assum ptions
ch o se n  are the most r e a l i s t i c  ones  g i v e n  the c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  the I r i s h  economy and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  the c o n s t r a i n t s  
on i t s  deve lopm ent .
The f i r s t  Chapter p r o v id e s  a b r i e f  i n t r o d u c t i o n  to  
the I r i s h  economy as  a pre lude  to  the main body o f  
a n a l y s i s ,  c o n ta in ed  i n  the f o l l o w i n g  s i x  C h apters .
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Ch a p t e r  I : The s t r u c t u r e  of  the I r i s h  economy
The c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  F o r e ig n  D ir e c t  Investm ent  (FDI) 
depends v ery  much on the economic environment i n  which i t  
o p e r a t e s .  The economic f e a t u r e s  of  the country  such a s  the  
s i z e  o f  i t s  p o p u la t io n ,  the e x i s t i n g  s e c t o r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  economic a c t i v i t y ,  the degree  o f  openness  o f  the  economy 
and the g e n e r a l  economic c l i m a t e ,  a l l  have a b e a r in g  on the  
e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  FDI. The purpose o f  t h i s  c h a p ter  i s  t o  
d e s c r i b e  the I r i s h  economic s t r u c t u r e .  T h is  w i l l  prov ide  
the  n e c e s s a r y  background f o r  an a n a l y s i s  o f  the e f f e c t s  
o f  FDI.
A fundamental  f a c t o r  i n  any d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the I r i s h  
economy i s  i t s  s i z e .  I r e la n d  i s  a sm a l l  country  i n  
v i r t u a l l y  every  s e n s e .  The area  o f  the  s t a t e  i s  27*136  
square m i l e s  ( 70,282 square km) and i t s  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  
i n  1971 was 2 , 9 7 1 , 2 3 0 . 1 A comparison o f  I r e la n d * s  popu­
l a t i o n  w i t h  th a t  o f  the o th e r  EEC c o u n t r i e s  a l s o  a t t e s t s  
t o  i t s  r e l a t i v e l y  sm a l l  s i z e  (Table 1 . 1 )
The o th e r  main f e a t u r e  i s  i t s  r e l a t i v e l y  low l e v e l  o f  
dev e lo p m en t .  I r e la n d  i s  not c l a s s e d  as  a l e s s  d e v e lo p ed  
c ountry  (LDG) i n  the U.N. **leag u e  t a b l e ” . Indeed ,  judged  
by i t s  per  c a p i t a  income (1 97 1 )  o f  # 1532 ,  I r e la n d  ranks  
w e l l  above the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  poverty  l i n e .  However, the  
country  d i s p l a y s  a l l  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  an economy at  
an in t e r m e d ia t e  s ta g e  o f  deve lopm ent ,  i f  not th ose  o f  an 
LDC. The h ig h  r a te  o f  unemployment, ne t  e m ig r a t io n ,
1
r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h  b i r t h  r a t e  and the h ig h  degree  o f  
dependence on a g r i c u l t u r e  and the s e r v i c e s  s e c t o r  are a l l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a t u r e s  o f  LDC’ s a l s o  e x h i b i t e d  by I r e l a n d .
The data  i n  Table 1 . 1  prov ide  f u r t h e r  e v id e n c e  o f  the  
low l e v e l  o f  development o f  I r e la n d  compared t o  h er  EEC 
p a r t n e r s .  I r e la n d  i s  the  p o o r e s t  member o f  the EEC a s  
measured by GNP per c a p i t a ,  which i s  th e  most f r e q u e n t l y  
employed,  a l th o u g h  not the  b e s t ,  y a r d s t i c k  o f  d eve lop m en t .
The o t h e r  s o c i a l  i n d i c a t o r s  p r e s e n te d  i n  Table  1 . 1  a l s o  
emphasise  t h i s  p o i n t .  The I r i s h  employment s t r u c t u r e  i s  
t y p i c a l  o f  an LDC. A h i g h  p r o p o r t io n  o f  the  labour  f o r c e  
i s  dependent on a g r i c u l t u r e  and the s e r v i c e s  s e c t o r .  The 
dependence on the s e r v i c e s  s e c t o r  i s  a r e s u l t  o f  the  l a r g e  
I r i s h  t o u r i s t  i n d u s t r y .  Much more im portant  i s  the h i g h  
l e v e l  o f  unemployment i n  I r e l a n d .  The I r i s h  unemployment 
r a t e  i s  the  h i g h e s t  o f  a l l  EEC c o u n t r i e s .  A h ig h  p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  consumption ex p e n d i tu re  i s  accou nted  f o r  by n e c e s s i t i e s .  
That I r e l a n d  i s  nowhere near a mass consum ption s o c i e t y  i s  
shown by the  low l e v e l  o f  e x p e n d i tu re  on such i tem s a s  c a r s  
and t e l e p h o n e s .  F i n a l l y ,  d e s p i t e  the l a r g e  p r o p o r t io n  c la im ed  
by e d u c a t i o n  ( l i n e  1 2 ) ,  I r i s h  e x p e n d i tu r e  on the s o c i a l  
s e r v i c e s  a s  a p ercen ta g e  o f  n a t i o n a l  income i s  the  l o w e s t  
i n  the  EEC.
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A c l e a r  p i c t u r e  o f  the  low l e v e l  o f  development o f  
I r e la n d  i s  ob ta in ed  by comparing h e r  income l e v e l  w i t h  
t h a t  o f  o th e r  OECD c o u n t r i e s . (Table 1 . 2 )
Ta b le  1 . 2  GNP per head^ s e l e c t e d  OECD c o u n t r i e s  1971
Country GNP per head g 1971
Turkey 360
Y u g o s la v ia  561+ +1969




I t a l y  1880
UK 2*+60
S w itz e r la n d  3880
USA 5160
S o u r c e : OECD: Economic Survey I r e la n d  -  March 1973
Amongst the OECD group o f  c o u n t r i e s ,  I r e la n d  ranks  
s i x t h  from the bottom i n  terms of  GNP per h e a d .
The p i c t u r e  that  emerges from t h e s e  comparisons i s  
o f  an economy which i s  i n  a s ta g e  o f  t r a n s i t i o n  from a low 
b a s e .  The investment/GNP r a t i o  compares fa v o u r a b ly  w i t h  
oth er  EEC c o u n t r i e s  (Table 1 . 1  l i n e  5) ana i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
the economy i s  geared f o r  growth.
6
The s o c i a l  and  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b ack g ro u n d
The R epu bl ic  o f  I r e la n d  was e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  1919 when 
the  D a i l  E ireann  ( I r i s h  P a r l ia m e n t )  r a t i f i e d  the  p r o c la m a t io n  
o f  the  I r i s h  R e p u b l ic .  I r e la n d  i s  a p a r l ia m e n ta r y  democracy  
and has  adopted the p h i lo so p h y  o f  a mixed economy. The 
s t a t e  owned s e c t o r  encompasses the  r a i l w a y s ,  the  b u lk  o f  
road p a s se n g e r  and road f r e i g h t ,  the e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  p e a t ,  
the  p r o d u c t io n  of  sugar from b e e t ,  s t e e l  p r o d u c t io n ,  
i n d u s t r i a l  a l c o h o l ,  n i t r o g e n o u s  f e r t i l i s e r s ,  a i r l i n e s  and 
a i r  t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s ,  sh ip p in g  and l i f e  assurance® The 
economic p h i lo so p h y  o f  both  major p a r t i e s  (Fine Gael and 
Fianna F a i l )  i s  o r i e n t a t e d  towards p r i v a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  t o  be 
guided  and r e i n f o r c e d  by the s t a t e .  T h is  i s  r e f l e c t e d  by 
the  s t r a t e g y  of  i n d i c a t i v e  p lanning  adopted  by the s t a t e .  
S e v e r a l  autonomous o f f i c i a l  b o d ie s  such as  the I n d u s t r i a l  
Development A uthor ity  (IDA) and Coras T r a c h t a la  ( th e  I r i s h  
Export Board) have the o b j e c t i v e  o f  f o s t e r i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  
development through i n d i r e c t  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
An overwhelming p r o p o r t io n  o f  the  p o p u l a t i o n  -  n e a r ly  
95$ a c c o r d in g  t o  the 1961 c e n s u s ,  i s  Roman C a t h o l i c .  The 
C a t h o l i c  Church appears t o  have c o n s i d e r a b l y  i n f l u e n c e d  the  
h i s t o r y  o f  the  s t a t e . 2 S e v e r a l  t e n e t s  o f  t h i s  r e l i g i o u s  
b e l i e f  have been in c o r p o r a te d  i n t o  the laws and c o n s t i t u t i o n  
o f  the  s t a t e .  The p r o h i b i t i o n  o f  d iv o r c e  and o f  the  s a l e  
o f  c o n t r a c e p t i v e s  are the most o b v io u s ,  a l th o u g h  such  
p r o v i s i o n s  are under rev iew  by a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o m m it tee .
1
Such r e l i g i o u s  s a n c t i o n  may, i n  l a r g e  m easure ,  e x p l a i n  
the  h ig h  b i r t h  r a te  i n  I r e la n d  -  a s t a t i s t i c  which i s  
the  h i g h e s t  i n  the EEC (Table 1 . 1  l i n e  6 ) .
However, d e s p i t e  th e se  h ig h  b i r t h  r a t e s ,  the  
p o p u l a t i o n  o f  Ire lan d  d id  not r e g i s t e r  an a p p r e c ia b le  
i n c r e a s e  i n  a b s o lu t e  terms i n  any time p e r io d  from the  
f i r s t  c e n s u s  of  18^1 u n t i l  1961* T h is  outcome i s  the  
r e s u l t  o f  the  h igh  r a t e s  o f  e m ig r a t io n  e x p e r i e n c e d  by 
I r e l a n d .  Table  1 .3  shows the  pos t  war e x p e r ie n c e  o f  
p o p u l a t i o n  cha n g es .  I r i s h  e m ig r a t io n  h a s  not only  b e e n  a 
s u b j e c t  o f  e x t e n s i v e  r e s e a r c h  but i t s  r e d u c t i o n  and 
e v e n t u a l  e l i m i n a t i o n  has been  a c o r n e r s to n e  o f  I r i s h  
economic p o l i c y .
Tab le  1 .3  Average Annual  R a te s  o f  Changes of  P o p u l a t i o n  
and Net E m i g r a t i o n  p e r  1 ,0 0 0  of  Average P o p u l a t i o n  19^6-71
t e r c e n s a l
P e r i o d
Change i n  
P o p u l a t i o n
N a t u r a l
I n c r e a s e
Net
E m i g r a t i o n
19^6-51 +0.^ 8 . 6 8 .2
1 9 51 -5 6 .3 9 .2 13.*+
1 956-61 - 5 . 6 9 .2 I k , 8
1 9 6 1 -6 6 +*t.6 1 0 .3 5 . 7
1 96 6 -7 1 +5-9 1 0 .1 **.2
A
S o u r c e : IDA R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  P l a n s 1 97 3 -7 7  Part I
IDA (19 72)
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D eterm in ants  o f  e m i g r a t io n  are o f t e n  c a t e g o r i s e d  
i n t o  "push" and "pull" f a c t o r s .  The d e c l i n i n g  labour  
n ee d s  o f  I r i s h  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  coupled  w i th  the  i n a b i l i t y  
o f  i n d u s t r y  to  absorb a g r i c u l t u r a l  labour  have been  th e  
main "push" f a c t o r s .  S o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  are  a l s o  im p o r ta n t ,  
such as  the  t r a d i t i o n  o f  e m ig r a t io n ,  l a c k  o f  a m e n i t i e s  i n  
r u r a l  a r e a s  and la ck  o f  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  economic  
advancement even f o r  the employed. "Pull"  f a c t o r s  such a s  
the  b e t t e r  remuneration i n  the g e o g r a p h i c a l l y  proximate  UK 
labour  m arket ,  the long s ta n d in g  A n g l o - I r i s h  s o c i a l  
c o n n e c t i o n s  such as a common language and the  a t t r a c t i o n  
o f  th e  USA, New Zealand and A u s t r a l i a  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  have  
a l s o  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  the h ig h  l e v e l s  o f  em ig r a t io n *
A major o b j e c t i v e  o f  I r i s h  economic p o l i c y  has  b een  
t o  reduce and e v e n t u a l ly  e l i m i n a t e  " in v o lu n ta ry "  e m i g r a t io n  
(which may be d e f in e d  as  job  se ek in g  o v e r s e a s  i n  the  
absence  o f  employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  I r e l a n d ) .  One o f  
th e  main in s tru m en ts  o f  such a p o l i c y  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  has  
b e e n  the a t t r a c t i o n  of  FDI t o  s t i m u l a t e  dom est ic  e x p o r t -  
o r i e n t a t e d  in v e s tm e n t .  The concern  o f  I r i s h  economic  
p la n n e r s  w i t h  em ig r a t io n  i s  unders tandable  i n  v iew  o f  the  
grave consequ en ces  i t  has  had f o r  the  economy. The age  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  the p o p u la t io n  has  been d i s t o r t e d  by e m i g r a t io n  
i n  such a way as to  reduce the  numbers i n  the  e c o n o m ic a l ly  
a c t i v e  a g e -g ro u p s  o f  1^-6^ .  (Table 1.*+)
■■.Pj r c_entage d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  bv
age groups 19^6-66
Year 0-l>+ li+- 1+1+ 1+J-61+ 65+
I 9I+6 2 7 . 9 1+2 . 1+ 1 9 . 1 1 0 . 6
1951 2 8 .9 1+1 .0 1 9 . 1+ 1 0 . 7
1961 3 1 .1 36.1+ 2 1 .3 1 1 .2
1966 3 1 .2 3 6 . 7 2 0 .9 1 1 .2
S o u rc e s  J . Meenan The I r i s h  Economy S in c e  1922 
L iv e r p o o l  UP 1970
T h is  d e c l i n e  o f  numbers i n  the e c o n o m ic a l ly  a c t i v e  
age group coupled  w i th  the h ig h  b i r t h  r a t e  and d e c l i n i n g  
death  r a t e  has  r e s u l t e d  i n  a heavy w e ig h t  o f  dependent age  
groups on a sm al l  earning p o p u l a t i o n .  As can  be s e e n  from 
Table 1 . 1  ( l i n e  1*+) the p er ce n ta g e  of  the  t o t a l  p o p u l a t i o n  
i n  the  labou r  f o r c e  f a l l s  below the ESC average  (as  does  
I t a l y  -  a country  w ith  a common r e l i g i o u s  background and 
t r a d i t i o n  of  e m i g r a t io n ) .  I t  i s ,  how ever ,  encourag ing  t o  
see  t h a t  th e  I r i s h  e f f o r t s  aimed a t  r ed u c in g  e m ig r a t io n  
appear t o  have met w i th  some p r e l im in a ry  s u c c e s s  ( s e e  
T able  1 . 5 ) .
T ab le  1 . 5  Average Annual Net E m igrat ion  1951-71
P e r io d  Average Annual Net E m ig r a t io n  -  Numbers
1 9 5 1 -5 6  3 9 ,3 5 3
1 9 5 6 -6 1  1+2 , 01+0
1 9 6 1 -6 6  1 6 ,1 2 1
1966-71 12,18^
Source : IDA R eg io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  Pi rns 1 9 7 3 -7 2  Part. I
T h is  s u c c e s s  i n  r ed u c in g  e m ig r a t io n  may not  have  
b een  an unmixed b l e s s i n g .  I t  may have a g g ra va ted  
unemployment which i s  a s e r i o u s  economic and s o c i a l  
problem f a c i n g  I r e l a n d .  Unemployment h a s  been  c o n s i s t ­
e n t l y  above %  o f  the labour  f o r c e  a s  Table  1 . 6  shows 
throughout  the  1957-72  p e r io d  (ex cep t  f o r  a sh o rt  i n t e r ­
lude  i n  1 9 6 6 ) .
T a b le  1 . 6  Unemployment as  a p ercen tag e  o f  the  labour  f o r c e  
Year
1957 / 5 8  / 5 9  /6 0  /6 1  /6 2  / 6 3  /&* / 6 5  /6 6  / 6 7  /6 8  / 6 9  /?Q / 7 1  /72
Unemployment f  Labour Force
6 .7  6.*+ 6 .1  5 .6  5 .0  5 .0  5 .2  5*2 5 .2  if . 7 5 «o 5 .*f 5 .1  6 .0  6 .0  6 .3
S o u r c e s : Report on F u l l  Employment ( 1 9 6 7 ) C en tr a l  
S t a t i s t i c s  O f f i c e ,  D u b l in .
Review of 1971 and Outlook f o r  1972 CSO, D u b l in  
Annual S t a t i s t i c a l  A b stract  ( v a r i o u s  i s s u e s )
Apart from the f a l l  i n  e m ig r a t io n ,  the d e c l i n i n g  labour  
needs  o f  I r i s h  a g r i c u l t u r e  and the i n a b i l i t y  o f  in d u s tr y  
t o  absorb the  labour thus  r e l e a s e d  appear t o  have been  the  
major c a u s e s  o f  such h ig h  unemployment r a t e s .  To t h e s e  
i s s u e s  we now turn .
I r i s h  i n d u s t r i a l  growth from the mid f i f t i e s
The data  on GNP per c a p i t a  shown i n  Table  1 .1  which  
p u ts  I r e la n d  a t  the bottom of  the EEC ”le a g u e  t a b l e ” c o n ­
c e a l s  the  c o n s id e r a b le  growth and s t r u c t u r a l  change t h a t
th e  economy has s u s t a in e d  s i n c e  the e a r l y  1950s* From 
1956 t o  1971 the average annual r a t e  o f  growth o f  GNP has  
been  i n  current  p r i c e s  and 3*3$ i n  c o n s t a n t  (1 9 5 8 )
p r i c e s *  The f u l l  record  o f  I r i s h  GNP growth i s  c o n t a i n e d  
i n  Appendix Table  A l . l .
A s i g n i f i c a n t  f e a t u r e  o f  I r i s h  economic growth s i n c e  
the f i f t i e s  i s  the ra p id  advance made by the i n d u s t r i a l  
s e c t o r  i n  output and employment p r o v i s io n *
( 1 )  Employment changes
Employment changes i n  the economy r e f l e c t  the chang in g  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  output between the d i f f e r e n t  s e c t o r s .
Table  1 . 7  g i v e s  employment i n  m anufacturing in d u s tr y  and 
f u l l  time male employment i n  farm work f o r  1961-1971* Over 
t h i s  p e r io d  manufacturing employment i n c r e a s e d  by 2 7 *5% 
and employment i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  d e c l i n e d  by 25*7$ -  Table  1 . 8  
summarises thes6  t r e n d s .
The f l o w  o f  labour from a g r i c u l t u r e  i s  one o f  the  
s t r a t e g i c  magnitudes i n  the  economy.+ I t  i s  a major 
determ inant  of  the r a te  o f  em ig r a t io n  and o f  the ’’t a r g e t ” 
r a t e  o f  Job c r e a t i o n  i n  i n d u s t r y .  D e s p i t e  the  c r e d i t a b l e  
r a t e  o f  Job c r e a t i o n  ( 2 .5 $  i n c r e a s e  per annum over  th e  
p e r io d  1 9 6 1 - 1 9 7 1 ) ,  milch of  i t  i n  f o r e i g n  owned c o n c e r n s ,  
i n d u s t r y  i n  g e n e r a l  h a s ,  a s  y e t ,  not b een  a b le  to  absorb  
s u f f i c i e n t  labour  to  reduce unemployment.
+ See Appendix Table 3 and Notes to  th a t  t a b l e ,
Table. 1 . 7  Employment, i n  M anufacturing In d u stry  and 
A g r ic u l tu r e  1961-71
1 .  Employment i n  2 .  K a le s  engaged i n
Year Ma n u fa c tu r in g  In d u stry  Farm Work ( 1 s t  J u n e )
1961 157 ,6 0 0  3 8 0 ,8 0 0
1962 163 ,8 00  3 6 0 ,8 0 0
1963 168 ,2 00  3 5 ^ ,9 0 0
196^ 171 ,900  3 ^ 3 ,5 00
1965 172 ,8 0 0  3 3 0 ,0 0 0
1966 1 7 ^ ,9 0 0  3 1 9 ,6 0 0
1967 177 ,3 0 0  3 0 8 ,0 0 0
1968 183,800 298,600
1969  1 9 ^ ,5 0 0  2 8 8 ,0 0 0
1970 197 ,2 00  27*+,000
1971  196 ,100  2 6 5 ,0 0 0
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T able  Al*3 shows th a t  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  has  
b e e n  r i s i n g ,  thus r e l e a s i n g  labour from the land w h i l s t  
m a i n t a i n i n g  a g r i c u l t u r a l  o u tp u t .  T h e r e fo r e )  a l thou gh  
e m i g r a t io n  has f a l l e n )  unemployment i s  s t i l l  r i s i n g *
The data  i n  Table 1 .8  a l s o  show the  importance o f  
the  s e r v i c e s  s e c t o r  which accou nts  f o r  o f  the labour  
f o r c e *  Tourism i s  an important source of  employment (and 
o f  f o r e i g n  exchange e a r n i n g s ) + as  Table 1*9 shows*
Ta b le  1*9 S t a f f  employed i n  the H o te l  Industry
Survey Permanent Jobs S eason a l  Jobs
CERT Survey 1965 1 0 , kk2  *+,370
CERT Survey 1970 12 ,15 6  7,663
So u r c e : IDA R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  Plans 1 9 7 1 - 7 7 . IDA D ubl in
(CERT = C o u n c i l  f o r  E d u c a t io n ,  Recruitment and Tra in ing  
f o r  the  H o t e l  I n d u s t r y ) .
T h is  r e o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  employment i s  the  r e s u l t  o f  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  growth b etw een  (and w i t h i n )  the  major s e c t o r s  
o f  the economy.
+ E a r n in g s  from tour ism  r o se  from £ 9B*7 m i l l i o n  i n  
1969 t o  £ 99*1 m i l l i o n  the  f o l l o w i n g  year  and t o  over  
£  100 m i l l i o n  i n  1971 when such earn in g s  e q u a l l e d  j u s t  
over  one q u a r t e r  o f  the  v a lu e  of  manufactured goods  
e x p o r t e d . 3
( 2 )  The growth of  the i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r
In  the p e r io d  s in c e  the  l a t e  f i f t i e s , ,  th e re  has b een  
a r e o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  the I r i s h  economy towards i n d u s t r i a l  
p r o d u c t i o n .  Appendix Table  2 shows th a t  g r o s s  output i n  
the  T r a n sp o r ta b le  Goods I n d u s t r i e s  (m anufacturing p l u s  
m ining  and qu arry ing)  in c r e a s e d  s i x f o l d  between  19^ 9-1 97 0 .  
I t  n e a r ly  doubled i n  the  more r e c e n t  p e r io d  1963-1971•
Net output  more than doubled between 1963 and 1969.
T ab le  1 .1 0  shows the growth o f  m anufacturing  
in d u s t r y  i n  both  current  and c o n s ta n t  p r i c e s .  Manufact­
u r in g  output  has  grown from a base o f  100 i n  1953 t o  239 
L.
i n  1971* Inc luded  a l s o  i n  Table 1 .1 0  i s  Gross Dom estic  
C a p i t a l  F orm ation .  U n f o r t u n a t e ly  data on the s e c t o r a l  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Gross Domestic  C a p i t a l  Formation are not  
a v a i l a b l e .  I t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  i n d u s t r i a l  investm ent  has  
c o n t r i b u t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t o  I r e l a n d ' s  r e c e n t  growth. The 
volume o f  Gross Domestic  C a p i t a l  Formation grew by 8 . 7 $  
per annum over  the p e r io d  1961-71  as  a g a i n s t  3*9$  
annum f o r  GNP.
s i x  t i e s G ro s s  Dom est ic C a p i t a l  F o r m a t io n  a s a % o f  GNP
Y e a r G ro s s  O utpu t  of 
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  
(£  m i l l i o n )
2Volume of  Outpu t  
Index
( i 960 = 1 0 0 )
Gross  Domest 
F o r m a t i o n  
a s  % GNP
I960 ^3 ^ .0 100
1961 1*79.8 107 l i t .  1
1962 5l7.*t 116 1 5 .6
1963 5 5 8 .6 121 1 6 .8
196!+ 6l*t.2 131 1 8 .0
1965 6 5 7 .6 137 1 9 .2
1966 6 9 ^ .6 11*2 1 8 . i*
1967 7 8 6 .3 152 19 .
1968 8 9 0 .3 167 1 8 .6
1969 1 0 1 0 .7 179 2 2 .3
1970 1 0 9 5 . ‘t 185 21.1*
1971 1 1 9 5 .3 192 2 2 . 5
S o u r c e : Review of  1972 and Outlook f o r  1973- ( P r l . 3 0 9 0 )
CSC D u b l i n .
W ith in  the manufacturing s e c t o r  i t s e l f ,  there  has been  
a r e o r i e n t a t i o n  away from the  ’’t r a d i t i o n a l ” s e c t o r s ,  food  
dr in k  and t o b a c c o ,  c l o t h i n g  and foo tw ear  towards c h e m i c a l s ,  
s t r u c t u r a l  c la y  produ cts  and ’’o th er  m anu factu r ing” ( th e  
f a s t e s t  growing of  a l l ) .  Table  1 .1 1  shows th e se  t re n d s  
c l e a r l y .  The s e c t o r s  i n  which th ere  has been s u b s t a n t i a l  
f o r e i g n  in ves tm en t  are the ones w ith  the  f a s t e s t  growth o f  
o u t p u t ,  a s  w i l l  be se en  l a t e r .
Table  1 . 1 1  Trends w i t h i n  the i n d u s t r i a l  sec tor -v o lu m e  o f
S e c t o r 1958 m i 1268 1970 1971
1 .  Food 88 112 lit 6 156 163
2 .  Drink and Tobacco 98 108 12k 136 li+5
3 .  T e x t i l e s 127 189 278 31+1+ 356
C lo t h in g  and Footwear 97 13*+ 160 17W 173
5 .  Wood, F u r n i t u r e ,  
B r u s h e s ,  Brooms
93 132 153 171+ 189
6 .  Paper and p r i n t i n g 129 172 213 236 239
7.  C hem icals 129 206 381 1+38 *+37
8 .  S t r u c t u r a l  C lay ,  
G l a s s ,  Concrete  e t c .
ICh 183 318 307 1+26
9* M e ta l s  and E n g in e e r in g 12*+ 217 302 331 317
1 0 . Other M anufacturing 122 25^ 1+30 511 51+9
T o t a l  M anufacturing 106 151 208 230 2i+0
S o u r c e : Review of  1972 and Outlook f o r  1973 (P r l  3090)
CSO D u b l in .
l £
The t a b l e  shows th a t  s u s t a in e d  i n d u s t r i a l  growth began  
t o  be a c h i e v e d  i n  the p e r io d  1958-68 a f t e r  a f a l t e r i n g  
s t a r t  i n  the  1953-58 p e r i o d .  Again the i n f l u e n c e  o f  FDI 
w i l l  be s e e n  t o  be paramount.
Trade and Trade P o l i c y
A c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f e a t u r e  of  the I r i s h  economy i s  the  
h i g h  de g r ee  o f  "op en ness” which stems frcm the  sm al l  s i z e  
of  the  c o u n t r y .  An open economy i s  one th a t  e x h i b i t s  a 
h ig h  d e g r e e  o f  dependence on f o r e i g n  t r a d e .  A measure o f  
o penn ess  i s  pro v id ed  by the r a t i o  o f  the sum o f  trade  
f l o w s  ( e x p o r t s  p lu s  im ports  in c lu d in g  current  income on 
c a p i t a l )  t o  GNP. In the c a se  of I r e la n d  (1970)  t h i s  r a t i o  
was 8 3 . 8$ compared to  *+8.5^ i n  the TO, 6 1 .2 fc fo r  Denmark, 
3 5 .9 ^  f o r  G re e c e ,  2 2 . 3 $  f o r  Japan and 12.*+$ f o r  the USA.^ 
Thus,  by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s ta n d a r d s ,  I r e la n d  i s  h e a v i ly  
dependent on f o r e i g n  t r a d e .
E x t e r n a l  trad e  dependence i s  however only  one f a c e t  
o f  o p e n n e s s .  In  the  I r i s h  c a s e ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f a c t o r  
f l o w s  o f  b o th  c a p i t a l  and labour  a l s o  c o n t r ib u t e  to  the  
o p e n n e s s .  The i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  the  TO and I r i s h  labour  
m a r k e t s ,  th e  use o f  cheque payments between the TO and 
I r e la n d  and the unique c u l t u r a l  and k in s h ip  t i e s  th a t  e x i s t  
w i t h  th e  UK, USA, Canada, A u s t r a l i a  and New Zealand have  
a l l  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  f a c t o r  f l o w s .
In  v ie w  o f  i t s  h i g h  d egree  o f  o p e n n e s s ,  the trade  
p o l i c y  pursued  by I r e l a n d  assumes paramount im portance.
19
I r i s h  tra d e  p o l i c y  has undergone s p e c t a c u l a r  changes  
s i n c e  the  l a t e  1 950s ,  The inward lo o k in g  p o l i c y  of  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  through import s u b s t i t u t i o n  pursued  
e a r l i e r  has  been r e p la c e d  by a p o l i c y  o f  export  based  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  and an encouragement o f  i n f lo w s  o f  
FDI, These a s p e c t s  are covered  i n  l a t e r  c h a p te r s  a s  
they form the  core  of  the t h e s i s .  S u f f i c e  i t  t o  note  
h e r e  t h a t  the  change of  trad e  p o l i c y  has  had s i g n i f i c a n t  
e f f e c t s  on FDI i n  I r e l a n d ,
R e g io n a l  D i s p a r i t i e s
No a n a l y s i s  o f  the I r i s h  economy can  be complete  
w ith o u t  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the r e g i o n a l  d i s p a r i t i e s  w i t h i n  
the c o u n t r y .  For the pu rp oses  o f  grant a l l o c a t i o n ,  the  
I n d u s t r i a l  Development A u th o r i ty  (IDA) d i v i d e s  the  
country  i n t o  two roughly  e q u a l  h a l v e s ;  E ast  and West,  I t  
i s  the  W estern ’’D e s ig n a te d  A reas” ( p r e v i o u s l y  and more 
a p t l y  "Underdeveloped Areas")  which la g  behind i n  terms  
o f  dev e lo p m en t .  I t  has  been an aim o f  Government p o l i c y  
t o  at tem pt  t o  r e c t i f y  t h i s  imbalance by the c r e a t i o n  o f  
new i n d u s t r i a l  employment. The Third Programme f o r  
Economic and S o c i a l  Development (1 9 6 9 -7 2 )  was p ledged  t o  
"ensure t h a t  the b e n e f i t s  o f  economic growth are spread  
throughout  the c o u n t r y ” .^ The new IDA R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  
P la n s  1 9 7 3 -7 7  have s e t  t a r g e t s  f o r  r e g i o n a l  job  c r e a t i o n  
and d ev e lo p m en t .  Here we p r e sen t  four  major i n d i c a t o r s  of  
r e g i o n a l  im b a la n ce ;  v i z .  ( 1 )  income (2 )  l e v e l  o f  i n d u s t ­
r i a l i s a t i o n  ( 3 )  m i g r a t i o n  (*f) unemployment.
( 1 )  I ncom es: Table 1 .1 2  shows the spread of  incomes i n
the  n in e  p lan n ing  r e g io n s  of  I r e la n d  ( s e e  Map I ) . 7
In  1969 ,  the p e r s o n a l  income l e v e l  o f  the E a s te r n  
r e g i o n  (which in c lu d e s  D u b l in )  was over  70% h ig h e r  than  
t h a t  o f  D on eg a l ,  r e p r e s e n t i n g  an a b s o l u t e  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  
around £ 2 1 2 . 0 0 .  Although the d i s p a r i t i e s  tended t o  narrow 
o ver  th e  p e r io d  1965-69 and the r a t e  o f  growth o f  incomes  
was ro u g h ly  s i m i l a r  between r e g i o n s ,  i n  a b s o l u t e  terms the  
more p ro sp er o u s  r e g io n s  fo rg e d  ahead*
Table  1 .1 2  P er so n a l  Incomes bv Region 1965 and 1969
R eg io n s  (ranked Average P erso n a l  Income Change 1 9 6 5 -6 9
by 1969 l e v e l )  per Head a t  Current
P r i c e s  ( £ ) ______
1965 1969 1 A c tu a l
E ast 359 517 + 4 4 .0 +158
South West 286 409 + 4 3 .0 +123
Mid West 275 391 +42.2 +116
South E a st 271 380 +40.2 +109
North E a st 259 380 + 4 6 .7 +121
M idlands 231 325 + 4 0 .7 + 94
West 223 324 + 45.3 +101
North West 219 316 + 44.3 + 97
Donegal 215 305 + 4 1 .9 + 90
S t a t e 292 420 + 43.8 +128
S o u r c e : IDA R eg iona l  I n d u s t r i a l  P lan s  197.3-77
Part I ,  IDA, D u bl in .
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( 2 )  Love1 o f—In d u str i a l i s a t i o n . The i n d i c a t o r  chosen  
t o  r e p r e s e n t  the l e v e l  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  i s  the  
p e r c e n ta g e  o f  the r e g i o n a l  labour f o r c e  which i s  
employed i n  the i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r .  I n d u s t r i a l  employment 
i s  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  good i n d i c a t o r  of  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  i n  
t h i s  c a s e ,  as  i t  i s  a l s o  a Government p o l i c y  o b j e c t i v e .
Table___1.13 Persons engaged i n  Industry  as  a % o f  t o t a l  
p e r so n s  a t  work i n  each r e g i o n  1 9 6 1 , 6 6 , 7 1 .
R e g io n  (ranked___by_ 1971%) P ercen tag e  i n  Industry
1961 1966 1 9 7 1 ( e s t im a t e d )
E ast 3 6 .2 3 7 . 5 3 8 . 6
North E ast 2 3 .6 2 7 . 7 3 2 . 9
South West 2k . 0 2 7 . 1 3 0 . 5
Mid West 1 8 .3 2*t . l 2 7 . 9
South E ast 20.1* 2 3 . 6 2 6 . 7
D onegal 1 6 . 6 1 9 .8 2l*.l*
Midlands 1 8 .3 2 0 . 3 2 3 .8
North West 1 2 .1 1 3 .2 17 .^
West 1 0 .8 1 2 .9 1 5-9
S t a t e 2 k . 6 2 7 . 5 3 0 .6
Source  : As Table 1 .1 1
Some narrowing o f  the  d i s p a r i t i e s  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  
employment between r e g i o n s  i s  ta k in g  p l a c e .  A compre­
h e n s i v e  p o l i c y  of inducements and c o n t r o l s ,  l a r g e l y  
under IDA d i r e c t i o n ,  i s  a t tem p t in g  t o  d i v e r t  in d u s tr y  t o  
u n d e r - i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  a r e a s .  In 1961 the p r o p o r t io n  o f
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i n d u s t r i a l  employment i n  the East  was th r e e  t im es  t h a t  i n  
the  West -  by 1971 t h i s  had d e c l in e d  to  two and a h a l f  
t im e s  the  i n d u s t r i a l  employment p r o p o r t io n  o f  the  W est .
( 3 )  M ig r a t io n  r a t e s
T a b l e  1.1*+ P o p u l a t i o n  change and Mi g-rat-.i nn R a t e s  bv
R e g io n  1961--71
Average 
Ra te  of
Annual
Net Rank bv
% P o p u l a t i o n  
R e g io n  Change
M i g r a t i o n  p e r■ 1 . --------- 1~ ||- —MT TTTllfll IT
1000 P o p u l a t i o n
P o p u l a t i o n
Change
1961-66  1966-71 1961-66 1966-71 1961-66  1 9 6 6 -7
E a s t + 9 .1 +7.1 + 2 .7 - 0 . 6 1 1
South West + 1 .3 + 2 .7 - 5 . 7 - 3 . 0 3 2
North E a st - 1 .0 + 2 .7 - 1 0 . 7 - 3 . 7 5 3
South E ast - 0 .1 +2 .6 - 9 . 8 -*+.7 it k
Mid West +1 • 6 + 1 .7 - 6 .0 - 5 . 6 2 5
Donegal - 4 . 6 - 0 . 5 - 1 5 .0 - 6 . 9 8 6
M idlands - 2 . 0 - 0 . 8 - 1 2 . 6 - 9 . 8 6 7
West -3 . k - 2 . 3 - 1 3 . 5 - 1 0 . 6 7 8
North West - 6 . 0 -*♦.0 - 1 5 . 1 - 1 0 . 0 9 9
S t a t e +2 .3 + 3 .0 - 5 . 7 - 4 . 2
S o u r c e : As Table :L . l l
The f i v e  r e g io n s  which ex p e r ien ce d  an in c r e a s e  i n  
o p o u l a t i o n  during  1966-71 are  the E a s te r n  Areas p lu s  the  
South and Mid West t o u r i s t  a r e a s .  The l a t t e r  has  b e n e f i t t e d  
f p  om the s p e c i a l  employment i n c e n t i v e s  g i v e n  by Shannon
Free A ir p o r t  Development Company Ltd .  (SFAD Co.)  The 
p o p u l a t i o n  change i n  the  l a t t e r  per iod  was more p o s i t i v e  
(o r  l e s s  n e g a t i v e )  than the  e a r l i e r  p e r io d  f o r  a l l  but one 
r e g i o n ,  two o f  them r e v e r s i n g  a d e c l i n e  i n  p o p u la t io n .
The E a s t  r e g i o n ’ s growth slowed -  and thus  the p o l i c y  aim 
o f  c h e c k in g  the  growth and spread o f  D u b l in  was a c h i e v e d .  
However, wide d i s p a r i t i e s  between r e g i o n s  s t i l l  remain.
(*+) Unemployment r a t e s . T h is  i n d i c a t o r  i s  c l o s e l y  
r e l a t e d  w i t h  p o p u l a t i o n  change and i n d u s t r i a l  job p r o v i s i o n .
Ta b l e  1 . 1 5  R e g io n a l  and S t a t e  Unemployment Rates
R e g io n  (ranked by lo w e s t  r a te  1971) Unemployment Rate
1566 19.71
South  E a s t 3 .6 5 M o
M idlands 3 . 6 5 M 3
E ast 3 .5 ^ 5 .0 6
South West M O 5 .1 9
North West 5 .6 6 5 .5 7
North E a s t M  7 5-57
Mid West k .50 5 .6 7
West 5 .7 7 7 .3 6
D onegal 9 .7 0 1 3 .3 3
S t a t e *+.30 5 .7 0
S o u r c e : IDA R e g io n a l I n d u s t r i a l  P lan s  1973-72
P art  I ,  IDA D u b l in .
The d i s c r e p a n c y  be tw een  r e g i o n s  i n  employment p r o v i s i o n  
h a s  b een  i n c r e a s e d  as  o v e r a l l  unemployment has  i n c r e a s e d .
The West r e g i o n  and Donegal  are c l e a r l y  i n  desp era te  need 
of  employment p r o v i s i o n .
I t  i s  c l e a r  from the fo r e g o in g  e v id en ce  that  there  
are  s e v e r e  r e g i o n a l  d i s p a r i t i e s  w i t h i n  the  s t a t e .  Table  1 .1 6  
c o n f ir m s  t h a t  the i n d i c a t o r s  of  r e g i o n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  show 
a c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  p a t t e r n .  Column 5 shows the percentage  of  
IDA e x p e n d i t u r e  which goes  t o  each r e g i o n .  Grants and 
o th e r  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o f  the  IDA are the major p o l i c y  t o o l s  
aimed a t  r e d u c in g  r e g i o n a l  d i s p a r i t i e s .  The ranking o f  
a r e a s  by r e g i o n  i s  not s u f f i c i e n t l y  d i s s i m i l a r  from 
i n d i c a t o r s  o f  r e g i o n a l  d i s p a r i t y  to  su g g e s t  that  IDA 
e x p e n d i t u r e  i s  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  s trong  c o u n t e r v a i l i n g  f o r c e .
In d e ed ,  IDA e x p e n d i tu r e  does  not seem to  favour the poorer  
r e g i o n s .
Table  1 . 1 6  The Hanking o f  Regions by f i v e  i n d i c a t o r s .
1 p p 4^ ^
P o p u l a t i o n  Unemploy- ^Personal  % at  Work % o f  
Change ment Rate  Income l e v e l  Industry  IDA 
R egion  1 9 6 6 -7 1  1971 1969 1971 Expenditure
E a s t 1 3 1 1 2
North E a s t 2 5 k 2 5
South West 2 if 2 3 I
South E a s t k 1 If 5 if
Mid West 5 7 3 it 3
Donegal 6 9 9 6 9
M idlands 7 2 6 7 8
West 8 8 7 8 6
North West 9 5 8 9
n(
Source  : R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  P la n s  1 9 7 3 - 7 7. °P c i t
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The f o u r  r e g io n s  ranked 6 -9  by i n d i c a t o r  1 remain i n  
t h e s e  p o s i t i o n s  i n  1*+ out o f  16 p o s s i b l e  i n s t a n c e s  
(columns 1 -  h )  and they have the lo w e s t  p r o p o r t io n s  o f  
IDA e x p e n d i t u r e ,  w h i l s t  the top two r e g i o n s ,  East  and 
South W est ,  are  the l a r g e s t  r e c i p i e n t s  o f  IDA e x p e n d i t u r e .  
Other c r i t e r i a  (such as  the w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  f irm s  t o  l o c a t e  
i n  an a r ea  w i th  a s t a t e d  grant i n c e n t i v e )  w i l l  i n f l u e n c e  
the  l o c a t i o n  o f  IDA exp en d itu re  and i t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  
r e g i o n a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  are not the on ly  ones p e r t a i n i n g  
t o  the  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  grants#
Even w i t h i n  the most backward r e g i o n s ,  and the  
above h a s  i d e n t i f i e d  the  four  West and North West r e g i o n s  
a s  the  "p o o res t  a r e a s ” , th ere  are sub r e g i o n s  markedly  
worse  o f f  than the  r e g i o n  a s  a w h o le .  The s i x  c o u n t i e s  
i n c lu d e d  i n  Table  1 .1 7  may be p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i n g l e d  o u t .  
S p e c i a l  r e m e d ia l  a c t i o n  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e q u ir e d  i n  such  
a r e a s .
T a b le  1 . 1 7  P o p u la t io n  performance o f  s e l e c t e d  c o u n t i e s  
1961 -  71 .
County ^P o p u la t io n  1971 ^1966-71  % Change ^1961-66  # Change
L e i t r i m 28 ,3 13 -7.*+ - 8 .7
Mayo 109,*+97 - 5 . 2 - 6 .3
Roscommon 53,>+97 - ‘+.9 - 5 .0
Longford 2 8 ,2 2 7 - 2 . 6 -5.*+
Cavon 52,67*+ - 2 . 5 -W.5
S l i g o 5 0 ,2 3 6 - 2 . 0 -*+•3
Source : R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  P lans  1 9 7 3 - 7 Z P_art__I,IDA D u b l in
Government p o l i c y  has  countered  e m ig r a t io n  i n  p e r io d  
1 9 6 6 -7 1  a s  compared to  1 9 6 1 -6 6 .  The p o p u la t io n  d e c l i n e  
i s  however s t i l l  ex trem ely  heavy i n  some areas#
One f u r t h e r  r e g i o n a l  so c io -ec o n o m ic  f e a t u r e  i s  to  he 
n o t e d .  The G a e l i c  speak ing  p o p u la t io n  ( 2 .5 $  o f  the  
p o p u l a t i o n  o f  the s t a t e )  i s  r e g i o n a l l y  c o n c en tr a ted  i n  a r ea s  
known c o l l e c t i v e l y  as  the G a e l t a c h t .  Such areas  e x h i b i t  
a v e r y  h i g h  degree  o f  dependence on the  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
s e c t o r  ( t h e  p r o p o r t io n  of  workers i n  in d u s tr y  i s  l e s s  than  
h a l f  t h a t  f o r  the  s t a t e  as  a w h o le ) ,  g e n e r a l l y  h igh er  than  
a vera ge  unemployment r a t e s ,  lower than average  incomes,  a 
h i g h e r  th a n  avera g e  dependency r a t i o  (¥+9 per 1 ,0 0 0  i n  the  
age r a n g e s  0 - l k  and over  63 y e a r s  compared t o  the s t a t e ’ s 
2^*+ per 1 , 0 0 0 )  and an imbalance of  the s e x e s  (89  fem a les
t o  100 m a le s  compared t o  99^100 at  the s t a t e  l e v e l ) .  In
1966 th e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  th e  G a e l ta ch t  a r ea s  was 7 2 ,706  and 
t h i s  f i g u r e  i s  r a p i d l y  d e c l i n i n g  (by 7*3$ over the p er io d  
1 9 6 1 - 6 6 ) .  S p e c i a l  measures are i n  f o r c e  i n  an attempt to  
a t t r a c t  i n d u s t r y  t o  t h e s e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  needy a r e a s .
F i n a l l y ,  the  c o n t i n u in g  dominance o f  Dubl in  i s
im portant  when the  urban s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e  s t a t e  i s  
c o n s i d e r e d .  The p o p u l a t i o n  o f  D u bl in  i s  shown i n  Table  1*18 
and 1 . 1 9 .  D u b l in  p r o v id e s  ^ 2 .3 $  o f  t o t a l  employment i n  
m a n u fa ctu r in g  and *+0.*+$ o f  t o t a l  s e r v i c e s  s e c t o r  employment 
( 1 9 7 D *  A lthough the  former p r o p o r t io n  h a s  been d e c l i n i n g  
(from *+6.8$ (1 9 6 1 )  and ¥+.**$ (1966)^ the l a t t e r  has  been  
i n c r e a s i n g  ( 3 9 . 2 $  1961 and ^ 0 .2 $  1 9 6 6 ) .8
T a b l e  1 . 1 8  Tha p o p u l a t i o n  o f  D u b l in  and th e
r e s t  o f  the S t a t e .
P o p u la t i o n  1961 1966 1971
D u b l in  718,332 795,0*+7 8*+9,5*+2
R e s t  o f  S t a t e  2 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 9  2 , 0 8 8 , 9 5 5  2 ,1 3 1 ,6 8 8
S t a t e  2 ,818,3*+! 2,88*+,002 2 , 9 7 1 , 2 3 0
D u b l in  as  $ 2 5 .5  2 7 .6  2 8 . 6
S t a t e
S o u r c e : IDA R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  P l a n s  1973-77
Table  1 . 1 9  The Urban S tr u c tu re  of  I r e la n d  1966 
( A l l  towns over 2 0 ,0 0 0 )
C i t v  o r  Town P o p u l a t i o n
D u b l i n 795,0*+7
Cork 1 22 ,1^6
L im e r i c k 5 7 ,5 7 0
W a te r f o r d 29,8*t2
Galway 2 6 ,2 9 5
Dundalk 2 1 ,6 7 8
R e g io n a l  S t u d i e s i n  I r e l a n d ,  C o l i n  Buchanan
and par tners  1968 .
The u r b a n  s t r u c t u r e ,  D u b l i n  a p a r t ,  i s  very  s p a r s e .  
Only s i x  m a jo r  c i t i e s  and towns e x ceeded  2 0 ,0 0 0  p o p u l a t i o n  
i n  1966.  The g row th  of  D u b l i n  and i t s  e n v i r o n s  i s  a 
m a jo r  p o l i c y  c o n c e r n ,  b u t  l i m i t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  g row th  m ust  
n o t  be a c h i e v e d  a t  th e  e x p en se  of  r e d u c i n g  employment
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c r e a t i o n .  I n d u s t r i a l  growth i n  the East  r e g io n  i s  
l i m i t e d  t o  th o s e  c a s e s  where no a l t e r n a t i v e  l o c a t i o n  i s  
f e a s i b l e  or where the expans ion  i s  o f  a f irm  a lready
e x i s t i n g  i n  the Dublin  M etro p o l i ta n  A r e a .9 R eg iona l
p o l i c y  h a s  i n  the past  a ttempted to  c r e a t e  "counter—
m agnets ’1 t o  the growth of  D u b l in ,  the most s u c c e s s f u l
a t tem p t  b e in g  the growth of L im er ic k -E n n is , through the  
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  of  Shannon Free A ir p o r t .
C o n c lu s io n
The b r i e f  rev iew  of  I r i s h  economic s t r u c t u r e  
p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  Chapter shows that  the  economy i s  i n  
an i n t e r m e d i a t e  s tag e  between an advanced i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  
economy and an LDC. However, many of  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
f e a t u r e s  o f  the  economy p red isp ose  the a n a l y s t  t o  v iew  
I r e la n d  i n  terms o f  co n c ep ts  o r i g i n a t i n g  i n  the l i t e r a t u r e  
on d e v e lo p in g  c o u n t r i e s .  Like most LDC’ s ,  Ire la n d  i s  
h e a v i l y  dependent on a g r i c u l t u r e  and has a weak urban 
s t r u c t u r e .  D e s p i t e  rec en t  rapid  advan ces ,  the I r i s h  
i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  i s  weak and i s  not w e l l  i n t e g r a t e d .
A co nsequ en ce  o f  t h i s  i s  the heavy dependence o f  the  
economy on the e x t e r n a l  s e c t o r .  A f u r t h e r  s a l i e n t  f a c t  i s  
the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  severe  r e g i o n a l  d i s p a r i t i e s  -  a g a in  a 
common f e a t u r e  o f  LDG's.
S e v e r a l  o ther  soc io -ec o n o m ic  i n d i c a t o r s  a l s o  show 
th a t  I r e l a n d  e x h i b i t s  the  f e a t u r e s  of  an LDC. The 
p a t t e r n  o f  consumption i s  o r i e n t a t e d  towards f o o d s t u f f s  
and away from the "luxury" goods which have become mass
c o n s u m p t i o n  goods i n  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  West ( t e l e p h o n e s ,  
c a r s ) o The low l e v e l  o f  p r o v i s i o n  o f  s o c i a l  i n f r a ­
s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  s o c i a l  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  t h e  age 
s t r u c t u r e  and  th e  h i g h  b i r t h  r a t e  a r e  a l l  f e a t u r e s  o f  
u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t .
F i n a l l y ,  I r e l a n d  l i k e  most LDC’ s s u f f e r s  from a n  
im b a l a n c e  i n  i t s  f a c t o r  endowments -  a  r e l a t i v e  abundance  
o f  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o u r  and a s h o r t a g e  of  c a p i t a l  and e n t r e ­
p r e n e u r i a l  know-how. The problem i s  a g g r a v a t e d  by th e  
d e c l i n i n g  n e e d s  o f  l a b o u r  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  and the  i n a b i l i t y  
o f  i n d u s t r y  t o  a b s o r b  th e  r e l e a s e d  l a b o u r .  The m ain  
p o l i c y  p ro b le m  h a s  b e en  th e  c o n ta in m e n t  of  e m i g r a t i o n .
I t  i s  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  t h a t  h a s  l e d  I r i s h  economic p o l i c y  
m ak e rs  t o  l o o k  f a v o u r a b l y  on FDI which i s  b e l i e v e d  t o  be 
a  s o u r c e  o f  c a p i t a l ,  t e c h n o lo g y ,  s k i l l s  and e n t e r p r i s e .
I t  i s  a g a i n s t  t h i s  background  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
o f  FDI t o  t h e  economy must be j u d g e d .
Appendix t o  Chapter I :  I r i s h GNP and Growth









(19 5 8 )  P r i c e s  
£m
^Rate o f   ^
Growth of  
GNP
(per annum)
Rate o f  
Growth o f  
Real GNP 
(per annum)
1956 5 6 0 A 6 1 0 .5
1957 5 8 1 .3 6 1 6 .3 3 . 7 0 .1
1958 6 0 0 .9 6 0 0 .9 3 .4 - 2 . 5
1959 6 3 7 .8 6 2 6 .O 6 . 1 4 .2
i 960 6 7^ .2 6 5 7 .4 5 -7 5 .0
1961 7 2 4 .3 6 8 9 .0 7 .4 4 . 8
1962 7 8 0 .0 710 .4 7 .7 3 . 1
1963 8 3 5 . 0 7 3 9 .1 7 .1 4 . 0
1964 9 4 6 . 0 767 .8 1 3 .3 3 . 9
1965 1 0 1 2 .8 7 8 7 .9 7 .1 2 . 6
1966 I 0 6 3 .O 7 9 7 .0 5 .0 1 .2
1967 1 1 6 8 .5 8 4 8 .0 9 . 9 6 .4
1968 1 3 1 9 .0 9 1 5 .0 1 2 .9 7 .9
1969 1 4 8 1 . 0 9 5 3 .0 1 2 .3 4 .2
1970 1 6 5 0 .0 9 6 7 .0 1 1 .4 1 . 5
1971 1 8 5 8 .0 9 9 4 .0 1 2 .6 2 .8
S o u r c e : Columns 1 and 2 OECD: Economic Survey -
I r e l a n d  ( V a r io u s )
Columns 3 and b c a l c u l a t e d  from c o l s .  1 and 2
T ab le  A1.2 The Growth i n  Transportab le  Goods 
I n d u s t r i e s  19^9 -  71
Y e a r  1G ro s s  Output  2 Net Output  ^Average
T r a n s p o r t a b l e  T r a n s p o r t a b l e  Numbers 
Goods I n d u s t r i e s  Goods I n d u s t r i e s  Employed 
£m £m
1949 2 0 1 . 7 6 1 .5 1 3 5 ,34 1
1950 2 3 5 . 5 6 8 .6 1 43 ,6 11
1951 2 7 1 . 9 7 4 .5 148 ,024
1952 2 9 5 . 7 7 7 .7 1 43 ,9 79
1953 3 2 8 . 9 8 9 .2 1 5 0 ,5 8 7
1954 3 3 1 . 7 9 1 .9 1 5 3 ,9 2 6
1955 3 4 1 . 7 9 7 .2 1 5 6 ,6 2 7
1956 3 3 5 .4 9 9 .4 1 54 ,3 21
1957 3 5 1 .0 100 .3 1 4 9 ,8 6 7
1958 3 7 1 .1 1 0 7 .7 1 5 0 ,2 6 9
1959 4 0 6 . 9 1 2 1 .7 1 53 ,1 41
i 960 4 4 3 . 1 1 3 0 .6 1 5 9 ,9 5 5
1961 4 9 0 . 8 1 5 0 .7 1 6 7 ,2 9 4
1962 5 2 9 .8 1 6 8 .7 1 7 2 ,9 4 7
1963 5 7 1 .4 183 .1 1 77 ,7 32
1964 6 2 8 .4 2 0 5 .9 1 81 ,662
1965 6 7 1 .3 2 2 1 .8 1 82 ,662
1966 7 4 1 .6 2 4 7 .8 1 84 ,652
1967 8 1 0 .1 2 8 6 .2 187 ,202
1968 9 2 2 .2 331 .3 1 94 ,1 7 4
1969 1 0 4 9 .3 3 8 9 .5 2 0 5 ,1 4 4
1970 1 1 3 7 .5 na 2 0 7 ,9 0 0
1971 1 2 4 0 .2 na 2 0 6 ,8 0 0
S o u rces  I r i s h  S t a t i s t i c a l  Bul l e t i n  19-6.9.
Review o f  1972 and Outlook f o r  1.973 
(P r 1 .3 0 9 0 )  CSO, D ubl in
Table  A1.3  Value of a g r i c u l t u r a l  o u tp u t .  r W H n o i n
emnloyme nt and net output per 1man i n  a g r i c u l t u r e 1953-71
y e a r  ^Gross Output 
£ m i l l i o n
Net Output 
£ m i l l i o n
^Males engaged  
i n  farm work 




1953 1 7 7 . 9 1 4 8 .4 4 0 2 .8 0 .3 7
1954 1 7 4 .4 1 4 1 .4 4 2 1 .3 0 .3 4
1955 1 8 6 . 9 1 5 4 .1 4 1 8 .4 0 .3 7
1956 1 7 5 .1 1 4 2 .8 4 0 9 .3 0 .3 5
1957 1 9 0 .2 1 5 6 .3 3 9 8 .6 0 .3 9
1958 1 8 1 . 5 1 4 5 -7 3 9 5 .3 0 .3 7
1959 1 9 1 .2 1 5 7 .0 3 8 9 .1 0 .4 0
i 960 1 9 3 .1 1 6 0 .8 3 8 2 .8 0 .4 2
1961 2 0 6 . 5 1 6 9 .4 3 8 0 .8 0 .4 4
1962 2 1 3 . 1 171.9. 3 6 0 .8 0 .4 8
1963 2 1 5 .0 1 7 1 .5 3 5 4 .9 0 .4 8
1964 2 4 0 .2 1 9 4 .7 3 4 3 .5 0 . 5 7
1965 2 5 2 . 5 1 9 0 .6 3 3 0 .0 0 .5 8
1966 2 4 8 . 9 1 9 5 . 1 3 1 9 .6 0 . 6 1
1967 2 6 6 .1 2 0 8 . 8 3 0 8 .0 0 .6 8
1968 3 0 3 . 9 2 3 7 .2 2 9 8 .6 0 . 7 9
1969 3 1 8 . 9 2 4 5 . 6 2 8 8 .0 0 . 8 5
1970 3 4 2 . 9 2 6 1 . 6 2 7 4 .0 0 .9 4
1971 3 8 6 . 3 2 9 2 . 1 2 6 5 .0 1 .1 0
S o u r c e : Review of 1971 and Outlook f o r  1972
CSO D u b l i n  Column k c a l c u l a t e d  by Author
N o t e s ; C l e a r l y ,  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  h a s  b e e n  r i s i n g  
from 1958 t h r o u g h  new c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e ,  t e c h n i q u e s  i n  
a g r i c u l t u r e ,  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  h o l d i n g s  and e n d in g  u n d e r ­
employment (on  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  f e m a le s m a le  l a b o u r












C h a p te r  I :  N o te s  and R e f e r e n c e s
! •  F a c t s  About I r e l a n d , Department o f  F o r e ig n  A f f a i r s ,
1 9 7 2 .
OECD -  Economic Survey -  Ire la n d  ( v a r i o u s )
2 .  S e e ,  f o r  example, John Whyte (1971)  Church and 
S t a t e  i n  Modern I r e l a n d , G i l l  and MacMillan,
D u b l in  and Garret  F i t z g e r a l d  (1972)  Towards a 
New Ir e  l a n d , G i l l  and MacMillan, D u b l in .
3 .  IDA R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  Plans 1973-77  Part I ,
IDA D u b l in  1972 .
Review o f  1972 and Outlook f o r  1 9 7 3 , ( P r l . 3 0 9 0 ) ,  
C e n t r a l  S t a t i s t i c s  O f f i c e ,  D u b l in .
5 .  OECD Economic Survey -  I r e la n d  (March 1973)*
6 .  Third Programme: Economic and S o c i a l  Development
1969-72  ( P r l . ^ 3 1 )  > CSO D u bl in ,  March 1969 .
7 .  IDA R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  P lans  o n . c i t .
8 .  F i g u r e s  d e r iv e d  from IDA R e g io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  P lan s  
op . c i t .
9 .  See P ad ra ig  O'Huggin (1972)  Regi o n a l  Developm.ent_and 
I n d u s t r i a l  L o c a t io n  i n  I r e la n d  : Volume 1 An Foras
F o r b a r th a ,  D u b l in .
Chapter II_:_ The D e v e lo pment of  I r i s h  P o l i c y  Towards 
F o r e ig n  D i r e c t  I n v e s tm e n t .
"Let goods be homespun wherever i t  i s  
r e a s o n a b ly  and c o n v e n ie n t ly  p o s s i b l e ,  
a nd ,  above a l l ,  l e t  f in a n c e  be p r im a r i ly  
n a t i o n a l " .
J .  M. Keynes i n  U n i v e r s i t y  C o l l e g e ,  D u b l in ,  1933^
I r i s h  economic p o l i c y  towards f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  has  
undergone d r a s t i c  changes s in c e  the 1930s when Keynes 
gave h i s  u n e q u iv o c a l  b l e s s i n g  to  a p o l i c y  o f  s e l f  s u f f i c ­
i e n c y  and independence from f o r e i g n  f in a n c e  and c o n t r o l .  
Recent I r i s h  p o l i c y  has  a c t i v e l y  encouraged F ore ign  
D i r e c t  Inves tm ent  (FDI) .  A unique f e a t u r e  of  s i g n i f i c a n c e  
i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t  i s  the p r o v i s i o n  of g r a n ts  i n  a id  t o  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  out o f  n a t i o n a l  f i n a n c e s .  The purpose o f  
t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  t o  a n a ly s e  I r i s h  p o l i c y  towards FDI, 
e s p e c i a l l y  the  p o l i c y  o f  p r o v id in g  grants  to  f o r e i g n  f i r m s .
The Era o f  Economic N a t io n a l i sm
The p r e s e n t  l i b e r a l  trade  ph i losophy  o f  the I r i s h  
Government s ta n d s  i n  g l a r i n g  c o n tr a s t  to  the p o l i c y  o f  
economic n a t i o n a l i s m  p r a c t i s e d  i n  the e a r ly  part o f  t h i s  
c e n t u r y .  The a t t i t u d e  towards trade i s  p a r a l l e l e d  
throughout  by a complementary a t t i t u d e  t o  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t m e n t .
I r e l a n d  had f o r  lo n g  been  an a g r i c u l t u r a l  h i n t e r l a n d  
and c o l o n i a l  market o f  B r i t a i n  b e fo re  the founding o f  the  
" I r i s h  Free  S ta te "  i n  192 2 .  The e s ta b l i sh m e n t  of  the s t a t e  
gave a huge impetus  to  a d e s i r e  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  growth and 
.domestic  c o n t r o l  o f  the economy. A p o l i c y  o f  p r o t e c t i o n i s m ,  
r e l y i n g  on t a r i f f s  and q u o t a s ,  was e s t a b l i s h e d  and p o l i c i e s  
of  import s u b s t i t u t i o n  were i n s t i t u t e d ,  c l i e f l y  i n  consumer 
p r o d u c t s .  A p o l i c y  o f  s e l e c t i v e  p r o t e c t i o n  was f o l lo w e d  i n  
the t w e n t i e s  t u r n in g  t o  one of  f u l l  p r o t e c t i o n  a f t e r  the  
advent o f  the  f i r s t  F ianna F a i l  Government (March 1 9 3 2 ) . “
The move towards h ig h  t a r i f f  w a l l s  was r e i n f o r c e d  by the  
d is p u te  w i t h  B r i t a i n  over  the  payment of I r i s h  land a n n u i t i e s  
and the r e s u l t a n t  "economic war". Table  2 . 1  shows the  l a t e r  
s t a g e s  o f  t h e  r a p id  change from a c o m p le te ly  f r e e  trade  
economy t o  one o f  the most h i g h l y  p r o t e c t e d  i n  the w o r ld .
(In  1937 the  Free S t a t e  was the  f i f t h  most h i g h ly  p r o te c te d *  
B r i t i s h  t a r i f f s  were two t h i r d s  as  h ig h  and Dutch t a r i f f s  
only  one f i f t h  o f  the  I r i s h  l e v e l ) .  The z e n i t h  of  p r o t e c t ­
ionism was reached  i n  1 9 3 6 - 7 *
Table 2 . 1  The growth o f  the I r i s h  t a r i f f  w a l l  1930-1938  
Date T a r i f f  L i s t  T a r i f f  l e v e l  index
Average % Ad valorem
D e c . 1931 Covered 68 a r t i c l e s
D e c . 1936 Covered 281  a r t i c l e s
+ many q u otas  ^5$
D e c . 1937  1 ,9 ^ 7  a r t i c l e s  s u b j e c t
t o  r e s t r i c t i o n s  N.A.
1938 N.A. 15$
Source : j # Meenan (1 9 7 0 )  The I r i s h  Economy S ince  1922,
L i v e r p o o l  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s .
The C o n t r o l  o f  M a n u f a c t u r e s  A c ts  o f  1932~l+ were 
i n t r o d u c e d  i n  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  c o n f i n e  o w n e r s h ip  and c o n t r o l  
of i n d u s t r y  t o  I r i s h  c i t i z e n s .  A l th o u g h  t h e  A c ts  s t i p u ­
l a t e d  t h a t  m a j o r i t y  v o t i n g  c o n t r o l  was t o  he i n  I r i s h  
h a n d s ,  t h e y  were  n e v e r  f u l l y  e f f e c t i v e .  Keynes saw such  
p o l i c i e s  a s  a s e n s i b l e  r e a c t i o n  t o  t h e  I r i s h  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
a d e p r e s s e d  w o r l d  economy
" . . .  i f  I  were  a n  I r i s h m a n ,  I  s h o u l d  f i n d  much t o  
a t t r a c t  me i n  th e  economic o u t l o o k  o f  your  p r e s e n t  
Government  to w a rd s  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y " . * ^
Throughout t h i s  p e r i o d ,  t a r i f f s  and quota p r o t e c t i o n  
c o n s t i t u t e d  the  main form o f  s t a t e  a id  to  i n d u s t r y .  No 
d i r e c t  s u b s i d i e s  were g i v e n .  The e x t e n t  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r ­
f e r e n c e  was l i m i t e d  to  the  p r o v i s i o n  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  
in f o r m a t io n  and c r e d i t .  Indeed ,  u n t i l  19*+9 the Government 
co n ten ted  i t s e l f  w i th  p r o v id in g  the c o n d i t i o n s  f e l t  t o  be 
conducive  t o  do m est ic  i n d u s t r i a l  ex p a n s io n .  P o l i c y  i n  the  
era o f  economic  n a t i o n a l i s m  was in tended  to  s t im u la t e  the  
p r iv a t e  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r  i n  I r i s h  hands ,  the growth o f  
which was meant t o  absorb the  f low  o f  labour be in g  r e l e a s e d  
from a g r i c u l t u r e .  The change o f  p o l i c y  from p r o t e c t i o n i s m  
arose  from a r e a l i s a t i o n  th a t  e m ig r a t io n  and unemployment 
had not b een  s u f f i c i e n t l y  checked .
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  growth  s lowed down, b a l a n c e  
o f  paym en ts  p ro b le m s  became s e r i o u s  and an  uneven ,  
i n e f f i c i e n t  p a t t e r n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  r e s u l t e d .  I n  
s u p p l y i n g  t h e  home m a r k e t ,  I r i s h  f i r m s  p rod u ced  a wide
range o f  p r o d u c t s  and such o v e r d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  l e d  t o  
short  p r o d u c t i o n  runs and i n c r e a s i n g  c o s t s .  An u n i n t e ­
grated  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  was formed w ith  l i t t l e  
dependence on dom est ic  raw m a t e r i a l s .  Many o f  the new 
i n d u s t r i e s  were c l u s t e r e d  round the p o r t s .  No c a p i t a l  
goods i n d u s t r i e s  came i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  because  o f  the  
sm al l  d o m e s t ic  m arket .  From t h i s  h ig h  c o s t ,  h ig h  import  
c o n te n t  p r o d u c t i o n  a r o se  ba lance  o f  payments problems.
The r e a l i s a t i o n  that  a n a t i o n  w ith  under three  m i l l i o n  
people  cannot  support a f u l l  range o f  modern in d u s tr y  l e d  
to  a fu n d a m en ta l  r e v i s i o n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  p o l i c y ,  beg in n in g  
i n  the immediate  pos t  war p e r io d .
I r i s h  p o l i c y  i n  t h i s  p er io d  has  been  a t t a c k e d  on
the grounds t h a t  i t  d id  not pay a t t e n t i o n  t o  "the
c o m p e t i t i v e  s t r u c t u r e ,  the degree o f  monopoly, /  and_7
1+
. . . t o  s c a l e  and e f f i c i e n c y ” . However the import su b­
s t i t u t i o n  p o l i c y  d id  a c h ie v e  the launching  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  
p r o d u c t io n  i n  the  f i e l d s  where t h i s  was e a s i e s t ,  n o ta b ly  
i n  consumer goods i n d u s t r i e s  r e q u ir in g  sm a l l  amounts o f  
c a p i t a l  and e x p e r t i s e .  The c o s t s  o f  import s u b s t i t u t i o n  
in c r e a s e d  a s  t h i s  fragm ented prod u ct io n  grew wider and 
such c o s t s  became more apparent in  subsequent y e a r s .
The Era o f  Economic L i b e r a l i s a t i o n
The decade o f  the 1950s can b e s t  be d e sc r ib e d  a s  an 
era of  economic l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  i n  I r e la n d .  I t  w i t n e s s e d  
the  r e p e a l  o f  the  C o n tro l  o f  Manufactures A c t s ,  a c t i v e
prom otion o f  e x p o r t s ,  the  a d o p t io n  o f  i n d i c a t i v e  p lan n ing  
and the  i n c e p t i o n  of  p o l i c i e s  d e s ig n e d  to  a t t r a c t  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  t o  I r e l a n d .
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  the I n d u s t r i a l  Development  
A u th o r i ty  (IDA) i n  19*+9 h e r a ld e d  a major s e r i e s  o f  changes  
i n  developm ent  p o l i c y .  The f u n c t i o n s  o f  the A u thor ity  
were t o  be th e  promotion of  new i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  and 
the a t t r a c t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  to  I r e l a n d .  The 
powers o f  the  IDA, how ever ,  were not e q u a l  t o  th ese  t a s k s  
because  the  o n ly  inducements a v a i l a b l e  were t a r i f f  and 
quota p r o t e c t i o n  o f  the sm a l l  dom est ic  market .
In  1952 the f i r s t  non-repayab le  g r a n ts  scheme was 
i n s t i t u t e d  under the c o n t r o l  o f  the Grants Board -  An 
Foras  T i o n s c a l  (AFT). These grants  were l i m i t e d  t o  the  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  and e x p a n s io n  of  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  the Under­
d e v e lo p ed  A r e a s . + The g r a n t s  were in ten d ed  to  c o u n te r a c t  
the  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  d e f i c i e n c i e s ,  h ig h e r  t r a n sp o r t  and 
labour t r a i n i n g  c o s t s  which were p r e v en t in g  in d u s tr y  
sp rea d in g  t o  t h e s e  a r e a s .  Such gra n ts  were payable a t  a 
r a t e  o f  up t o  66% o f  the  c a p i t a l  c o s t s  o f  q u a l i f y i n g  p r o j e c t s .  
The g r a n t s  were open to  bo th  f o r e i g n  owned and I r i s h  f i r m s .  
However, the  i n f l o w  of  f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  investm ent  d id  not  
become s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  t h e s e  y e a r s  because  the grants  were 
not p e r c i e v e d  by f o r e i g n  f i r m s  as  b e in g  la r g e  enough to  o v e r ­
come the  sm a l l  s i z e  o f  th e  I r i s h  market,  the Control  o f  Manu­
f a c t u r e s  A cts  i n h i b i t i o n s  and the a g r i c u l t u r a l  image o f  I r e l a n d .
+ L a te r  " D es ig n a ted  A rea s" .  Roughly the We s t e r n  and North  
W estern  h a l f  o f  the  c o u n t r y .
The n e x t  s ta g e  i n  the l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  p r o cess  was 
prompted by c o n t in u in g  e m ig r a t io n  and balance  of  payments 
problem s.  The inward lo o k in g  growth p o l i c y  was becoming  
more d i f f i c u l t  t o  f o l l o w  because  of  the ex h a u s t io n  of  
import s u b s t i t u t i o n  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  The r a te  of growth 
slowed down. E m ig ra t ion  became very  heavy i n  the 1956-61  
p e r io d .  (See  Table  1 .3  i n  Chapter I )
There was a major s h i f t  i n  p o l i c y  towards the 
a t t r a c t i o n  o f  FDI as  a means of  development.  I t  was f e l t  
tha t  th e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  had proved i t s  i n a b i l i t y  to  r a i s e  
the in v e s tm e n t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  reduce unemployment and 
e m ig r a t io n  and t h a t  th e re  was a shortage  o f  domestic  
c a p i t a l i s t s  w i l l i n g  t o  expand p rodu ct ive  c a p a c i ty  w i t h i n  
I r e l a n d .
FDI was se en  a s  a means o f  b r in g in g  product ive  c a p i t a l  
to  labour  i n  order  t o  reduce em ig r a t io n  and to  improve 
the b a la n c e  o f  paym ents ,  d i r e c t l y  through the impact on 
c a p i t a l  a cco u n t  and by i n c r e a s i n g  e x p o r t s .  I t  was hoped 
tha t  FDI c o u ld  supplement I r i s h  r e s o u r c e s  by prov id ing  
t e c h n i c a l  know-how, c a p i t a l ,  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  a b i l i t y  and 
market a c c e s s .  Such r e s o u r c e s  were seen  to  be u n a v a i la b le  
w i t h i n  I r e l a n d ,  or a v a i l a b l e  on ly  at  p r o h i b i t i v e  p r i c e s .  
E n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  a b i l i t y  was f e l t  to  be the c r u c i a l  co n ­
s t r a i n t .  Perhaps i t  may be more a c c u r a te  t o  say that  the  
c o n s t r a i n t  was the l a c k  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  conducive to  the  
p r o f i t a b l e  performance o f  the  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  f u n c t io n  
w i t h i n  I r e l a n d .  The c o s t  o f  h i r i n g  managers, l e a s in g
t e c h n o l o g y ,  r a i s i n g  c a p i t a l  and o b t a i n i n g  a c c e s s  t o  
f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s ,  a l l  o f  w h ich  were n e c e s s a r y  t o  
a c h i e v e  t h e  s t a t e d  p o l i c y  a im s ,  was f e l t  t o  be b e s t  met 
by t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  of  FDI.  T h e r e f o r e  a s u b s t a n t i a l  
i n c e n t i v e  scheme f o r  FDI was i n s t i g a t e d .  Our c o n c e r n  i s  
w i t h  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h i s  programme.
A p o l i c y  instrum ent  which was to  become a major  
weapon i n  the armoury o f  inducements to  f o r e i g n  i n d u s t ­
r i a l i s t s ,  - th e  export  ta x  r e l i e f  -  was in tr o d u ce d  i n  
1956* The Finance  Act o f  th a t  year a l lo w e d  $0% exem ption  
from ta x  o f  a l l  p r o f i t s  earned from ex p or t  s a l e s  above 
the  1955 (or  1956)  l e v e l  f o r  a p er io d  o f  10 y e a r s .  In  
1958 r e m i s s i o n .w a s  r a i s e d  t o  100%  and the Finance Act o f  
i 960 ex te n d ed  f u l l  r e l i e f  from ten  to  f i f t e e n  y e a r s .  In  
a d d i t i o n ,  the I n d u s t r i a l  Grants Act o f  1956 empowered the  
IDA t o  e x te n d  the  d isbursem ent  o f  g r a n ts  t o  new i n d u s t r i e s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  throughout the c o u n tr y ,  no lo n g e r  j u s t  i n  the  
Underdeveloped Areas.  In 1 9 5 7 j the i n f l o w  o f  FDI became 
a s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r  i n  I r i s h  Gross Domestic  C a p i t a l  Form­
a t i o n  f o r  the f i r s t  time (See Table 3 * 1 ) •  This  was the  
f i r s t  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  the h ig h  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  supply o f  f o r e i g n  
c a p i t a l  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  changes i n  d om est ic  i n c e n t i v e s *
A m a j o r  w a t e r s h e d  o c c u r e d  i n  1958 w i t h  th e  p u b l i ­
c a t i o n  o f  "The F i r s t  Programme f o r  Economic D e v e lo p m e n t " .^  
T h i s  was I r e l a n d ’ s f i r s t  a t t e m p t  a t  p l a n n i n g .  Prom inence  
was g i v e n  t o  e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t e d  i n d u s t r i a l  g row th  and t h e  
a t t r a c t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  i n t o  e x p o r t  i n d u s t r i e s  was
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one of  the  prime o b j e c t i v e s  o f  the p la n .  The I n d u s t r i a l  
Development (Encouragement o f  E x te r n a l  In ves tm en t)  Act 1958  
gave exem ption  from the c o n t r o l  o f  Manufactures Acts  t o  
export  o r i e n t e d  f i r m s .  ( In  196*+ the C on tro l  Acts  were 
r e p e a l e d ) .  I t  was noted i n  "the Programme" that  pas t  
p u b l i c  inv e s tm en t  had b u i l t  up a s trong  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  
base  but th a t  l i t t l e  i n d u s t r i a l  a c t i v i t y  had d e v e lo p e d .  T h is  
i s  an e a r l y  i n d i c a t i o n  that  the c r u c i a l  b o t t l e n e c k  on I r i s h  
i n d u s t r i a l  growth was e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  a b i l i t y .
The t r a d i t i o n  of  I r i s h  p o l i c y  th a t  s t i l l  s tan ds  today  
i s  th a t  no d i s t i n c t i o n  be made between f o r e i g n  and I r i s h  
p r o j e c t s  when the p r o j e c t s  are under c o n s i d e r a t i o n  f o r  a 
g r a n t .  A l l  r a t e s  o f  g r a n ts  and o ther  i n c e n t i v e s  apply  
e q u a l l y  t o  dom est ic  and f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s .  The s t e p s  taken  
i n  1959 c a n ,  however,  be construed  l a r g e l y  as an attem pt  
t o  a t t r a c t  more f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n t .  A s e p a r a t io n  o f  
f u n c t i o n s  between  the IDA and AFT was a l s o  put i n t o  f o r c e .
A l l  grant  g i v i n g  powers were t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  AFT by the  
I n d u s t r i a l  Grants Act 1959 .  The r o le  o f  the IDA was c o n ­
f i n e d  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  promotion and o f  recommending p r o j e c t s  
f o r  grant a i d .  The IDA a l s o  began to  open o v e r se a s  o f f i c e s  
to  a t t r a c t  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s .  Grants became a v a i l a b l e  f o r  
i n d u s t r i e s  o u t s i d e  the Underdeveloped Areas a t  the r a t e s  
shown i n  Table  2 . 2 .
Table 2 . 2  Maximum l e v e l  o f  grant 1959 -  % o f  c o s t  o f  
purchase o f  f i x e d  a s s e t s
U n d e rd e v e lo p e d  A reas  
O th e r  A reas  
D u b l in 2 %
Source s I n d u s t r i a l  Grants Act 1959
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  the export  ta x  r e l i e f  scheme l a i d  
a f u r t h e r  c o rn er s to n e  o f  modern p o l i c y .  Export tax  r e l i e f  
was a s u f f i c i e n t l y  pow erfu l  i n c e n t i v e  to  a l lo w  the Grants  
Board t o  reduce the l e v e l  o f  c a p i t a l  g r a n ts  w h i l s t  s t i l l  
a t t r a c t i n g  an i n c r e a s i n g  inflow, o f  FDI. Export tax  r e l i e f  
t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  some e x t e n t ,  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  g rants  as  an  
important i n c e n t i v e .
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  Shannon Free A irport  Development  
Co. (SFAD C o . )  i n  1959 marks the b e g in n in g  o f  Shannon A irp o r t  
a s  a major magnet f o r  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l .  T h is  l e g i s l a t i o n  
gave f i n a n c e  and s p e c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  a t t r a c t  FDI t o  the  
i n d u s t r i a l  e s t a t e  a t  Shannon A i r p o r t , w h ich ,  a l thou gh  
customs f r e e  from 19*+7) had remained dormant. The i n c e n t i v e  
package a v a i l a b l e  to  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  in c lu d e d  custom  
b u i l t  f a c t o r i e s ,  labour t r a i n i n g  g r a n t s ,  machinery g r a n ts  
o f  up t o  o f  t o t a l  c o s t  and tax  exem ption on export  
p r o f i t s  up t o  the year 1983 .
The f o u n d a t io n s  o f  current  p o l i c y  o f  encouraging  
inward FDI were thus l a i d  i n  the decade o f  the f i f t i e s .
The decade o f  the 1 s i x t i e s .  Import l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  and 
export  p r o m o t io n .
The 1 s i x t i e s  saw the  f u r t h e r  development o f  the l i b e r a l  
p o l i c y  towards FDI. The r e o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  i n c e n t i v e s  towards  
e x p o r t in g  meant th a t  the r a t i o n a l e  f o r  the h ig h  t a r i f f  and 
quota p r o t e c t i o n  was b e in g  undermined. T a r i f f s  i n h i b i t
e x p o r t e r s  by i n c r e a s i n g  the c o s t  o f  imported in p u ts  and 
by making the home market more a t t r a c t i v e  f o r  producers  -  
in d u c in g  a " b ias  a g a i n s t  e x p o r t s " .
In  1963 the r e p o r t  o f  the  Committee on I n d u s t r i a l  
O r g a n is a t io n  found I r i s h  i n d u s t r y  t o  be u n d e r - s p e c i a l i s e d ,  
i n e f f i c i e n t  and below optimum s c a l e .  T h is  was adduced t o  
be e v id e n c e  o f  the  need t o  r e a l l o c a t e  r e s o u r c e s  a long  the  
l i n e s  d i c t a t e d  by c o m p a r i t iv e  advan tage .  This  p r o c ess  
began i n  1963  and 196*+ when two u n i l a t e r a l  t a r i f f  c u t s  o f  
10/b a c r o s s  the  board were implemented. Further  s t e p s  
towards f r e e  trade were tak en  w ith  the "Anglo I r i s h  Free 
Trade Area" agreement (1 96 5 )  and I r i s h  membership o f  GATT 
under which customs d u t i e s  were to  be reduced by an average  
o f  3 3 3% i n  fo u r  i n s t a l m e n t s  to  1972# These s t e p s  towards  
f r e e r  tr a d e  cu lm in a ted  i n  the agreement t o  j o i n  the EEC -  
upheld by an overwhelming m a jo r i ty  by referendum i n  1972 
and becoming e f f e c t i v e  1 s t  January 1973•
The development p o l i c y  which was put i n t o  p r a c t i c e  
from the time o f  the e a r l y  1 9 6 0 ’ s c o n t a in e d  two l in k e d  
s t r a n d s :  ( 1 )  Movement towards f r e e r  t r a d e ,  w ith  r e l i a n c e  on 
the e x p a n s io n  o f  e x p o r t s  ( 2 ) the a t t r a c t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  i n ­
v e s t m e n t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t o  the export  s e c t o r .  This  l i n k  
was c l e a r l y  r e c o g n i s e d  by the Government. The c o n d i t i o n s  
to  be met when q u a l i f y i n g  f o r  a grant became the " a b i l i t y  
t o  su r v iv e  i n  f r e e  trade  c o n d i t i o n s " .  However, no t e s t  
f o r  d em o n s tra t in g  t h i s  ex ante  were l a i d  o u t .
*+5
The Reorganisation o f  the IDA
In  s p i t e  o f  the i n c r e a s e s  i n  m anufactur ing  output  
and e x p o r t s  a c h ie v e d  i n  the ' s i x t i e s  (See Chapter 3)>  
the D i r e c t o r s  o f  the IDA f e l t  th a t  job  c r e a t i o n  was not  
-expanding a t  a r a t e  r a p id  enough to  absorb a l l  the  labour  
b e in g  r e l e a s e d  from the a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r .  This  v iew  
was r e i n f o r c e d  by the ’’Report on F u l l  Employment” (1 9 6 ? )?  
A g r i c u l t u r a l  employment d e c l i n e d  by 2 . %  per annum i n  
the y e a r s  1951 -6 5  and t h i s  r a t e  o f  d e c l i n e  was e x p e c ted  
t o  c o n t in u e  i n t o  the 1 9 8 0 ' s ,  (See Table A l . 3  i n  the 
Appendix t o  Chapter I ) .  A f a l l  i n  e m ig r a t io n  from 1 6 ,0 0 0  
per annum t o  5>000 per annum was a l s o  e x p e c t e d .  Such 
p r o j e c t i o n s  meant th a t  1 8 1 ,0 0 0  to  2 1 8 ,0 0 0  a d d i t i o n a l  j o b s  
had to  be c r e a t e d  i n  the  p e r io d  1966-81 j u s t  t o  m a in ta in  
the 1965 l e v e l  o f  employment.
In r e sp o n se  to  th e se  c o n d i t i o n s  and to  the p r o j e c t i o n s  
o f  the Report  the IDA conc luded that  an o v e r a l l  r e a p p r a i s a l  
o f  i n d u s t r i a l  promotion p o l i c y  was n e c e s s a r y .  The g e n e s i s  
o f  the  c u r r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  and promotion  
p o l i c y  came w i th  the a c t i o n  of  the IDA i n  commiss ioning two 
Reports  by Arthur D. L i t t l e  In c .  In the f i r s t  R eport ,  ”A 
rev iew  o f  th e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  I n d u s t r i a l  Development  
A u t h o r i t y ” (March 1 9 6 7 ) ,  widespread changes i n  the o r g a n i s ­
a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  IDA were recommended. The b a s i s
o f  t h i s  recommendation i s  c o n ta in e d  i n  the f o l lo w in g
%
s ta tem en t  s
”We b e l i e v e  i t  i s  i n a p p r o p r ia t e  to  a s s i g n  the IDA 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  a t t r a c t i n g  new industry  at
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an a c c e l e r a t e d  r a t e  w i th o u t  a l s o  g i v i n g  i t  
the  s t a f f ,  budget and scope to  ensu re  a t  l e a s t
o
a c r i t i c a l  minimum e f f o r t ’1.
The Report c o n s id e r e d  th a t  a c r i t i c a l  minimum e f f o r t  
had not th e n  been made and th a t  the i n c e n t i v e s  o f f e r e d  d id  
not f u l l y  o f f s e t  the d i s a d v a n ta g e s  f a c i n g  p r o s p e c t i v e  
f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s *  To o b t a i n  the o b j e c t i v e s  d e s i r e d  by 
the Government, the  Report f e l t  th a t  a d d i t i o n a l  r e s o u r c e s  
and a more e f f i c i e n t  framework o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  were 
n e c e s s a r y .  The o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  p r o p o s a l s  were th a t  the IDA 
should  withdraw from the c i v i l  s e r v i c e  and be autonomous  
i n  h i r i n g  s t a f f ,  i n  o r g a n i s i n g  i t s  own a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and 
i n  employee com p en sat ion ,  .A l l  the b o d ie s  concerned i n  
i n c e n t i v e  promotion and grant g i v i n g ,  i t  was f e l t  should  be 
c o n s o l i d a t e d  i n t o  one body.  This  would have the v a lu a b le  
b y -p rod u ct  o f  d e c r e a s in g  the time n e c e s s a r y  to  approve a 
g r a n t .  In  a d d i t i o n  a r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  of  the top l e v e l s  o f  
the IDA and an ex p an s io n  o f  s t a f f  abroad and i n  Ir e la n d  
were recommended.
The second Report "Review o f  I n c e n t i v e s  f o r  In d u s tr y  
i n  Ire lan d"  (June 196?)  s u g g e s t e d  s e v e r a l  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  to  
the scheme o f  i n c e n t i v e s .  The p r o p o s a l s  were that  a 
s i m p l i f i e d  and u n i f i e d  system o f  i n c e n t i v e s  should be s e t  
up and th a t  a l l  p r o j e c t s  m eet ing  an agreed s e t  o f  c r i t e r i a  
should r e c e i v e  a uniform p ercentage  grant based on f i x e d  
c a p i t a l  a s s e t s .  The c o n s u l t a n t s  su g g e s te d  that  t h i s  would 
remove a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  am bigu ity  and u n c e r t a in t y  from the
t e n d e r in g  o f  in v e s tm en t  p r o p o s a l .  Appendix I to  t h i s  
Chapter s e t s  out the o t h e r  s u g g e s t io n s  o f  t h i s  Report .
Government a c t i o n  on t h e s e  p r o p o s a l s  was embodied 
In  the I n d u s t r i a l  Development Act 1969* The Act adopted  
most o f  the  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  p r o p o s a l s  o f  the f i r s t  R eport .  
An Foras T i o n s a l  was d i s s o l v e d ,  i t s  powers and f u n c t io n  
were t r a n s f e r r e d  to  the  IDA. The new IDA was a s s ig n ed  
f u n c t i o n s  a s  f o l l o w s :
" ( i )  t o  a c t  under the M i n i s t e r  as  a body having  
n a t i o n a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  the fu r th e r a n c e  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l  dev e lo p m en t ,
( i i )  t o  provide  and a d m in is t e r  such g r a n ts  and 
o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  in d u s tr y  as  i t  
may be a u t h o r i s e d  by the  O ir e a c h ta s  t o  provide  
and a d m i n i s t e r ,
( i i i )  t o  d e v e lo p ,  c o n s t r u c t ,  m a in t a in  and adm in i­
s t e r  i n d u s t r i a l  e s t a t e s  and f a c t o r y  b u i l d i n g s  
( o t h e r  than a t  the Shannon Customs Free A ir p o r t )  
t o g e t h e r  w ith  the  a s s o c i a t e d  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  such 
e s t a t e s  and b u i l d i n g s ,
( i v )  t o  prov ide  and a r r a n g e ,  where the  A u th or ity  
c o n s i d e r s  i t  n e c e s s a r y ,  h o u s in g  f o r  employees
i n  i n d u s t r y ,
( v )  t o  f o s t e r  the n a t i o n a l  o b j e c t i v e  o f  r e g i o n a l
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i n d u s t r i a l  deve lopm ent" .
The A u th o r i ty  was g i v e n  f u l l  powers over r e c r u i t i n g  
and became autonomous from the C i v i l  S e r v i c e .  The p resen t  
l e g a l  maximum o f  g r a n ts  towards f i x e d  a s s e t s  was 
e s t a b l i s h e d .  The c o n d i t i o n s  which were to  be s a t i s f i e d  
b e fo re  the  p r o j e c t  c o u ld  r e c e i v e  a grant were that  
" ( a )  i t  would be l i k e l y  to  provide  or m ainta in  
employment i n  the S t a t e ,
(b )  f i n a n c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  i s  n e c e s s a r y  to  ensure  
i t s  e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  maintenance or development,  and
( c )  i t  i s  o f  a r e a s o n a b ly  permanent nature and 
w i l l  be c a r r i e d  on e f f i c i e n t l y " . ^ 0
The Act g i v e s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  room f o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  
t o  the IDA and concern  has  been e x p r e s s e d  over  the amount 
o f  l e g a l  and f i n a n c i a l  autonomy g i v e n  t o  the A u th o r i ty .  
Current p o l i c y  d a t e s  from the im p lem en ta t ion  o f  the Act 
and i t  i s  t o  current  p o l i c y  th a t  we now t u r n .
I n d u s t r i a l  promotion p o l i c y  as i t  now s ta n d s  (p o s t  1969)
The p r e s e n t  system of  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  
inves tm en t  and p ro d u ct io n  c o n s i s t s  o f  a comprehensive  
package o f  (non -repayab le  c a sh )  g r a n t s ,  tax  r e l i e f s  
and p r o v i s i o n  o f  s e r v i c e s  by the Government. The o n ly  
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  between I r i s h  and f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  f o r  
such awards i s  th a t  to  r e c e i v e  a grant a f o r e i g n  f irm  
must be non c o m p e t i t iv e  w ith  e x i s t i n g  I r i s h  f irm s on the  
home m arket .  F o r e ig n  p r o j e c t s  are accepted  under the 
"New I n d u s t r i e s "  g r a n ts  scheme i n  the main.  The IDA a l s o  
c a r r i e s  out a "sm al l  Industry"  programme^1 and a "Home
12I n d u s t r y ” programme. The l a t t e r  p r o v id es  re-equipment  
g r a n t s ,  i n f o r m a t i o n  and a d v ice  ( e . g .  on mergers)  to  
e x i s t i n g  I r i s h  f i r m s .  Approximately 76% o f  a l l  i n v e s t ­
ment on new IDA a s s i s t e d  in d u s tr y  has  been undertaken by 
f o r e i g n  owned c o m p an ies^
Export  ta x  r e l i e f  i s  a v a i l a b l e  to  any export in g  
f i r m ,  d o m e s t i c  or f o r e i g n  owned. The whole package o f  
i n c e n t i v e s  a s  they  now s ta n d  i s  rev iew ed  i n  d e t a i l  i n  
Appendix I I  t o  t h i s  C h apter .  The main t e x t  i s  a summary 
o f  the Appendix .
Two major s e t s  o f  i n c e n t i v e s  are a v a i l a b l e  to  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t o r s  i n  I r e l a n d .  These are (1 )  ta x  r e l i e f s  and 
( 2 )  a v a r i e t y  o f  grant a id  schemes.
( 1 )  a .  The most im portant  tax  r e l i e f  i s  tha t  on
e x p o r t  p r o f i t s .  Tax r e l i e f  e x te n d s  to  1990 .  F u l l  (100fO 
r e l i e f  i s  a v a i l a b l e  u n t i l  1985 w i th  f i v e  a d d i t i o n a l  y e a rs  
r e l i e f  a t  a d e c l i n i n g  r a t e .  P r o j e c t s  a t  Shannon A irport  
r e c e i v e  100> r e l i e f  u n t i l  1990.
b .  E x p orters  are a l lo w ed  duty f r e e  imported i n p u t s .
c .  D e p r e c i a t i o n  a l lo w a n c e s  are prov ided  f o r  new 
inves tm en t  i n  manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s .
( 2 )  a .  The New I n d u s t r i e s  grant scheme, under which
most f o r e i g n  f irm s  q u a l i f y ,  p rov ides  f o r  g r a n ts  o f  up 
t o  50$ o f  c a p i t a l  i n v e s t e d  i n  the d e s ig n a te d  areas  and 
up to  35/i o u t s i d e  t h e se  a r e a s .  The r a te  of  grant i s  
n e g o t i a t e d  w i th  the IDA on a p r o je c t  by p r o j e c t  b a s i s .
A c tu a l  r a t e s  o f  grant a id  have been w e l l  below the perm itted
50
”a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  maxima” r a t e s  because  export  ta x  r e l i e f  
h a s  encouraged new investm ent  w ithout  the n e c e s s i t y  to  
g iv e  such h ig h  r a t e s  o f  Governmental a i d .
b .  In  a d d i t i o n  g r a n ts  are a v a i l a b l e  towards  
labour  t r a i n i n g ,  r e se a r c h  and development c o s t s  i n  I r e la n d  
and to  h e l p  e x p o r te r s  ( th e  l a s t  b e in g  d i s b u r se d  by Coras 
T r a c h ta la  -  the Export B o a r d ) .
c .  I n t e r e s t  and r en t  s u b s i d i e s  are a v a i l a b l e  i n  
s p e c i a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
d .  A d d i t i o n a l  grant  a id  i s  a v a i l a b l e  fo r  p r o j e c t s  
at  Shannon A i r p o r t .
Table  2 . 3  (which i s  a summary o f  Appendix Table 3 )  
shows the  a c t u a l  d i sb u rse m en ts  under the v a r io u s  a c t s  
w ith  the amount and p r o p o r t io n  o f  such g r a n ts  paid to  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  The f i n a l  column was c a l c u l a t e d  by a g g r e ­
g a t in g  i n d i v i d u a l  payments t o  f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  Since 1961-2  
the p r o p o r t io n  paid to  f o r e i g n  f irm s  h a s  been between 75% 
and o f  the t o t a l  w i th  the e x c e p t i o n  o f  1966-7* In the  
y e a r s  s i n c e  1969 the p r o p o r t io n  o f  g r a n ts  paid to  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s  h a s  been  over 82$ .  In  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  g r a n ts  paid to  
I r i s h  f i r m s  have i n c r e a s e d  i n  a b s o l u t e  terms -a l th o u gh  
they  have formed a d e c l i n i n g  p r o p o r t io n  o f  the t o t a l .
Table 2.3 Grants disbursed under the various Acts
1
Year (ending  
3 1 s t  March)
2
T o ta l
Disbursem ents
(£m)
Amount pa id  
to  f o r e i g n  
f irm s  (£m)
1+
% paid to  
f o r e i g n  f irm s
( 5 A  x 100)
Up March
1955 0 . 1*+ 0 . 0*+ 3 1 .3
1955 -56 0 .1 3 0 .0 1 8 . 5
1956 0 .1 2 0.0*+ 3 5 -9
1957 0 .3 3 0 .1 7 53.3
1958 0.*+0 0 .3 0 7*+.*+
1959 0 .8 2 0 .5 9 72 .2
i 960 0 .5 8 0 .2 8 *+8.5
1961 l.*+3 1 .1 8 8*+.6
1962 1 .6 1 1 .2 8 79.*+
1963 2 .6 9 2 . 1 7 8 0 .9
196*+ 1 .7 1 l.*+9 8 5 .6
1965 2.1*+ 1 . 7 5 8 1 . 6
1966 2.1+9 1 .2 6 50.*+
1967 3 .0 2 2.*tl 8 0 .0
1968 *+•57 3.*+*+ 75.*+
1969 8 .9 2 7*1+9 8*+.0
1970 1 1 .7 2 1 0 .0 5 8 5 .8
1971 1 8 .3 8 1 5 .2 5 8 2 .9
S o u r c e : C a lc u la t e d  from AFT and IDA Annual Report_s.
(Var ious  Y ears )
See a l s o  Table A2.3 i n  Appendix to  t h i s  Chapter.
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The f i g u r e s  shown i n  T a b le  2 . 3  f o r  t h e  a n n u a l
d isbu rsem en t  o f  g r a n t s  by th e  IDA a r e  a p p r o x i m a t e l y
e q u a l  t o  the t o t a l  a n n u a l  y i e l d  o f  income an d  c o r p o r a t e
p r o f i t s  ta x  on e x i s t i n g  b u s i n e s s  c o s t s .  A r e d i s t r i b u t i o n
from c u r r e n t  producers t o  f u t u r e  ( l a r g e l y  f o r e i g n  owned)
produ cers  i s  b e in g  c a r r i e d  o u t .  E x i s t i n g  f o r e i g n  owned
f i r m s  are o f  course  t a x e d  b u t ,  a s  no p r o f i t s  t a x  i s
paid  by a f irm  which e x p o r t s  lOOfl- o f  i t s  o u t p u t  and
f o r e i g n  producers  are c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  the e x p o r t i n g  s e c t o r 9
t h i s  amount o f  tax  i s  no so g r e a t  a s  the s u b s i d y  c u r r e n t l y
g i v e n .  More g e n e r a l l y  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  income
i s  from d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned f i r m s  p r o d u c i n g  f o r  th e
d o m est ic  market to  f o r e i g n  ov/ned f i r m s  p r o d u c i n g  f o r
e x p o r t .  Over S0% of  g r a n ts  go to  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  but
the  p o r p o r t io n  of  tax  paid by f o r e i g n  owned u n i t s  I s  much
below t h i s  f i g u r e .  An e f f e c t i v e  t r a n s f e r  o f  s i z e a b l e
p r o p o r t io n s  i s  thus t a k in g  p la c e  through the mechanism o f
c o r p o r a te  t a x e s ,  channeled  through the IDA.
«
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  e s t im a t e  a l s o  the amount o f  t o t a l  
ta x  fo re g o n e  under the p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the export  ta x  r e l i e f  
scheme. Table  2 . b  shows th a t  over the p er iod  1960-1971  
(year  ended 31 J a n u a r y ) ,  ta x  foregone  by the Revenue 
A u t h o r i t i e s  v/as £ 39*9 m i l l i o n s .  I f  we assume th a t  h6% o f  
t h i s  f i g u r e  accrued to  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  ( the  p r o p o r t io n  
o f  manufactured e x p o r ts  due to  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  
a c c o r d in g  t o  the c a l c u l a t i o n s  embodied i n  Table 3 . 1 8 )  t h i s  
r e p r e s e n t s  a f u r t h e r  su b s id y  o f  £ 1 8 . k  m i l l i o n s  to  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s .
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Table  2.*+ T o t a l  tax fo reg on e  due t o  the export  tax  
r e l i e f  scheme I960 -  1 9 7 1 .
T o t a l  
S o u r c e :
Year Tax R e l i e f  (On)
1 960  O.1*
1961 0.6
1962 0 . 7
1963 1.2
196^ 1 . 1
196? 1.1
1966  1 .6
. 1967 2 . 0
1968 W.3
1969 5 .1
1970 6 . 7
1971 1 5 .1
1960-1971  3 9 . 9
Dermot McAleese (1 9 7 2 )  " C a p i ta l  In f low  and 
D i r e c t  F o r e ig n  Investment i n  I r e la n d  1952 to  
1970" Jo u r n a l  o f  the S t a t i s t i c a l  and S o c i a l  
In q u ir y  S o c i e t y  o f  I r e l a n d . Volume XXII,
Part  TV 1 9 7 1 -2 .  Table 7>P-83-
5*+
Summary
I r i s h  p o l i c y  p r o v i d e s  an  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  amount o f  
s u b s i d i e s  f o r  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s .  Tax r e l i e f  on e x p o r t  
p r o f i t s  t o  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  h a s  g i v e n  a n a t i o n a l  
£ 1 8 . k m i l l i o n s  t o  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  i 960 -  
1971* G ra n t  a i d  t o  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  from th e  t ime t h a t  g r a n t  
schemes b e g a n  up t o  th e  end o f  1971? amounted  t o  £ *+9*2 
m i l l i o n s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t a x  r e l i e f s  have  b e e n  g i v e n  on 
im p o r t e d  i n p u t s  f o r  e x p o r t e r s  and i n  r e s p e c t  o f  d e p r e c ­
i a t i o n  a l l o w a n c e s .  I t  i s  no t  p o s s i b l e  however  t o  compute 
t h e  amount o f  s u b s id y  t o  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  which  t h i s  
e n t a i l s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  th e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  
f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  new f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  h a s  imposed a 
c o s t  on t h e  I r i s h  t a x p a y e r .  There  h a s  b e e n  t h e r e f o r e  a 
t r a n s f e r  o f  r e s o u r c e s  from th e  d o m e s t i c  t o  th e  f o r e i g n  
owned s e c t o r .
I n  v iew  o f  t h i s  r e s o u r c e  b u r d e n ,  a c o s t - b e n e f i t  
a n a l y s i s  o f  FDI i s  e s s e n t i a l  and C h a p te r  V I I  u n d e r t a k e s  
t h i s  t a s k .  I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  have a c l e a r  i d e a  o f  t h e  
r e t u r n s  from the  i n v e s t m e n t  compared t o  su c h  c o s t s .  The 
a t t r a c t i o n  o f  FDI t o  I r e l a n d  h a s  c l e a r l y  b e e n  an  e x p e n s i v e  
b u s i n e s s  and  th e  r e m a in d e r  o f  th e  t h e s i s  e v a l u a t e s  th e  
im pac t  o f  FDI on v a r i o u s  c r u c i a l  p a r a m e t e r s ;  the  d o m e s t i c  
i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  t r a d e  f l o w s ,  th e  b a l a n c e  of  paym ents  
and th e  e f f i c i e n c y  of  the  economic f ram ew ork .  Such 
e f f e c t s  a r e  c o l l e c t i v e l y  a s s e s s e d  i n  C h a p te r  V I I .
Charter  I I % Appendix T
Summary o f  P ro p o sa ls  c o n ta in e d  i n  "Review o f  I n c e n t i v e s
f o r  I n d u s t r y _ ( Arthur D. L i t t l e  I n c . .  June 1967)
1 .  A simple and u n i f i e d  system o f  requirem ents  should be 
s e t  up and a l l  q u a l i f y i n g  p r o j e c t s  should r e c e i v e  a 
uniform percentage  grant based on f i x e d  c a p i t a l  
a s s e t s #
2 .  The d e p r e c i a t i o n  a l lo w a n c e s  should be broadened.
(They were then  a p p l i c a b l e  in  the Underdeveloped  
Areas o n l y ) .
3 .  More double tax  avoidance  agreements to  be arranged  
and a u n i l a t e r a l  ta x  c r e d i t  system t o  be implemented  
u n t i l  t h i s  i s  p o s s i b l e .
*+. S p e c i a l  p r o v i s i o n s  f o r  " p r o je c t s  o f f e r i n g  e x c e p t i o n a l  
b e n e f i t s  to  Ireland" which may j u s t i f y  more generous  
f i n a n c i a l  b e n e f i t s  than the autom atic  grant p r o v i d e s .  
A f u r t h e r  s e t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  such as  
guaranteed  lo a n  i n t e r e s t  r a te  s u b s i d i e s  or a s p e c i a l  
package to  be a v a i l a b l e .
5« C a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  p r o j e c t s  were not t o  be t r e a t e d  
l e s s  f a v o u r a b ly .
6 .  S e r v i c e  i n d u s t r i e s  o f  a t e c h n i c a l  or s c i e n t i f i c  type  
t o  come w i t h i n  the o r b i t  o f  g r a n t -a id e d  i n d u s t r y .
Chapter II, Appendix IT
In ves tm en t  I n c e n t i v e s  a v a i l a b l e  fo r  New I n d u s t r y  
in  I r e la n d
1 .  Grants
New In d u s tr y  Grants are a v a i l a b l e  to  q u a l i f y in g  
p r o j e c t s  towards f i x e d  a s s e t  c o s t s ,  d e f in e d  as s i t e ,  s i t e  
deve lop m en t ,  b u i l d i n g s ,  new machinery and equipment.  The 
l e v e l  o f  g r a n t  has been reduced twice  from i t s  l e g a l  
maxima t o  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  maxima se t  by the IDA. This  
cou ld  be done l a r g e l y  because  of  the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  the  
tax  r e l i e f  scheme on export  p r o f i t s .  The recommendation 
o f  Arthur D. L i t t l e  In c .  to  e s t a b l i s h  a uniform percentage  
of  f i x e d  a s s e t s  as the f i x e d  grant to  a l l  q u a l i f y i n g  
p r o j e c t s  was r e j e c t e d .  The Government (and IDA) f e l t  th a t  
the d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power a v a i l a b l e  i n  f i x i n g  the grant as  
a p p r o p r ia te  t o  each p r o j e c t  was more important than any 
g a in s  i n  the r e d u c t io n  of  u n c e r ta in ty  to  the i n v e s t o r .
Table A2.2  shows the a c t u a l  ra te  of  grant approved per job  
c r e a te d  and as a p r o p o r t io n  o f  f i x e d  a s s e t s  to g e th e r  w i t h  
l e g a l  and c u r re n t  a d m in is t r a t iv e  maxima.
Labour T ra in in g  Grants are d isbu rsed  by the IDA on
the b a s i s  o f  wages i n  the t r a in in g  per iod  and may cover
t r a v e l  and l i v i n g  c o s t s  f o r  workers t r a in e d  abroad. Such
g r a n ts  are a v a i l a b l e  f o r  management t r a i n i n g  and the h i r i n g
o f  q u a l i f i e d  people  to  t r a i n  labour .  I n d u s t r i a l  t r a i n i n g
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c e n t r e s  have been e s t a b l i s h e d  by AnCo on the three  IDA
i n d u s t r i a l  e s t a t e s  at  Galway, Waterford, and Shannon 
A i r p o r t .  As can be se en  from Table A2.1 on ly  a small  
p r o p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  app rova ls  i s  r ep re sen ted  by labour  
t r a i n i n g  (and Research and Development) g r a n t s .
Tab le  A2.1  Grants Approved by the IDA 1966-72 to show 
Importance o f  New I n d u s t r i e s  Grants
£ ( 0 0 0 s )
Grants
Approved
1966 /7 1967 /8 1968/9 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72
New I n d u s t r i e s  
and Ma j or  
Expansions 3 ,6 9 0 7 ,^ 3 0 12,511 2 2 ,1 6 7 22 ,3 2 0 11,61+2'
Adaption 3 ,9 9 9 7,^81 2,222 8 - -
Small
I n d u s t r i e s - 81+ 1 ,0 8 5 1 ,6 6 8 1 ,1 8 9 897
Re-equipment - - - 5,912 5,13^ 5,105
R & D - - - - 6 7 156
T ra in in g  o f  
Workers 293 380 0 0 1,1+88 1 ,3 5 9 920
T o t a l  Grants  
Approval 7,982 1 5 ,3 7 5 16,513 31,21+3 3 0 ,5 6 9 1 8 ,7 2 0
i IDA Annual R e p o r t  ( v a r i o u s ) ,  IDA Dublin
Table A2.2 Grants to New Industry
G ra n t G ran t  a s % C a p i t a l  Cost
L e g a l  Maximum 1969 Act D e s i g n a t e d
Areas
Non D e s i g n a t e d  
A reas
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A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Maxima (IDA) 1972 50 35
Hate o f  G r a n t  Approved
(fo f i x e d  a s s e t s  f u l l  p r o d u c t i o n )
Average 1952-70 53.5 *f0.2
1969-70 53.3 **1.1
1970-71 50 .8 3 0 .6
G r a n t s  p e r  j o b  c r e a t e d
D e s ig n a te d
Areas
Non D e s i g n a t e d  
A reas
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e  Maximum 5000 **000
P r o j e c t e d  G ra n t  P a y a b le  
( R a t i o  o f  G ra n t  Approved 
t o  p r o j e c t e d  em p lo ym en t)
Average 1952-70 1057 1119
1969-70 2286 191*1*
1970-71 1373 26**6
S o u r c e :  Dermot McAleese " C a p i t a l I n f lo w s  and D i r e c t
F o r e ig n  Investment In Ire lan d  19j*7_mZQn Inquiry  
J o u r n a l  o f  the S t a t i s t i c a l  and S o c i a l  S o c i e t y ,  
Volume XXII, Part IV 1971-72 ,  and 
i n d u s t r i a l  Development in  I r e l a n d ; ; IDA, v a r i o u s
i s s u e s .
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R e se a rc h  and Development Grants are non repayable  
and are a v a i l a b l e  up to  a maximum of  £ 1 5 ,0 0 0  or 50$ o f  
approved c o s t s ,  whichever  i s  the s m a l l e r .  They were 
i n s t i t u t e d  i n  the I n d u s t r i a l  Development Act o f  1970.  
Grants up t o  a maximum o f  35$ are a l s o  a v a i l a b l e  towards  
f i x e d  a s s e t s  o f  new i n d u s t r i a l  r e se a r c h  f a c i l i t i e s  on 
the IDA sponsored  Research Park at  Naas.
I n t e r e s t  and Rent S u b s i d i e s . Under s p e c i a l  c i r c ­
um stances ,  the IDA may a l s o  provide i n t e r e s t  s u b s i d i e s  
and r e n t  s u b s i d i e s .  Low r en t  f a c t o r i e s  may be provided  
on the i n d u s t r i a l  e s t a t e s  and r e a d y - b u i l t  f a c t o r i e s  a t  
reduced terms may be prov ided  f o r  " s p e c i a l l y  a t t r a c t i v e  
p r o j e c t s " .  S u b s i d i e s  towards housing  f o r  key workers  
are pro v id ed  f o r  in  the 1969 A ct .
Shannon Free A i r p o r t . A d d i t io n a l  p r o v i s i o n s  apply  
t o  in v e s tm en t  a t  Shannon Free A ir p o r t .  Up to  h a l f  the  
c o s t  o f  new machinery and the f u l l  c o s t  o f  the b u i l d i n g s  
can be c la i m e d .  ( In  a d d i t i o n  the tax  h o l i d a y  i n  export  
p r o f i t s  g i v e s  t o t a l  exemption u n t i l  1990)* No inward or 
outward custom s d u t i e s  are payable from the Customs Free  
Zone.
Grants from Coras T r a c h t a l a . Grants d isb u rsed  by 
the IDA do not cover  a l l  th a t  i s  a v a i l a b l e  to  e x p o r t e r s .  
Coras T r a c h t a la  (The I r i s h  Export Board) awards d e s i g n  
g r a n t s ,  a d v e r t i s i n g  g r a n t s ,  marketing r e se a r c h  and 
c o n s u l ta n c y  g r a n ts  t o  e x p o r t e r s .
6 0
Table  A2.3 shows the  amount o f  g ra n ts  paid under the  
v a r io u s  A c t s ,  Column k  shows the t o t a l  o f  a l l  grants  paid  
( a c t u a l  d i sb u rse m en ts  -  Table A2.1 shows a p p r o v a l s ) .
Column 5 shows the amount pa id  to  f o r e i g n  f irm s and Column 
6 the p r o p o r t i o n  o f  the t o t a l  grant going t o  f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  
New I n d u s tr y  Grants o n ly  are in c lu d e d .
Table  A2.3 shows t h a t  the  p r o p o r t io n  of  grants  going  
t o  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  has  been  i n c r e a s i n g  s in c e  the i n c e p t io n  
o f  the g r a n t s  scheme. S in ce  1958 payments to  f o r e i g n  f irm s  
have b een  over  72%, w i t h  the  e x c e p t i o n  of  the years  ending  
March 31 1961 and March 31 1967 .  In  the ' s e v e n t i e s  the  
p r o p o r t io n  h a s  been over  82%, The p r o p o r t io n  o f  grant  
d i s b u r s e d  i s  g e n e r a l l y  g r e a t e r  than the p r o p o r t io n  o f  
f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  i n  t o t a l  p r o j e c t s , a s  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  are 
l a r g e r  on a v e r a g e ,  than I r i s h  o n e s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s  
to  be n o te d  th a t  g r a n ts  pa id  to  I r i s h  f i r m s  under the New 
I n d u s t r i e s  scheme have been  i n c r e a s i n g  i n  a b s o lu te  term s,  
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S o u r c e ; (Table A2.3 Grants paid  under the v a r io u s  
A cts  ( £ s )
A u t h o r ' s  c a l c u l a t i o n s  from An F o r a s  T i o n s c a l  and IDA 
Annual R e p o r t s , ( v a r i o u s )+++
The most s p e c t a c u l a r  p er io d  o f  growth i n  d i s b u r s e ­
ment to  f o r e i g n  f irm s was i n  the p e r io d  1 9 6 6 /6 7  t o  1971 /72  
i n  which p e r io d  payments per annum i n c r e a s e d  from £ 1 .2 6  
m i l l i o n  t o  £ 1 5 .2 ?  m i l l i o n .  The f i g u r e s  i n  Table 3 . 1  
below i n d i c a t e  th a t  the p r o p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  investm ent  
i n  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by grant a id  has  in c r e a s e d  
over t h i s  p e r io d .  E st im a ted  t o t a l  inves tm en t  i n  f o r e i g n  
p r o j e c t s  r o se  from £ 7 . 8  m i l l i o n  to  £ 3 6 . k m i l l i o n  between  
1966 and 197 0 .  The f a c t  th a t  Table A2.3 i s  i n  f i n a n c i a l  
y ea rs  and Table 3 . 1  i n  c a le n d a r  y ea rs  c o m p l i c a t e s  the i s s u e  
but i t  i s  c l e a r  th a t  the p r o p o r t io n  o f  c a p i t a l  c o s t s  met 
by the IDA (or  u l t i m a t e l y  by the I r i s h  ta x  payer )  has  b een  
an i n c r e a s i n g  p r o p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  inv es tm en t  by f o r e i g n  f i r m s .
+++ Column 5 c a l c u l a t e d  from AFT and IDA r e p o r t s  by 
i s o l a t i n g  and a g g r e g a t in g  payments to  i n d i v i d u a l  f o r e i g n  
p r o j e c t s .
The f i n a n c i a l  c o s t  o f  g r a n ts  to  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  
t h e r e f o r e  i s  a major f a c t o r  i n  the t o t a l  d isbursem ent o f  the  
IDA, T h is  r e p r e s e n t s  a burden on the I r i s h  Exchequer and 
on the ta x  pa yer .  Grants may be c o n s id e r e d  as  an employ­
ment su b s id y  or as a t r a n s f e r  from one group ( the  employed)  
to  another  (dom est ic  and f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l i s t s  and those  
workers o b t a in in g  employment w i t h i n  grant a ided  f i r m s ) .
The f i n a n c i a l  c o s t ,  however must be c o n s id e r e d  i n  the c o n ­
t e x t  o f  a f u l l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  o f  FDI. T h is  i s  
in troduced  i n  Chapter I I I  and i s  thorough ly  a n a lysed  i n  
Chapter V I I ,  where a " r e a l  cost"  i s  imputed to  payments t o  
f o r e i g n  e n tr e p r e n e u r s  i n  a f u l l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s .  The 
important q u e s t io n  as to  whether the b e n e f i t s  a r i s i n g  from 
the f o r e i g n  investm ent  j u s t i f y  th e se  (and o th er  c o s t s )  i s  
d eferred  u n t i l  those  s e c t i o n s  o f  the t h e s i s .
2 .  Tax R e l i e f
Tax r e l i e f  i s  a l lo w ed  w i th  no d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  on the  
b a s i s  o f  ow nersh ip .  I t  i s  aimed at  the fu r th e ra n ce  o f  
two Governmental o b j e c t i v e s ,  the s t i m u l a t i o n  o f  investm en t  
( d e p r e c i a t i o n  a l lo w a n c e s )  and the encouragement o f  e x p o r t in g  
(export p r o f i t s  tax  r e l i e f  and duty f r e e  i m p o r t s ) .
D e p r e c i a t i o n  A l lo w a n c e s . Generous tax  a l lo w a n c e s  
can be c la im ed  by a l l  m anufacturers  a g a i n s t  the d e p r e c i ­
a t ion  o f  p la n t  and m achinery .  Annual a l lo w a n c e s  o f  10-2  5$ 
on new p la n t  and machinery and on b u i l d i n g s  may be 
claimed. T h is  may however be in c r e a s e d  by a s  much as the  
entrepreneur c h oo ses  (up to  100^) i n  r e s p e c t  o f  new p la n t
and machinery brought i n t o  use i n  the D e s ig n a te d  Areas  
at  any time or i n  the r e s t  o f  the country  i n  the p er io d  
1 s t  A p r i l  1971 to  3 1 s t  March 1973* A l t e r n a t i v e  p r o v i s i o n s  
a l lo w in g  60$ of  new p la n t  and machinery and 20$ o f  
b u i l d i n g s  c o s t  to  be deducted  from t a x a b le  p r o f i t s  may be 
c h o se n .  F u r th e r ,  20$ o f  c a p i t a l  e x p e n d i tu re  i s  g i v e n  as  
an investm en t  a l low ance  i n  the D e s ig n ated  Areas between  
A p ri l  1971 and March 1973* Taken w i th  the f r e e  d e p r e c i ­
a t i o n  p r o v i s i o n  t h i s  a l l o w s  120$ o f  inves tm en t  to  be c la im ed  
a g a i n s t  tax  i n  the f i r s t  year  o f  o p e r a t i o n .
i i .  Tax r e l i e f  on export  p r o f i t s . A l l  e x p o r t e r s  o f  
manufactured goods whether f o r e i g n  or I r i s h  owned, r e c e i v e  
complete  r e m i s s i o n  o f  ta x  on a l l  p r o f i t s  earned from 
e x p o r t i n g .  R e l i e f  o f  ta x  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  as  f o l l o w s j-  
T o t a l  s a l e s  v a lu e  = £S 
T o t a l  Q u a l i f y in g  export  s a l e s  = £X 
T o t a l  tax  payable  = £T
Tax r e l i e f  then  i s  £ (X .T)
S
Tax r e l i e f  e x te n d s  to  1990 .  P r o j e c t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  and 
before  1970-71  o b t a i n  15 y e a r s  r e l i e f  a t  100$ and th en  
f i v e  a d d i t i o n a l  years  a t  a d e c l i n i n g  r a t e .  P r o j e c t s  
e s t a b l i s h e d  up to  1975-6  g a in  15 y ea rs  100$ r e l i e f  but  
l o s e  the d e c l i n i n g  p ercen ta g e  r e l i e f  c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y .  
I n d u s t r i e s  a t  Shannon Free A irport  r e c e i v e  100$ r e l i e f  
from p r o f i t s  tax  u n t i l  1 9 9 0 .
T h is  exemption i s  c a r r i e d  through to  d i v i d e n d s .  
D i s t r i b u t e d  p r o f i t s  bear  on ly  the e f f e c t i v e  rate  o f  ta x
which the company has borne i n s t e a d  o f  the normal income 
tax  o f  35$* Thus i f  100$ r e l i e f  has been  g i v e n ,  no 
income ta x  i s  w i th h e ld  from d i v i d e n d s .  The i n d i v i d u a l  
s h a r e - h o ld e r  may a l s o  g e t  e q u a l  r e l i e f  from s u r t a x .  In  
order t o  ex tend  the b e n e f i t s . o f  t h i s  scheme, the Govern­
ment have n e g o t i a t e d  double  t a x a t i o n  avo idance  agreements  
w ith  13 c o u n t r i e s  in c lu d i n g  the main i n v e s t o r s  i n  I r e l a n d .
i i i .  Tax r e l i e f  f o r  imported i n p u t s . Imported
in p u ts  are exempt from duty  provided they  are embodied
i n  manufactured e x p o r t s .  Consequently  100$ e x p o r t in g
f irm s  o p e r a te  i n  f r e e  trad e  c o n d i t i o n s .  T h is  p r o v i s i o n
has many s i d e  e f f e c t s ,  one of  which i s  th a t  I r i s h  in p u ts
i n t o  e x p o r t in g  f i rm s  have to  be c o m p e t i t i v e  a t  world p r i c e s .
Consequently  l in k a g e  e f f e c t s  from the e x p o r t in g  s e c t o r  are
red uced ,  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  the "dual ism ” noted  b e low .  I t
a l s o  i n c r e a s e d  the " e f f e c t i v e  p r o t e c t io n "  o f  any f irm
17producing i n  part  f o r  the dom est ic  market .
The ta x  r e l i e f s  o u t l i n e d  above r e p r e s e n t  a very  h ig h
18cash grant  e q u i v a l e n t .  They r e p r e s e n t  a major i n c e n t i v e  
fo r  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  to  l o c a t e  i n  I r e la n d  -  perhaps the  
most important o n e .^ '  Given the s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  
c a p i t a l  flow’s to  dom est ic  c o n d i t i o n s  and i n c e n t i v e s ,  t h i s  
p r o v i s i o n  i s  o f  major im portance .
3 .  P r o v i s i o n  o f  I n f r a s t r u c t u r a l  F a c i l i t i e s .
The p r o v i s i o n  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ,  l e g a l ,  p h y s i c a l  and 
i n f o r m a t i o n a l , c o n s t i t u t e s  an i n c e n t i v e  t o  f o r e i g n  in v es tm en t
t h r o u g h  i t s  c o s t  r e d u c i n g  e f f e c t .  The l e g a l  i n f r a ­
s t r u c t u r e  r e l a t i n g  t o  FDI a l l o w s  th e  minimum o f  d i f f i c u l t y  
i n  e s t a b l i s h i n g  a s u b s i d i a r y .  D i s c l o s u r e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  on the  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t h a t  s u b s i d i a r y  a re  
v i r t u a l l y  n i l  a s  most f o r e i g n  com panies  a r e  p r i v a t e  f i r m s ,  
w h o l ly  owned by the  p a r e n t  and so no b a l a n c e  s h e e t s  a r e  
r e q u i r e d .  C o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  i s  j e a l o u s l y  m a i n t a i n e d  by th e  
IDA and so f o r e i g n  co m pan ies  o p e r a t e  i n  a lm o s t  c o m p le te  
s e c r e c y .  A most i m p o r t a n t  l e g a l  p r o v i s i o n  i s  t h a t  r e p a t r i ­
a t i o n  o f  d i v i d e n d s ,  i n t e r e s t s  and c a p i t a l  i s  f r e e l y  a l l o w e d .
P h y s i c a l  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  i s  r e a s o n a b l y  w e l l  d e v e lo p e d  
i n  I r e l a n d .  R e g io n a l  d e ve lop m en t  g o a l s  d i c t a t e  the  
p r o v i s i o n  o f  r o a d s ,  w e l l s ,  e l e c t r i c i t y  and power s e r v i c e s ,  
sewerage and o t h e r  i n s t a l l a t i o n s .  Most o f  th e  i n f r a ­
s t r u c t u r a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  f i r m s  i s  G overn ­
ment p r o v i d e d  even  i n  D e s i g n a t e d  A r e a s .  T h i s  i s  t a k e n  up 
i n  a l a t e r  s e c t i o n  on t h e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  t o  
the  economy from e x t e r n a l  e co n o m ie s .
I n f o r m a t i o n  c o s t s  and s e a r c h  c o s t s  a t t e n d a n t  on th e  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  an  e n t e r p r i s e  a re  r e d u c e d  by the  s e r v i c e s  
of th e  IDA, s i m i l a r  p ro b lem s  w i t h  e x p o r t i n g  a r e  d e c r e a s e d  
by the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  C o ra s  T r a c h t a l a  and w i t h  l a b o u r  
t r a i n i n g  by AnCo. An " a f t e r c a r e  s e r v i c e "  r u n  by the  IDA 
and SFADCo t o  h e l p  new e n t e r p r i s e  t o  overcome t h e i r  d i f f i ­
c u l t i e s  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  f u r t h e r  " h i d d e n  s u b s i d y " .
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.1)3id  p . 31 S e c t i o n  3 3 ( 3 )
1 1 .  Small  f i rm s  are d e f in e d  as those  w i th  up to  50 
workers and f i x e d  c a p i t a l  a s s e t s  o f  £ 10 0 ,0 0 0  in  
the D es ignated  Areas and up to  30 workers and 
£ 6 0 ,0 0 0  i n  f i x e d  a s s e t s  i n  the Non-Designated  
A rea s .  The IDA co n d u cts  a search  a t  home and 
abroad f o r  p o t e n t i a l  new e n tr e p r e n e u r s  under t h i s  
scheme. The g r a n ts  a v a i l a b l e  are up to  60$ o f  
f i x e d  a s s e t s  i n  D e s ig n a te d  Areas and i n  Non- 
D e s ig n a te d  Areas.
12. The Home I n d u s t r i e s  programme c o n c e n t r a t e s  on 
d o m e st ic  f irm s i n  p a r t i c u l a r  and d i s b u r s e s  
Re-equipment g r a n ts  t o  provide  new p l a n t ,  machinery  
and t e c h n o l o g y .  I t  a l s o  i n v o l v e s  the IDA in  
s e e k in g  out f o r e i g n  p a r tn e r s  f o r  I r i s h  f i r m s  w i t h
a v iew  to  c r e a t i n g  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  or l i c e n s i n g  
ag r ee m e n ts .
13. IDA Annual Report 1971-72 page I I :  In  the New 
In d u s tr y  Scheme 76$ o f  t o t a l  Investm ent  i s  from 
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  I n d u s t r i a l  Development i n  
I r e la n d  (1972)  IDA g i v e s  a f i g u r e  o f  7^*1$ o f  
c a p i t a l  in v e s t e d  - t h i s  co v er s  M^rch I960 to March 
1971- In  the An Foras  Forbartha Survey 73$ o f  
f i r m s  are f o r e i g n  owned ( see  Chapter I I I  b e lo w ) .
I1*-. An Chomhairle O ilu na:  The I n d u s t r i a l  Train ing  
A u t h o r i t y .
15* S&aries  and Wages, Equipment and m a t e r i a l s ,  p la n t  
and machinery s e r v i c e s ,  b u i l d i n g s  and la n d .
16. IDA Annual Report 1971 -  2 Page 7
17* Dermot McAleese (1971)  E f f e c t i v e  T a r i f f s  and th e  
S t r u c t u r e  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  P r o t e c t i o n  i n  I r e l a n d  
Economic and S o c i a l  R e s e a r c h  I n s t i t u t e  P a p e r  No. 6 2 , 
D u b l i n  Ju n e  1971*
18.  See Tax R e l i e f  f o r  E x p o r t  P r o f i t s  (1972)  IDA I r e l a n d .  
19* E v id e n c e  s u p p o r t i n g  t h i s  p o i n t  i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n
Survey  o f  G ran t  Aided I n d u s t r y  o p . c i t . and L o r r a i n e  
D o n a ld so n  (1966)  Development P l a n n i n g  i n  I r e l a n d  
P r a e g e r  New York .  I t  i s  a l s o  s u p p o r t e d  by the  
a u t h o r f s c o n v e r s a t i o n s  w i t h  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  and IDA 
a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  th e  m a t e r i a l  o f  
C h a p te r  V . .
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Chapter III: The Nature and Importance of Foreign Direct
In v e s tm e n t  i n  I r e l a n d
The p r e v io u s  Chapter a n a ly sed  I r i s h  p o l i c y  towards  
FDI. T h is  Chapter i s  dev o ted  to  a d e t a i l e d  exam inat ion  
of  the s t r u c t u r e  of  FDI i n  I r e l a n d .  I t  a t tem p ts  to  
a s s e s s  the  magnitude o f  FDI i n  I r e l a n d ,  i t s  s e c t o r a l  d i s t ­
r i b u t i o n  and i t  p r e s e n t s  a p r e l im in a r y  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  i t s  
p o s s i b l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  I r i s h  deve lopm ent .
S e c t i o n  I F ore ig n  D i r e c t  Investment i n  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  
In d u stry  1955-70
The i n c e n t i v e  programme, which d a t e s  from the l a t e  
1 95 0 s ,  combined w ith  the a t t r a c t i o n  o f  r e l a t i v e l y  cheap  
labour and new m arkets ,  have r e s u l t e d  i n  a la r g e  and 
i n c r e a s i n g  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  fo rm a t io n  i n  the manufacturing  
s e c t o r  o f  the  I r i s h  economy.
Data on the amount o f  FDI i n  I r e la n d  are not r e a d i l y  
a v a i l a b l e .  They ha v e ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  to  be e s t i m a t e d  i n d i r e c t l y .  
Column I  o f  Table 3*1 p r e s e n t s  the e s t i m a t e d  amount o f  FDI 
i n  the I r i s h  manufacturing s e c t o r .  These are e s t i m a t e s  
based on the p r o j e c t i o n s  o f  t o t a l  in v e s tm e n ts  made by 
f o r e i g n  f irm s  when a p p ly in g  f o r  an IDA g r a n t .  I t  i s  assumed 
that  the a c t u a l  amount o f  investm ent  made i n  any p a r t i c u l a r  
year out o f  the t o t a l  p r o j e c t e d  investm ent  i s  p r o p or t io n ed  
to  the amount o f  the grant  a c t u a l l y  pa id  i n  that  year  from 
the t o t a l  approved g r a n t .  Thus, i f  a t o t a l  grant o f  
£ 50 ,000  has  been approved f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  p r o j e c t  and
71
£ 2 5 ,0 0 0  has  a c t u a l l y  been  paid  out in  a p a r t i c u l a r  y e a r ,  
i t  i s  assumed th a t  50$ o f  the t o t a l  p r o j e c t e d  investm ent  
i s  undertaken i n  that  y e a r .  The f i g u r e s  i n  Columns 1 and 
2 in c lu d e  re in v e s tm en t  o f  p r o f i t s  by f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  
However, t h i s  r e in v e s tm en t  p e r t a i n s  o n ly  to  grant a ided  
e x t e n s i o n  p r o j e c t s .  Re investm ent  which i s  not grant a id ed  
i s  not i n c lu d e d .  I t  must be noted th a t  the f i g u r e s  
p r e se n te d  i n  Columns 1 and 2 may be u n d e r e s t im a te s  i n  so  
f a r  as  they  exc lude  in v e s tm e n ts  undertaken by f o r e i g n  
f irm s  who do not o b t a i n  f u r t h e r  g r a n t s .  F o r e ig n  i n v e s t ­
ments which are non grant  a id ed  are ex c lu d ed  -  t h i s  may 
have been  o f  importance i n  the e a r l y  y e a r s ,  but appears to  
have d e c l i n e d .  This  i s  l a r g e l y  the r e s u l t  o f  the f r e e r  
trade p o l i c i e s  adop ted  by I r e la n d  which o b v ia t e  the need  
fo r  inv es tm en t  behind t a r i f f  w a l l s  to  s e r v i c e  the dom est ic  
market."*" Column 2 i n  Table  3 . 1  p r e s e n t s  data  on f i x e d
c a p i t a l  fo r m a t io n  by e x c lu d in g  working c a p i t a l .  F o l lo w in g  
2
Me A le ese  i t  h a s  been assumed th a t  the p r o p o r t io n  o f  
working c a p i t a l  i n  t o t a l  investm ent  i s  around one q u a r t e r .
T a b le  3*1 E s t i m a t e d  F o r e i g n  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  i n
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  1955-70 (G ra n t  ^ ided  P r o j e c t s  Only)
1 2 
Year T o t a l  F ixed C a p i t a l
Investm ent  Formation i n  
i n  F o r e ig n  F o r e ig n  E n t e r -  
E n t e r p r i s e s  p r i s e s  £000s  
£ 000s
Gross F ix ed  F o r e ig n
C a p i t a l  Firms C o n tr ib -
Formation i n  u t i o n  to
I r e la n d  G.D.K.F.
£000s  (2 a s  % o f  33
1955 171 128 92 ,!+00 -
1956 82 62 9 1 ,8 0 0 -
1957 1 ,8 0 0 1 ,3 5 0 8 0 ,1 0 0 2
1958 1 ,6 7 7 1 ,2 5 8 8 0 ,3 0 0 2
1959 2 ,6 6 2 1 ,9 9 7 8 2 ,9 0 0 2
I960 5 ,072 3,80>+ 8 9 ,7 0 0 k
1961 3,69*+ 2 ,7 7 1 1 0 8 ,8 0 0 3
1962 3 ,6 3 6 2 ,7 2 7 1 2 9 ,0 0 0 2
1963 5 ,3 3 7 ^ ,0 0 3 1 ^ 7 ,700 3
196U 2 ,9 8 5 2 ,2 3 9 1 7 3 ,3 0 0 1
1965 1 0 ,1 3 5 7 ,6 0 1 1 9 7 ,9 0 0 5+
1966 7 ,8 0 6 5 ,8 5 5 1 9 7 ,1 0 0 3
1967 9 ,8 6 9 7 ,!+02 2 1 7 ,6 0 0 3
1968 23,88!+ 1 7 ,9 1 8 2 5 1 ,0 0 0 7
1969 2 9 ,0 6 6 2 1 ,8 0 0 3 2 9 ,0 0 0 7
1970 3 6 ,  !+2l+ 2 7 ,3 1 8 3 5 3 ,0 0 0 8
T o ta l
1966-
1970 1 3 7 ,9 0 8
Total lM+,300 1 07 ,3 33
S o u r c e ; Columns 1 and 2 c a l c u l a t e d  from c o n f i d e n t i a l  IDA 
data c o l l e c t e d  by Mr. John Tee l i n g  which he f u r n i s h e d  w i t h  
the p e r m is s io n  of  the IDA* Column 3* OECD Economic Survey -  
Ire l a n d (Annual)  Various I s s u e s *
Table 3 . 1  shows th a t  t o t a l  investm ent  under the c o n ­
t r o l  of  f o r e i g n  f i rm s  i n  the Years 19 55~70 amounted to  over  
£!*+*+ m i l l i o n s .  McAleese e s t i m a t e s  t o t a l  FDI i n  the 
p er iod  1960-70  to  be £ 1 3 6 .6  m i l l i o n s  (£ 12? m i l l i o n s  IDA 
aided  p lu s  £ 1^ .1  m i l l i o n s  a t  Shannon A ir p o r t )^  For the  
same p e r i o d ,  the p r e se n t  e s t i m a t e s  g iv e  £ 137*9  m i l l i o n s .  
The a c t u a l  in f lo w  of  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  i n t o  the m anufacturing  
s e c t o r  i s  c o n s id e r a b ly  l e s s  than t h i s  f i g u r e  because  a su b­
s t a n t i a l  p r o p o r t io n  of  inv es tm en t  i s  f in a n c e d  from I r i s h  
so u r c e s :  v i z .  I r i s h  d e b t ,  e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and grant  
a i d .  (See S e c t i o n  2 ( i )  o f  t h i s  C h a p ter ) .  F ixed  c a p i t a l  
fo rm a t io n  i n  f o r e i g n  e n t e r p r i s e s  c l e a r l y  r e p r e s e n t s  an  
i n c r e a s i n g  p r o p o r t io n  o f  Gross Domestic  C a p i t a l  Form ation,  
reach ing  8% o f  t h i s  a g r r e g a te  i n  1 9 7 0 .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  comparisons o f  the c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  FDI 
to  Gross Domestic  C a p i t a l  Formation are d i f f i c u l t  to  come 
by b ecause  o f  the la c k  o f  data  on FDI i n  g e n e r a l .  Compared 
to  some LDCs l i k e  M a la y s ia ,  the I r i s h  p r o p o r t io n  i s  not  
very h i g h .  Between 1 960-66  the p r o p o r t io n  o f  FDI to  Gross  
Domestic C a p i t a l  Formation amounted to  1 9 .6 ^  i n  M a la y s ia .
At the o th e r  end o f  the  s c a l e  i s  Japan, w ith  only  a 0 .6 ^  
share o f  FDI i n  Gross Dom est ic  C a p i t a l  F orm ation .*
+ FDI $ - o f  Gross Domestic  C a p i t a l  Formation:
M a la ys ia Japan
i 960 I ?.'k 1962 0 .8 3
1961 1 6 . 9 1963 0 . 8 5
1962 1 6 . 7 196^ 0 .3 2
1963 2 ? . k 1965 0 .3 0
196W 2 1 . k 1966 O.Uo
1965 2 1 .5 1967' O.lf l
1966 1 7 . 7 1968 0 .9 2
Source s V #N• B a l a subramanyam and A . I ,  KacBean B e n e f i t  Co s t
Ajialvgis  of  Fo re i r -n  I  rive s  b r e n t  w i t h  S p e c i a l  R e f e r e n c e  t o As i a  . 
U n p u b l i s h e d . "
These two extreme c a s e s  r e f l e c t  the d i f f e r e n t  p o l i c i e s  
towards FDI pursued by th e se  two c o u n t r i e s .  The 
i n c r e a s i n g  share of  FDI i n  Gross Domestic  C a p i t a l  Form­
a t i o n  i n  I r e la n d  i s  i n  part  a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  i t s  p o l i c i e s  
towards FDI. The f i g u r e  o f  8/1 FDI i n  Gross Domestic  
C a p i t a l  Formation r e p r e s e n t s  a h ig h  f i g u r e  i n  comparison  
w ith  s e v e r a l  LDCs such a s  Ceylon ,  In d ia  and P a k i s t a n .  
P o l i c i e s  o f  h o s t  c o u n t r i e s  are c l e a r l y  v e ry  important  
d eterm in an ts  o f  the amount o f  FDI ~ Japan p r e f e r s  l i c e n s i n g ,  
i n s i s t i n g  on j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  and r e s t r i c t i o n s  on f o r e i g n  
ownersh ip ,  w h i l s t  M alays ia  f o l l o w s  an "open door” p o l i c y  
with  a b a t t e r y  o f  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  FDI. In  t h i s  c o n t e x t  the  
I r i s h  r e l i a n c e  on FDI can be seen  to  be heavy but not  
u n p reced en t ly  h i g h .
S e c t i o n  2 The N a tu re  o f  F o r e i g n  Owned P r o j e c t s  i n  the  
M a n u f a c t u r i n g  S e c t o r .
The data  u t i l i s e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  are d e r iv e d  from IDA 
sources  and r e p r e s e n t  an a lm ost  complete  coverage  o f  the  
a p p l i c a t i o n s  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  f o r  grant a s s i s t a n c e  up to
If
January 1972• The f i g u r e s  are p r o j e c t i o n s  made by f o r e i g n  
f irms o f  o u t p u t ,  investm en t  and employment a t  f u l l  prod­
u c t io n .  The e s t i m a t e s  may not  have been  f u l l y  r e a l i s e d  i n  
a l l  c a s e s .  The number o f  a p p l i c a t i o n s  on which data are 
a v a i la b l e  i s  6*+8 p r o j e c t s  (new f irm s  and major e x t e n s i o n s ) .  
From t h i s  d a t a ,  a complete  p i c t u r e  o f  grant  a ided  FDI can  
be b u i l t  up.
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( a )  O p e r a t io n a l  s t a t u s  o f  the a p p l i c a t i o n s .
The 65+8 a p p l i c a t i o n s  are broken down by o p e r a t i o n a l  
s t a t u s ’ i n  Table 3*2 .  The c a t e g o r i e s  are d e f in e d  as  
f o l l o w s .  ( A l l  c a t e g o r i e s  r e f e r  to  January 1 9 7 2 ) .
(1 )  ’L i v e ’ f irm s  -  th o se  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i n  
p r o d u c t io n .
(2 )  ’P en d in g 1 -  f i rm s  about to  b e g i n  pr o d u ct io n  
h a v in g  r e c e i v e d  IDA approval  f o r  a g r a n t .
( 3 )  ’F a i l e d 1 -  f i r m s  which had begun o p e r a t io n s  
but su b s e q u e n t ly  c l o s e d  down.
(1+) ’Taken over b e f o r e  f a i l i n g '  -  f i r m s  which  
began p r o d u ct io n  b u t ,  having  met w i th  
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  were taken over  by another  
c o n cern  (not a lways  by another  f o r e i g n  f i r m ) .
C a t e g o r i e s  (5 )  to  ( 7 )  never  came i n t o  p r o d u ct io n  f o r
the  f o l l o w i n g  r e a s o n s .
( 5 )  P r o j e c t s  r e f u s e d  g r a n ts  by the IDA on the grounds  
o f  weak f i n a n c e ,  inadequate  m arket ing f a c i l i t i e s  
or o th e r  r e a s o n s .
( 6 )  Firms which were a l l o c a t e d  a grant  but did not  
take  up the o f f e r .
( 7 )  Firms which withdrew t h e i r  grant a p p l i c a t i o n s .
Table 3.2 Foreign Grant Applications by Operational
S t a t u s
S t a t u s  (January 1972) Number o f
1 .  Live 396
2 .  Pending ^9
3 .  F a i l e d 51*
*+. Taken over b e fo r e  f a i l u r e 13
5 .  Refused grant by IDA 36
6 .  A p p l ica n t  did  not  take up grant  ^0
7 .  Firm withdrew a p p l i c a t i o n 60
T o t a l  F o re ig n  A p p l i c a t i o n s 6H8
S o u r c e : Author’ s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA data
The p r o p o r t io n  o f  p r o j e c t s  which f a i l e d  a f t e r  having  
been a t  one time o p e r a t i o n a l  ( i . e .  c a t e g o r i e s  1 ,3  and *0 
i s  1 1 . 7%« I f  f i rm s  taken  over  are in c lu d e d  as  f a i l u r e s ,  
t h i s  p r o p o r t io n  r i s e s  to  I k *5%, These f i g u r e s  g iv e  some 
cause f o r  concern  about the  c r i t e r i a  o f  acceptance  f o r  
s t a t e  f i n a n c e .  F a i l u r e s  are a n a lysed  i n  d e t a i l  b e low .
( b ) N a t i o n a l i t y  of  parent  f irm
The n a t i o n a l i t y  o f  o r i g i n  o f  grant  a p p l i c a t i o n s  
(parent f i r m s )  i s  shown i n  Table 3«3* Tbe share o f  the  
UK, USA, and Germany i s  overwhelming,  a l th ou gh  no one 
country pred o m in a tes .  The three  major i n v e s t i n g  c o u n t r i e s
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account  f o r  79% o f  a p p l i c a t i o n s  and 80%, o f  l i v e  p r o j e c t s *  
Other major so u rc es  are H o l la n d ,  South A f r i c a ,  France ,  
I t a l y  and A ustr ia*
Table 3 .3  A p p l i c a t i o n s f o r  IDA Grants by N a t i o n a l i t y
of Parent Firm and O p era t io n a l  S t a t u s .
N a t io n a lM z STATUfS
Live Pending F a i l e d Taken
over
b e fo r e
f a i l u r e
Refused Grant 
d id  not take  
up grant or 
withdrew
Tota:
UK 12k 7 19 5 33 188
USA 10 7 22 6 3 37 175
Germany 87 10 21 28 150
Holland 18 1 - 1 3 23
Other 60 9 8 - 35 112
T ota l 396 ^9 5k 13 136 6*t8
S o u rc e : A uthor’ s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA d a t a .
The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p r o j e c t s  pending d i f f e r s  from th a t  
of l i v e  p r o j e c t s .  I t  r e f l e c t s  an upsurge i n  US investm ent  
and a d e c l i n e  i n  that  o f  UK i n v e s t o r s  (o n ly  7 pending  
p r o j e c t s  were o f  UK o r i g i n ) .  This  r e f l e c t s  the impact o f  
e x t e n s i v e  a d v e r t i s i n g  and promotion by the IDA i n  the USA 
and the adverse  e f f e c t  o f  the  Northern I r e la n d  p o l i t i c a l  
s i t u a t i o n  on p r o s p e c t i v e  UK i n v e s t o r s .
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( c ) The I n d u s t r i a l  S t r u c t u r e  o f  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  -
T o t a l  p r o j e c t e d  in ves tm en t  i n  l i v e  f i r m s  a t  f u l l  
p r o d u ct io n  up to  January 1972 i s  e s t i m a t e d  a t  £ 1 9 2 .8 5  
m i l l i o n s .  Table 3 . 1  showed e s t im a te d  a c t u a l  investm ent  
to  be £ I 1*1* . 3 m i l l i o n s .  The d i f f e r e n c e  between the two 
f i g u r e s  i s  the amount by which l i v e  f i r m s  had not  
a c h ieved  (up to  1970) t h e i r  f u l l  p r o d u c t io n  investm en t  
l e v e l s ,  l e s s  investm ent  i n  f a i l e d  p r o j e c t s .  (The f i r s t  
f i g u r e  e x c l u d e s  investm en t  i n  f irm s  which have f a i l e d  or  
been ta k e n  over  and any f irm  c l a s s i f i e d  as  1 p e n d in g * which  
had begun to  i n v e s t .  The l a t t e r  f i g u r e  i n c l u d e s  i n v e s t ­
ment in  p r o j e c t s  which u l t i m a t e l y  f a i l e d  or were taken  
o v e r ) .
The i n d u s t r i a l  breakdown o f  FDI i s  o f  major i n t e r e s t .
I t  w i l l  be se en  th a t  FDI l a r g e l y  de ter m in e s  the s t r u c t u r e  
of the "modern" s e c t o r  o f  I r i s h  in d u s tr y  and the p a t t e r n  
of  development o f  m anufacturing  i n d u s t r y ,  which i s  a v i t a l  
f ea tu re  o f  I r i s h  p la n n in g .  Table 3.*+ shows the s e c t o r  
breakdown o f  ' l i v e 1 p r o j e c t s ,  a c co rd in g  to  the Standard  
I n d u s t r i a l  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  (SIC) code ,  the average  s i z e  o f  
investm ent  i n  the i n d u s t r y  ( a l l  p r o j e c t s  by f u l l  p r o d u ct io n  
l e v e l  o f  in v e s tm e n t )  and the c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  v a r i a t i o n  + o f  
investm ent  s i z e  w i t h i n  each SIC g r o u p in g .  The average  
investm ent f i g u r e  a lo n e  does  not g iv e  an adequate p i c t u r e  o f
+ C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  V a r i a t i o n  = S t a n d a r d  D e v i a t i o n
Mean
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p r o j e c t  s i z e  and a measure o f  d i s p e r s i o n  i s  needed t o  
throw l i g h t  on the d i v e r s i t y  o f  p r o j e c t  s i z e  w i t h i n  each  
s e c t o r .  I t  i s  t o  be noted here  th a t  the  a n a l y s i s  r e f e r s  
t o  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o j e c t s , not  t o  f i r m s , which may have  
undertaken more than one sep a r a te  p r o j e c t .  Column 5 shows 
the p er ce n ta g e  o f  the t o t a l  f o r e i g n  in v e s tm en t  which the  
p a r t i c u l a r  s e c t o r  c o n s t i t u t e s .
Firm s i z e  w i t h i n  each  s e c t o r  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  by average  
investm ent  and the c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  v a r i a t i o n  round the  mean 
of the s e c t o r .  The s i z e  o f  the f o r e i g n  f irm ’s I r i s h  u n i t  
w i l l  be determ ined by th r ee  major s e t s  o f  f a c t o r s .
F i r s t l y ,  t e c h n i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h i n  the  in d u s tr y  
w i l l  determ ine  the minimum e f f i c i e n t  s i z e  o f  the I r i s h  
s u b s i d i a r y .  This  w i l l  vary  w i t h i n  the in d u s tr y  group a c c o r d ­
ing to  the p a r t i c u l a r  p rodu cts  made and the p r o c e s s  u t i l i s e d  
by the s u b s i d i a r y .
S e c o n d ly ,  the r e s o u r c e s  o f  the parent  f irm  are  
im portant .  Large p a r e n t s  tend t o  s e t  up l a r g e r  s u b s i d ­
i a r i e s  than sm al l  f irm s  because  o f  t h e i r  g r e a t e r  command 
over r e s o u r c e s ,  p r e f e r e n t i a l  treatm ent  i n  the c a p i t a l  
market and p o s s i b l y  because  they  may have a c c e s s  to  e a s i l y  
t r a n s f e r a b le  i n t e r n a l  r e s o u r c e s .  The o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  the  
f irms i n t e r n a t i o n a l  network i s  a l s o  an important determ ­
inant o f  s u b s i d i a r y  s i z e  through i t s  i n f l u e n c e  on the range  
of  f u n c t i o n s  which the  s u b s i d i a r y  i s  to  perform. ( S e c t i o n  3 
of t h i s  Chapter e l a b o r a t e s  t h i s  p o i n t ) .
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T h i r d l y ,  the market a t  which the outp ut  o f  the  
s u b s i d i a r y  i s  aimed. I f  the u n i t  i s  in ten d ed  to  s e r v i c e  
the I r i s h  market o n l y ,  then  a sm al l  s u b s i d i a r y  w i l l  
s u f f i c e .  The s i z e  o f  the I r i s h  s u b s i d i a r y  i n c r e a s e s  a s  
the market coverage  r e a c h e s  the UK, the EEC and o th er  
m arkets .  In  the c a se  o f  l a r g e r  ( m u l t i n a t i o n a l )  f i r m s ,  
the I r i s h  u n i t  may perform , not the f i n a l  s t a g e  o f  prod­
u c t i o n  which i s  o f t e n  the c a s e ,  but an in te r m e d ia te  
p r o c e s s .  In  such c a s e s  o f  worldwide o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  
p r o d u ct io n  based on v e r t i c a l l y - i n t e g r a t e d  p r o c e s s e s ,  the  
I r i s h  u n i t  ten d s  to  be l a r g e ,  because  the f i n a l  market i s  
l a r g e .
Firm s i z e  r e f l e c t s  the nature o f  the  I r i s h  s u b s i d ­
i a r i e s  which  r a n g e ,  in  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  ter m s ,  from a u to n o ­
mous o f f s h o o t s  o f  o v e r s e a s  f i r m s  to  f u l l y  i n t e g r a t e d  sub­
s i d i a r i e s  o f  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  f i r m s .  Some s e c t o r s  are n o ta b le  
f o r  d i v e r s i t y  i n  f irm  s i z e  (Table 3 . ^ ) .  S e c t o r s  281  
( i n d u s t r i a l  c h e n i c a l s ) ,  3 3 3 -5  ( sm elted  and r e f i n e d  m e t a l )  
and 282 ( p l a s t i c s  and s y n t h e t i c s )  each  c o n t a i n  one huge 
f i r m ,  which i n  the case  o f  p l a s t i c s  i s  n e a r ly  fo u r  t im es  
the s i z e  o f  the next  o p e r a t i o n a l  u n i t .  S i m i l a r l y  the i r o n  
and s t e e l  and non f e r r o u s  products  s e c t o r  (3 3 1 $ 3 3 2 ,3 3 9 )  
and s e c t o r  36 c o n t a i n  two l a r g e  and many sm a l le r  f i r m s .
The la r g e  u n i t s  are s u b s i d i a r i e s  o f  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  f i r m s .
These i n d u s t r i e s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  s e c t o r s  27 (p r in t e d  m a t t e r ) ,
3 ( t y r e s  and r u b b e r ) ,  357 ( o f f i c e  and computing m achinery)  
and 3B*+ (m ed ica l  in s tr u m e n t s )  are the a r e a s  i n  which i n v e s t ­
ments o f  la r g e  s i z e  have been  made i n  I r e l a n d .  The r e a s o n s  
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Sm a l ler  s c a l e  inv es tm en t  has been pursued most 
s t r o n g l y  i n  the food and t e x t i l e s / a p p a r e l  s e c t o r s .  A lso  
some sm a l l  s c a l e  investm en t  has occured i n  a rea s  o f  the  
m e ta l s  s e c t o r ,  in s tru m en ts  and p r e c i s i o n  goods ,  some sub 
s e c t i o n s  o f  the  chem ica l  i n d u s t r y ,  the machinery groupings  
and i n  " o th er  p ro d u cts" .
The i n d u s t r i e s  w i t h  a h ig h  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  v a r i a t i o n  
are the ones  where la r g e  p r o j e c t s  c o e x i s t  w i t h  sm a l le r  
s c a l e  o n e s .  The la r g e  s c a l e  in v e s tm en ts  are  i n  the s e c t o r s  
t r a d i t i o n a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  d i r e c t  f o r e i g n  in ves tm en t  -  
p l a s t i c s  and s y n t h e t i c s ,  o f f i c e  and computing m achinery ,  
s p e c i a l i s t  in s tru m en ts  and e l e c t r o n i c  g o o d s .  A l l  th e se  
i n d u s t r i e s  can be e x p e c ted  to  e x h i b i t  l a r g e  economies o f  
s c a l e  and i t  i s  w i t h i n  t h e s e  i n d u s t r i e s ,  where markets are  
worldwide th a t  the m u l t i n a t i o n a l  e n t e r p r i s e  has come to  
predom inate .  The s e c t o r s  l i s t e d  above are r e p r e se n te d  i n  
I r e la n d  by one or two v e r y  l a r g e  u n i t s  o f  a cross -E uropean  
( ind eed  g l o b a l  in  some c a s e s )  i n t e g r a t e d  f i r m .  The market 
aimed a t  by such u n i t s  i s  the EEC and t e c h n o lo g y  i n t e n s i v e  
p ro d u ct io n  i s  the norm. The i n d u s t r i e s  a l s o  s t r o n g l y  
in v o lv e  product  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and t h i s  c o m p e t i t i v e  f e a t u r e  
a l lo w s  sm a l l  f i rm s  to  c o e x i s t  v/ith l a r g e r  r i v a l s .
Column 5 shows th a t  major c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  f o r e i g n  
investm ent  are found i n  i n d u s t r i a l  c h e m i c a l s ,  p l a s t i c s  and 
s y n t h e t i c s ,  t e x t i l e s ,  i r o n ,  s t e e l  and non f e r r o u s  p rod u cts  
and o f f i c e  and computing m achinery .  The number o f  se p a r a te  
p r o j e c t s  which c o n t r ib u t e  to  th e se  a g g r e g a t e s  v a r i e s  w i d e l y -
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i n d u s t r i a l  c h e m ic a l s  and o f f i c e  and com p u t ing  m a c h in e ry  
a r e  h i g h l y  c o n c e n t r a t e d ,  v / h i l s t  the  f o r e i g n  owned t e x t i l e s  
and p l a s t i c s  and s y n t h e t i c s  a r e  c o n s t i t u t e d  by a l a r g e  
number o f  p r o j e c t s *
The r e c e n t  l i t e r a t u r e  on FDI i s  r i c h  i n  t h e o r e t i c a l  
e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  such  i n v e s t m e n t * ^  These t h e o r i e s  bo rrow  
h e a v i l y  from t h e o r i e s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  t r a d e  
t h e o r y  and t h e  econom ics  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c h a n g e .  None 
o f  the  t h e o r i e s ,  ho w ever ,  a r e  c a p a b le  o f  p r o v i d i n g  a com­
p l e t e  s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  e x p l a n a t i o n .  E ach  o f  them i s  a p p l i c ­
a b l e  to  p a r t i c u l a r  t y p e s  o f  FDI.  A f u l l  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  th e  
s e c t o r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  FDI i n  I r e l a n d  a l s o  h a s  t o  r e l y  
on d i f f e r e n t  s e t s  o f  t h e o r i e s .  The most  i m p o r t a n t  o f  
t h e s e  t h e o r i e s  a r e  th o s e  o f  S t e p h e n  Hymer and C .P .  K i n d l e -  
b e r g e r  and Raymond V e r n o n ’ s P r o d u c t  C yc le  H y p o t h e s i s .
The H y m e r - K in d le b e r g e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  FDI r u n s  i n  
t e rm s  o f  th e  m o n o p o l i s t i c  a d v a n t a g e s  p o s s e s s e d  by f i r m s .  
Such a d v a n t a g e s ,  o r  income y i e l d i n g  a s s e t s ,  a r e  p o s t u l a t e d  
t o  be f i r m  s p e c i f i c  i n  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  
com p e t in g  f i r m s  ( i n  the  h o s t  c o u n t r y ) .  I t  i s  r e a s o n a b l e  
to  assume t h a t  h o s t  c o u n t r y  f i r m s  i n  t h e i r  t u r n  may p o s s e s s  
c e r t a i n  a d v a n t a g e s  w h ich  a re  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  to  the  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s .  They may be endowed w i t h  a knowledge o f  th e  l o c a l  
m arke t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  l o c a l  law s and cus to m s  and th e  l o c a l  
e n v i ro n m e n t  i n  g e n e r a l .  But  th e  f i r m - s p e c i f i c  a d v a n t a g e s  
p o s s e s s e d  by th e  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  may o u tw e ig h  th e  d i s a d v a n t ­
ages  a r i s i n g  from t h e i r  h a v in g  to  o p e r a t e  i n  a f o r e i g n
e n v i r o n m e n t .  I n  o t h e r  words  th e  e n t e r p r i s e  s p e c i f i c
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a d va n tag es  o f  the f o r e i g n  f i r m s  can be t r a n s f e r r e d  w i t h i n  
the f irm  to  combine w i t h  l o c a t i o n  s p e c i f i c  advantages*
The e x a c t  nature o f  the advantage may d e r iv e  from (1 )  
s u p e r io r  t e c h n o lo g y  o f  the source  country  f i r m s ,  the product  
o f  p a s t  R & D expen d itu re*  (? )  Product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n :  
brand names and a d v e r t i s i n g  or (3 )  the p o s s e s s i o n  o f  a "new 
produ ct” i n  the K e lv in  L a n ca s te r  sense  o f  a new com b ina t io n  
o f  d e s i r a b l e  a t t r i b u t e s ' 7 or (k ) su p e r io r  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
and m a nager ia l  r e s o u r c e s  which enable  the f irm  to  i d e n t i f y  
and to  s e i z e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  p r o f i t a b l e  investm en t  which  
host  country  f irm s  are unable to i d e n t i f y  or are unable to  
e x p l o i t  because  o f  r e so u rc e  or i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  
(e*g* c a p i t a l  market c o n s t r a i n t ) *  Such an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  
FDI i s  most r e l e v a n t  i n  s e c t o r s  which e x h i b i t  h ig h  R & D 
o u t l a y s ,  l a r g e - s c a l e  p r o d u c t io n  and h i g h l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d
g
products* In to  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  f a l l  c h e m i c a l s  and pharm­
a c e u t i c a l s ,  e l e c t r o n i c s  and e l e c t r i c a l  e n g i n e e r i n g ,  m echani­
c a l  e n g i n e e r i n g ,  motor v e h i c l e s ,  rubber p r o d u c t s ,  o i l  and 
petroleum p r o d u c t s .  A l l  such i n d u s t r i e s  may be c l a s s i f i e d
as r e s e a r c h - i n t e n s i v e  on a q u a n t i f i a b l e  c r i t e r i o n  o f
9r esea rch  i n t e n s i t y .
Given th a t  the f o r e i g n  f i r m s ’ advan tages  are f irm  
s p e c i f i c  r a t h e r  than l o c a t i o n  s p e c i f i c ,  the  f i rm s  p o s s e s s i n g  
such adva n tag es  have a c h o ic e  r eg a rd in g  the manner i n  which  
they e x p l o i t  the ad van tages  i n  s e r v i c i n g  f o r e i g n  m a rk ets .
They can produce in  the source  country  and e x p o r t ,  a l t e r n ­
a t i v e l y  they  can o p era te  pr o d u ct io n  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  the f o r e i g n
87
m a r k e t s  o r  t h e y  c a n  l i c e n s e  th e  a d v a n ta g e  t h e y  p o s s e s s  t o  
h o s t  c o u n t r y  f i r m s .
The l a s t  a l t e r n a t i v e  -  l i c e n s i n g  -  may n o t  h o ld  much 
a t t r a c t i o n  i n  th e  c o n t e x t  o f . I r e l a n d ,  m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  o f  
th e  l a c k  o f  p r o s p e c t i v e  l i c e n s e s  i n  I r e l a n d ,  The a t t r a c t ­
i v e  package  o f  i n c e n t i v e s ,  th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  cheap  
l a b o u r  and t h e  a c c e s s  t o  E u r o p e a n  m a r k e t s  w h ich  I r e l a n d  
p r o v i d e s  may have added w e i g h t  t o  th e  p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  i n ­
v e s tm e n t  o v e r  e x p o r t i n g  d i r e c t  to  f i n a l  m a r k e t s  * Thus th e  
H y m e r -K in d le b e rg e r  e x p l a n a t i o n  a p p e a r s  t o  be h i g h l y  r e l e ­
v a n t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  t h e  r e s e a r c h - i n t e n s i v e  s e c t o r s  o u t ­
l i n e d  a b o v e .
The secon d  e x p l a n a t i o n  w h ich  i s  r e l e v a n t  i s  th e  
P r o d u c t  Cycle  H y p o t h e s i s  o f  Raymond V e r n o n , 10 The 
em p h a s i s  i s  on  the  t im in g  o f  i n n o v a t i o n ,  demand p a t t e r n s ,  
the  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m  and c o m p a r i -  
t i v e  c o s t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p r o c e s s e s .  B r i e f l y  th e  h y p o t h e s i s  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  i n n o v a t i o n  w i l l  t a k e  p l a c e  i n  h i g h  income 
c o u n t r i e s  and p r o d u c t i o n  w i l l  f i r s t  be o f  a h i g h  c o s t ,  
s k i l l e d  l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  n a t u r e .  However a s  demand s p r e a d s  
the  need  f o r  a d a p t a t i o n  and s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  becomes pe rm ­
a n e n t .  S u b s i d i a r i e s  a r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  
c h ea p e r  s k i l l e d  l a b o u r  where  t h e r e  i s  a m a rk e t  f o r  t h e  
p r o d u c t .  F i n a l l y  when th e  p r o d u c t  becomes c o m p l e t e l y  
s t a n d a r d i s e d ,  t h e r e  i s  a t e n d e n c y  f o r  th e  m a tu re  p r o d u c t ,  
o r  a t  l e a s t  t h o s e  p a r t s  w h ich  a r e  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  
to  be l o c a t e d  i n  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  cheap  and a b u n d a n t  u n s k i l l e d  
l a b o u r •
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I n  su c h  a  scheme, th e  p r o c e s s e s  c a r r i e d  ou t  i n  I r e l a n d  
s h o u ld  m atch  i t s  f a c t o r  p r o p o r t i o n s .  The e x p e c t a t i o n  i s  
t h a t  the  p r o c e s s e s  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  I r e l a n d  w i l l  be u n s k i l l e d  
l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e ,  o f t e n  th e  f i n a l  s t a g e s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  
b e f o r e  s a l e  ( f i n i s h i n g  p r o c e s s e s ) .  The ch eap  l a b o u r ,  and 
f u r t h e r  r e d u c t i o n  o f  c o s t s  by  th e  i n c e n t i v e  scheme, p l u s  
a c c e s s  t o  th e  EEC m a rk e t  a r e  the  a t t r a c t i o n s  h e r e .  T h i s  
k in d  o f  i n v e s t m e n t  c a n  be i d e n t i f i e d  i n  th e  p l a s t i c s  and 
s y n t h e t i c s ,  m e t a l s  and m a c h in e r y ,  m o to r  v e h i c l e s ,  e l e c t ­
r o n i c s ,  p h a r m a c e u t i c a l s  and p a r  e x c e l l e n c e  i n  th e  " o t h e r "  
p r o d u c t s  s e c t o r s .  A f u r t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  such  
i n v e s tm e n t  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  a ro u n d  Shannon A i r ­
p o r t .  The goods p ro d uced  a t  Shannon a r e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  
s u b s e t  o f  such  i n v e s t m e n t  w hich  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by h i g h  
v a lu e  t o  low w e ig h t  p r o d u c t s  which  means t h a t  t r a n s p o r t  
c o s t s ,  b o t h  o f  i n p u t s  and e x p o r t e d  o u t p u t s ,  do n o t  i n c r e a s e  
the  c o s t  g r e a t l y  even  when th e  f i n a l  good i s  t r a n s p o r t e d  
back  t o  t h e  s o u r c e  c o u n t r y .
A f u r t h e r  m a jo r  c a t e g o r y  i s  v e r t i c a l  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  
the  m o t i v a t i o n  o f  which  i s  t o  c a p t u r e  raw m a t e r i a l s . ^  
Recent  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  t h e  m e t a l s  s e c t o r ,  which  i s  
e x c lu d ed  f rom t h i s  w o rk ,  i s  a n  example  o f  t h i s .  I n  the  
m a n u f a c t u r in g  s e c t o r  t h e  m a jo r  example i s  t h e  food  s e c t o r ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  m i l k  b o a rd  p r o d u c t s  b u t # o t h e r  i n s t a n c e s  o c c u r  
i n  the  t e x t i l e s  and g l a s s ,  s t o n e ,  c l a y  and c o n c r e t e  s e c t o r s  
Such i n t e r e s t  i s  h e r e  e n h an ced  by c o s t , f a c t o r s  and th e  EEC 
market  and  I r i s h  m em bersh ip  o f  th e  Community.
F i n a l l y  t h e r e  i s  a need  t o  invoke  h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t o r s  
t o  roun d  o f f  th e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  FBI i n  I r e l a n d ,  The e r a  
o f  p r o t e c t i o n  a t t r a c t e d  s e v e r a l  p r o j e c t s  t o  s e r v i c e  th e  
home m a r k e t ,  s h i e l d e d  from c o m p e t i t i o n  by  the  t a r i f f  w a l l .  
S e v e r a l  su ch  f i r m s  s u r v i v e d  th e  r e m o v a l  o f  t a r i f f s  -  t h i s  
a p p l i e s  i n  t h e  t e x t i l e s ,  a p p a r e l ,  wood and f u r n i t u r e ,  
p r i n t e d  m a t t e r  and m e t a l s  s e c t o r .  There  h a s  a l s o  b e e n  some 
Mp u t t i n g  o u t ” o f  work from N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d  t o  t a k e  
a d v a n ta g e  o f  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  l a b o u r  and g r a n t s .  The 
s p l i t t i n g  o f  D onega l  f rom  i t s  t r a d i t i o n a l  m a r k e t s  f o r  d a i r y  
p roduce  i s  a f u r t h e r  f a c t o r .
I t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  we need  t o  u t i l i s e  
s e v e r a l  com plem en ta ry  e x p l a n a t i o n s  o f  th e  i n d u s t r i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  FBI i n  I r e l a n d .  No one s i n g l e  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  
s u f f i c i e n t  t o  c a p t u r e  t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  r e a s o n s  f o r  w h ich  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  e s t a b l i s h  I r i s h  u n i t s .  The P r o d u c t  Cyc le  
H y p o t h e s i s  o f  Vernon i s  however  v e r y  r i c h  i n  e x p l a n a t o r y  
power i n  th e  c a s e  o f  I r e l a n d ,  g i v e n  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  
m arke t  a c c e s s ,  m a r k e t i n g  f a c t o r s  and th e  n a t u r e  o f  th e  
p r o d u c t i o n  c a r r i e d  o u t  by  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .
We end t h i s  s e c t i o n  by p r e s e n t i n g  a  summary T ab le  
( 3 . 5 )  w hich  g ro u p s  f i r m s  on  a w id e r  b a s i s .  F iv e  m a jo r  
s e c t o r s ;  fo o d  and d r i n k ,  t e x t i l e  p r o d u c t s ,  m e t a l s  and 
e n g i n e e r i n g ,  p l a s t i c s  and c h e m ic a l s  a r e  shown.
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The degree  o f  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  o f  p r o j e c t  s i z e  i n c r e a s e s  
as  we move down the T a b le .  This  i s  b ecause  the s i z e  o f  
the  l a r g e s t  f irm  i n  each s e c t o r  i n c r e a s e s .  For an 
e x p l a n a t i o n  we r e tu r n  to  the three  major i n f l u e n c e s  a b o v e t 
s i z e  o f  parent  f i r m ,  minimum e f f i c i e n t  p l a n t  s i z e  and the  
market a t  which  the product  i s  aimed.
(<*) ^^irmsjh±ch_havC-fall i e d  or been  ta k e n
o v e r .
Firms which have f a i l e d  amount to  1 1 .7 ^  o f  the p r o j e c t s
which w e re ,  or had been  o p e r a t i o n a l  up to  January 1972 .  The
t o t a l  number o f  f a i l e d  p r o j e c t s  i s  5*+* F a i l u r e s  by s e c t o r
and n a t i o n a l i t y  o f  parent  are shown i n  Table  3 . 6 .
Table 3 . 6  F o r e ig n  owned p r o j e c t s  which had f a i l e d
( t o  January 1972)
S e c t o r  SIC Code Number o f  N otes
F a i l u r e s
T e x t i l e s 22 12 7 German 
k  U.K.
Apparel 23 8 5 German
P l a s t i c s  and S y n t h e t i c s 282 8 5 U.K.
3 German
Ir o n  S t e e l , N o n  Ferrous  
P roducts
3 3 1 ,3 3 2 ,3 3 9 2 -
S p e c i a l , G e n e r a l  I n d u s t r i a l  
Machinery
3 5 ^ ,3 5 6 ,3 5 8 3 -
Household A p p l i a n c e s , E l e c t ­
r o n ic  and Communications  
Equipment
36 6 3 U.K.  
2 U . S .
Instrum ents  and P r e c i s i o n  
Goods
38 minus 38*+ 3 -
Other and Unknown P roducts 19 k 3 ”other"
By N a t i o n a l i t y ?  21 German, 19 U .K . ,  8 "o th er  n a t i o n a l i t i e s ’,’ 
6 U . S . ,  No Dutch f a i l u r e s .  T o t a l  5*+.
S o u r c e ? A u thor! s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA d a t a .
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Apart from the i n d u s t r i e s  shown i n  the T a b le ,  no 
other  s e c t o r  has  had more than one f a i l u r e .  There are  
s e v e r a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which h e lp  to  e x p l a i n  t h i s  i n d u s t ­
r i a l  p a t t e r n  o f  f a i l u r e s  ( 1 )  Ease o f  e n t r y  i n t o  fou r  
i n d u s t r i e s  in  terms o f  sm a l l  minimum s i z e  5 t h i s  a p p l i e s  
to  s e c t o r s  ( 2 2 ,2 3 ,2 8 2  and 1 9 ) .  In a lm ost  e v er y  case  the  
p r o j e c t  was a sm a l l  one and a l s o  the parent  f irm  was s m a l l .  
(2 )  A c o r o l l o r y  o f  the sm a l l  parent s i z e  i s  l a c k  o f  manage­
ment c a p a b i l i t y ,  which i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  n e c e s s a r y  i n  d e a l i n g  
w ith  an a l i e n  economic env ironm ent .  The IDA a t t r i b u t e s  
most f a i l u r e s  to  poor management and g i v e n  the s u b s t a n t i a l  
amount o f  a s s i s t a n c e  from the IDA and o th e r  s t a t e  b o d i e s  
t h i s  must be a major part  o f  the e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  f a i l u r e  
i n  many c a s e s .  (3 )  Bad s e l e c t i o n  o f  p r o j e c t s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
in  the e a r l y  per iod  o f  the i n c e n t i v e  programme when the  
sc r e e n in g  procedure was not  as  thorough as  i t  now i s .
(*0 The t e r m in a t io n  o f  t a r i f f  p r o t e c t i o n  a l s o  h e l p s  to  
account f o r  f a i l u r e s  i n  th o s e  s e c t o r s  where p r o j e c t s  were  
e s t a b l i s h e d  to  s e r v i c e  the  home m arket .  S e c t o r s  2 2 ,2 3  and 
some a r e a s  o f  the m eta l  in d u s t r y  ( n o ta b ly  s e c t o r  3 6 ) were  
indeed a f f e c t e d  by the removal  o f  t a r i f f  b a r r i e r s  and 
c l e a r l y  some o f  the p r o j e c t s  were unable to  w i th s ta n d  
increased  c o m p e t i t i o n  from im p o r ts .
The number o f  German owned f irm s  which f a i l e d ,  i n  
r e l a t i o n  to t o t a l  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  i s  rem arkable .  The s e c t o r a l  
f a c t o r s  above c l e a r l y  are r e l e v a n t  -  tw e lv e  o f  the German 
firms which f a i l e d  were i n  the t e x t i l e  s e c t o r s .  In  
a d d i t io n ,  the parent  f i rm  s i z e  i s  s m a l le r  i n  the case  o f
German p r o j e c t s  than f o r  o th e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s *  Thus 
f i n a n c i a l  hack ing  and m an a g er ia l  r e s o u r c e s  may have 
been l a c k i n g .
To add to  these  f a i l u r e s ,  a number o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  
have been  taken  over  by o th e r  c o n c e r n s .  A l l  o f  th ese  
p r o j e c t s  were i n  d i f f i c u l t y  when they were taken o v e r .  
Table 3 *7 shows the breakdown o f  t a k e o v e r s .
Again p l a s t i c s  and t e x t i l e  f irm s  are the most prone 
to  f a i l u r e  (a s  are UK owned f irm s  i n  s e c t o r  3 6 ) .  The 
two US f i r m s  which f a i l e d  i n  the food s e c t o r  are e x c e p t ­
io n s  to  the r u le  o f  s t a b i l i t y  i n  th a t  s e c t o r .  These two 
f irm s  i l l u s t r a t e  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  c o n t r o l  and d i f f e r ­
en ces  i n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  labour  m a t t e r s )  
between parent  and s u b s i d i a r y .
Table 3 . 7  F o r e ig n  f i r m s  taken  over b e f o r e  f a i l i n g
SIC Code Number o f  P r o j e c t s  NotesS e c to r
Food S e c t o r  2 0 1 -7
T e x t i l e s  22
I n d u s t r i a l  Chemicals 281
P l a s t i c s  and S y n t h e t i c s  282
Household A p p l ia n c e s ,  36










By N a t i o n a l i t y  % 5 U .K . ,  If German, 3 U . S . ,  1 Dutch
T o t a l  13
Source i A uthor’ s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA d a t a .
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P r o j e c t s  pending are th o s e  which have been  a c c e p te d  
f o r  a grant  from the IDA but had not come i n t o  p r o d u c t io n  
by January 1972* Borne o f  t h e s e  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  be o p e r a t ­
i o n a l  a t  the time o f  w r i t i n g .
Table  3*8 shows th a t  the i n d u s t r i a l  p a t t e r n  o f  such  
p r o j e c t s  was v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  th a t  o f  " l i v e ” f i r m s .  By 
n a t i o n a l i t y  however)  UK a p p l i c a t i o n s  were much l e s s  Im port­
a n t .  T h is  was l a r g e l y  b ecause  o f  the t r o u b le  i n  n o r th e r n  
I r e l a n d .  The expected  upsurge i n  Japanese  inv es tm en t  i n  
I r e la n d  had not  m a t e r i a l i s e d  a t  t h i s  t ime a l th o u g h  many 
e n q u i r i e s  were b e in g  made by Japanese  f i r m s  and t h e i r  
importance can be e x p e c te d  to  grow o ver  the next  q u in ­
quennium. There was a l s o  a tendency towards the a t t r a c t i o n  
o f  l a r g e r  s c a l e  p r o j e c t s *
Table 3 . 8  P r o j e c t s  r en d in g  (January 1972)
S ec to r
Dairy P ro d u cts
Canned Food,  Grain K i l l ,  
Bakery P rod ucts
T e x t i l e s
Apparel
I n d u s t r i a l  Chemicals  
P l a s t i c s
Soaps and C o s m e t i c s 3P a in t
Iron and. S te e l ,M o n  Ferrous


























3 U .S .
By n a t i o n a l i t y j  22 US, 10 German, 9 "Other",.  ? UK, 1 B u tc h .
T o t a l  %9
Source: Author’ s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA data-
( f ) "Extension" P r o j e c t s
Any grant  a ided f irm  which expands i t s  p r o d u ct io n  
f a c i l i t i e s  i s  e l i g a b l e  f o r  a f u r t h e r  grant  to  enable  i t  
to  do s o .  Such e x p a n s io n s  are termed " e x t e n s i o n  p r o j e c t s "  
by the IDA. E x t e n s io n  g r a n ts  are a v a i l a b l e  on the same 
b a s i s  and a t  the  same r a t e s  as f o r  new f i r m s .
Of the 396 l i v e  p r o j e c t s ,  69 are e x t e n s i o n s ,  
a cco u n t in g  f o r  1 7 o f  the t o t a l .  F i f t y - t w o  f irm s  have  
expanded, 15  f i rm s  hav ing  undertaken two grant  a ided  
e xp a n s io n s  and one f irm  h a s  expanded th r e e  t i m e s .  The 
importance o f  extensions d e c l i n e s  i f  we e x p r e s s  investm en t  
in  e x t e n s i o n s  as  a p e r ce n ta g e  o f  t o t a l  grant  a ided  FBI.  
T ota l  in v e s tm e n t  i n  e x t e n s i o n s  a t  f u l l  p r o d u c t io n  i s  
£ 2 6 .8  m i l l i o n s  from a t o t a l  investm en t  o f  £ 1 9 2 .9  m i l l i o n s  
13.9^ o f  t o t a l  in v e s t m e n t .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  average i n v e s t ­
ment i n  e x t e n s i o n s  i s  l e s s  than th6 average  f o r  a l l  p r o ­
j e c t s  -  i t  i s  £ 3 8 9 ,0 0 0  a g a i n s t  the o v e r a l l  £ %87,000.
In a d d i t i o n  to  the  69 l i v e  e x t e n s i o n  p r o j e c t s ,  there  were 
four e x t e n s i o n s  by f irm s  which su b s e q u e n t ly  f a i l e d  and 
there were e x t e n s i o n s  pending i n  January 1972 .
The s e c t o r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  e x t e n s i o n s  and average  
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In  o n ly  two s e c t o r s ,  t e x t i l e s  and a p p a r e l  i s  the  
average s i z 6  o f  e x t e n s i o n  p r o j e c t s  l a r g e r  than the average  
s i z e  o f  p r o j e c t s  as  a w h o le .  Both s e c t o r s  are c h a r a c t ­
e r i s e d  by a la r g e  number o f  sm al l  f i r m s .
The r e - in v e s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  a t  work i n  f o r e i g n  owned 
f i rm s  i n  I r e la n d  can be f u r t h e r  examined by c o n s i d e r in g  
the time p r o f i l e  o f  e x t e n s i o n s  -  Table  3*1 0 .
The in c r e a s e  i n  the number o f  e x t e n s i o n s  c a r r i e d  out  
i n  the p e r io d  1967-1970 i s  a te s t im o n y  to  the s a t i s f a c t i o n  
o f  f o r e i g n  f irm s  w i t h  the s u c c e s s  o f  t h e i r  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  
I r e la n d .  C l e a r l y ,  the number o f  f i r m s  a c h i e v i n g  p r o f i t a b l e  
o p e r a t io n  i n c r e a s e d .  The importance o f  r e - i n v e s t m e n t  (and 
th e r e fo r e  o f  e x t e n s i o n  g r a n t s )  i s  l i k e l y  to  su rp ass  the  
present  f i g u r e  o f  lk% o f  t o t a l  inves tm en t  as  more p r o j e c t s  
become f i r m l y  e s t a b l i s h e d .
Table 3 . 1 0  E x t e n s io n  P r o j e c t s -  Year o f  Grant Approved
Year Number o f  E x t e n s i o n  
Grants Approved
Year Number o f  E x t e n s i o n  
Grants Approved
1961 1 1967 10
1962 1 1968 6
1963 3 1969 15
196** 3 1970 20
1965 2 1971 *+ (+ 3 p e n d in g )+
1966 k
+ F igure  f o r  1971 may be incom plete  
Source i a s  Table 3 . 9
( g )  J o i n t  Ventures
I t  i s  a w id e ly  h e ld  v iew  th a t  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  o f  
d o m est ic  i n t e r e s t s  w ith  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  are i n h e r e n t l y  
p r e f e r a b le  to  wholly-owned f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s #  An 
e lement o f  d o m est ic  ownership i s  f e l t  to  g iv e  some l o c a l  
c o n t r o l  over  o p e r a t i o n s ,  c o n f e r  on the h o s t  country  a 
l a r g e r  share o f  the b e n e f i t s  and to  ensure  g r e a t e r  s t a b i l i t y #  
The acknowledged d i s a d v a n ta g e s  ( i n  a d d i t i o n  to  g r e a t e r  
reso u rce  c o s t s  f o r  the h o s t )  are c o n f l i c t s  o f  i n t e r e s t  
between the p a r tn e r s  and, from the f o r e i g n  p a r e n t 1s v i e w ­
p o i n t ,  a l o s s  o f  speedy a d a p t a b i l i t y .  J o i n t  v e n t u r e s  
account f o r  107 o f  the 6*+8 grant  a p p l i c a t i o n s  i n  Table 3«^* 
The breakdown by s t a t u s  o f  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  i s  shown i n  
Table 3 . 1 1 .
Table 3 . 1 1  J o i n t  V entures  by S t a t u s
S t a t u s Number o f  P r o j e c t s
3 F a i l e d
k  Taken over  b e f o r e  f a i l u r e
2 Pending




5 Refused  grant  by IDA 7
6 A p p l ica n t  d id  not  take up grant  11
7 Firm withdrew A p p l i c a t i o n 9
T o t a l  J o i n t  V entu res 107
Source • A u t h o r s  c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA data
J o i n t  v e n t u r e s  have  had  a b e l o w - a v e r a g e  s u c c e s s  r a t e .  
The p r o p o r t i o n  o f  f a i l u r e s  amongst  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  w h ic h  
become o p e r a t i o n a l  ( c a t e g o r i e s  1 ,3  and *0 i s  15*2% -  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  th e  o v e r a l l  f a i l u r e  r a t e  o f  11 .7$*  I f  t a k e n  -  
o v e r  f i r m s  a r e  i n c l u d e d ,  th e  f a i l u r e  r a t e  f o r  j o i n t  
v e n t u r e s  i s  1 6 .7 $  a g a i n s t  1 ^ .5 $  o v e r a l l .
*
Management p ro b lem s  and d i f f i c u l t i e s  p e c u l i a r  t o  
p a r t i c u l a r  i n d u s t r i e s  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h i s  h i g h e r  r a t e .  
Management p r o b le m s ,  the  most  i m p o r t a n t  s i n g l e  r e a s o n ,  
a r i s e  b e c a u s e  o f  c o n t r o l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  
i n t e r e s t  o f  th e  p a r t i e s .  The o v e r a l l  commitment i n  t e r m s  
of  c a p i t a l  i s  l e s s  f o r  th e  f o r e i g n  p a r t n e r  t h a n  i n  a w h o l l y -  
owned f i r m .  C o n s e q u e n t ly  t h e  commitment o f  com plem enta ry  
i n p u t s  such  a s  t e c h n o lo g y  and management may have  b e e n  l e s s  
th an  w h o l ly -o w ned  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  i t  i s  n a t u r a l  
t h a t  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  sh o u ld  be more numerous i n  th o s e  
s e c t o r s  where  I r i s h  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  s t r o n g e r  -  t e x t i l e s ,  
m e ta l s  t r a d e s  and some b r a n c h e s  o f  e n g i n e e r i n g  ( n o t  g r e a t l y  
i n  the  fo o d  s e c t o r  h o w e v e r ) .  These s e c t o r s  have  b e e n  d e ­
c l i n i n g ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t a r i f f  
p r o t e c t i o n .  Some j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  may have  b e e n  e n t e r e d  i n t o  
when the  d o m e s t i c  p a r t  o f  t h e  p a r t n e r s h i p  was i n  d e c l i n e ,  
or  indeed  i n  d a n g e r  o f  f a i l u r e .  D e s p i t e  th e  b e lo w - a v e r a g e  
success  r a t e ,  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  a re  l i k e l y  t o  become a l a r g e r  
share o f  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  a c c e p t e d  p r o j e c t s .  I r i s h  
f i rm s w i l l  b e g i n  to  l o o k  f o r  p a r t n e r s  f rom whom t o  a c q u i r e  
techno logy  and the  IDA p o l i c y  o f  o b t a i n i n g  e q u i t y  p a r t i c i ­
p a t io n  i n  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  a l s o  have  t h i s  e f f e c t .
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T h ere  a r e  however  s e r i o u s  p ro b lem s  t o  overcome i n  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  c r e a t i n g  j o i n t  o w n e r sh ip  o f  p r o j e c t s .
( h )  The l o c a t i o n  o f  f o r e ign -ow n ed  p r o j e c t s
One m a jo r  aim o f  I r i s h  economic p o l i c y  i s  t o  r e d u c e  
the  s e v e r e  r e g i o n a l  im b a la n c e  from w h ich  th e  economy 
s u f f e r s .  To t h i s  e n d ,  h i g h e r  r a t e s  o f  g r a n t  a i d  a r e  
a v a i l a b l e  i n  t h e  " d e s i g n a t e d  a r e a s "  (BAs) w h ich  means 
ro u g h ly  th e  W e s te r n  h a l f  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y .  I t  i s  o f t e n  
a rgued  t h a t  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  a r e  more f o o t l o o s e  
t h a n  d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned o n e s  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  l e s s  t i e d  
to  d o m e s t i c  i n s t i t u t i o n s  and s u p p l i e r s  and a r e  p r e p a r e d  t o  
t r a i n  l a b o u r .  C o n s e q u e n t ly  th e  en co u rag e m en t  o f  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s tm e n t  i s  s e e n  a s  a m a jo r  t o o l  t o  e a s e  th e  r e g i o n a l  
d i s p a r i t y .
S e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  c an  be e x p e c t e d  t o  be  i m p o r t a n t  
i n f l u e n c e s  on  th e  l o c a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s .  
Nearness  o f  m a r k e t s  and r e d u c t i o n  o f  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t s ,  
a c c e s s  t o  raw m a t e r i a l s  and l a b o u r  i n p u t s  and th e  a v a i l ­
a b i l i t y  o f  s o c i a l  and econom ic  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  a r e  some o f  
the i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  Government  p o l i c i e s  
d es igned  to  i n f l u e n c e  l o c a t i o n ,  l i k e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  g r a n t s ,  
the p r o v i s i o n  o f  i n d u s t r i a l  e s t a t e s  and o t h e r  in d u ce m e n ts  
a re  a l s o  i m p o r t a n t .  The c o r p o r a t e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  l o c a t ­
i o n a l  a d v a n t a g e s  may d i f f e r  b e tw e e n  d i f f e r e n t  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  
of p a r e n t  f i r m  and may be a l s o  s i g n i f i c a n t .
1 0 1
The m a rk e t  a t  w hich  th e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  owned 
p l a n t  i s  a imed i s  an  i m p o r t a n t  l o c a t i o n a l  f a c t o r .  U .K .  
f i r m s  a r e  c l u s t e r e d  rou n d  D u b l i n  b e c a u se  t h e y  m a in ly  
s u p p ly  t h e  U.K. and I r i s h  m a r k e t s .  U .S .  f i r m s  a r e  
c l u s t e r e d  a t  Shannon A i r p o r t  b e c a u s e  t h i s  r e d u c e s  t r a n s ­
p o r t  c o s t s  o f  i n p u t s  f rom th e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  and o u t p u t  
c an  be a i r - f r e i g h t e d  e a s i l y  t o  E urope  o r  b a c k  t o  th e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s .  German s u b s i d i a r i e s  p r e f e r  l o c a t i o n s  i n  s m a l l  
towns i n  t h e  West o f  I r e l a n d  t a k i n g  a d v a n t a g e  o f  h i g h e r
g r a n t s ,  a b u n d a n t  l a b o u r  and th e  s o c i a l  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  b e i n g
12th e  c e n t r e p i e c e  o f  a l o c a l  community .  C l e a r l y  t h e  
l o c a t i o n  i s  i n f l u e n c e d  by  th e  m a jo r  i n p u t s  w h ich  th e  p r o ­
j e c t  n e e d s  -  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  r i c h e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a n d  o f  
the  E a s t  h a s  a t t r a c t e d  i n d u s t r y  b a s e d  on raw m a t e r i a l  
i n p u t s .
A r e c e n t  a n a l y s i s  o f  th e  l o c a t i o n  p r a c t i c e s  o f  
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  i n  I r e l a n d ,  by a g e o g r a p h e r f o u n d  
l i t t l e  e v i d e n c e  o f  " p h y s i c a l  a g g l o m e r a t i o n "  by  n a t i o n ­
a l i t i e s  o f  o w n e r s h i p ,  e x c e p t  f o r  Am erican  owned p l a n t s  
( l a r g e l y  e x p l a i n e d  by c l u s t e r i n g  a t  Shannon  A i r p o r t ) .
There was a l s o  l i t t l e  e v i d e n c e  o f  d i f f u s i o n  o v e r  t im e  i . e .  
no e v id e n c e  o f  c o n c e n t r i c  c i r c l e s  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p l a n t s  
w i th  o l d e r  e s t a b l i s h e d  p l a n t s  a t  t h e  c e n t r e .  The p r e s e n t  
s tu d y  r e i t e r a t e s  t h o s e  f i n d i n g s  a l t h o u g h  c e r t a i n  l o c a t ­
i o n a l  t e n d e n c i e s  ( r a t h e r  t h a n  c o n c e n t r a t i o n s  o f  i n v e s t ­
m en ts )  by  n a t i o n a l i t y  c a n  be b r o u g h t  o u t  v i z .  German 
p l a n t s  p r e f e r  th e  DAs, a l t h o u g h  n o t  i n d u s t r i a l  e s t a t e s ,  
American f i r m s  s t r o n g l y  f a v o u r  i n d u s t r i a l  e s t a t e s  and U.K.
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f i r m s  eschew b o t h  i n  f a v o u r  o f  th e  E a s t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
D u b l i n ,  The most  i m p o r t a n t  l o c a t i o n a l  f a c t o r s  t h u s  a r e  -  
f i n a l  m a r k e t ,  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t  d i f f e r e n c e s  and d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  th e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  l o c a t i o n a l  a d v a n t a g e s ,  which  a p p e a r s  
t o  be c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  th e  ty p e  o f  p roduct®  A good 
example o f  th e  l a s t  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  many o f  th e  U .S .  p l a n t s  
f a v o u r i n g  Shannon a r e  f a b r i c a t i n g  p l a n t s .
Government p o l i c y  ( through th9 IDA) has  been aimed 
at  a t t r a c t i n g  p r o j e c t s  to  the West i n  the f a c e  o f  the  
"natural" advantages  o f  the E a st  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  the  
major c i t i e s ,  D u b l in ,  Cork and Waterford® D u b l in ,  the  
c a p i t a l ,  a c c o u n ts  f o r  20% o f  the p o p u l a t i o n  o f  the R ep u b l ic  
and i s  a l s o  the most important p o r t .  The second c i t y  and 
second port  i s  Cork, which has the a d d i t i o n a l  advantage th a t  
the DA/NDA boundary d i v i d e s  County Cork., so  th a t  the h ig h e r  
(DA) r a t e s  o f  grant app ly  i n  c l o s e  p r o x im ity  to  the c i t y .  
Waterford i s  a major E a s t  c o a s t  port  w i t h  the added a d v a n t ­
age o f  an IDA i n d u s t r i a l  e s t a t e .  The s u c c e s s  o f  the IDA 
p o l i c y  can be judged i n i t i a l l y  by the numbers o f  f o r e i g n  
owned p r o j e c t s  which are a t t r a c t e d  to  the l e s s  deve loped  
r e g i o n s .  Table  3 .1 2  shows l o c a t i o n  a c co r d in g  to  the DA/NDA 
d i v i s i o n  and Table 3 .1 3  shows l o c a t i o n  by county .
Table 3 .1 2  L o c a t io n  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p ro jec t s -D A s  v e r s u s  
Non DA
S ta tu s  o f  P r o j e c t  Non DAs PAs T o t a l
1 Live 2 53(^1)  1 ^ 3(2 8 )  3 9 6 ( 6 9 )
3 F a i l e d  30 2k  $k
k Taken over  b e fo r e  f a i l i n g  8 13
Pending 2 7 ( 1 ) l lK 2 )  59+ (3 )
Ex tens ion  p r o j e c t s  are shown i n  b r a c k e t s .
+ In c lu d e s  9 ‘NONE* o f  Table 3*3.3*
J^rc&s A u t h o r ' s  c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA d a ta
Judged by numbers o f  p r o j e c t s  o n l y ,  the p o l i c y  has  
been r e a s o n a b ly  s u c c e s s f u l  -  over  36^ o f  f o r e i g n  owned 
p r o j e c t s  are l o c a t e d  i n  DAs„ (Table 3 « 1 2 ) .  In  terms o f  
a t t r a c t i n g  new p r o j e c t s ,  the Shannon-Limerick area  has  
been s u c c e s s f u l  as  a countsr-m agnet  to  D u b l in .  Table 3*13  
shows th a t  up to  January 1972 ,  60 l i v e  p r o j e c t s  had b e e n  
a t t r a c t e d  to  c o u n t i e s  Clare  and L im er ick .  The t r a n sp o r t  
i n c e n t i v e s  o f  the Free A irpo r t  t o g e t h e r  w i th  the s p e c i a l  
i n c e n t i v e s  th ere  a t t r a c t e d  £ 1 3 .9  m i l l i o n s  o f  investm en t  
by f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  -  o f  which £ 8 . 9  m i l l i o n s  was o f
li±
U .S .  o r i g i n .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  c o u n t i e s  K e r ry  and Galway h ave  
a t t r a c t e d  a l a r g e  number o f  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  -  b o t h  a r e  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  f a v o u r e d  by German i n v e s t o r s .
However ,  s e v e r a l  c o u n t i e s  have a t t r a c t e d  v e r y  few 
f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  n o t a b l y  Carlow (NBA), K i lk e n n y  (NBA), 
L a io s  (NBA), L e i t r i m  (BA), Meath (NBA), Roscommon (DA) and 
Westmeath (NBA). A new p rob lem  t h u s  a r i s e s  -  d i s p a r i t i e s  
w i t h i n  t h e  BA/NBA c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .  Most o f  th e  l i s t e d  c o u n ­
t i e s ,  by  v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  E a s t e r n  l o c a t i o n ,  f a l l  i n t o  th6  NBA 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and t h u s  do n o t  b e n e f i t  f rom th e  h i g h e r  r a t e s  
of  g r a n t  a i d .  I n f r a s t r u c t u r e  and t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  
l a c k i n g .  I n  t h e  m a in ,  t h e s e  c o u n t i e s  have  l i t t l e  i n  the  way 
of  s c e n i c  a t t r a c t i o n s  o r  r i c h  a g r i c u l t u r a l  m a t e r i a l s  t o  
c o u n t e r b a l a n c e  t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  Under  th e  p r e s e n t  sy s te m  
of  g r a n t  a l l o c a t i o n ,  t h e  IDA i s  a t  l i b e r t y  t o  g iv e  a h i g h e r  
r a t e  o f  g r a n t  t h a n  i t  would o t h e r w i s e  d o ,  t o  a p r o j e c t  
l o c a t e d  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  needy  a r e a .  I t  may be h o w ever ,  i f  
r e g i o n a l  d i s p a r i t i e s  a r e  t o  be r e a l l y  t a c k l e ,  t h a t  t h e  r a t e
10k
o f  grant a id  must be t i e d  to  the per c a p i t a  income or  
unemployment r a te  o f  the immediate a r e a .  D e s p i t e  the  
h ig h e r  grant  a id  a v a i l a b l e ,  most p r o j e c t s  have p r e fe r r e d  
to  l o c a t e  i n  NDAs. T h is  t e s t i f i e s  to  the s t r e n g t h  o f  
e x t e r n a l  economies and lower t r a n sp o r t  c o s t s .  A f u r t h e r  
f a c t o r  i s  the  d e s i r e ,  on the part  o f  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s ,  
f o r  t r a i n e d  labour  -  or a t  l e a s t  labour w i t h  i n d u s t r i a l  
e x p e r i e n c e .  T his  i s  l a c k i n g  i n  DAs, a l th o u g h  the a c t i v ­
i t i e s  o f  AnCo should reduce t h i s  f a c t o r  as  a l o c a t i o n a l  
i n f l u e n c e .
The c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  to  a l l i e v i a t i n g  
the r e g i o n a l  d i s p a r i t i e s  may be summed up as  f o l l o w s .
Over 36^ o f  l i v e  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  are l o c a t e d  i n  the  
DAs. T h is  r e p r e s e n t s  an important p o l i c y  ach ievem en t ,  
b r ing ing  appro x im a te ly  1 ^ ,000  new j o b s  to  the DAs ( c a l c u ­
la te d  from the f i g u r e s  g i v e n  i n  Table 3 * 2 0 ) .  However, 
w ith in  the DAs, t h i s  i s  un even ly  spread and there  i s  s u f f i c ­
i e n t  e v id en ce  to  argue th a t  the most needy a r ea s  o f  a l l  
have been e n t i r e l y  n e g l e c t e d  by f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s .  The 
"middle development a r e a s ” have b e n e f i t  ted  from FBI but not  
the p o o r e s t  a r ea s  o f  a l l .  A g r e a t e r  e lem ent  o f  r e g i o n a l  
s e l e c t i v i t y  i s  needed and perhaps a s t a r t  can be made by 
c re a t in g  temporary " p r i o r i t y  areas" and downgrading th o se  
areas which are now s t i l l  d e s ig n a te d  a l th o u g h  they have  
reached as h ig h  a l e v e l  o f  per c a p i t a  income and employment 
l e v e l s  as  the NBAs.
Before  l e a v in g  l o c a t i o n ,  i t  i s  .worthwhile  to  examine 
the p o l i c y  i n  terms o f  f a i l u r e  r a t e s  and r e in v e s tm e n t  r a t i o s
Table 3#13 Location by County o f  Foreign Projects
County Live
Proj e c t s  
(1 )
F a i l u r e s
(3 )
P r o j e c t s  Taken 
Over Before  
F a i l i n g  (^)
P r o j e c t s
Pending
( 2 ) .
CARLOW 2 - - -
CAVAN 13 ( 3 ) - 1 1
CLARE ( i n c . S . F . A . )  Mt ( 1 0 ) 12 k 6
CORK ^3 ( 2 ) 6 1 7
DONEGAL 15 ( l ) 3 - 2
DUBLIN 83 ( 1 9 ) k - 2
GALWAY 23 ( 6 ) 9 1 k
KERRY 21 ( 5 ) k - 2 ( 2 )
KILDARE I k  ( 1 ) 1 - 1 ( 1 )
KILKENNY k -
LAIOS 3 1 - -
LEITRIM 1 - 1 . -
LIMERICK 16 ( 1 ) 1 1 6
LONGFORD 6 ( 2 ) - -
LOUTH 18 ( 6 ) 2 1 -
MAYO 8 ( 2 ) 1 2 1
MEATH 1 - - -
MONAGHAN 13 ( 2 ) 3 - -
OFFALY 5 ( 1 ) 2 - 1
ROSCOMMON 3 ( 1 ) 1 - -
SLIGO 15 ( 6 ) - -
TIPPERARY 7 ( 1 ) - - -
WATERFORD 21 3 1 3
WESTMEATH 2 - - k
WEXFORD 8 - -
WICKLOW 7 1 - 1
NONE - - - 8
TOTAL 396 (6 9 ) 13 ... ^9 ( 3 )
Figures i n  
pendingt b r a c k e t s s  e x t e n s i o n s . NODIE a p p l i e s  o n ly  to  p r o j e c t s  Sourceg A u th o r ’ s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA d a t a .
1 0 6
i n  DAs v e r s u s  non DAs. The f a i l u r e  r a t e  (Table 3*12 
c a t e g o r i e s  3 and >+ as  % o f  1 , 3  and *0 has been 1 3 *1$ i n  
Non DAs and 1 6 .8 $  i n  DAs. The r e in v e s tm e n t  r a t i o  -  
e x t e n s i o n  p r o j e c t s  as  a per ce n ta g e  o f  l i v e  p r o j e c t s  -  
has been 16,?%  i n  Non DAs but 19*6$ i n  DAs. D e s p i t e  a 
h ig h e r  f a i l u r e  r a t e ,  th ere  has  been a more pronounced 
tendency f o r  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  to  expand i n  DAs. This  s u g g e s t s  
th a t  once the i n i t i a l  problems o f  s e t t i n g  up a p r o j e c t  i n  
l e s s  d e v e lo p ed  areas  can be overcome, the o p p o r t u n i t e s  f o r  
p r o f i t a b l e  o p e r a t i o n  are e q u a l  t o ,  i f  not  b e t t e r  than th ose  
i n  more i n d u s t r i a l l y  advanced r e g io n s  o f  I r e l a n d .
( i ) The f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s
T a b l e s  3 • I 1* and 3 . 1 5  show th e  p r o j e c t e d  s o u r c e s  o f  
f i n a n c e  f o r  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  i n  I r e l a n d ,  f o r  a l l  
f i r m s  and U . S .  f i r m s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  
s e l f - e x p l a n a t o r y ,  b u t  i t  s h o u ld  be n o t e d  t h a t  ’G r a n t ’ i s  
c a p i t a l  g r a n t  o n ly  and e x c l u d e s  any t r a i n i n g  g r a n t s  and 
s u b s i d i e s  t o  r e n t  and i n t e r e s t  w hich  may h ave  b e e n  d i s ­
b u rse d  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t .  Coverage  o f  l i v e  p r o j e c t s  i s  incom ­
p l e t e  -  no i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  a v a i l a b l e  on  th e  e x c lu d e d  Ik 
l i v e  p r o j e c t s .  One anom aly  i s  the  f a c t  t h a t  th e  f i g u r e  
f o r  p r o j e c t e d  f i n a n c e  e x c e e d s  the  p r o j e c t e d  i n v e s tm e n t  
a g g re g a te  -  t h i s  a r i s e s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  need  f o r  c l a s s i f y ­
ing p r o v i s i o n s  and r e s e r v e s .
T a b le  3 . 11* P r o j e c t e d  s o u r c e s  o f  f i n a n c e :  a l l  l i v e  f i r m s
Source o f  F inance Number T o t a l  P ercentage
o f  Amount o f  T o t a l  
P r o j e c t s  P r o j e c t e d  P r o j e c t e d  
(£M) F inance
1 Long Term I r i s h  Debt 87 13*7 6 .2 3
2 Current Debt (Bank O v e r d r a f t )  2*16 3 2 . 5  l*+.76
3 F o r e ig n  Debt (Overseas  103 3 8 . 5  17**+6
bo r r o w in g , lo a n s  from p a r e n t )
*+ Grant 357 6 5 .3  2 9 .6 2
5 IDA E q u i t y  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  5 0 . 3  1 . 1 9
6 E q u ity  + P r e fer en ce  Shares  368  6 7 .8  30.7*+
TOTAL 382+ 220.*+ 1 0 0 .0 0
+ Coverage o f  396 f i r m s  incom plete
Source s A u th o r ’ s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from c o n f i d e n t i a l  IDA d a t a .
Table 3 . 1 5  P r o j e c t e d  so u r c e s  o f  f i n a n c e ;  l i v e  U .S .  companies
Source o f  F inance Number T o t a l  P ercen ta ge
o f  Amount o f  T o t a l  
P r o j e c t s  P r o je c te d  P r o j e c t e d  
(£14) F inance
1 Long Term I r i s h  Debt 21 3 . 8  *+.23
2 Current Debt (Bank O v er d r a f t )  60 1 0 .6  11.7*+
3 F ore ig n  Debt (Overseas
borrow ing , lo a n s  from p a r e n t )  *+3 19«*+ 21.*+3
k  Grant 93 3 2 . 7  3 6 .1 0
5 IDA E q u i ty  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  1 0 . 1  0 . 0 0
6 Equity  + P re fe r e n c e  Shares  97 2 3 - 9  2 6 .^ 1
TOTAL 102+ 9 0 .5  1 0 0 .0 0
+ Coverage o f  107 f irm s  incom plete  
Source: As Table 2 .1 8
The most important s o u r c e s  o f  f in a n c e  f o r  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  taken  as a whole are debt ( 3 8 . 5 $ ) ,  e q u i t y  
and p r e fe r e n c e  sh ares  ( 3 0 .7 ^ )  and grant a id  (29*6^) U . S .  
f irm s  have a d i f f e r e n t  o r i e n t a t i o n s  debt  (37**$)> grant  
a id  ( 3 6 .1 $ )  and e q u i t y  and p r e fe re n c e  sh a re s  (?6.*+jO. U .S .  
f irm s r e c e i v e  l a r g e r  g r a n ts  i n  both  p r o p o r t io n a te  and 
a b s o lu te  terms than f i r m s  o f  o th e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s .  (U .S .  
average grant a id  £ 351 ,000  -  o v e r a l l  average  grant £ 1 8 3 , 0 0 0 ) .  
I t  i s  n o t i c e a b l e  a l s o  th a t  U . S .  f irm s  commit l e s s  e q u i t y  
funds per p r o j e c t .
High g e a r in g  i s  a f e a t u r e  o f  f o r e i g n  in v e s t m e n t .
High g e a r in g  reduces  the parent  f i r m ’ s c a p i t a l  commitment 
and a l lo w s  ( t a x - f r e e )  p r o f i t s  to be used to  pay o f f  the
I ’ddebt -  thus  l e a v i n g  a c a p i t a l  g a in  f o r  the parent  company. '  
There are s e v e r a l  p r o j e c t s  which have no e q u i t y  funds  
invo lved  -  th e se  are e x t e n s i o n  p r o j e c t s  f in a n c e d  from debt  
and grant a i d ,  thus n e c e s s i t a t i n g  no d i r e c t  in f lo w  o f  funds  
from the parent  company. A f u r t h e r  common p r a c t i c e  i s  to  
match the c a p i t a l  grant w i th  e q u i t y  funds and r a i s e  the  
remainder by debt f i n a n c i n g .  S u r p r i s i n g l y , perhaps ,  U .S .  
firms r e l y  on I r i s h  debt  to  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t  than do o th e r  
n a t i o n a l i t i e s .  This  may be due to the d i f f i c u l t i e s  which  
the I r i s h  c a p i t a l  market p r e s e n t s  i n  r a i s i n g  funds on a 
large s c a l e .
The r e c e n t l y  promoted IDA d r iv e  to  a cqu ire  e q u i t y  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  had not produced much resp o n se  a t  the time  
at which the data  was c o l l e c t e d  (January 1 9 7 2 ) .  Only a
sm a l l  number of  la r g e  companies -  c h i e f l y  o f  European 
o r i g i n  -  had en tered  t h i s  type o f  agreem ent .  Only one 
U .S .  f irm  a l low ed  IDA e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  r e f l e c t i n g  
the w idespread tendency o f  U .S .  f o r e i g n  investm ent  to be 
100% s u b s i d i a r i e s  w i th  no a t ten d a n t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  by m in o r i ty  
s h a r e h o ld e r s .
Th is  s e c t i o n  on f i n a n c e  has shown th a t  *+8.1^ o f  t o t a l  
investment under the c o n t r o l  o f  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  comes 
from o u t s id e  Ir e la n d  (a l th o u g h  some cu r re n t  debt i s  
funded by f o r e i g n  banks,  some o f  whom have been a t t r a c t e d  
to Ir e la n d  because  o f  the in f lo w  o f  F D I) .  This  f i g u r e  i s  
almost the same f o r  U .S .  f i r m s  (*+7*8% o f  t o t a l  investm en t  
i s  from non I r i s h  s o u r c e s ) .  U .S .  f irm s  a l s o  g e t  a h ig h e r  
proport ion  o f  investm ent  f in a n c e d  by grant  a i d .  T his  i s  
p a r t ly  because  o f  e x tr a  b a r g a in in g  power and a l s o  because  i t  
i s  f e l t  by the IDA that  s p e c i a l  b e n e f i t s  accrue  from U . S .  
investment which are o f  the nature o f  e x t e r n a l  econ om ies .
I t  can be e x p e c ted  t h e r e f o r e  th a t  the f o r e i g n  exchange in f lo w  
accompanying a new f o r e i g n  investm ent  w i l l  be o f  the order  
of magnitude o f  rough ly  h a l f  the t o t a l  in v e s t m e n t .  T h is  i s  
a u s e f u l  r u l e  o f  thumb f o r  fu tu r e  p o l i c y  making and p r e ­
d i c t i o n .
S e c t io n  I s  The Economic F u n c t i o n s  c a r r i e d  o u t  by th e  I r i s h  
S u b s i d i a r i e s  o f  F o r e i g n  F i rm s
The data  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  are taken  from the An Foras  
Forbartha s u rv e y  o f  g r a n t  a id e d  i n d u s t r y  c o n d u c ted  by 
Padraig O 'H u g g in .^  Responses  were r e c e i v e d  from 377 f i r m s
o f  which 276 (73?0 were f o r e i g n  o\^ned. ( J o i n t  v e n t u r e s  
were a l l o c a t e d  accord ing  to  m a jo r i ty  ( 51? )  o w n er sh ip ) .
The f i r s t  p o in t  o f  i n t e r e s t  i s  the range o f  ty p e s  
o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  w i t h i n  the f o r e i g n  group. The 
I r i s h  u n i t  may be a wholly-owned s u b s i d i a r y  o f  a m u l t i ­
n a t i o n a l  company, a more l o o s e l y - c o n t r o l l e d  o f f s h o o t  o f  a 
f o r e i g n  f i r m ,  a j o i n t  v e n tu r e  or an autonomous investm en t  
owned by a group o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  or i n d i v i d u a l s .  T h is  
v ar ia n ce  i n  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  the p r o p o r t io n  
o f  fore ig n -o w n ed  f irm s  i n  the sample which c la im  to be 
’’independent s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  e s t a b l i s h m e n t s 1’ . Such f i r m s  
number 102 (37? o f  the t o t a l  f o r e i g n  group) as a g a i n s t  17*+ 
f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  which are "’part  o f  a l a r g e r  i n d u s t r i a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n ” . Such f i r m s  are l a t e r  r e f e r r e d  to  as ’’a u t o ­
nomous i n v e s t m e n t s ” . T his  s e c t i o n  p r o v id e s  part  o f  the  
background to  s e c t i o n  b o f  the f o l l o w i n g  chapter  which  
a n a ly s e s  the c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  FDI to  the emergence o f  a 
d u a l i s t i c  framework i n  I r i s h  i n d u s t r y .
The survey  i n v e s t i g a t e d  the f u n c t i o n s  performed by 
the head o f f i c e  (or o th e r  u n i t s  o f  the o r g a n i s a t i o n ) .  An 
a n a l y s i s  o f  the f u n c t i o n s  performed o u t s i d e  Ire lan d  by the  
f o r e i g n  group not o n ly  g i v e s  an i n s i g h t  i n t o  the nature o f  
f o r e i g n  f irm s  but a l s o  i s  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t h e  degree  o f  
c r o s s - n a t i o n a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  w i t h i n  the f o r e i g n  group. Table  
3*16 p r e s e n t s  an a n a l y s i s  o f  the f u n c t i o n s  performed by 
the ’’non-autonoiaous” group o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  (Autonomous 
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The f u n c t i o n  most f r e q u e n t l y  c a r r ie d  out  abroad i s  
Research and Development a c t i v i t y *  The overwhelming  
m a jo r i ty  o f  f irm s  who perform any R & D do so o u t s id e  the  
R e p u b l ic .  This  f i n d in g  i s  supported by the f a c t  th a t  the  
f irm s who do not perform R & D abroad f a l l  v e r y  l a r g e l y  
i n t o  the n o n -re se a rc h  i n t e n s i v e  s e c t o r s .  F i f t y  o f  the  
106 f i r m s  l i s t e d  as r e l y i n g  on R & B from abroad f a l l  i n t o  
the m e t a l s 5 e l e c t r i c a l  and e n g in e e r in g  s e c t o r s  ( I r i s h  
Census o f  P ro d u ct ion  c a t e g o r i e s  35 -  3 8 ) .  This  s i t u a t i o n  
has been r e c o g n is e d  by the IDA who are t r y i n g  to  c o u n t e r ­
ac t  i t  by the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  the R esearch  Park a t  Naas,  
with s p e c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  r e se a r c h  p r o j e c t s .
Almost h a l f  o f  th e  non-au tonom ous  f i r m s  c a r r y  o u t  
the  m a r k e t i n g  f u n c t i o n  a b r o a d .  T h is  i s  p a r t l y  t h e  r e s u l t  
o f  th e  h i g h  e x p o r t  p r o p o r t i o n  i n  t h e i r  t o t a l  s a l e s .  The 
number o f  f i r m s  i n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  would p r o b a b l y  be g r e a t e r  
were i t  n o t  f o r  the  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  Coras  T r a c h t a l a  ( t h e  
I r i s h  E x p o r t  B o a r d ) .
The number of  f i rm s  which carry  out f u n c t i o n  1 (pur­
chasing o f  i n p u t s )  and 2 ( p r o v i s i o n  o f  components f o r  the  
I r i s h  p l a n t )  h e lp  to  e x p l a i n  the a l l e g e d l y  low l in k a g e
e f f e c t s  between the f o r e i g n  s e c t o r  and the r e s t  o f  the  
17economy. A f o r e i g n  u n i t  p u rc h a se s ,  components  and m a t e r i a l s  
f o r  the  I r i s h  p l a n t  i n  the  c a se  o f  55 f i r m s .  Such m a t e r i a l s  
w i l l  be from t r a d i t i o n a l  ( f o r e i g n )  s u p p l i e r s .  T w e n t y - f i v e  
f i rm s  c a r r y  o u t  b o t h  f u n c t i o n s  1 and 2 a b ro a d  and w i l l  
t h e r e f o r e  have  v e r y  h i g h  im p o r t  p r o p e n s i t i e s .  S e c t o r a l  
c l u s t e r i n g  i s  a g a i n  a p p a r e n t  -  12 such  f i r m s  a r e  from 
s e c t o r s  35 -  3 8 .
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I n  o n l y  n in e  f i r m s  a r e  b o t h  f u n c t i o n s  2 and 3 
p e r fo rm ed  o u t s i d e  I r e l a n d .  A com ple te  i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  
p r o c e s s e s  a c r o s s  n a t i o n a l  f r o n t i e r s  i s  e v i d e n t  i n  such  
f i r m s .  Of t h e s e  f i r m s ,  f o u r  a r e  i n  t h e  m e t a l  t r a d e s  
i n d u s t r y  ( IC IP  35)  and two i n  the  m a n u f a c t u r e  o f  
e l e c t r i c a l  m a c h in e r y .  These s i x  f i r m s  a r e  l a r g e  m u l t i ­
n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n ie s .
D e s p i t e  the  above f i n d i n g s ,  i n  many c a s e s  i t  d o e s  
a p p e a r  t h a t  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  a r e  g i v e n  m a n a g e r i a l  a u t o n ­
omy. I n  o n l y  *f6 f i r m s  i s  r e g u l a r  management c o n t r o l  o f  
the  p l a n t  e x e r c i s e d  from o u t s i d e . (However what  c o n ­
s t i t u t e s  " r e g u l a r  c o n t r o l "  may v a r y  b e tw e e n  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ) .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  a t  l e a s t  o p e r a t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s ,  230 o f  th e  
276 f o r e i g n  f i r m s  c l a im  t o  be i n d e p e n d e n t .
The t o t a l  number o f  d i f f e r e n t  f u n c t i o n s  p r o v i d e d  f o r  
the  I r i s h  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  by f o r e i g n  a s s o c i a t e s  i s  shown i n  
Table 3«17® T w e n ty - s ix  f i r m s  which  form  p a r t  o f  a l a r g e r  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  c l a im  to  have  none o f  t h e  l i s t e d  f u n c t i o n s  
p rov id ed  f o r  them w h i l s t  o n l y  two s t a t e  t h a t  a l l  e i g h t  
f u n c t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a number o f  o t h e r  s e r v i c e s ,  a r e  c a r r i e d  
out  a b r o a d .  The m ed ian  number f o r  t h e  a s s o c i a t e d  g roup  i s  
two f u n c t i o n s  and th e  mean number o f  f u n c t i o n s  p r o v i d e d  
i s  2 . 5 .
I l k
T a b le  3 . 1 7  Number o f  f u n c t i o n s  p e r fo rm ed  a b ro a d  f o r
the I r i s h  e s t a b l i s h m e n t
Number o f  f u n c t i o n s  Number o f  f i r m s  
Performed Abroad










S o u r c e t Author's  c a l c u l a t i o n s  from AFF Survey d a t a .
T h is  s e c t i o n  has shown th a t  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  
d i f f e r  g r e a t l y  i n  the d i v i s i o n  o f  f u n c t i o n s  between the  
I r i s h  s u b s i d i a r y  and th o se  performed f o r  the s u b s id i a r y  
by u n i t s  o f  the f irm o u t s i d e  I r e l a n d „ This  i s  a r e f l e c t i o n  
o f  d i f f e r e n c e s  of  o r g a n i s a t i o n  w i t h i n  the f o r e i g n  s e c t o r .  
Foreign owned u n i t s  i n  I r e la n d  range from s u b s i d i a r i e s  o f  
large m u l t i n a t i o n a l  companies ,  which are c l o s e l y  i n t e ­
grated a c r o s s  n a t i o n a l  f r o n t i e r s ,  to  sm a l l  p r iv a te  f i r m s ,  
l o o s e l y  connected  to  the parent  company. In  the extreme . 
c a s e ,  the parent  i s  a l o o s e l y  l in k e d  group o f  f o r e i g n  
in d iv i d u a l s  and the I r i s h  u n i t  can be c o n s id er ed  as an 
autonomous in v e s tm e n t .
S e c t i o n  h i  The Importance o f  the F o r e ig n  Owned Grant 
Aided S e c to r  o f  I r i s h  I n d u s t r y .
The importance o f  the f o r e i g n  owned grant  aided  
s e c t o r  i s  b e s t  c on s id ered  by exam in at ion  o f  i t s  c o n t r i b ­
u t io n  to  s e v e r a l  key economic m agnitudes;  to  output and 
e x p o r t s ,  to  employment c r e a t i o n ,  i t s  e f f e c t  on the  
economic s t r u c t u r e  and i t s  impact on i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  
and growth.
Table 3*18 shows the c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  t r a n s p o r t a b le  
goods output  and to e x p o r t s  made by f o r e i g n  owned, grant  
aided f i r m s  i n  1970. Column 2 o f  the Table i s  d e r iv e d  
from data  on the a c t u a l  output  and e x p o r t s  o f  277 f o r e i g n  
owned f irm s  from an An Foras Forbartha (AFF) Survey  
to ge th er  w i th  IDA data  on output  p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  a l l  f irm s*  
Actual output  o f  f o r e i g n  f irm s  not  in c lu d ed  i n  the Survey  
was e s t im a te d  i n  the f o l l o w i n g  way. The p r o p o r t io n  o f  
p ro jec ted  output  a c t u a l l y  r e a l i s e d  i n  each in d u s tr y  was 
c a lc u la t e d  f o r  a l l  f i rm s  i n  th a t  in d u s tr y  in c lu d ed  i n  the  
AFF Survey .  This  p r o p o r t io n  was then a p p l i e d  to  the  
pr o jec ted  output  o f  a l l  f o r e i g n  f i rm s  not  inc lu d ed  i n  the  
AFF sample .  In t h i s  way e s t i m a t e s  were made o f  the output  
and e x p o r ts  o f  a l l  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  f o r  1970.
The IDA e s t i m a t e s  th a t  76$ o f  grant  a ided  investm ent
18has come from f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s .  The output o f  
fo r e ig n  owned f irm s accounted  f o r  over 13$ o f  the t o t a l  
output o f  the t r a n sp o r ta b le  goods i n d u s t r i e s  i n  1970 
(Table 3 . 1 8 ) .  This  p r o p o r t io n  i s  I n c r e a s i n g  s e c u l a r l y .
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Table 3*1 i l l u s t r a t e d  the i n c r e a s e  i n  FBI over  the y e a rs  
and many o f  the f irm s  now i n  pr o d u ct io n  have not y e t  
reached t h e i r  f u l l  p o t e n t i a l  o u tp u t .
Table 3 .1 8  The F o re ig n  Owned Grant Aided S e c to r  of  I r i s h  
In du stry  ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
Item
2
A l l  F i rm s  F o r e i g n  G ran t
1.  Output o f  the  
Transp ortab le  
Goods In d u stry




3 .  T o ta l  E x p o rts
*f. E xp orts  e x c lu d in g  
Food, Drink and 
Tobacco
£
m i l l i o n
1 1 3 7 .5
7 6 7 .9
*+16.*+ 
2 2 3 .3
Aided Firms  
£ m i l l i o n
1 5 0 . 7
132.6
1 2 2 .7
102.8
3
F o r e i g n  
S h a re  o f  
t o t a l  
( i H ( 2 )  :
1 3 .3 *
17 A *
2 9 . 5 *
b6.1%
Column 1 ,  l i n e s  1 and 2 s Review o f  1971 and 
Outlook f o r  1 9 7 2 1 P r l  2357? S t a t i o n e r y  O f f i c e ,  
D u b l in .
Column 1 ,  l i n e  3 and f^s E x t e r n a l  Trade S t a t i s t i c s  
1970 CSO D u b l in ,  P r l .  2012.
Column 2 ,  Author’ s e s t i m a t e s  from c o n f i d e n t i a l  
IDA d ata  and AFF Surrey ( s e e  note  k )  see  t e x t .
L in es  3 and k  i l l u s t r a t e  a g a in  the importance o f  
fo r e ig n  owned f irm s  i n  the I r i s h  export  d r i v e .  Almost one 
th ird  o f  I r i s h  e x p o r ts  are from f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  -  t h i s  
in c r e a s e s  to  k6% when f o o d ,  dr ink  and tobacco  e x p o r ts  are  
excluded .  The d i f f e r e n c e  i n  the p r o p o r t io n  o f  output and
and e x p o r t s  c o n t r o l l e d  by f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  shows the  
commitment to  e x p o r ts  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s .
Table  3 . 1 9  shows the s e c t o r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the  
output o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  Hie d egree  o f  f o r e i g n  
c o n t r o l  v a r i e s  from s e c t o r  to  s e c t o r  but  the la rg e  share  
o f  the c h e m ic a ls  s e c t o r  i n  f o r e i g n  hands i s  notew orthy .  
Other s e c t o r s  w i th  c o n s i d e r a b l e  f o r e i g n  ownership are wood 
and f u r n i t u r e ,  m e ta ls  and emgineering  and o th e r  m anufact­
u r in g .  Only a sm al l  p r o p o r t io n  o f  the f o o d ,  dr ink  and 
tobacco i n d u s t r i e s  i s  i n  f o r e i g n  hands .  The in f lo w  o f  FBI 
has c l e a r l y  a l t e r e d  the  s e c t o r a l  c o m p o s i t io n  o f  I r i s h  
manufacturing i n d u s t r y .
Employment i n  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  i s  perhaps the  
most d i f f i c u l t  ’’impact e f f e c t ” to  e s t i m a t e  e i t h e r  from 
o f f i c i a l  f i g u r e s  or from the c o n f i d e n t i a l  IDA and AFF d a t a .  
Table 3*20 g i v e s  o f f i c i a l  f i g u r e s  f o r  employment i n  New 
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Table 3.20 Employment in New Industry Projects
(New F i rm s  and M ajor
D a te Numbers a c t u a l l y  employed
3 1 . 3 . 6 7
3 1 . 3 . 7 1
3 1 . 3 . 7 2  





+ I n c l u d i n g  employment a t  Shannon F r e e  A i r p o r t
IDA; Annual R e p o r t  1971 /72
T ab le  3 . 2 0  shows th e  amount o f  employment c r e a t e d  by  
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  The IDA s u g g e s t s  t h a t  o v e r  80$ o f  
t h e s e  j o b s  a r e  i n  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s .  J o b  c r e a t i o n  by 
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  i s  t h u s  o v e r  3 9 , 0 0 0 .  The a u t h o r ’ s own 
c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  u s i n g  p r o j e c t e d  employment f rom th e  IDA 
f i g u r e s  and a c t u a l  employment f rom the  AFF Survey  to  c o n ­
s t r u c t  ’’a c h ie v e m e n t  r a t i o s ” g i v e s  a n  e s t i m a t e  o f  j u s t  o v e r  
¥ 3 ,0 0 0 .  I t  c an  be assumed t h a t  th e  l a t t e r  f i g u r e  r e p r e s e n t s  
an  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  to  the  number employed i n  f o r e i g n  owned 
f i r m s  a t  t h e  b e g in n i n g  o f  1972 .
The c r e a t i o n  o f  *+0,000 new i n d u s t r i a l  j o b s  o v e r  a 
p e r i o d  o f  j u s t  o v e r  15 y e a r s  r e p r e s e n t s  a m a jo r  p o l i c y  
s u c c e s s .  T h i s  h ow ever ,  b e g s  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
methods o f  j o b  c r e a t i o n  u s i n g  s i m i l a r  amounts  o f  I r i s h  
r e s o u r c e s .  A f u l l  c o s t  b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  o f  r e s o u r c e  u se  i s  
r e q u i r e d ,  i n c l u d i n g  o t h e r  e f f e c t s  and we r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  
theme i n  C h a p te r  VII*
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S e c t i o n  5; C o n c lu s io n
The p o l i c i e s  o u t l i n e d  i n  C h a p te r  I I  have  r e s u l t e d  i n  
a  r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  i n  FDI i n  the  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o r  o f  th e  
economy. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h i s  i n v e s tm e n t  were examined i n  d e t a i l .
T h i s  C h a p te r  h a s  shown th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  FDI i n  
te rm s  o f  i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  G ross  D om e s t ic  C a p i t a l  Form­
a t i o n ,  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  o u t p u t ,  e x p o r t s ,  employment and t o  
th e  s e c t o r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  th e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o r .
The im p o r ta n c e  o f  Government p o l i c y  i s  c l e a r l y  
i l l u s t r a t e d  by the  s u c c e s s  o f  I r e l a n d  i n  r e d u c i n g  e m i g r a t i o n  
th r o u g h  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  new employment c r e a t i n g ,  
ou tward  l o o k i n g  i n d u s t r i e s .  The c o s t s  and s i d 6 - e f f e c t s  o f  
t h i s  p o l i c y  sho u ld  n o t  be i g n o r e d .  I n  th e  m a in ,  i t  i s  the  
s u c c e s s  o f  t h i s  p o l i c y  w h ich  h a s  b e e n  em p h a s i se d  h e r e .  
However, t h i s  sh o u ld  n o t  l e a d  t o  a n e g l e c t  o f  the  d o m e s t i c  
s e c t o r  i n t o  which  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  sh o u ld  be s e e n  a s  an  
e s s e n t i a l  i n p u t  ( p e r h a p s  t e m p o r a r i l y )  r a t h e r  t h a n  a s  an  
a l t e r n a t i v e .  The f o l l o w i n g  C h a p te r  l o o k s  e x p l i c i t l y  a t  
the  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e tw ee n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  and the  f o r e i g n  owned 
s e c t o r  i n  a d d i t i o n  to  a n  e x a m in a t io n  o f  t h e  e x t e r n a l  t r a d e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  the  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r .
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The author  would l i k e  to  convey h i s  thanks to
Mr. O’Huggin f o r  a l l o w in g  him a c c e s s  to  the Survey,  
a l s o  to  the s t a f f  o f  An Foras Forbartha f o r  t h e i r  
v a l u a b le  h e lp  and a s s i s t a n c e .
17 .  See Survey o f  Grant Aided In d u stry  (1967)  o p . c i t . and 
Chapter b .
18.  I n d u s t r i a l  Development A u t h o r i t y ,  D u b l in ,  Annual 
Report 1971 -  2 % Page 1 1 .
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Chapter IV: The Trade Pattern of Foreign Owned Firms
and the Emergence o f  a D u a l i s t i c  S tru c tu re  
i n  I r i s h  I n d u s t r y .
Chapter I I I  o u t l i n e d  the  magnitude and s t r u c t u r e  o f  
F o re ig n  D i r e c t  Investment i n  I r e l a n d .  This  Chapter b u i l d s  
on th a t  base  and a n a l y s e s  the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s  between the  
trade f l o w s  o f  I r e l a n d ,  the dom est ic  economic framework 
and the p a t t e r n  o f  FDI. Throughout t h i s  Chapter ,  the  
a n a l y s i s  i s  conducted i n  market p r i c e s .  Chapter VI on 
the Balance  o f  Payment proceeds  from t h i s  by v a lu in g  a l l  
goods ,  s e r v i c e s  and i n p u t s  a t  "world p r i c e s " .
In  Chapter I ,  I r e la n d  was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  as  a sm a l l  
open economy by r e f e r e n c e  to  the f o r e i g n  trade la t io  -FTR 
( t o t a l  e x p o r t s  p lu s  t o t a l  imports  in c lu d i n g  current  income 
on c a p i t a l  to  G .N .P . )  Heavy dependence on e x t e r n a l  t r a d e ,  
however,  i s  not the o n ly  f a c e t  o f  openness  which the I r i s h  
economy e x h i b i t s .  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  f l o w s  o f  primary f a c t o r s ;  
c a p i t a l  and la b o u r ,  a l s o  tend to be h ig h  in  the Irish c a s e .  
B e s id e s  d i r e c t  in v e s tm e n t ,  s t a t e  borrowing from abroad, p o r t ­
f o l i o  c a p i t a l  in f lo w s  and "other  items" (changes  i n  the  
e x t e r n a l  p o s i t i o n  o f  the commercial b an ks ,  h i r e  purchase  
agreements and f o r e i g n  a c c e p ta n c e s  by banks)  a l s o  f i g u r e  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  as  Table ^*1 shows#
Table *+,1 D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Net C a p i t a l  In f lo w  to  
Ir e la n d  1 9 6 1 - 1 9 7 0 . ?
1 Net 2 Net 3 Net k  Net 5 6
Govern- Borrowing D i r e c t  P o r t -  Other T o t a l
m enta l  by S t a t e  I n v e s t -  f o l i o  Items
Borrowing Sponsored ment I n v e s t -
B o d ie s  ment
T o t a l  (£m) 5 l73  76~  U 3T2 7^7  9Ju 9 ~ ^ + 3 T 2
% I k  . 9  2 2 .2  33o0 2 .2  2 7 . 7  1 0 0 .0
Source ? Dermot McAleese (1972)  "C ap ita l  In f lo w s  and
D i r e c t  F o re ig n  Investment i n  Ir e la n d  19^7-70"
In  comparison to  o th e r  European c o u n t r i e s ,  the
magnitude o f  these  c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s  i s  la r g e  r e l a t i v e  to
Gross D om est ic  C a p i t a l  Formation and o f f i c i a l  f o r e i g n
3currency r e s e r v e s .
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  f l o w s  o f  labour f i g u r e  prom inently  i n  
I r i s h  economic p o l i c y  as Chapters I and I I  dem onstrated .  
R ed u ct io n  o f  the labour o u t f lo w  from I r e la n d  has been  a 
major p o l i c y  t a r g e t .  In a d d i t i o n ,  I r e la n d  has a number o f  
unusual  e x t e r n a l  l i n k s .  The I r i s h  labour  market i s  c l o s e l y  
l in k e d  w i t h  th a t  o f  the U .K . ,  cheque payments between the 
two c o u n t r i e s  o b t a in  and i n  a d d i t i o n  I r e la n d  has unique  
c u l t u r a l  and k in s h ip  t i e s  w i th  the U .K . ,  U . S . A . ,  Canada,  
A u s t r a l i a  and New Z ealand.  These trade f l o w s  and f l o w s  
of  primary f a c t o r s  both  c o n t r ib u t e  to  the open nature o f  
the I r i s h  economy.
The o p e n n e s s  o f  th e  economy h a s  i m p o r t a n t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
f o r  deve lo p m e n t  p o l i c y .  The economy i s  s e n s i t i v e  to  
e x t e r n a l  s h o c k s ,  t r a n s m i t t e d  hy the  t r a d e  s e c t o r .  I n j e c t ­
i o n s  i n  th e  form o f  e x p o r t s  and l e a k a g e s  i n  the  form o f  
i m p o r t s ,  do m in a te  r e a l  income changes  t o  a f a r  l a r g e r  e x t e n t  
t h a n  would be th e  c a se  i n  a more c l o s e d  s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  
economy. The f o r e i g n  t r a d e  s e c t o r  c o u ld  t h u s  be a n  i m p o r t ­
a n t  s o u r c e  o f  i n s t a b i l i t y .  M o reov er ,  some o f  the  c o n v e n t ­
i o n a l  p o l i c y  t o o l s  f o r  th e  c o r r e c t i o n  o f  such  d i s e q u i l i b r i a  
a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  th e  I r i s h  Government .  M one tary  p o l i c y  
i s  c o n s t r a i n e d  by the  c i r c u l a t i o n  o f  th e  B r i t i s h  £ s t e r l i n g  
i n  the  R e p u b l i c ,  The I r i s h  £ h a s  c o n v e n t i o n a l l y  b e e n  t i e d  
to  s t e r l i n g  and so d e v a l u a t i o n  o r  r e v a l u a t i o n  u n i l a t e r a l l y  
i s  n o t  f e a s i b l e .  I n s t a b i l i t y  i n  th e  f a c e  o f  an  i n c o m p le te  
rang e  o f  c o r r e c t i v e  p o l i c y  t o o l s  c o n s t i t u t e s  a s e v e r e  c o n ­
s t r a i n t  on th e  c h o ic e  o f  d eve lopm en t  p a t h s .
An economy w i t h  a h i g h  FTR and a f a i r l y  low l e v e l  o f  
deve lopm en t  must have a low d e g re e  o f  i n t e r n a l  s t r u c t u r a l  
i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e .  D om es t ic  i n p u t - o u t p u t  l i n k s  =re s m a l l .
The im p o r t  c o n t e n t  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e s  i s  h i g h  and d o m e s t i c  
a c t i v i t y  a p p r o x i m a t e s  to  a f a b r i c a t i n g  economy i n  w h ich  im­
p o r t e d  i n p u t s  a re  p r o c e s s e d  and r e - e x p o r t e d .  The need  f o r  
im p o r ted  i n t e r m e d i a t e  goods n e c e s s i t a t e s  a h i g h  l e v e l  o f  
e x p o r t  e a r n i n g s .  The v i c i o u s  c i r c l e  o f  dependence  on the  
world  economy can  be e a s e d  o n ly  by d o m e s t i c  economic g row th  
and the  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s e s .  
The c o n t r i b u t i o n  of  FDI t o  t h i s  dev e lop m en t  i s  a n a l y s e d  i n  
t h i s  C h a p t e r .  There a r e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  s u b s t a n t i a l  b e n e f i t s
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from i n t e r n a t i o n a l  trade and these  too  should be 
i l l u m i n a t e d .  The Chapter thus  examines the s t r o n g  and 
p e r v a s iv e  l i n k s  between i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f l o w s  o f  f a c t o r s  
and o f  goods*
S e c t i o n  I FDI and Trade F low s:  An Exam ination o f  Trends
The t r a d i t i o n a l  "comparative c o s t"  theory  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  trade  made, i n  g e n e r a l ,  a r a th e r  f o r c e d  dichotomy  
between trade and f a c t o r  f l o w s .  The growth and r e c o g ­
n i t i o n )  o f  the phenomenon o f  d i r e c t  investm en t  and the  
i n c r e a s i n g  importance o f  the " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  firm" made 
the assum ption  o f  independence o f  the two f l o w s  an i n ­
adequate b a s i s  f o r  a complete  theory o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
t r a d e .  Many r e c e n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  trade  
theory  have attempted to  i n t e g r a t e  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f lo w  
of  f a c t o r s  and the f low  o f  goods w i t h i n  a s i n g l e  £rame-
kwork. R e c o g n i t io n  of  the importance o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f irm s  i n  world trade  n e c e s s i t a t e s  abandoning s e v e r a l  o f  
the u s u a l  assum ptions  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  trade  th e o r y .  These  
a r e :
(1 )  t h a t  a l l  f irm s  are p r i c e  t a k e r s ,
(2 )  th a t  knowledge i s  a f r e e  good and t h e r e f o r e  th a t  
p r o d u c t io n  f u n c t i o n s  are i d e n t i c a l  i n  a l l  c o u n t r i e s ,
(3 )  th a t  c o m p le te ly  f r e e  movement o f  goods and com­
p l e t e  im m obi l i ty  o f  f a c t o r s  o f  p r o d u c t io n  i s  the  
norm i n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  trade*
The e x i s t e n c e  o f  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f irm  means th a t  
the f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r s  must be r ec o g n ise d ?
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( 1 )  The o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  i n d u s t r i e s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
o f t e n  means th a t  o l i g o p o l i s t i c  behaviour  must be g i v e n  
e x p l i c i t  r e c o g n i t i o n .
(2 )  The c o n t r o l  o f  knowledge and o th e r  in c o m e -c r e a t in g  
a s s e t s  w i t h i n  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f irm  means tha t  such  
f i r m s  can i n f l u e n c e  the "comparative advantage” o f  n a t i o n ­
s t a t e s  by t h e i r  l o c a t i o n  and p ro d u ct io n  d e c i s i o n s .
(3 )  C on tro l  o f  the f l o w s  o f  c a p i t a l  and goods i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l l y  w i t h i n  the same d e c i s i o n  t a k i n g  u n i t  has both  
s h i f t e d  a t t e n t i o n  away from the n a t io n  to  the i n d i v i d u a l  
f irm  and has made the assum ption o f  independence o f  the  
two f lo w s  u n t e n a b le .
The d e c i s i o n s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m s  about l o c a t i o n  
and s o u r c e s  o f  supply have become c r u c i a l  to  the p r e ­
d i c t i o n  o f  trade f l o w s .  Trade and l o c a t i o n  theory  must
$
th e r e f o r e  be combined. The i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f irm  can choose  
between e x p o r t in g  and p r o d u c t io n  abroad as  a means o f  
s e r v i c i n g  a f o r e i g n  market .  (L ic e n s in g  may be a th ir d  
means o f  i n c r e a s i n g  the r e t u r n  on a f i r m - s p e c i f i c  income-  
c r e a t i n g  a s s e t ) .  S e v e r a l  t e s t s  o f  the nature  o f  t h i s  
cho ice  have been c a r r ie d  o u t ,  n o ta b ly  by Horst  and by 
Buckley  and Dunning.
C o n s id e r a t io n  i s  g iv e n  f i r s t  to trade f lo w s  of  I r e la n d  
in  the a g g r e g a t e .  The f i g u r e s  o f  the in f l o w  o f  FDI,  
imports and e x p o r t s  are s e t  out i n  T a b le s^ .2  and *+.3* 
Underly ing  the in c r e a s e  i n  e x p o r ts  i s  a rap id  ex p a n s io n  o f  
i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r t s  (Table ^-.2 Column 3 )  which in c r e a se d
from 20% o f  t o t a l  e x p o r t s  i n  1956 to  over  58$ i n  1970.  
Table *+.*+ which p r e s e n t s  annual  growth r a t e s  o f  the  
major s e r i e s  shows that  i n  a l l  yea rs  ( e x c e p t  I960 -  6 2 ) ,  
the growth o f  i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r t s  was over  13$ and th a t  
the average  annual growth r a t e  was 19*1$» In c o n t r a s t ,  
the growth o f  t o t a l  e x p o r t s  has  been unsteady  d e s p i t e  
the 9*8$ average annual growth.  The c o n n e c t io n  between  
FDI and i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r t s  w i l l  be a m p l i f i e d  l a t e r  i n  
t h i s  Chapter.
T a b le  *+.2 FDI and E x p o r t s  1956-1970 ( £ 0 0 0 s )
Year
1.
F o r e i g n
D i r e c t
I n v e s tm e n t
2.
T o t a l
E x p o r t s
3.
I n d u s t r i a l
E x p c r t s +
1+.
I n d u s t r i a l  K x p o r t s  
a s  $ t o t a l  e x p o r t s  
(3/2)
1956 82 1 0 0 ,1 2 7 2 2 ,000 20.3
1957 1,800 131,3^1 28,000 21.3
1958 1,677 131,293 3 3 ,0 0 0 25.1
1959 2,662 130,607 1+1,000 31.1+
I960 5,072 152,703 53,000 31+.7
1961 3,69^ 180,1+73 56,ooo 31.0
1962 3,636 17!+,390 59,ooo 33.8
1963 5,337 196,539 68,000 31+.6
196*+ 2,98? 222,001+ 91,000 1+1,0
196? 10,135 220,811 10l+,000 1+7.1
1966 7,806 2l+l+,323 127,000 52.0
1967 9,869 285,086 11+7,000 51.6
1968 23,881* 332,1+75 18l+,000 55.3
1969 29,066 371,1+1+1211+,000 57.6
1970 36,1+2*+ 1+31,618 251,000 58.2
S o u r c e : Column 1. As T ab le  2 .8
Column 2 .  E x t e r n a l  Trade S t a t i s t i c s  197 1* 
Column 3 .  IDA Annual Report 1 9 6 9 /7 0 .  F ig u r e s  
f o r  1956 and 1957 from Trade and Shipping  
S t a t i s t i c s  ( v a r i o u s )  and f o r  1970 from Rev lev; 
o f  1971 Outlook f o r  1972 ( P r l . 2357)
+ As d e f i n e d  i n  Appendix I I  o f  The Second Programme f o r  
Economic Expansion Part I I .
Over the p er iod  1956 -  70, the growth o f  imports has  
corresponded to  that  o f  e x p o r t s ,  annual average growth o f  
imports b e in g  9 *7$ (Table I t  i s  h e l p f u l  to  d i v i d e
imports  by use i n  order to  e s t a b l i s h  whether in c r e a se d  
e a rn in g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange from the in c r e a s e d  export  
r e c e i p t s  have been spent  on consumption go od s ,  in te r m e d ia te  
goods or c a p i t a l  goods.  In  f a c t  Table ^-.3 shows th a t  
p r o d u c e r s ’ c a p i t a l  goods have in c r e a se d  as a p r o p o r t io n  o f  
the t o t a l  import b i l l ,  consumption goods have r e t a i n e d  a 
c o n s ta n t  share and the share o f  imported in te r m e d ia te  goods  
has d e c l i n e d .  This s u g g e s t s  that  d o m est ic  v a lu e  added (a t  
market p r i c e s ) has in c r e a s e d  and t h i s  was borne out i n  
Chapter I .  The trend i s  towards im port ing  c a p i t a l  goods  
and i n c r e a s i n g  the share o f  the p r o d u c t io n  p r o c e s s  c a r r ie d  
out i n  I r e l a n d .  FDI may have c o n t r ib u t e d  to  t h i s  -  c l e a r l y  
an in f lo w  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  w i l l  in v o l v e  in c r e a se d  imports  
of  c a p i t a l  goods and should  expand the p rod u ct iv e  c a p a c i t y  
o f  the d o m e st ic  economy. We must however r e t a i n  r e s e r ­
v a t i o n s  on t h i s  i s s u e  u n t i l  the output i s  v a lu e d  a t  true  
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The r a t e s  o f  growth o f  imports and e x p o r t s  are both  
g r e a t e r  than the average r a t e  o f  growth o f  GNP which was 
8.1$- 1956-70  ( se e  Table A l . l ) .  I r e la n d  i s  thus becoming 
more ’o p e n 1 -  more dependent on the trade s e c t o r .
Table The r a te  o f  growth o f  FDI, e x p o r t s « i n d u s t r i a l
e x p o r t s  and im ports  1956 -  1 9 7 0 .
Year 1 .  Annual  
% FDI 
In c r e a s e
2 .  Annual  
% In c r e a s e  
T o t a l  Exports
3 .  Annual  
% In cr ea se  
I n d u s t r i a l  
Exports
4 .  Ann 
% Incr  
Import
1 956-57 2095 2 1 . 5 2 7 .3 +0 .0
1957-58 - 6 .8 - 0 .0 1 7 .9 8 .0
1958-59 5 8 .7 +0 .0 2 4 .2 6 . 9
1959-60 9 0 .5 1 6 . 9 2 9 .3 6 .4
1960-61 - 2 7 .0 1 8 .2 5 . 7 1 5 .5
1961-62 - 1 .6 -3  A 5 . 1 4 . 7
1962-63 1+6 .8 1 2 . 7 1 3 .2 1 2 .4
1963-64 -i+l+.l 1 3 .0 3 3 . 8 1 3 .5
1964-65 2 3 9 .5 - 0 . 0 1 4 .3 6 .4
1965-66 - 2 3 .0 + 0 .0 2 2 . 1 + 0 .0
1966-67 2 6 A 11+.3 1 5 . 7 5 .3
1967-68 1 4 2 .0 1 6 .6 2 5 . 4 2 6 .5
1968-69 2 1 . 7 1 1 .7 1 5 .4 1 8 .9




- 9 .8 1 9 . 1 9 . 7
S o u r c e : As Table *+.2 and Table ^ . 3 .
The i n f l u e n c e  o f  FDI i s  most pronounced on I r i s h  
i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r t s .  The i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r t  performance  
o f  Ir e la n d  i s  v ery  c r e d i t a b l e  when s e t  a g a i n s t  the growth  
o f  world m a rk ets .  Table shows the r a t e  o f  growth o f  
I r i s h  i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r t s  and o f  the markets f o r  such  
p r o d u c t s .  Line 1 shows the growth o f  world trade i n  
n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  products  w e ighted  by the commodity and 
g e o g r a p h ic a l  p a t t e r n  o f  I r i s h  e x p o r ts  i n  the base  y e a r .
The second l i n e  shows the growth o f  I r i s h  e x p o r t s  o f  non-  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  products  ( the  d e f i n i t i o n  d i f f e r s  from th a t  
u t i l i s e d  i n  Tables  *+.2 and k . k  -  i t  i s  a broader d e f i n i t i o n .  
In  every  year  between 1965 and 1970 the r a t e  o f  growth 
o f  I r i s h  e x p o r t s  was i n  g e n e r a l  g r e a t e r  than  th a t  o f  the  
markets which s u g g e s t s  th a t  some changes i n  the supply  
s id e  as w e l l  as in c r e a s e d  demand have o c c u r e d .  This  i s  
a d d i t i o n a l  e v id en ce  o f  the change i n  I r i s h  dom est ic  e c o n ­
omic s t r u c t u r e  brought about a t  l e a s t  i n  par t  by FDI (Table
H.7 shows th a t  3k% o f  I r i s h  e x p o r t s  came from f o r e i g n  owned
grant a id ed  f i r m s ) .  F o r e ig n  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  mainly i n t o
the e x p o r t in g  s e c t o r s  o f  I r i s h  in d u s tr y  -  indeed i t  c r e a t e s  
such s e c t o r s .  F o re ig n  f i rm s  are encouraged to  export  by 
the system o f  i n d u s t r i a l  i n c e n t i v e s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  by the  
tax  c o n c e s s i o n s  on p r o f i t s  earned from e x p o r t s  and the  
removal o f  d u ty  on imports  embodied i n  ex p o r t  p r o d u c t io n ,  
as e x p la in e d  i n  Chapter I I .
Table *+.5 I r i s h  export  performance 1965 -  70
Year 1965 166 f 67 }6S  ’ 69 170
I .  Growth o f  I r i s h  Markets % 3 |  8^ 12 J 12^ 11 12 i
2 .  Growth o f  I r i s h  Exp orts  % 9^- 11-* ?2-£ 13 15 27
3 . . .Export Performance (2 minus 1) 3 i  10 \  *+ 1 5 j
Source s OECD (1972)  Economic Survey; I r e l a nd
13*+
These c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  s u g g e s t  th a t  th e re  are mech­
anisms which make f o r  a h ig h e r  l e v e l  o f  im porting by 
f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  than by comparable I r i s h  o n e s .
Thus an in c r e a s e  i n  FDI may be e x p ected  to  l ea d  to  a 
l a r g e r  quantum o f  trade  b oth  i n t o  and out o f  the economy.
Some secondary c a u s a l  l i n k s  may r e - i n f o r c e  t h i s  
ten d e n c y .  An in f lo w  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  combined w i th  
subsequent r e c e i p t s  from export  p r o v id e s  the f o r e i g n  
exchange to  f in a n c e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  im p o r ts .  The imports  
th e m se lv e s  may r e l i e v e  a c o n s t r a i n t  on e x p o r t in g  -  p a r t i c ­
u l a r l y  where p r o d u ce r 's  c a p i t a l  goods and c e r t a i n  i n t e r -
7
mediate  in p u t s  are not a v a i l a b l e  l o c a l l y .  S p i l l o v e r s  
from the f o r e i g n  f i r m s  may r a i s e  the e x p o r t in g  c a p a b i l i ­
t i e s  o f  d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned f i r m s .  E x t e r n a l  e f f e c t s  
i n  a more g e n e r a l  sense  ( c r e a t i o n  o f  an i n d u s t r i a l  e thos ,  
r e d u c t i o n  o f  search c o s t s  f o r  p r o f i t a b l e  o p p o r t u n i t e s  
and the spur o f  in c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t io n )  may a l s o  improve 
export  perform ance.  Indeed f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  may be 
regarded a s  a s p e c i f i c  and separate  input  i n  the prod­
u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  o f  the e x p o r t in g  s e c t o r .  The in f lo w  o f  
FDI which embodies t e c h n o l o g i c a l  e x p e r t i s e ,  management 
s k i l l s  and the a b i l i t y  to  g a in  a c c e s s  to  markets may have
been an e s s e n t i a l  p r e r e q u i s i t e  f o r  a s u c c e s s f u l  a ttempt
8
t o  in c r e a s e  e x p o r t s .  The f a c t  th a t  I r e la n d  has become 
more c o m p e t i t i v e  i n  world  markets (Table *+,5) i s  a 
phenomenon which m e r i t s  exam in at ion  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  FDI 
i n f l o w s .
Table b,6 A Cross-section analysis of the Exports of
F o re ig n  Owned Grant-Aided I n d u s t r y (1970)
1





Exports  o f  




T o t a l  
I r i s h  
FiXpor t s 
(£m)
F o r e ig n  
( 3 )  as  
% (*+>
Food ( e x c lu d in g  l i v e  
a n i m a l s )
2 0 1 -7 Ik .8 2 3 6 .3 6
T e x t i l e s 22 1 2 .1 2 7 .5 *+8
Appare1 23 8 . 9 2 2 .1 ko
Wood and F urniture 2*+ k.8 5 .0 96
Paper and Paperboard,  
Boxes
26^-5 2 . 6 it .  8 53
P r in te d  M atter 27 1 . 0 2 . 6 hO
C h em ica ls ,  P l a s t i c s ,  
Drugs
2 8 1 -7 2 3 .8 2 5 . 9 92
Tyres and Rubber 
P roducts
30 /301 5 . 7 6 . 1 9*+
G la s s ,  S t o n e ,  Clay  
and Concrete
321r4f 0 . 6 7 .2 8
Iro n ,  S t e e l ,  Non-  
f e r r o u s  M eta ls
33 k*$ 1 0 .0 k5
Household A p p l ia n c e s ,  
H eating Apparatus
3*+,36 1 0 .1 1 6 .2 62
S p e c i a l  I n d u s t r i a l  Mach­
in e r y
35 8 . 5 9 . 3 92
Motor V e h i c l e s  and 
Par t s
37 1 . 1 $ .0 22
Instrum ents  and P re c ­
i s i o n  Goods
38 8.k 1 0 .3 81
Other and Unknown 19 1 2 . 7 - -
T o ta l  I n d u s t r i a l  Exports 1 1 7 .0 2 5 1 .0 ^6
TOTAL EXPORTS 1 2 2 .6 W16.1* 3>k
Sources s Column 3 Author •s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from c o n f i d e n t ! a l
IDA and AFF d a ta  ( s e e  T a b l e ) .  Column ** D er iv e d
from E x t e r n a l  Trade S t a t i s t i c s
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A Cross-section Analysis of FDI and Exports
T ab le  ^ . 6  shows th e  e x p o r t s  o f  th e  f o r e ig n - o w n e d  
f i r m s  by i n d u s t r y .  The d i v i s i o n  i n t o  i n d u s t r y  g ro u p s  
i s  by th e  SIC c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  and some r e - c l a s s i f y i n g  
had  t o  be c a r r i e d  o u t .  The s e c t o r s  n o t  i n c l u d e d  i n  
T ab le  *+.6 c o n t a i n  l i t t l e  o r  no e x p o r t s  f rom g r a n t  a i d e d  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  -  some s e c t o r s  would have  s l i g h t l y  
i n c r e a s e s  f i g u r e s  i f  n o n - g r a n t  a i d e d  FBI were i n c l u d e d  
b u t  such  i n v e s tm e n t  i s  m a in ly  d i r e c t e d  a t  s u p p ly in g  th e  
home m a r k e t .  +
The e s t i m a t e s  show t h a t  o f  a l l  e x p o r t s  i s  
a c c o u n te d  f o r  by the  e x p o r t s  o f  g r a n t  a i d e d  f o r e i g n  owned 
f i r m s  and t h a t  t h i s  s h a r e  r i s e s  t o  when o n ly  i n d u s t ­
r i a l  e x p o r t s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d .  The f o r e i g n  f i r m s  p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  e x p o r t s  v a r i e s  w i d e l y  b e tw e e n  s e c t o r s  e v en  i n  th e  
i n d u s t r i a l  g r o u p i n g s .  Some s e c t o r f s e x p o r t s  a r e  c o m p l e t e l y  
d om in a ted  by  th e  e x p o r t s  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  I n  f o u r  s e c t o r s ;  
wood and f u r n i t u r e ,  c h e m i c a l s ,  p l a s t i c s  and d r u g s ,  t y r e s ,  
r u b b e r  and s p e c i a l  i n d u s t r i a l  m a c h in e r y ,  o v e r  90% o f  
e x p o r t s  come from f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  I n  some c a s e s ,  one 
o r  two l a r g e  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  a c c o u n t  f o r  a lm o s t  a l l  o f  th e  
f o r e i g n  s h a r e  of  e x p o r t s .  O f t e n  th e  b u l k  o f  the  e x p o r t s  
o f  a w i d e l y  d e f i n e d  s e c t o r  i n  f a c t  o r i g i n a t e  v / i t h i n  one o r  
two n a rrow  p r o d u c t  g r o u p s .  Such p r o d u c t s  a r e  u s u a l l y  t y p i ­
c a l  o f  t h e  o u t p u t  o f  the  s e c t o r  a s  a whole  -  an  example  o f  
t h i s  e x i s t s  i n  th e  wood p r o d u c t s  s e c t o r • (Bowling a l l 6 y  e q u i p ­
ment ) .
-+ See s e c t i o n  3 b e lo w .
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The low p r o p o r t io n  o f  food  e x p o r t s  accounted f o r  
by f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  i s  worthy o f  n o t i c e ,  because  t h i s  
i s  one o f  the s e c t o r s  where I r i s h  raw m a t e r i a l s  could  
be e x p l o i t e d .  (This  can be accounted f o r  by the h ig h  
export  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  the dom est ic  food  s e c t o r ) .  The 
Table shows that  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  has  e n te r e d  m ainly  the  
te c h n o lo g y  i n t e n s i v e  s e c t o r s  v i z .  c h e m i c a l s ,  p l a s t i c s
9and d r u g s ,  rubber p r o d u c t s ,  machinery and p r e c i s i o n  g o o d s .  
The i n d u s t r i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  i s  
a g a in  shown to  d i f f e r  from that  o f  d o m e st ic  f i r m s .  The 
e ntran ce  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i n t o  the e x p o r t in g  s e c t o r  has  
broadened the  range o f  I r i s h  export  p r o d u c t s .
The Terms o f  Trade
The f i n a l  p o in t  above l e a d s  i n t o  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the
e f f e c t  o f  the in f lo w  o f  FDI on the Terms o f  Trade i n
I r e l a n d .  The Commodity Terms o f  Trade (T o f  T) r e l a t e
the p r i c e  o f  a c o u n t r y f s e x p o r ts  to the p r i c e  o f  i t s
im p o rts .  (Px 
Pm 5
The standard theory  of  growth and trade s u g g e s t s  t h a t ,  
when a country  i s  r e c e i v i n g  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l ,  i t s  terms o f  
trade w i l l  tend to  improve i f  i t s  im ports  are r e l a t i v e l y  
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  and to  worsen i f  i t s  e x p o r t s  are c a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i v e  (w ith  the extreme case  b e in g  "Im m iser is ing  
growth’1) .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an optimum tax  on i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  f l o w s  p a r a l l e l  to  the optimum t a r i f f  on 
trade f l o w s  has been d e v e lo p e d .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t e c h n i c a l  
p r o g r ess  i n  the export  in d u s tr y  w i l l  tend to  turn  a
1 3 8
co u n tr y * s  terms of  trade  a g a i n s t  i t .  Consequently  one 
needs to  combine th ese  two e f f e c t s  to  a r r iv e  at  the 
t h e o r e t i c a l  p r e d i c t i o n  on the T o f  T. A p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i n t e r e s t i n g  a r t i c l e  by Max Corden e x te n d s  t h i s  p o s s i b ­
i l i t y  by c o n s id e r in g  the " f o r e i g n  owned sec to r "  as  
ana lagou s  to  a f o r e i g n  s t a t e ,  thereby m u l t i p l y i n g  the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  goods and c a p i t a l  f l o w s . '1'0
I t  i s  u n l i k e l y  however,  as Johnson p o i n t s  o u t ,  th a t
n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s  are i n f l u e n c e d  by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  such
11as those  con ta in ed  i n  the l a s t  paragraph. Of more 
i n t e r e s t  to  the Governments i s  the a b i l i t y  to  f in a n c e  an 
i n c r e a s i n g  import b i l l  and to  expand the range o f  e x p o r t s  
to  t h i s  end .  Table *+.7 shows volume and p r ic e  i n d i c e s  
o f  I r i s h  imports  and e x p o r t s  and p r e s e n t s  two measures o f  
the T o f  T d e f in e d  as f o l l o w s .
1 .  The Commodity T o f  T (C ) are d e f i n e d  as a p r i c e  index
t
o f  e x p o r t s  d iv id e d  by a p r i c e  index  o f  imports  i . e .
P P
E l  Ml
C = /  * /
t  P P
EO MO
where p = p r i c e  in d e x ,  and the s u b s c r i p t s  E ,M ,1 ,0  i n d i c a t e  
e x p o r t s ,  im p o r ts ,  current  year  v a l u e  and base year v a lu e  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  An in c r e a s e  (or " favourab le  movement") o f  
such an ind ex  i s  not n e c e s s a r i l y  o f  b e n e f i t  to  the country  -  
i t  i s  the movement i n  the under ly ing  supp ly  and demand co n ­
d i t i o n s  f o r  imports and e x p o r t s  which determ ine  g a i n s  and 
l o s s e s .  I t  i s  v a lu e  and not p r ic e  a lone  which m a t t e r s .
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( 2 ) The Income T o f  T (Y are d e f i n e d  as the Commodity
t )
T o f  T m u l t i p l i e d  by a volume index  i . e .
Q
Y = C ( )
* * QE0
where Q = volume in d e x .  This  index  i l l u s t r a t e s  the a b i l i t y  
o f  the economy to  purchase imports* A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  the  
index  shows the purchas ing  power o f  a u n i t  in c r e a s e  i n  . 
ex p o r ts*
Table W.7 shows th a t  both  the import and export  
p r ic e  i n d i c e s  have been  i n c r e a s i n g  over  the p e r io d .  I n ’ 
r e c e n t  y e a r s  however (p o s t  1 9 6 6 ) the e x p o r t  p r ic e  ind ex  
has been  r i s i n g  f a s t e r .  The income T o f  T have improved 
s in c e  1962* The i n c r e a s e  i n  the volume o f  e x p o r ts  has  
been a major f a c t o r  here  and the c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  FDI to  
t h i s  i s  im p o rtan t .  These i s s u e s  are d e a l t  w i th  a t  
g r e a t e r  l e n g t h  i n  the c o n t e x t  o f  a form al  a n a l y s i s  o f  the  
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S e c t i o n  2 The Market  P a t t e r n  o f  E x p o r t s  f rom F o r e i g n
Owned F i rm s  i n  I r e l a n d ,
I t  was shown e a r l i e r  t h a t  I r i s h  e x p o r t s  have  i n c r e a s e d  
much f a s t e r  t h a n  the  g ro w th  o f  t h e i r  p r i n c i p a l  m a r k e t s .  I t  
i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p e r t i n e n t  t o  a n a l y s e  t h e  m a rk e t  d i s t r i b ­
u t i o n  p a t t e r n  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  i n  I r e l a n d ,  w h ic h  a p p e a r  
t o  ha.v8 s i g n i f i c a n t l y  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  th e  g ro w th  o f  I r i s h  
e x p o r t s *  Such an  a n a l y s i s  a l s o  sh eds  l i g h t  on th e  i n t e r ­
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw een  c a p i t a l  f lo w s  and t r a d e  f low s*  T h i s  
i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  h a s  b e e n  ig n o r e d  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  t r a d e  
t h e o r y .  C a p i t a l  f l o w s  were u s u a l l y  p l a c e d  i n  the  am b i t  
o f  c a p i t a l  t h e o r y ,  which  r e g a r d e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i f f e r ­
e n t i a l s  i n  i n t e r e s t  a s  the  m a jo r  f a c t o r  i n f l u e n c i n g  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  f l o w s .  However,  th e  H e c k s h e r - O n l i n  
t h e o r y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  e x p l i c i t l y  assumed the  
i m m o b i l i t y  o f  f a c t o r s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  b e tw e e n  c o u n t r i e s .
The a d v e n t  o f  th e  " i n t e r n a t i o n a l ” f i r m  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s  
h a s  d e a l t  a t e l l i n g  blow t o  th e  f a l s e  d icho tom y  b e tw e e n  
f a c t o r  and t r a d e  f l o w s  assumed by t r a d i t i o n a l  t h e o r y .  The 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m  i s  a b l e  t o  s e r v i c e  a f o r e i g n  m a rk e t  by 
e x p o r t i n g  o r  by i n v e s t i n g  i n  and p r o d u c in g  w i t h i n  th e  
c o u n t r y  ( i t  may a l s o  have th e  c h o ic e  o f  l i c e n s i n g  any 
a d v a n ta g e  i t  p o s s e s s e s  t o  a h o s t  c o u n t r y  f i r m ) .  The a t t e n t ­
i o n  i s  t h u s  s h i f t e d  away from the  c o u n t r y  to  the  f i r m  a s  an
Ip
i n d e p e n d e n t  d e c i s i o n  t a k i n g  u n i t .  T h e r e f o r e  we need  to  
a n a l y s e  the  m ark e t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  p a t t e r n  o f  th e  e x p o r t s  o f  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i n  I r e l a n d .  Because  o f  t h e  autonomous d e c i s i o n  
t a k i n g  n a t u r e  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m s , we must  a l s o  pay 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e i r  l o c a t i o n  and " s o u r c i n g "  p o l i c i e s .
lh2
L o c a t i o n  t h e o r y  becomes i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h i s  new c o n t e x t  
and i t  m eshes  w e l l  w i t h  th e  t h e o r y  o f  t h e  f i r m .  C os t  and 
m a rk e t  f a c t o r s  a r e  c l e a r l y  m a jo r  i n f l u e n c e s  on the  f i r m s  
when t h e  f i r m  i s  f a c e d  w i t h  a f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  v e r s u s  
e x p o r t i n g  d e c i s i o n .  The m a rk e t  a t  which  the  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t o r  i s  a im in g  (and th e  e x t e n t  to  which  th e  i n v e s t o r  
c an  i n c r e a s e  demand by b e i n g  p r e s e n t  i n  a m a r k e t )  a r e  
c l e a r l y  m a jo r  i n f l u e n c e s  on the  i n v e s t m e n t  d e c i s i o n .
I n  th e  case  o f  I r e l a n d ,  we must  c o n s i d e r  a f u r t h e r  
a r e a  o f  t h e o r y  -  cus tom s u n i o n  t h e o r y .  The " h o s t  c o u n t r y "  
m ark e t  f o r  many f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  may be th e  EEC o r  t h e y  
may be a im in g  a t  the  AIFTA ( I r e l a n d  and U . K . ) .  C o nse ­
q u e n t l y  th e  e l i m i n a t i o n  of  t a r i f f s  b e tw e e n  the  u n i o n  
members,  th e  h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  economic  and s o c i a l  p o l i c i e s  
and t h e  e x t e n t  to  w h ich  th e  f i r m  i s  a l r e a d y  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  
th e  EEC m a r k e t s ,  by e x p o r t s  and p r o d u c t i o n ,  become r e l e v a n t  
d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e s  when a f i r m  c o n s i d e r s  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  
I r e l a n d .  F i rm s  whose head  o f f i c e  i s  o u t s i d e  the  u n i o n  may 
have p l a n t s  i n  more t h a n  one u n io n  c o u n t r y  and r a t i o n a l ­
i s a t i o n  o r  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  may tak e  p l a c e .  Hew n o n - u n i o n  
e n t r a n t s  may w ish  t o  s e r v i c e  the  whole u n io n  from one p l a n t  
w i t h i n  th e  u n i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  from e x p o r t s .  The rem o v a l  
o f  t a r i f f s  and l a r g e r  m a rk e t  may a l s o  a f f e c t  the  p r o d u c t i o n  
l o c a t i o n  d e c i s i o n  o f  f i r m s  whose head  o f f i c e  i s  w i t h i n  the
u n i o n .  These i s s u e s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  a t  l e n g t h  i n  an  e x c e l l -
13e n t  p i o n e e r i n g  p a p e r  by D u n n in g .  E m p i r i c a l  t e s t i n g  o f  
the  e f f e c t  o f  the  f o r m a t i o n  o f  cus tom s u n i o n s  on f l o w s  o f  
i n v e s tm e n t  h a s  b e e n  l a r g e l y  u n s u c c e s s f u l  and the  use  o f
i n s tr u m e n t a l  v a r i a b l e s  has  c louded the i s s u e .  The 
approach adopted here i s  to  examine f i r s t  the d i r e c t i o n  
o f  o v e r a l l  trade f l o w s  from Ire la n d  over  the per iod  1 9 5 9 -  
1971 and then  to  lo o k  at  the market d i s t r i b u t i o n  p a t t e r n  
o f  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  i n  I r e l a n d .
I r i s h  e x p o r t s  by d e s t i n a t i o n  1959-71
Table ^ .8  shows t h a t ,  even  b e fo r e  I r e la n d  e n te r e d  
the EEC, the s i x  n a t i o n s  o f  the  EEC were becoming a 
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McAleese  and M a r t i n  have  e s t i m a t e d  th e  e f f e c t s  o f
the  r e m o v a l  o f  the  common e x t e r n a l  t a r i f f  o f  the EEC
( f o l l o w i n g  I r i s h  m em bersh ip )  on I r i s h  e x p o r t s  to  the
community t o  be a round  25% -  kofa, im p ly in g  a n  i n c r e a s e
1^of  betw een  £6 -  £10 m i l l i o n  a t  1971 p r i c e s .  I t  i s ,  
however,  to be noted th a t  one f a c t o r  e x p l i c i t l y  l e f t  out  
of  the McAleese and M artin  a n a l y s i s  i s  the e x te n t  to  
which the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  o th e r  s u b s i d i a r i e s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f irm s i n  the EEC w i l l  prevent  f o r e i g n  owned I r i s h  s u b s i d ­
i a r i e s  from i n c r e a s i n g  e x p o r t s .
The M arke t  D i s t r i b u t i o n  P a t t e r n  o f  F o r e i g n  Owned F i rm s  
i n  I r e l a n d .
The d a t a  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  a r e  a g g r e g a t e d  
from th e  i n d i v i d u a l  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r y  l e v e l .  They a r e  
a g g r e g a t e s  o f  th e  f i r m ' s  e s t i m a t e d  l e v e l  o f  o u t p u t  f o r  
each  m a jo r  m a r k e t .  The i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e r e f o r e  r e l a t e s  to  th e  
i n t e n d e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  o u t p u t .  The d a t a  show ex a n t e  
i n t e n t i o n s .  Such d a t a  a r e  i d e a l  f o r  o u r  p r e s e n t  p u rp o se  
b ecause  th e y  show the m a r k e t s  which  th e  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d ­
i a r i e s  were  e x p e c t i n g  t o  s e r v i c e  from I r e l a n d  when th e y  
a p p l i e d  f o r  a g r a n t .  A c t u a l  e x p o r t s  d i d  n o t  r e a c h  th e  
i n t e n d e d  l e v e l  b e ca u se  some f i r m s  have n o t  r e a c h e d  f u l l  
p r o d u c t i o n ,  o t h e r s  d i d  n o t  a c h ie v e  t h e i r  s t a t e d  e x p o r t  
t a r g e t s  and some may have d e l i b e r a t e l y  o v e r s t a t e d  t h e i r  
e x p o r t  p r o p o r t i o n .
The i n f o r m a t i o n  from e a c h  f i r m  h a s  b e e n  a g g r e g a t e d  
on the  b a s i s  o f  n a t i o n a l i t y  o f  o w n e r s h ip .  Thus i t  i s
l*+6
p o s s i b l e  to  see  the market o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  the f i rm s  o f  
the v a r i o u s  i n v e s t i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  Table *+,9 i s  a g g r e ­
gated from the f irm  l e v e l  to  t o t a l  ocports on a s im ple  
average b a s i s  -  thus i t  shows the average percentage  o f  
output which was intended  to  be exported  to  the major 
m ark ets .  Table ^ ,1 0  g i v e s  w eighted  a v e r a g e s ;  the  
w e ig h ts  b e in g  the output o f  each f i r m .  Table ^f.10 thus  
shows the p r o p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  output o f  the  f irm s  aimed 
a t  each o f  the  major m ark ets .
N a t i o n a l i t y  o f  ownership and the number o f  f i r m s  o f  
t h i s  n a t i o n a l i t y  i s  shown v e r t i c a l l y .  These are c l a s s i ­
f i e d  as  U .K . ,  U . S . A . ,  Europe ( i n  p r a c t i c e  the EEC o f  the  
Six  e x c l u d in g  Germany, but in c lu d in g  one or two Swedish  
f i r m s )  Germany and ’’Other’1 (mainly South A f r ic a  and Canada 
p lu s  J a p a n ) .  The h o r i z o n t a l  d imension shows the major  
markets f o r  e x p o r t s ;  U .K . ,  U . S . A . ,  Europe,  Germany ( t h i s  
c a teg o ry  a p p l i e s  Only to  German f i r m s  and i n  the case  o f  
other  than German f i r m s ,  Germany i s  in c lu d e d  i n  "Europe” ) ,  
"other" r e f e r s  to  the r e s t  o f  the w o r ld ,  and Ir e la n d  to  
the d o m e st ic  market o f  the R e p u b l ic .  The two t a b l e s  
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Table **,10 shows the p r o p o r t io n  o f  output o f  the 
f irm s  aimed a t  each market .  The f i n a l  l i n e  shows that  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  as a whole aim mainly  a t  the European and 
UK market which t o g e t h e r  a t t r a c t  over 75$ o f  p ro d u ct io n .
The markets  o f  the USA, Other markets and Ire lan d  i n  
d e c l i n i n g  order  o f  importance were in tend ed  to  take up 
the rem aining 25%* In a c t u a l  f a c t  the p r o p o r t io n  o f  the  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s '  output a c t u a l l y  exported was 81% r a th e r  • 
than the  95$ (100$ minus box k6) th a t  th e se  p r o j e c t i o n s  
would s u g g e s t .  (See Table 3 * 1 8 ) ,  The r easo n s  f o r  t h i s  
are th a t  f i r m s  have not  y e t  reached f u l l  p rod u ct io n ,  they  
may have underest im ated  the problems of  e x p o r t in g ,  i n  
some c a s e s  they  have d i s c o v e r e d  a l a r g e r  than expected  
I r i s h  market and the f a c t  th a t  t a r i f f  r e d u c t io n s  ( p a r t i c ­
u l a r l y  by the EEC c o u n t r i e s )  had not been completed when 
the export  p r o p o r t io n s  were c a l c u l a t e d .  The importance  
o f  the UK and EEC markets ( a n t i c i p a t i n g  t a r i f f  r e d u c t i o n s )  
i s  the f i r s t  c l e a r  f i n d i n g .
The d i f f e r e n c e  between the two t a b l e s  i s  in fo r m a t io n  
because  i t  shows the in f l u e n c e  of  the s i z e  o f  f irm  on 
the in ten d ed  market d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p ro d u ct io n .  In  
g e n e r a l ,  f irm s  engaged i n  p rodu ct ion  f o r  the I r i s h  market 
are sm a l le r  than average as the d e c l i n e  i n  the p e r c e n ta g e s  
i n  Column 6 from Table *+.9 to  Table **.10 shows. The 
l a r g e r  f i r m s  are more o r i e n t a t e d  towards the UK and Europe,  
e x c e p t i o n s  b e in g  European f irm s  s e r v i c i n g  the UK market  
and o th e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  se r v in g  Europe.  In  the case  o f  
the f i r m s  s e r v in g  the U .S .A .  market,  th e se  ar6 sm a l ler
150
than average  f o r  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l i t y  i n  the case  o f  U .K . ,  
U .S .A .  and European f i r m s  but l a r g e r  than average f o r  
German and Other N a t i o n a l i t i e s .
The p r o j e c t i o n s  are now examined (1 )  by major 
market and ( 2 )  by n a t i o n a l i t y  o f  i n v e s t o r .
(1 )  Bv Major Market
The importance o f  the U.K. Market, bo th  to  I r i s h  
trade i n  g e n e r a l  and to  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  
a l lu d ed  t o .  The p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the AIFTA mean the  
c r e a t i o n  o f  a common market o f  the U.K. and Ire lan d  b e f o r e  
the complete  e q u a l i s a t i o n  o f  t a r i f f s  w i t h i n  the EEC of  
the n i n e .  In  f a c t  the p r o j e c t i o n s  o f  the f irm s a t t a c h  
l e s s  w e ig h t  t o  the U.K. market than to  the o ld  6 -c o u n tr y  
EEC as a market o u t l e t  ( k l  v e r s u s  k 3 ) .  U.K. f irm s  
in tended  to export  73$ o f  output back to  the U.K. w h i l s t  
approxim ate ly  one t h i r d  o f  the output o f  U . S . ,  Serman 
and " o th e r ’1 p r o j e c t s  was in tended  f o r  the U.K. but the  
f i g u r e  i s  o n ly  17$ f o r  European f i r m s .  I t  may be th a t  
European f i r m s  p r e fe r  to l o c a t e  i n  the U.K. to supply  th a t  
market w h i l s t  U .S .A .  and " o th er ” f irm s  p r e f e r  Ire la n d  
( p a r t i c u l a r l y  Shannon Free A ir p o r t )  f o r  t ra n sp o rt  and c o s t  
reasons..  German f irm s  appear to  p r e f e r  I r e la n d  as  a base  
fo r  bo th  c o s t - r e d u c i n g  ( i n c e n t i v e s ,  cheap and homogeneous 
labour)  and non-economic r e a s o n s .*
+ See Chapter VI.
The a t t r a c t i o n  o f  the European market ( i n  the  
t a b l e s  the  EEC o f  the s i x )  i s  c l e a r l y  a s trong  one -  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  f o r  European owned f irm s ( 6 5 . 3$ )  and U .S .  
f irm s ( * t l . 7 $ ) .  F o re ig n  i n d u s t r i a l i s t s  and I r i s h  o f f i c i a l s  
c o r r e c t l y  p r e d ic t e d  the e n try  of Ire lan d  i n t o  the EEC.
The l a r g e s t  share of  the output  o f  U .S .  f irm s  was p r o ­
j e c t e d  to  go to  Europe.  Taking the U.K. and the o ld  EEC 
to  r e p r e s e n t  the new EEC ( o u t s id e  I r e la n d )  the p r o p o r t io n  
o f  output  p r o j e c t e d  to  go to  t h i s  market i s  as  f o l l o w s  
fo r  each  n a t i o n a l i t y ;  U.K. f irm s  8 ^ .6 $ ,  U .S .A .  f irm s  
72 .^$ ,  European f irm s  8 2 . 3 $ ,  German f i r m s  76 . 6$ and o th e r  
f irm s *+6.3$. This  market i s  c l e a r l y  o f  paramount im port­
ance f o r  a l l  f irm s  except  "other n a t i o n a l i t i e s " .
This  c o n c lu s i o n  I s  l i t t l e  a l t e r e d  by the a d d i t i o n  o f  
the d o m e st ic  I r i s h  Market. In a l l  c a s e s  the p r o p o r t io n  
of  output  p r o j e c t e d  by the f irm s to  be so ld  on t h i s  market 
i s  l e s s  than 9$ .  (European and U.K. f i r m s  have the h i g h e s t  
p r o p o r t io n  o f  output f o r  the dom est ic  m a rk et ) .  When we 
add p r o j e c t e d  import s u b s t i t u t i o n  (remembering th a t  the  
a c tu a l  p r o p o r t io n  o f  output  so ld  on the I r i s h  Market i s  
near ly  19$)  the t o t a l s  f o r  Europe o f  the nine from each  
n a t i o n a l i t y  i s  U.K. f i r m s  93*1$ jE .S .A .  7^*2$, Europe 90.9$»  
Germany 8 1 .7 $  and "other" *+7*6$.
The U .S .A .  market i s  important f o r  U .S . f i r m s  (17$  
outp ut)  German f irm s (13*5$)  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  fo r  
"other" n a t i o n a l i t i e s  ( 3 2 . 8 $ ) .  This market i s  l a r g e l y  
served from Shannon Free A irport  and the trade c o n s i s t s
l a r g e l y  o f  h i g h  v a l u e / l o w  w e ig h t  goods i n  o r d e r  t o  
overcome th e  t r a n s p o r t  c o s t  b a r r i e r . ,  I r e l a n d  i s  n e a r e r  
to  t h e  U .S .  t h a n  th e  s o u r c e  c o u n t r y  f o r  some i n v e s t o r s  -  
t h i s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  f o r  South  A f r i c a n  f i r m s ,  w h ich  
c o n s t i t u t e  a l a r g e  s h a r e  o f  o u t p u t  o f  " o t h e r "  n a t i o n ­
a l i t i e s .
One t r a i t  worthy o f  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i s  "reverse  f lo w  
trade" -  e x p o r t s  back to the country o f  o r i g i n  o f  the  
in v e s t m e n t .  This  i s  the type o f  investm ent  that  some 
s e c t i o n s  o f  the source country ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  labour  
groups ,  f i n d  most o b j e c t i o n a b l e  -  i t  i s  sometimes r e f e r r e d  
to as  " ex p o r t in g  j o b s " .  The importance o f  such trade  
can be a s c e r t a i n e d  by examining b o x e s ,  f l ,  g2 ,  h3 ,  i ^ ,  
and j 5 i n  Table **.10. Such trade i s  73$ f o r  the U.K.  
and 65$ f o r  Europe but i s  com parat ive ly  sm al l  i n  the 
c a s e s  o f  the U .S .A .  (17$)  and Germany ( ! ? $ ) •  A s u r p r i s ­
i n g l y  l a r g e  amount of  r e v e rse  f low  trade occu rs  i n  the  
o th er  n a t i o n a l i t i e s  group (20$)  where d i s t a n c e  and t h e r e ­
fore  t r a n sp o r t  c o s t s ,  are v e ry  h ig h .  This  can be 
e x p la in e d  m ainly  in  terms of  product c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i n  
th a t  such f i r m s  produce goods in  the h igh  v a l u e ,  low 
weight  c a t e g o r y ,  f o r  i n s ta n c e  diamond p r o c e s s i n g .  Air  
f r e i g h t  c o s t s  are low i n  r e l a t i o n  to  f i n i s h e d  va lue  and 
I r e l a n d ’ s tax  f r e e  export  p r o f i t s  and o th e r  i n c e n t i v e s  are  
s u f f i c i e n t  to  overcome th e se  tran sp ort  c o s t s *
( 2)  The f i r m ' s  p r o j e c t i o n s  by c o u n t r y  o f  o r i g i n
As i n d i c a t e d ,  U.K. p r o j e c t s  are l a r g e l y  o r i e n t a t e d  
towards the home (U.K.)  market.  The p r a c t i c e  o f  e s t a b ­
l i s h i n g  a p la n t  over the border from Northern Ire la n d  
to  take advantage o f  g r a n ts  and labour (be fore  d e v e lo p ­
ment g r a n t s  i n  the North assumed t h e i r  p resen t  im portance)  
was e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  the l a t e  ’f i f t i e s .  Abundant a g r i ­
c u l t u r a l  raw m a t e r i a l s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  m i lk )  have a t t r a c t e d  
f irm s from the U.K. to supply B r i t a i n .  Older and 
sm a l ler  U.K. f irm s e x i s t  to  supply the p r e v io u s l y  h i g h l y  
p r o t e c t e d  I r i s h  Market.
U .S .  p r o j e c t s  are m ainly  aimed a t  the European and 
U.K. markets  w ith  the l a r g e r  p r o j e c t s  v e ry  much 
Europe o r i e n t a t e d .  U .S .  r ev erse  f low  e x p o r ts  emanate 
l a r g e l y  from Shannon A ir p o r t .  A r e c e n t  United  S t a t e s  
Chamber o f  Commerce survey o f  U .S .  f irm s  i n  Ire la n d  
(sample r e p l i e s  numbered 55) showed th a t  38$ o f  the  
p r o d u ct io n  o f  U .S .  f irm s  went to  the EEC (the  S i x )  and 
15$ to  the U . S . ^  The s i m i l a r i t y  of  th e se  f i g u r e s  w ith  
Table k .1 0  ( k l . 7 $  and 17$) s u g g e s t s  th a t  the intended  
export  d e s t i n a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  f irm s (U .S .  f irm s at  l e a s t )  
are r e a so n a b ly  c l o s e  to  those  a c t u a l l y  a c h ie v e d .
German f irm s  export  a much l a r g e r  p ro p o r t io n  o f  
output to  the U .S .A .  than that  achieved  by B r i t i s h  and 
o ther  European f i r m s .  The d i f f e r e n t  i n d u s t r i a l  d i s t r i b ­
u t i o n  o f  German f irm s  (more concen tra ted  i n  the m eta l
t r a d e s ,  consumer d u r a b le s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  household goods)  
may be part  o f  the e x p l a n a t i o n .  The p r o p o r t io n  o f  the  
output o f  German owned f irm s  intended f o r  the U.K.  
market i s  the  h i g h e s t  apart from U.K. f i r m s .  German 
f irm s c l e a r l y  regard Ire la n d  as a good l o c a t i o n  from 
which to  s e r v i c e  the U.K. market.  German ex p o r ts  d i f f e r  
from the o t h e r  European owned p r o j e c t s  i n  the lower  
p r o p o r t io n  o f  r ev e r se  f low  trade and g r e a t e r  share to  the  
Anglo-Saxon n a t i o n s .
The f i n a l  ca tego ry  "other" c o n s i s t s  mainly o f  
South A f r i c a n ,  Canadian and Japanese p r o j e c t s .  The 
impact o f  Japanese  f o r e i g n  investment had hardly  been  
f e l t  a t  the  time the d ata  was compiled (January 1 9 7 2 ) .
The U . S .  market i s  much more prominent i n  the p r o j e c t i o n s  
of  t h i s  d i s p a r a t e  group than fo r  any o f  the o ther  n a t i o n ­
a l i t i e s .  T h is  group p r e s e n t s  the b e s t  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  
the f i n d i n g  th a t  the type o f  product has a larg e  i n f l u ­
ence on the market d i s t r i b u t i o n  p a t t e r n .  The bulk  o f  
the output  o f  t h i s  group i s  i n  the h igh  v a l u e ; low w eight  
group (diamond p r o c e s s in g  f i g u r e s  prom inent ly )  and 
l o c a t i o n  a t  Shannon Free Airport  o f t e n  a p p l i e s .  Also  In  
terms o f  l o c a t i o n ,  Ir e la n d  i s  mid-way between South 
A fr ica  and the U . S .A . ,  w ith  the s p e c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  o f  
Shannon to  recomment i t .  A f ter  the U .S .  market,  the U.K.  
i s  o f  next  importance w ith  Europe s u r p r i s i n g l y  low.
Indeed , • " rev e rse  flow" t r a d e ,  with la rg e  d i s t a n c e s  to  
t r a v e l ,  r a t e s  much h ig h e r  than exports  to  Europe* Import 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  i s  almost z e r o .
Summary
T his  s e c t i o n  has  attem pted to  overcome problems,  
both i n  th e o ry  and p r a c t i c e ,  o f  i s o l a t i n g  the d e s t i n a t i o n  
o f  p r o d u c t io n  from f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  i n  I r e la n d .  The 
data p r e s e n t e d  was the f i r m s  own p ro d u ct io n s  as to  the  
market d i s t r i b u t i o n  p a t t e r n  o f  t h e i r  e x p o r t s .  The o u t -  
s tan d ing  f a c t  i s  the importance o f  the EEC as the prime 
d e s t i n a t i o n  o f  the e x p o r t s  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  . "Reverse f low  
trade" was found to  be important f o r  U.K. and European 
f irm s  but not  e s p e c i a l l y  so f o r  U .S .  f irm s  -  an important  
f i n d i n g  i n  v iew  o f  the pressu re  to  d e c r e a se  U .S .  outward 
FBI from the  "export o f  jobs" lo b b y .  The b e n e f i t s  o f  
l e s s e n e d  trad e  dependence on the U.K. f o r  s t a b i l i t y  o f  
I r i s h  e x p o r t  e a rn in gs  and f o r  growth p r o s p e c t s  are o b v io u s .
The i n f l o w  o f  FBI and the e x p o r ts  from f o r e i g n  owned 
f irm s are an important f a c t o r  u n der ly ing  the McAleese and 
Martin f i n d i n g  that  the EEC i s  assuming a most important  
p o s i t i o n  as a d e s t i n a t i o n  f o r  I r e l a n d ’ s manufactured e x p o r t s .
S e c t i o n  3 The R e l a t i o n s h i p  of  T a r i f f s  to  FBI
The p r e v io u s  S e c t i o n s  have c o n cen tra ted  on the l i n k  
between FBI and e x p o r t s .  I t  was shown th a t  the d e c i s i o n  
o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  to  l o c a t e  i n  Ire la n d  may have been s i g ­
n i f i c a n t l y  in f lu e n c e d  by the export  o p p o r t u n i t e s  i t  
p r o v id e s .  There i s  however,  a la rg e  body o f  theory  which  
emphasises  the  r o l e  o f  t a r i f f s  i n  i n f l u e n c i n g  the l o c a t i o n  
d e c i s i o n .  This  S e c t i o n  e x p lo r e s  the p o s s i b l e  e f f e c t s  o f
t a r i f f s  i n  I r e l a n d .  I t  would be i n  o r d e r  to  b r i e f l y  
r e v ie w  t h e  t h e o r y  b e f o r e  a n a l y s i n g  th e  I r i s h  c a s e .
T h e o r e t i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e s
A p o t e n t i a l  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r  must p o s s e s s  some f i r m
s p e c i f i c  income c r e a t i n g  a s s e t  which g i v e s  th e  f i r m  an
a d v a n ta g e  such  t h a t  i t  c an  overcome th e  c o s t s  o f  p r o d u c in g
i n  a n  a l i e n  e n v i r o n m e n t .  Given t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  the  f i r m
can  ch oo se  b e tw e e n  s u p p l y i n g  the  f o r e i g n  m ark e t  e i t h e r  by
e x p o r t s  o r  by  f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  and p r o d u c t i o n  i n  th e
h o s t  m a r k e t .  Such i s  t h e  b a s i s  o f  th e  " o l i g o p o l i s t i c
a d v a n ta g e "  t h e o r y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n v e s t m e n t .  Caves h a s
gone on t o  say  t h a t  the  ad v an tag e  may be r e d u c a b l e  to
17the  knowledge o f  how t o  s e r v i c e  a m a r k e t .  The v iew  o f  
f o r e i g n  i n v e s tm e n t  t a k e n  by Dunning i n c o r p o r a t e s  c e n t r a l l y  
the  c o n c e p t  o f  b a r r i e r s  t o  e n t r y . ^  The a d v a n ta g e s  
p o s s e s s e d  by the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i rm  p r e v e n t  e n t r y  i n t o  the  
i n d u s t r y  by l o c a l  f i r m s  (on whom c e r t a i n  o t h e r  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  
such as  l a c k  o f  c a p i t a l ,  may a l s o  be o p e r a t i v e )  and b a r r i e r s  
t o  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  ( t a r i f f s )  f o r c e  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i r m  t o  s e r v i c e  the  m a rk e t  by in v e s tm e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  by 
e x p o r t s .
The l i n k  t o  the  t h e o r y  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  i s  p r o v id e d  by 
the  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  th e  m ark e t  to  th e  above t h e o r y .  A 
t a r i f f - p r o t e c t e d  home m ark e t  i s  o f t e n  adduced t o  p r e s e n t  
an  a d d i t i o n a l  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  FDI. T a r i f f s  redu ce  o r  p r e v e n t  
c o m p e t i t i o n  from th e  e x p o r t s  o f  o t h e r  c o u n t r i e s  and r a i s e
i n c e n t i v e s  t o  pro d u ct io n  f o r  the home market .  But 
t a r i f f s  d i s co u ra g e  e x p o r t in g  i n  two ways 5 by making 
g r e a t e r  rewards a v a i l a b l e  f o r  p rodu ct ion  f o r  the  
d om est ic  market and by in c r e a s i n g  the c o s t  o f  im­
ported i n p u t s .
T a r i f f s  thus a f f e c t  FDI in  two major ways.
F i r s t l y  by in c r e a s i n g  the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  o p e r a t io n s  
i n  the p r o t e c t e d  market and secon d ly  by t h e i r  e f f e c t  
on the c h o ic e  open to  the m u l t i n a t i o n a l  f i r m ,  e i t h e r  to  
s e r v i c e  the market by e x p o r ts  or o f  i n v e s t i n g  i n  the  
m arket .  A r e c e n t  development i n  t a r i f f  theory  i s  the  
concept o f  the e f f e c t i v e  r a te  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  (ERP). In  
a n a ly s in g  the e f f e c t s  o f  t a r i f f s  on FDI, i t  may be 
a d v i s a b le  to  t a l k  i n  t e r m s-o f  ERP r a th er  than nominal  
t a r i f f s .  Nominal t a r i f f s  show the degree  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  
which a t a r i f f  a f f o r d s  to  p r o d u c t s . But a more i n t e r e s t ­
ing  a s p e c t  o f  the t a r i f f  s t r u c tu r e  i s  th e  degree  o f  
p r o t e c t i o n  a f fo rd ed  to  a c t i v i t i e s . The concept o f  ERP 
i s  d e s ig n e d  to  show t h i s  e f f e c t .  The ERP o f  an a c t i v i t y  
may be d e f i n e d  as the e x c e s s  o f  dom est ic  va lue  added i n  
th a t  a c t i v i t y  under p r o t e c t i o n  above v alue  added a t  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s ,  e x p ressed  as a percentage  o f  the l a t t e r .
= v $ ~ , where v fj = v a lu e  added per u n i t  o f  j
vj
i n  a c t i v i t y  j made p o s s i b l e  by t a r i f f s  
vj = va lue  added per u n i t  o f  j i n  
a c t i v i t y  j i n  the absence o f  t a r i f f s )
The ERP t h e o r y  t h u s  d raws a t t e n t i o n  to  the  i n c e n t i v e s  
t o  p r o d u c t i o n  f o r  the  home m arke t  c r e a t e d  by the  t a r i f f  
sys tem  by showing the  amount o f  v a lu e  added which  i s  ,fdue 
t o ” th e  t a r i f f  s t r u c t u r e .
T h e r e f o r e  the ERP shows the  i n c r e a s e  i n  the  a c t i v i t y  
p r i c e  i n d u c e d  by the  t a r i f f  sy s tem .  The i n c r e a s e  i n  the  
a c t i v i t y  p r i c e  shows th e  i n c r e a s e d  f a c t o r  r e w a rd s  from 
p r o t e c t i o n .  These i n c e n t i v e s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  th e  p r o d u c t i o n  
r e s p o n s e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  th e  v a r i o u s  f a c t o r s  to  the  
i n c r e a s e d  r e w a r d s ,  d e te r m in e  the  e x p a n s i o n  o f  th e  d o m e s t i c  
i n d u s t r y  r e s u l t i n g  from p r o t e c t i o n .  The r e s p o n s e  o f  
f o r e i g n  owned c a p i t a l  t o  p r o t e c t i o n  may w e l l  depend on  th e  
p o l i c y  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  and on the  s i z e  o f  the  
d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t .
The a d v a n ta g e  p o s s e s s e d  by an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n v e s t o r  
c o n s i s t s  o f  a f i r m  s p e c i f i c  income c r e a t i n g  a s s e t  which  
can  be t r a n s f e r r e d  w i t h i n  th e  f i r m  i n  c o m b in a t io n  w i t h  
c a p i t a l  o r  s k i l l e d  l a b o u r  ( i n c l u d i n g  m a n a g e r i a l  e x p e r t i s e ) .  
These s e c t o r s  where su ch  i n t r a  f i r m  knowledge i s  a v a i l a b l e  
and e x p l o i t a b l e  by FDI w i l l  be the  ones  where f o r e i g n
o n
i n v e s tm e n t  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  th e  l a r g e s t  q u a n t i t i e s .  The 
e l a s t i c i t y  o f  su p p ly  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  to  t a r i f f - i n d u c e d  
i n c e n t i v e s  w i l l  be a f u n c t i o n  o f  the  i n c i d e n c e  o f  the  
ERP on a c t i v i t i e s  e x h i b i t i n g  such  f e a t u r e s  and on one o t h e r  
c r u c i a l  p a r a m e t e r  -  th e  s i z e  o f  the  p r o t e c t e d  m a r k e t .  jf~It  
i s  no rm al  to  c o n s i d e r  th e  i n c e n t i v e s  o f  th e  t a r i f f  to  b o t h  
c a p i t a l  and l a b o u r ,  b u t  where i t  i s  s a f e  to  assume u n l i m i t e d
s u p p l i e s  o f  la b o u r ,  the i n c e n t i v e  e f f e c t s  may be d e r iv e d  
fo r  c a p i t a l  a lone  by i n c lu d in g  labour as a non-traded  
i n p u t .  There i s  a s tro n g  case  f o r  app ly in g  t h i s  formu­
l a t i o n  where the i n c e n t i v e s  to FI)I are the cen tr e  o f  i n ­
v e s t i g a t i o n .  7
The importance o f  the s i z e  o f  the dom est ic  market  
a r i s e s  because  t a r i f f  p r o t e c t i o n  i n c e n t i v e s  apply to  the  
market o n l y .  P r o t e c t i o n  may r a i s e  the r e t u r n  to  f a c t o r s  
per u n i t  o f  output  but the quantum o f  output i s  r u led  by  
the home market s i z e  and by the degree o f  c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s  
t h e r e i n .  Exports  are d iscou raged  and input  c o s t s  r a i s e d  
under a regime of  p r o t e c t i o n .  In such a regime the  
rewards from the dom est ic  market fo r  the f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r  
must be s u f f i c i e n t  to  cover  the in c re a se d  r i s k  and problems  
of  o p e r a t in g  i n  an a l i e n  environment.  I f  the market i s  
large  then  the l i k e l i h o o d  i s  that  quasi-monopoly g a in s  can 
be made to  o f f s e t  such d i s a d v a n ta g e s .  A lso  the r i s k  f a c t o r  
d e c l i n e s  i n  im portance.  This  c o n c lu s io n  i s  s tren g th en ed  
by the f a c t  that  FBI tends  to occur i n  i n d u s t r i e s  where  
there  i s  not  o n ly  a la r g e  minimum s i z e  o f  f irm  but a l s o  
where s u b s t a n t i a l  economies at  p lant  l e v e l  a re a v a i l a b l e .
The s t r a t e g y  o f  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f irm  i n  response  to  
t a r i f f  p r o t e c t e d  markets  should be m entioned .  Although  
the h ig h  r i s k  f a c t o r  e x i s t s  f o r  the f i r s t  e n tra n t  i n t o  a 
market, th e r e  i s  e v id en ce  to  su g g es t  th a t  the r i s k  f a c t o r  
becomes l e s s  o f  a d e t e r r e n t  to subsequent in v e s tm e n t .
O l i g o p o l i s t i c  b e h a v i o u r  o f t e n  com p l ie s  w i t h  a " l e a d e r  
and f o l l o w e r "  s i t u a t i o n .  T h is  l e a d s  to  d e f e n s i v e  i n v e s t ­
ment t o  p r o t e c t  an  e s t a b l i s h e d  m arke t  p o s i t i o n  -  a 
p o s i t i o n  w h ich  may have b e e n  b u i l t  up by e x p o r t s  f rom the  
s o u rc e  c o u n t r y .  K i n d l e b e r g e r  d e f i n e s  i n v e s tm e n t  a s  
" i n v e s t m e n t  t h a t  p ro d u c e s  a l e s s  t h a n  a v e ra g e  r e t u r n ,  b u t  
where t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw ee n  the  g r o s s  r e t u r n  p l u s  and 
the  l o s s  t h a t  would have  r e s u l t e d  from e x c l s u i o n  g i v e s  th e
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n e c e s s a r y  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n ,  on a m a r g i n a l  b a s i s . "  The 
s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  d e m o n s t r a t i o n  e f f e c t  o f  the  f i r s t  e n t r a n t  
can  be such  t h a t  the  market- becomes p o p u l a t e d  w i t h  s u b -  
o p t i m a l  s i z e  f i r m s .
A s y n t h e s i s  o f  th e  t h e o r y  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  w i t h  the
22t h e o r y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  i n v e s tm e n t  i s  a t t e m p t e d  by H o r s t ,  
The s e t t i n g  i s  a t  f i r m  l e v e l  and the  f i r m  i s  c o n s i d e r i n g  
w h e th e r  t o  s e r v i c e  t h e  h o s t  m arke t  by e x p o r t s  o r  by e s t a b ­
l i s h i n g  a s u b s i d i a r y  ( l i c e n s i n g  i s  i m p l i c i t l y  r u l e d  o u t ) .  
The t h e o r y  a s  c o n s t r u c t e d ,  u s in g  d e c i s i o n  r u l e s  b a s e d  on 
the  r e a c t i o n  o f  the  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  and rev en u e  c u rv e s  o f  th e  
f i r m  t o  t a r i f f s ,  h a s  o n ly  one u n e q u iv o c a l  r e s u l t  -  t h a t  
t a r i f f s  w i l l  b i a s  th e  f i r m  i n  the d i r e c t i o n  o f  i n v e s t i n g  
r a t h e r  t h a n  e x p o r t i n g .  E x p o r t i n g  from the  h o s t  w i l l  be 
d i s c o u r a g e d  by an i n c r e a s e  i n  the  t a r i f f  b u t  w h e th e r  i n ­
v e s tm e n t  i n  the  h o s t  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  depends  on the  r e l a t i v e  
s h i f t s  o f  th e  m a r g i n a l  c o s t  and reve n u e  c u r v e s .  The s h i f t s  
o f  the  m a r g i n a l  rev e n u e  curve  w i l l  be d e p en d e n t  on m a rk e t  
s i z e .  Now the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  f a c t o r  c o s t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
wage r a t e s  o f f s e t  t a r i f f  ind u ced  d i f f e r e n t i a l s .  I n v e s t m e n t
i n  the h o s t  w i l l  then be determined by the c o s t s  o f  
c a p a c i t y  adjustment i n  the h o s t  country  -  i n  B a ldw in’ s 
terms the  r e l a t i v e  c o s t  o f  t r a n s f e r r i n g  f a c t o r s  ra th er  
than good s . ^  The time h o r iz o n  o f  the f irm  -  i t s  r a te  
of  d i s c o u n t  f o r  f u t u r e  p r o f i t s  -  w i l l  determine the r a te
o f  in v es tm en t  which w i l l  a g a in  depend on the s i z e  of
the h o s t  market ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  on the ra te  o f  growth 
o f  the market .
T a r i f f s  can thus a f f e c t  both the q u a n t i ty  and the 
( i n d u s t r i a l )  compositon o f  FDI. We now examine the 
r e le v a n c e  o f  the above theory  to  the case  of  I r e la n d ,
Re le v a n c e  to  Ire land
S e c t i o n  2 o f  t h i s  Chapter showed th a t  the i n t e n t i o n
o f  the i n v e s t i n g  f irm s  i n  Ire lan d  was that  the v a s t
m a jo r i ty  o f  t h e i r  output should be exported  from I r e l a n d .
In f a c t  19$ o f  the output o f  f o r e i g n  owned grant aided  
f irm s i s  f o r  the I r i s h  market .  This i s  due mainly to  non 
f u l f i l m e n t  o f  t a r g e t s  by the f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  However import  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  by grant a ided f o r e i g n  owned f irm s i s  not o f  
major importance and w i l l  d e c l i n e  as a p roport ion  o f  output  
as f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  a c h iev e  f u l l  pro d u ct ion  and as  
I r i s h  t a r i f f s  d e c l i n e  under the p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the AIFTA and 
the terms o f  en try  i n t o  the EEC.
In the p a s t  however,  t a r i f f s  have been s i g n i f i c a n t  
and may have encouraged FDI. In 1966 the average nominal  
t a r i f f  o f  I r e la n d  was 25% compared to U.K. 15% and EEC 12a> -
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c o n v erted  to  EPRs t h i s  was 79$ compared to 28$ and 19$ 
pU
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The p o l i c y  of  h igh  p r o t e c t i o n  overlapped  
i n  time w i t h  the p o l i c y  o f  encouraging export  o r i e n ­
ta ted  FDI, The high t a r i f f  h a r r i e r s  had to  be o f f s e t  by 
the p r o v i s i o n  of  duty f r e e  in p u ts  f o r  FDI i n  order to  
encourage f o r e i g n  investm ent  and to a l lo w  the new f i r m s  
to  compete w i t h  e x p o r ts  o f  c o u n t r i e s  w i th  f r e e r  trade  
p o l i c i e s .  Many o f  the f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  were e s t a b l i s h e d  
b efo re  the p resen t  f r e e  trade p o l i c i e s  were adopted.
There has been  a t r a d i t i o n  o f  B r i t i s h  investm ent  i n  the  
Republic* The f o l l o w in g  s e c t i o n s  i d e n t i f y  and a n a lyse  
f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  producing mainly f o r  the I r i s h  market .
The main a n a l y t i c a l  s e c t i o n s  of  t h i s  t h e s i s  are 
concerned w i th  grant a ided FDI, However, from the time 
that  the f i r s t  grants  were d isbu rsed  i n  1 9 5 5 ? there has  
been a sm a l l  in f lo w  o f  non grant aided f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n t ,  
serv in g  the home market a lmost  e x c l u s i v e l y .  These f i rm s  
are now examined b e fo re  we turn to grant aided f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t o r s  engaged in  import s u b s t i t u t i o n .
In fo rm a t io n  about non grant aided f o r e i g n  investm ent  
can be q u ic k ly  summarised as i t  i s  s e v e r e l y  l i m i t e d .
Such inves tm en t  i s  almost  e n t i r e l y  import s u b s t i t u t i n g  -  
o n ly  an e s t im a te d  18$ o f  t o t a l  output was exported i n  
1966?  ^ as a g a i n s t  the p re sen t  a u th o r ' s  e s t im a te  of  over  81$ 
(1970)  f o r  grant  aided f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  Be tween 1955 and 
1966, 55 such p r o j e c t s  were e s t a b l i s h e d  w ith  in fo rm a tio n  
and ad v ice  from the IDA; 36 were o f  B r i t i s h  o r i g i n  and c ig h
from the U .S .A .  T o ta l  output was e s t im a te d  at  £ 1 6 .8  
m i l l i o n  and employment at  3?8i40 (1 9 6 6 )2^. However, 
e i g h t  p r o j e c t s  accounted fo r  £ ^ .5  m i l l i o n  o f  turnover  
and 1 ,5 0 0  employees .
The i n f l u e n c e s  o f  t a r i f f s  on  non g r a n t  a i d e d  
f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  may be s e e n  by i n v e s t i g a t i n g  th e  
i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e s e  p r o j e c t s .  They are  c o n ­
c e n t r a t e d  i n  c o s m e t i c s ,  o i l  r e f i n i n g ,  t e x t i l e s  and th e  
a u t o m o b i l e  i n d u s t r y .  I n  1966,  t h e s e  i n d u s t r i e s  had  
n o m i n a l  and e f f e c t i v e  t a r i f f s  o f  32$  and 1 0 0 $  ( m e d i c a ­
m e n t s / s o a p ) ,  10$  and 53$ ( r u b b e r  and p e t r o l e u m ) ,  W6$ 
and 90$  ( c l o t h i n g )  and 32$ and l L>-2$ ( r o a d  v e h i c l e s ) ^ .
A l l  t h e s e  a r e a s  t h u s  r e c e i v e d  v e r y  h i g h  p r o t e c t i o n .
Three  o f  t h e s e  s e c t o r s ,  c o s m e t i c s ,  p e t r o l e u m  and a u t o ­
m o b i l e s  a r e  o r g a n i s e d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  on  t h e  k in d  o f  
o l i g o p o l i s t i c  l i n e s  w h ic h  would  l e a d  us  t o  e x p e c t  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t m e n t  t o  ta k e  p l a c e .  They a l s o  depend  h e a v i l y  on
p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and t e c h n i c a l  advance  a s  means o f
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c o m p e t i t i o n  w h ic h  would  s t r e n g t h e n  t h i s  b e l i e f .  G o v e r n ­
ment p e r s u a s i o n  and q u o t a s  o n ’ f i n i s h e d  c a r s  h a v e  l e d  t o  
a s s e m b l y  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  th e  a u t o m o b i l e  i n d u s t r y .  S e v e r a l  
f i r m s  o f  sub-opt im um  s i z e  s e r v i c e  th e  home market  a f t e r  
some d e f e n s i v e  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  th e  f a c e  o f  t h r e a t s  t o  an  
e s t a b l i s h e d ,  th o u g h  s m a l l  m a r k e t .  T a r i f f s  and q u o t a s  
a p p ea r  t o  h a v e  b e e n  m ajor  f a c t o r s  i n  a t t r a c t i n g  t h i s  ( s m a l l  
amount o f )  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t .  To some e x t e n t  th e  non  
g r a n t  a i d e d  i n v e s t m e n t  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  h e r e  r e p r e s e n t s  o n l y  
a s m a l l  p o r t i o n  o f  th e  t o t a l  b e c a u s e  B r i t i s h  f i r m s  h a v e
been  e n t e r i n g  the I r i s h  market f o r  y e a r s ,  c h i e f l y  
through tak eov ers  of  e x i s t i n g  I r i s h  f irm s* No attempt  
to  t ra c e  t h i s  lo n g - s ta n d in g  investment i s  made here*
When we turn  to grant aided import s u b s t i t u t i n g  
f i r m s ,  two a r b i t r a r y  measures o f  import s u b s t i t u t i o n  are 
su g g es ted  ( 1 )  a s t r i c t  d e f i n i t i o n  -  f i r m s  exp o r t in g  1% 
or l e s s  o f  output (? )  a much wider d e f i n i t i o n ,  adopted  
because  o f  the small  market s i z e  and export  o r i e n t a t i o n  
of  grant  a ided f irm s -  t h i s  i s  l e s s  than 60% o f  output  
exported* Two c a t e g o r i e s  o f  grant a ided FDI engaged i n  
p r o d u ct io n  f o r  the home market can then be i s o l a t e d .  -  
( 1 )  " I n t e n t i o n a l ly "  import s u b s t i t u t i n g  f irm s  ( t h e s e  are  
p r o j e c t s  where the o r i g i n a l  subm iss ion  to  the IDA f o r  a 
grant i n d i c a t e d  that  the p r o je c t  would, i n  the main,  
s e r v i c e  the home market) (2 )  Import s u b s t i t u t i n g  f irm s  
"by d e f a u l t "  ( f irm s  where,  contrary  to  the grant sub­
m i s s i o n ,  export  s a l e s  have not m a t e r i a l i s e d  as q u ic k ly  as  
home market s a l e s  or where the home market has expanded,  
w ith  the r e s u l t  th a t  *+0^  or more of  p rodu ct ion  i s  f o r  the  
I r i s h  market)*
W ith in  the 396 " l iv e "  grant aided f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  
only  21 f i r m s  ( p r o j e c t s )  aimed to be f u l l y  Import sub­
s t i t u t i n g  i n  t h e i r  su bm iss ion  to  the IDA* On the wider  
0+0% home p rod u ct io n )  d e f i n i t i o n  the number i n c r e a s e s  to  
*+8 p r o j e c t s ,  (*+5 f i r m s ,  three  e x t e n s i o n s  in c lu d in g  one 
e x t e n s i o n  p r o j e c t  to  a 99% export in g  p l a n t ) .  The f irm s  
are spread a c r o s s  many s e c t o r s .  Only two s e c t o r s ,  p l a s t i c s
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(SIC 2 8 2 )  and T e x t i l e s  (SIC 22 )  have more than one 
p r o j e c t  -  f i v e  and th r ee  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Table ^ .11  
shows t h a t  f i r m s  s e r v i c i n g  the I r i s h  Market are much 
sm a l ler  than e x p o r t in g  f irm s  i n  the same sector*
Table  *+*11 Grant Aided F ore ig n  Owned Pro . iec ts  Engaged
i n Import S u b s t i t u t i o n  compared w ith  A l l  Grant Aided FDI
Average Investment at  F u l l  Production(£OOQs)
S e c to r  and SIC I .S .F ir m s  (b0%) I . S . F i r m s (99$)  A l l  l i v e  
Number f i rm s
282 P l a s t i c s  36  ^ -  ^83
22 T e x t i l e s  1^6 -  335
A l l  Firms 2*+5 227 ^87
Source ; A u thor 's  c a l c u l a t i o n s  from c o n f i d e n t i a l  IDA d a t a .
Import s u b s t i t u t i n g  f irm s  have an o ld e r  e s ta b l i sh m e n t  
date  than the bulk o f  grant aided p r o j e c t s  -  19 o f  the  
f i rm s  (on the wide d e f i n i t i o n )  were e s t a b l i s h e d  b e fo r e
1965 i n c lu d i n g  seven o f  the "over-99$” c a te g o r y .
The r e le v a n c e  o f  t a r i f f s  to  the d e c i s i o n  to  i n v e s t  
i s  examined w i th  the a id  o f  the Appendix Table be low .  The 
Table shows the year o f  e s t a b l i s h m e n t , nominal t a r i f f s  f o r
1966 and 1972 ,  and M cA leese 's  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  the r e l e v a n t  
ERP f o r  1 9 6 6 . For some f irm s t a r i f f s  appear to  be o f  
importance i n  the d e c i s i o n  to  i n v e s t ,  however t h i s  i s  by
no means c l e a r  c u t .  Only two of  the p r o j e c t s  f a l l  i n t o
- 29the h i g h e s t  range o f  p r o t e c t i o n  (ERP over 200E ) • S e v e r a l
en ter ed  the  market a f t e r  the d e c i s i o n  to  move to  f r 6 e  trade*
T a r i f f s  cannot be adduced to  be the major f a c t o r  i n  
the in v e s tm en t  d e c i s i o n  o f  most f irm s i n  the Appendix 
T ab le .
One f i n a l  area o f  import s u b s t i t u t i n g  FBI i s  worthy  
o f  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  -  "temporary import s u b s t i t u t i n g  f i r m s " .  
These are l i v e  f irm s  who have not achieved  t h e i r  export  
p r o j e c t i o n s  as  c onta ined  i n  t h e i r  grant subm iss ion  to  the  
IDA. The number o f  f i rm s  whose a c t u a l  export  performance  
f a l l s  so f a r  below p r o je c te d  that  -^0$ o f  output i s  
d i r e c t e d  to  the I r i s h  market,  i s  on ly  t w e lv e .  However, 
as mentioned above o v e r a l l  non f u l f i l m e n t  o f  t a r g e t s  i s  
an important phenomenon -  the o v e r a l l  export  p ro p o r t ion  
i s  81% ( 1 9 7 0 ) / " a u t h o r ’ s e s t i m a t e ?  but the p r o j e c t i o n s  
g iv e n  t o  the IDA su gg es t  th a t  t h i s  should be over 90$ 
/ ’’Table *+.107. There are s e v e r a l  e x p la n a t io n s  fo r  t h i s  
s h o r t f a l l .  Many f irm s  have not reached f u l l  p rodu ct ion  
and f i n d  i t  e a s i e r  to supply the h o s t  market f i r s t  because  
o f  c l o s e n e s s  o f  c o n t a c t ,  b e t t e r  in form atio n  and lower  
t ra n sp o r t  c o s t s *  Other f i r m s  have d i s c o v e r e d  that  the  
I r i s h  market i s  l a r g e r  than they a n t i c i p a t e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
i n  v iew o f  r e c e n t  rapid  r a t e s  o f  growth. Also in  t im es  o f  
a slump i n  demand i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  m arkets ,  the f o r e i g n  
owned f irm  may d i v e r t  p ro d u ct io n  to  the I r i s h  market (one 
f irm surveyed i n  Chapter V changed the nature o f  i t s  o u t ­
put c o n s i d e r a b l y  and su p p l ie d  the I r i s h  market w i th  t h i s  
product during a slump i n  the world market f o r  i t s  more 
usua l  o u t p u t .  The f irm  normally  e x p o r ts  96$ o f  output but  
during the slump almost  k0% o f  output was f o r  the I r i s h  
m a rk et ) .  A f u r t h e r  r e a so n  f o r  supp ly ing  the home market 
was g i v e n  by a s u c c e s s f u l  German f irm  in c lu d ed  i n  the
a u t h o r ’ s su rv ey ;  the f i r m  s u p p l i e s  a sm all  prop or t io n  o f  
i t s  t o t a l  output  (5$ )  to  the I r i s h  market i n  the i n t e r e s t  
o f  worker s a t i s f a c t i o n .  I t  I s  f e l t  th a t  t h e i r  workers  
d e r iv e  p le a s u r e  from s e e in g  the r e s u l t s  o f  t h e i r  e f f o r t s
i n  the l o c a l  shops .  F i n a l l y  some f irm s  may have a r t i ­
f i c i a l l y  in c r e a s e d  t h e i r  expected  export  p r o p o r t io n  when 
su b m it t in g  t h e i r  p r o j e c t s  f o r  IDA grant approval  i n  the  
hope o f  s e c u r in g  a grant  -  thus the p r o j e c t i o n s  may not  
always f u l l y  r e f l e c t  the r e a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  the  f i r m s .
Summary
Ir e la n d  i s  not a good t e s t  case  f o r  the  r e l e v a n t  
theory  r e l a t i n g  to  the e f f e c t  o f  t a r i f f s  on FBI. In  
the e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  I r i s h  p o l i c y  m a k i n g , t a r i f f s  may have  
been a d e t e r r e n t  to  f o r e i g n  investm ent  because  o f  the  
sm all  s i z e  o f  the I r i s h  market .  However, some f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t o r s  chose  to s e t  up (both w ith  and without  g r a n t s )  
to  s e r v i c e  the dom est ic  market. The above i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
showed such p r o j e c t s  to be much sm a l ler  than average
f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  and concentrated  in  a few consumer
goods s e c t o r s .  In the case  o f  the automobile  in d u s t r y ,  
s p e c i a l  p e r s u a s io n  had to  be a pp l ied  to f o r e i g n  producers  
i n  order to  ge t  them to  e s t a b l i s h  assembly o p e r a t io n s  i n  
I r e l a n d .  S e c t i o n  2 o f  t h i s  Chapter provided e loq uent  
t e s t im on y  to  the importance of  a la rg e  market to p r o s ­
p e c t i v e  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s .  Without such a l a r g e  m arket ,  
we can conclude that  t a r i f f s  have l i t t l e  in f lu e n c e  i n  
a t t r a c t i n g  inward FDI.
A f t e r  the e s ta b l i sh m e n t  of  the AIFTA and I r e l a n d ’ s 
en try  i n t o  the  EEC, t o g e t h e r  w ith  the s p e c i a l  i n c e n t i v e s  
f o r  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  duty f r e e  
imports f o r  e x p o r t in g  f i r m s )  I r i s h  t a r i f f s  become i r r e l e ­
vant to  f o r e i g n  in v e s to r s . .  I t  w i l l  be i n t e r e s t i n g  to  
examine f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  i n  the l i g h t  o f  the Common 
E x t e r n a l  T a r i f f  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the EEC i n  order to  provide  
a b e t t e r  t e s t  case f o r  the above th e o r y .
Se c t i o n  k  Has F ore ign  Investme nt l ed  to  a D u a l i s t i c  
S tr u c tu re  i n  I r i s h  Industry  ?
Economic dualism may be d e f in e d ,  f o l l o w i n g  M y in t , as  
the c o n t in u in g  c o e x i s t e n c e  o f  a ’modern* s e c t o r  and a
’ t r a d i t i o n a l *  s e c t o r  w i t h i n  the dom est ic  economic fram e-
10work. Myint i n t e r p r e t s  dualism as a m a n i f e s t a t i o n  o f  
d i s t o r t i o n  i n  the a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  a r i s i n g  from the  
unequal terms on which economic r e s o u r c e s  (such as c a p i t a l ,  
f o r e i g n  exchange and p u b l ic  economic s e r v i c e s )  are a v a i l ­
able  to  the two s e c t o r s .  One p a r t i c u l a r  form o f  d u a l i sm ,  
that  e x i s t i n g  between the f o r e i g n  owned manufacturing  
s e c t o r  and the dom est ic  s e c t o r ,  has been i d e n t i f i e d  by 
Hans S i n g e r . ^  S in ger  su gges ted  th a t  the c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  
FBI to  the h o s t  country  w i l l  be minimal u n l e s s  the f o r e i g n  
s e c t o r  i s  absorbed f u l l y  i n t o  the dom est ic  economy. The 
e x te n t  o f  a b s o r p t io n  i s  to  be judged by the s t r e n g t h  o f  
the l in k a g e  e f f e c t s  c r e a te d  by the f o r e i g n  s e c t o r .  Where 
dualism i s  e v i d e n t ,  the secondary e f f e c t s  are t r a n s f e r r e d  
by the modern s e c t o r  to  the in v e sting,  c o u n try r a th e r  than  
b e n e f i t i n g  the h o s t  economy.
In  v iew  o f  the importance o f  the f o r e i g n  owned 
s e c t o r  to  the I r i s h  economy, an a n a l y s i s  o f  the above 
a s p e c t s  o f  dualism i s  im perat ive*  A t t e n t i o n  has a l ­
ready b e e n  drawn to the marked d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e x p o r t in g  
behaviour  between f o r e i g n  owned and dom est ic  i n d u s tr y .
The change o f  p o l i c y  from p r o t e c t i o n  to  f r e e r  trade  
t o g e t h e r  w i th  encouragement of  FBI meant th a t  a new 
o utw a rd - lo o k in g  form of  economic a c t i v i t y  was g r a f t e d  
onto the o l d e r  i n d u s t r i e s  which r e l i e d  on the c o n t i n u ­
ing p r o t e c t i o n  o f  the home market. This  new d i v i s i o n
c u t s  a c r o s s  in d u s tr y  d i f f e r e n c e s  and has been d e s c r ib e d
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by McAleese as  i n t r a - i n d u s t r y  du a l ism .  The p re sen t  
s e c t i o n  e x te n d s  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  dualism by c o n s id e r in g  
import p r o p e n s i t i e s  and o th er  l in kage  e f f e c t s  i n  a d d i t i o n  
to  ex p or t  b e h a v io u r .
The d a ta  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  o f  the paper are taken from 
the An Foras  Forbartha survey o f  grant aided in d u s tr y  
conducted by Padraig O’Huggin. A l l  a n a l y s i s  and comments 
r e f e r  to  th a t  sample a l o n e ,  though i t  i s  reaso n a b le  to  
su g g es t  th a t  the r e s u l t s  are t y p i c a l  o f  the p o p u la t io n  
from which they  are drawn. The sample co v ers  377 f i r m s ,  
of  which 276  (73%) were f o r e i g n  ownedj- j o i n t  v e n tu r e s  
were app o rt io n ed  i n t o  f o r e i g n  or d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned on 
the b a s i s  o f  m a jo r i ty  ( 51$ )  ownership .
The AFF su rv e y  i n v e s t i g a t e d  the  number o f  f u n c t i o n s  
which  o t h e r  u n i t s  o f  the  o r g a n i s a t i o n  pe rfo rm ed  f o r  th e  
f o r e i g n  owned I r i s h  u n i t .  The p r e v i o u s  s e c t i o n  showed
t h a t ,  i n  many c a s e s ,  the I r i s h  s u b s id ia r y  did not i t s e l f  
perform a f u l l  range o f  f u n c t i o n s  ( f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  61% o f  
f irm s c a r r i e d  out Research and Development abroad) .  The 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  l e n t  support to  Hymer’ s h y p o t h e s i s  th a t  
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f irm  c e n t r a l i s e s  the ’h igh er  order  
a c t i v i t i e s ’ ( th o se  r e q u ir in g  s p e c i a l i s e d  c a p i t a l  and 
s k i l l e d  labour i n p u t s )  and d i s p e r s e s  l e s s  c r u c i a l  a c t i v -  
i t i e s .  The s o c i a l  consequences  are s e r i o u s ,  f o r  the  
e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  can leave  a h o s t  country  
denuded o f  h ig h  l e v e l  a c t i v i t i e s  and t h e r e f o r e  o f  s k i l l e d  
manpower* This  s i t u a t i o n  has not ye t  come to  pass  i n  
Ir e la n d  because  o f  the l o o s e l y  organs ied  nature o f  some 
c o r p o r a t io n s  and the e x i s t e n c e  o f  near autonomous f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t m e n t s .  There are s i g n s  that  t h i s  phenomenon w i l l  
become a p o l i c y  i s s u e  i n  the fu tu re  and p r e v en t iv e  measures  
have a l r e a d y  been  taken  by the IDA ( f o r  example, the e s t a b ­
l i sh m en t  o f  the Research Park at  N aas) .  However, th ere  are  
s trong f o r c e s  w i t h i n  the m u l t i n a t i o n a l  f irm  making f o r  the  
c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  o f  h igh  l e v e l  a c t i v i t i e s  which p o l i c y  
measures w i l l  have d i f f i c u l t y  i n  c o u n t e r a c t i n g .
These f a c t o r s  w i t h i n  the group o f  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  
p re sen t  a background to  the a n a l y s i s  o f  du a l ism .  The 
f i r s t  s t a g e  o f  the a n a l y s i s  i s  to p resen t  the r e s u l t s  o f  
f o r e i g n  and dom est ic  f i r m s  as  regards ( 1 ) the p r o p o r t io n  
o f  output which i s  exported  (2 X t h e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  m a t e r i a l  
in p u ts  purchased from I r i s h  sources  and ( 3 )  the p r o p o r t io n  
o f  s e r v i c e  in p u ts  purchased from I r i s h  s o u r c e s .
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( 1 )  Table  ^t.l? shows a c l e a r  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  e x p or t in g
b ehav iou r  between the f o r e i g n  and d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned
I r i s h  f i r m s  i n  the sample .  F ore ign  f i rm s  are c o n c en tra ted
i n  the two h i g h e s t  export  c a t e g o r i e s  (over  90$ e x p o r t e d ) .
I r i s h  f i r m s  are d i s p e r s e d  over  the whole spectrum, but
the s t a t i s t i c a l  mode o f  the I r i s h  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o ccu rs
i n  the 100$ import s u b s t i t u t i o n  c a te g o r y .  This  obv ious
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  behaviour i s  confirmed by a ch i - sq u a re  
3)4
t e s t .
Table h .12 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  I r i s h  and F o re ign  Grant 
Aided Firms by the p r o p o r t io n  o f  t o t a l  output which i s
e x p o r t e d .
% o f  t o t a l  Number 
output  f irm s  
ex p o r ted  c l a s s
2
• o f  f o r e i g n  
i n  each
3
Number o f  
I r i s h  f irm s  
i n  each c l a s s
*+
% o f  each c l a s s  
r ep re sen ted  
by f o r e i g n  
f irm s
( 2 ) x  100
2 + 3
0 19 25 ^3
1 -9 12 6 66
1 0 -1 9 I k 8 6k
2 0 -2 9 11 6 65
3 0-39 8 6 57
i* 0-1*9 3 7 30
50-59 8 k 66
60-69 10 3 77
70-79 9 6 60
80 -89 12 9 57
90-99 70 11 86
100 100 9 92
U n c l a s s i f i e d * 1 -
T o ta l 2 76 101 73
Sources  Author’ s c a l c u l a t i o n from AFT survey •
1 7 2
( 2 )  T ab le  *+.13 c l a s s i f i e s  the  f i r m s  a c c o rd i n g  to
the p er ce n ta g e  o f  m a t e r i a l  in p u ts  which they o b ta in  from
I r i s h  s o u r c e s .  I t  i s  e v id e n t  from the Table that  f o r e i g n
f irm s purchase  t h e i r  m a t e r i a l  in p u ts  preponderantly  from
abroad -  more than 76% o f  f o r e i g n  f irm s purchase l e s s
than 50% o f  t h e i r  m a t e r i a l  input requirem ents  from I r i s h
s o u r c e s .  Again the d i f f e r e n c e  i n  behaviour  i s  obv ious
3 5and t h i s  i s  confirmed by a ch i - sq u a re  t e s t .
Table  ^+.13 C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  F ore ign  and I r i s h  Firms by
1
% o f  t o t a l  
m a t e r i a l  in p u ts  
purchased from 
I r i s h  s o u r c e s
2
Number o f  
f o r e i g n  
f irm s  i n  
each c l a s s
3
Number o f  
I r i s h  
f irm s i n  
c l a s s
i+
% o f  each c l a s s  
r ep resen ted  by.  
f o r e i g n  f irm s
( - j ^  ) X 100
0 1+8 3 9*+
1 -9 *+1 10 80
1 0-19 50 7 88
2 0 -2 9 39 9 81
3 0 -3 9 16 2 89
*+0-*+9 8 1 89
50-59 10 8 56
60-69 5 3 63
70-79 8 5 61
80-89 9 5 6k
90-99 22 l*+ 61
100 20 33 38
U n c l a s s i f i e d - 1 -
T o t a l 276 101 73
Source;  Author’ s c a l c u l a t i o n  from AFF su rv e y .
( 3 )  The ev idence  on the p r o p e n s i ty  o f  the two 
groups to  import s e r v i c e  in p u ts  such as m aintenance,  
a c c o u n t s ,  r e p a i r s  i s  shown i n  Table k . l k .  L i t t l e  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  the p r o p o r t io n s  i s  apparent from the  
Table and c h i - sq u a re  t e s t s  confirm t h i s  b e l i e f .
However, i t  has been  shown above th a t  some o f  the  
f u n c t i o n s  which may be inc lu ded  i n  s e r v i c e  in p u ts  
(R & D, purchasing m arket ing)  are not performed i n  
Ire lan d  at  a l l  by some s u b s id i a r i e s *  F u rther ,  the f i r m s  
may not c o n s id e r  the use o f  t h e i r  p a r e n t ' s  knowledge on 
these  i s s u e s  as "importing se r v ic e s "  ( o f t e n  no payment 
i s  m a d e ) . ^  I t  would be unwise to r e l y  on the o s t e n s i b l e  
c o n c lu s i o n  th a t  there  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  i n  s e r v i c e  input  
purchasing behaviour* I t  can a r i s e  because  o f  the  
d i f f e r e n t  nature  o f  f o r e i g n  f irm s  i n  terms o f  the range  
o f  f u n c t i o n s  performed.
T a b le  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  F o r e i g n  and I r i s h  f i r m s
bv the p r o p o r t io n  o f  s e r v i c e  in p u ts ob ta in ed  from
I r i s h  so u r c e s -
1 2 3 b
% o f  t o t a l  
s e r v i c e  in p u ts  
o b ta in e d  from 
I r i s h  so u r c e s
Number o f  
f o r e i g n  
f i rm s  i n  
c l a s s
Number of  
I r i s h  
f irm s  i n  
c l a s s
% o f  each c l a s s  
r ep re sen ted  by 
f o r e i g n  f irm s
( 2 + 3  ^ x
0 2 k 33
1 -9 1 - 100
1 0-19 If 1 80
20 -29 b 3 57
3 0 -3 9 3 3 50
1+0 -1*9 - 1 -
50-59 0 100
60-69 5 b 56
70-79 15 it 79
80-89 ?3 5 82
90-99 61 21 7b
100 5*+ 73
U n c l a s s i f i e d - 1 -
T o ta l 276 101 73
S o u r c e : A uthorf s c a l c u l a t i o n  from AFF survey-
I t  may be su gges ted  th a t  the d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
e x p o r t in g  and input purchasing behaviour  are due to  
( I )  the d i f f e r e n c e  i n  the i n d u s t r i a l  mix o f  the two 
groups ( 2 )  d i f f e r e n c e s  in  f irm s i z e  ( 3 )  inh eren t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  due to  f o r e i g n e s s  per se (a d u a l i s t i c  
d i v i s i o n ) .  These p o s s i b i l i t i e s  are now examined.
The i n f l u e n c e  o f  the i n d u s t r i a l  m ix ,
( a )  E x p o r t s . The i n d u s t r i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the  
sample i s  shown i n  Table *+.15* Four major s e c t o r s  
are i d e n t i f i e d ,  c o v er in g  2 ?b f irm s i n  the sample.
Tab le  *->-.15 AFF Sample. Number o f  f irm s  i n  four  
major s e c t o r s .
S e c to r  Number o f  Number o f
F ore ign
Firms
I r i s h
Firms
1 . Food and Brink  
( 0 3 , 0 7 , 1 0 - 1 3 , 1 6 )
36 33
2 , T e x t i l e s  and Cloth ing  
( 1 8 - 2 2 )
59 28
3 . M e t a l s ,  E n g in e e r in g ,  
E l e c t r i c a l  (35-*+l)
89 8
k . P l a s t i c s  (M+) 21 k
T o t a l  (Four S e c t o r )  201 73
An exam in at ion  o f  e x p o r t in g  behaviour  i n  th ese  
( r a t h e r  broad) i n d u s t r i a l  groupings show th a t  f o r e i g n  
f i rm s  export  a g r e a te r  p ro p or t io n  o f  output than  
I r i s h  f i r m s ' w i t h i n  each grouping ,  (Table h . l 6 )  I t  i s  
a l s o  apparent tha t  the e x p o r t in g  performance o f  I r i s h  
grant a ided  f irm s i s  s u p e r io r  to th a t  o f  I r i s h  in d u s tr y
    i  rr£ . - -  -  „
in general.
Table *+.16 Sectoral Exporting Performance
S e c to r AFF Sample Average 
% output exported
1 . F o re ig n  2 . I r i s h  
Firm Firm
3 . T o ta l  
E xports  o f  
S e c to r  -  
t o t a l  
output o f  
s e c t o r  1970
1 ,  Food and Drink 7 9 .0 56.2 3 1 .0
2 .  T e x t i l e s  and 
C lo th in g
7*+.0 5 3 .7 28.*+
3 .  M e t a l s ,  E n g in ­
e e r i n g ,  E l e c t r i c a l
7 8 .5 *+8.8 2 1 . 6
k .  P l a s t i c s 6 2 .9 1 6 .8 *+0,9+
Four S e c t o r  Average 7 6 A 5 1 .6 2 9 . 6
’’A d justed” export  
P r o p o r t io n  o f  
F o r e ig n  Firms *+8.0
Source i Columns 1 and 2 AFF d a t a .  Column 3 E x te r n a l  
Trade S t a t i s t i c s  1970.
+ F ig u re  f o r  M is c e l la n e o u s  M anufacturing.
A tech n iq u e  which can be used to  separate  out the  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  s e c t o r a l  com p osi t ion  on the o v e r a l l  average  
p r o p o r t io n  of  ex p o r ts  i s  ’’s h i f t  and share a n a l y s i s ” .*3 
The o v e r a l l  d i s p a r i t y  i n  the prop o r t ion  o f  output exported  
between groups i s  2 k . 8%. T h is  i s  d iv id e d  i n t o  two p a r t s  
by u s in g  the  ’’a dju sted  export  p e r c e n ta g e ” of  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s .  The adjusted  f i g u r e  sho\</s the p r o p o r t io n  o f  o u t ­
put which f o r e i g n  f irm s  would have exported  i f  t h e i r
export  p a t t e r n  had been  the  same as th a t  o f  the I r i s h  
f irm s  w i t h i n  the same s e c t o r .  The adju sted  f i g u r e  i s  
c a l c u l a t e d  to  be *+8.0$. Now the " i n t r a - s e c t o r a l  e f f e c t ” , 
caused by the su p er io r  exp o r t in g  performance w i t h i n  
each s e c t o r  i s  shown by the d i f f e r e n c e  between the a c t u a l  
and the a d ju s te d  f o r e i g n  export  p e r c e n t a g e s .  The i n t r a  
s e c t o r a l  e f f e c t  accounts  f o r  a d i f f e r e n c e  o f  2 8 ,*+^
( 7 6 .*+ minus *+8.0). The i n t e r  in d u s tr y  f i g u r e  appears  
as a n e g a t i v e  f a c t o r  o f  3 . 6 $ .  This  r e s u l t  means th a t  i f  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  had the same i n d u s t r i a l  com p osi t ion  as the  
I r i s h  f i r m ,  then  the f o r e i g n  f i r m ’ s average export p r o ­
p o r t io n  would in c r e a se  by 3 . 6 $ I This  phenomenon i s  
e x p l i c a b l e  by exam ination  o f  Tables *+.15 and *+.16 i n  con­
j u n c t i o n .  The I r i s h  f irm s  in  the sample are almost  
e n t i r e l y  c o n cen tra ted  in  s e c t o r s  1 and 2 which have above  
average ex p or t  r a t i o s .  Almost h a l f  o f  the t o t a l  I r i s h  
f irm s are i n  the food and drink  s e c t o r  which has the h i g h ­
e s t  export  p ro p o r t io n  f o r  both groups o f  f i r m s .  The 
group w i th  the low est  export  prop o r t io n  -  p l a s t i c s ,  i s  
hardly  r e p r e s e n t e d  at  a l l  in  the I r i s h  group.
Aside  from the use o f  the broad i n d u s t r i a l  groups  
and the f a c t o r  of  s i z e ,  both o f  which are cons id ered  
be low ,  th ere  are three  s e t s  o f  f a c t o r s  which h e lp  to  
account f o r  the d i f f e r e n c e  in  behaviour w i t h i n  i n d u s t r i e s .
(1 )  The p r o v i s i o n  that  f o r e i g n  f irm s i n  r e c e i p t  o f  grant  
aid must be n o n -co m p et i t iv e  w ith  e x i s t i n g  I r i s h  f i rm s  on 
the d o m est ic  market.  Export o r i e n t a t e d  f irm s are t h e r e ­
fore  a t t r a c t e d  and are rewarded w ith  exemption from t a x ­
a t i o n  on export  p r o f i t s #
*1 r?Q
( 2 )  The f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  have c lo s e  co n ta c t  w ith  
t h e i r  home market .  They have a c c e s s  to  b e t t e r  in fo r m a t io n ,  
s a l e s  and marketing f a c i l i t i e s  than do I r i s h  f i r m s .
F o r e i g n  f i r m s  a l s o  may be more e f f i c i e n t  and a re  g e a r e d  to  
the  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  " e x p o r t  p r o d u c t s ” .
(3 )  The sm a l l  s i z e  o f  the I r i s h  market i n  c o n ju n c t io n  
with  pas t  I r i s h  p o l i c y  i s  a l s o  a f a c t o r .  Under the p ro ­
t e c t i o n i s t  regime o f  I r i s h  p o l i c y  which ran  from the  
middle 1930s u n t i l  the 1960s ,  I r i s h  f i r m s  became geared  
to  su p p ly in g  the home market behind h igh  t a r i f f  w a l l s .  
Consequently  they were unable to take immediate advantage  
of  the f r e e  trade p o l i c i e s  and export  advantages th a t  now 
p r e v a i l .
The p r o c e s s  o f  r e - o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  product ion  towards  
export  markets  i s  a gradual  and d i f f i c u l t  one .  The p e r ­
formance o f  I r i s h  f i rm s  must be seen i n  t h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  
c o n t e x t .  F o re ig n  f irm s  are not bound by the c o n s t r a i n t s  
of  such a background.
(b )  Import p r o p e n s i t y . A s im i la r  procedure can be adopted  
to  i n v e s t i g a t e  the e f f e c t  o f  s e c t o r a l  d i f f e r e n c e  on the  
purchase o f  I r i s h  i n p u t s .  Table *+.17 p r e s e n t s  the e v id e n c e  
on the s e c t o r a l  breakdown o f  imported input  p r o p o r t io n s .
Table h . 1 7  Percentage  o f  t o t a l  m a t e r ia l  in n u ts  
purchased from I r i s h  sources
Average % o f  t o t a l  m a t e r i a l  in p u ts  
purchased from I r i s h  sou rces_______
S e c to r
1
F o re ig n  Firms
2
I r i s h  Firms
1 .  Food and Drink 8 2 .1 85.0
2 .  T e x t i l e s  and C lo th in g 2*+. 6 ^ 9 .9
3 .  M e t a l s ,  E n g in e e r in g ,  
E l e c t r i c a l
23.1* 38.8
f^. P l a s t i c s 13.1 6.8
Four s e c t o r  Average 31.5 68.3
Adjusted average % I r i s h  
i n p u t s  used by f o r e i g n  
f irm s *+6.1
S o u r c e : A u th or ’ s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from AFF su rv ey .
Only i n  the food and drink  se c t o r  do f o r e i g n  f i rm s  
purchase most o f  t h e i r  m a t e r i a l  input needs from I r i s h  
s o u r c e s .  The cheap and p l e n t i f u l  s u p p l i e s  o f  I r i s h  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  produce e x p l a i n  t h i s  h igh  f i g u r e .  Indeed ,  
the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  I r i s h  inp uts  i s  o f t e n  the r a i s o n  d ’e tr e  
o f  f o r e i g n  investm ent  i n  t h i s  s e c t o r .  However, i n  the  
t ec h n o log y  i n t e n s i v e  f i e l d s  o f  a c t i v i t y ,  where f o r e i g n  
f irm s are c o n c e n tr a t e d ,  they  depend mainly  on imported  
i n p u t s .  T h is  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  behaviour i s  not s u r p r i s i n g .  
F ore ign  owned f irm s are prone to  r e l y  on t h e i r  parent  f i rm s  
fo r  the supply o f  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  m a t e r i a l s  and components 
which may not be a v a i l a b l e  from the I r i s h  s o u r c e s .  In  f a c t ,
an o f t e n  c i t e d  reason  f o r  the e f f i c i e n t  performance o f  
f o r e i g n  r e l a t i v e  to dom est ic  r i v a l s  i s  t h e i r  a c c e s s  to  
b e t t e r  q u a l i t y  in p u ts  and t e c h n i c a l  know-how. Such 
i n p u t s  are a v a i l a b l e  duty f r e e  to  e x p o r t in g  f i r m s .  The 
f o r e i g n  owned f irm s import b i l l  w i l l  a l s o  tend to  be 
r a i s e d  by knowledge o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  s u p p l i e r s  and g o o d w i l l  
towards them. F i f t y - f i v e  f irm s i n  the sample perform 
the purchas ing  f u n c t i o n s  abroad. This  s i t u a t i o n  i s  com­
pounded by q u a l i t y  and p r ic e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  between  
imported and I r i s h  i n p u t s .  The survey o f  Grant Aided 
In d u stry  (1966)  noted com pla in ts  by f o r e i g n  f irm s  on 
s lo w n ess  of  d e l i v e r y  o f  in p u ts  from I r i s h  s o u r c e s :  th ere  
a l s o  appears  to  have been a r e lu c ta n c e  amongst I r i s h  f i r m s  
to  se ek  out b u s i n e s s  from new f o r e i g n  e n t e r p r i s e s .  (M etric  
standard req u irem en ts ,  s c a l e  f a c t o r s  and d i f f e r e n t  modes 
o f  o p e r a t in g  may have been a d e t e r r e n t .  +
. The e f f e c t s  o f  s e c t o r a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  are separated  
by the c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  an "adjusted import c o e f f i c i e n t ” 
f o r  f o r e i g n  f irm s which works out to be k6»l%* The 
d i f f e r e n c e  between the observed amount o f  I r i s h  in p u ts
+ P l a s t i c s  f irm s  appear to  be the e x c e p t i o n  to  the above ,  
as f o r e i g n  p l a s t i c s  f irm s  appear to  purchase a g r e a t e r  
share o f  I r i s h  in p u ts  than l o c a l  o n e s .  The rea son s  f o r  
t h i s  are i n  the i n t e r n a l  s t r u c tu r e  o f  the in d u s tr y  
(which i n c l u d e s  both im porters  and p r o c e s s o r s  o f  raw 
polymer and f i n i s h e r s  o f  a s u b s t a n t i a l l y  completed p r o ­
d u c t ) .  Also the sm all  number of  I r i s h  f i rm s  i n  the  
sample does  not a l low  proper comparison.
purchased and t h i s  a d ju s te d  f i g u r e  measures the i n t e r ­
s e c t o r a l  e f f e c t .  (22.8% of  the o v e r a l l  d i f f e r e n c e ) .
The remainder o f  lM.6% accounts  f o r  the i n t r a  s e c t o r a l  
e f f e c t s .
I t  can be deduced from the above procedure tha t  
the s h o r t f a l l  i n  the p ro p o r t io n  o f  dom est ic  m a te r ia l  
in p u ts  purchased by f o r e i g n  f irm s i s  due not on ly  to  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the i n d u s t r i a l  mix o f  the two groups but  
a l s o  a r i s e s  from the d i f f e r e n t  nature o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  
w i t h i n  the  same s e c t o r .  M yin t’ s v iew th a t  a fundamental  
cause o f  dual ism  i s  the f a c t  that  the two groups have 
unequal a c c e s s  to  economic re so u rc es  thus g a in s  some 
p l a u s i b i l i t y  i n  the I r i s h  c o n t e x t .  S p e c i a l i s e d ,  h ig h  
q u a l i t y  in p u t s  embodying patented knowledge or t e c h n i ­
c a l  know-how are a v a i l a b l e  to  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  from 
o th e r  branches o f  th e  f i r m .  Inputs may be a v a i l a b l e  
at  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  p r i c e s  below r u l in g  world p r i c e s ,  
en a b l in g  f o r e i g n  f irm s to  make p r o f i t s  i n  tax  f r e e  
I r e l a n d .  Export ing  f irm s  are a l lowed duty f r e e  in p u ts  
and t h i s  d r i v e s  a f u r t h e r  wedge between the input p r i c e s  
fa ced  by the  two groups .
The e f f e c t  o f  the d i f f e r e n t  i n d u s t r i a l  mix o f  the  
two groups can be summarised as f o l l o w s .  The d i f f e r e n c e  
i n  e x p o r t in g  behaviour i s  due e n t i r e l y  to  i n t r a  in d u s tr y  
f a c t o r s  -  the su p e r io r  export in g  performance o f  f o r e i g n  
f irm s w i t h i n  each s e c t o r .  S e c to r a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  account  
f o r  a c o n s id e r a b le  part o f  the o v e r a l l  d i s p a r i t y  i n
p u rch ases  o f  dom est ic  in p u ts  but a la r g e  part i s  s t i l l  
unaccounted f o r .  However, s e v e r a l  important c a v e a t s  
must be added. (1 )  The IDA d isb u rse  g rants  on the  
b a s i s  th a t  new f irm s do not  o f f e r  c o m p et i t io n  to  i n d i g ­
enous producers  on the home market.  The com p a ra b i l i ty  
o f  the two groups i s  thus reduced.  (2 )  The s e c t o r a l  
c a t e g o r i e s  used are ex trem ely  broad and a much f i n e r  
i n d u s t r i a l  breakdown i s  n e c essa ry  to e s t a b l i s h  dualism  
w ith  any f o r c e .  The l i m i t e d  nature o f  the I r i s h  i n d u s t ­
r i a l  s e c t o r  makes t h i s  a l l  the more f o r c i b l e .  (3 )  F o r e ig n  
f i r m s ,  a l th o u g h  they would f a l l  i n t o  the f i n e s t  i n d u s t ­
r i a l  d i v i s i o n  w ith  I r i s h  f i r m s ,  are o f t e n  producing diss ira  
i l a r  p r o d u c t s .  A narrow range of export  products  may
account f o r  a la r g e  p r o p o r t ion  of  such a s e c t o r ’ s output  -
39emanating almost  e n t i r e l y  from f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  The 
s p e c i a l i s e d  in p u ts  a v a i l a b l e  to  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  account i n  
la r g e  part  f o r  the advantage of  f o r e i g n  f irm s  i n  such 
f i e l d s .  I t  may be argued th a t  the f a c t  a lone  d i s t i n g u i s h s  
them from t h e i r  c l o s e s t  I r i s h  r i v a l  i n  product c a teg ory  
i t e m s .  (*0 A f u r t h e r  f a c t o r ,  to  which we now tu r n ,  may 
be the i n f l u e n c e  o f  s i z e .
The i n f l u e n c e  o f  s c a l e  f a c t o r s
I t  i s  a p l a u s i b l e  a p r i o r i  b e l i e f  th a t  the rep orted  
d i s p a r i t y  i n  e x p o r t in g  and i n  the purchasing o f  I r i s h  
in p u ts  may be due to  s c a l e  f a c t o r s .  I r i s h  f irm s may be 
sm a l ler  and thus face  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  e x p o r t i n g .  I t  may 
a l s o  be e a s i e r  fo r  I r i s h  f irm s to supply the input needs
o f  s m a l le r  f i r m s .  Table ^ .1 8  shows the r e s u l t s  when a l l  
f irm s employing l e s s  than 100 people  i n  Ire lan d  are 
e l i m i n a t e d .
Table fcf.18 The Performance o f  la r g e  f i rm s
% M a te r ia l  
Export in p u ts  obta ined
Number o f  Output i n  Ire lan d
I r i s h  F o r e ig n  I r i s h  F o re ig n  I r i s h  F ore ign
A g r ic u l t u r e  12 13 5 3 .0  5 6 .1  8 3 .5  75 .9
based f i r m s
(ICIP 0 1 - 1 5 )
Non A g r ic u l t u r e  17 78 ^7*3 8 3 .6  2 ^ .7  2 0 . 6
based f i r m s
T o ta l  29 91 *+9.7 7 9 .7  ^9^0 2 8 .5
S o u r c e : A u thor’ s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from AFF survey .
The s i z e  f a c t o r  does  not appear to  a l t e r  the e x p o r t in g  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  to  any c o n s id e r a b le  e x te n t  (compare Table  
^ . 1 6 ) .  The l a r g e r  f o r e i g n  f irm s are s l i g h t l y  more export  
o r i e n t a t e d  and the l a r g e r  I r i s h  f irm s s l i g h t l y  l e s s  so 
than t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  groups as  a w h o le .  The s i z e  f a c t o r  
i s  c l e a r l y  o f  major importance with regard to  purchases  
of  I r i s h  m a t e r i a l  i n p u t s .  The pro p or t io n  of  goods which  
the l a r g e s t  29 I r i s h  f irm s  o b ta in  from dom est ic  so u rces  i s  
*+9*0/T> compared to  the 6 8 .3 a f i g u r e  o f  the whole sample.
By c o n t r a s t  the f i g u r e  f o r  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  changes l i t t l e  
(28 .5^  f o r  la r g e  f irm s  as a g a in s t  the o v e r a l l  3 1 .5 ^ )  S c a le  
i s  c l e a r l y  a f a c t o r  i n  the p a t t e r n  o f  input  p u rch ases .  The 
tendency o f  I r i s h  f irm s  not to  seek out b u s i n e s s  from 
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  may i n  la rg e  part be due t o - i n a b i l i t y  to
s e r v i c e  the  n e e d s -o f  l a r g e r  c o rp o ra t io n s  because  of  
l a c k  o f  c a p a c i t y  i n  the dom est ic  s e c t o r .
The i n f l u e n c e  o f  o ther  l in k a g e  e f f e c t s
A f u r t h e r  s e t  o f  f a c t o r s  which reduce the f o r c e  o f  
the du a l ism  h y p o th e s i s  are those  concerning  the l in k a g e  
e f f e c t s  c r o s s i n g  the ownership d i v i s i o n .  S p i n - o f f  
from the dom est ic  s e c t o r  can occur by o th er  means than  
the purchase o f  d o m e s t i c a l l y  produced in p u ts  i n  ways 
which reduce  the dichotomy. Taxes paid on wages and 
o ther  f i s c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  are used to  f o s t e r  i n d u s t r i a l  
development as a w h o le .  The f a c t  of  f o r e i g n  f irm s  
employing s k i l l e d  labour (and keeping labour w i t h i n  
Ir e la n d  r a t h e r  than em igrant)  c r e a t e s  g a i n s ,  not a l l  o f  
which can be appropriated  by the f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r ,  f o r  
labour  m o b i l i t y  w i t h i n  Ire la n d  means th a t  some r e t u r n  from 
the t r a i n i n g  w i l l  accrue to the dom est ic  s e c t o r .  The 
d e m o n stra t ion  e f f e c t  o f  new tech n iq u es  introduced  by the  
f o r e i g n  s e c t o r  may h e lp  improve p r o d u c t i v i t y  throughout  
the economy. The re in forcem en t  o f  the i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r  
by new f o r e i g n  f irm s h e l p s  to crea te  an i n d u s t r i a l  e t h o s ,  
b o l s t e r i n g  hopes fo r  f u t u r e  i n d u s t r i a l  development.
F i n a l l y ,  perhaps the most b e n e f i c i a l  long run i n f l u e n c e  
red uc in g  the  d i v i s i o n  i s  the c r e a t i o n  w i t h i n  Ire la n d  o f  a 
p o o l  o f  s k i l l e d  management. The in terchange  o f  such manage 
ment and the e f f e c t  o f  new management te c h n iq u e s  i s  o f  
g r ea t  long  run importance f o r  the development o f  the domsst  
i c  s e c t o r .  An a d d i t i o n a l  b e n e f i t  i s  the a t t r a c t i o n  back
to  I r e la n d  o f  emigrant managers. The e n tr y  o f  new f irm s  
i s  a l s o  f e l t  to  have the e f f e c t  o f  a s a l u t a r y  " jo l t"  on 
somnolent dom est ic  f i r m s .
The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  takes a wider look  at the  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  the output o f  f o r e i g n  f irm s to  the I r i s h  
economy.
S e c t i o n  5 The Retained Value o f  F ore ign  FirmTs 
Operations i n  I r e l a n d .
One r a th e r  crude method o f  e s t im a t in g  the p r o p o r t io n  
o f  output which may be cons id ered  b e n e f i c i a l  to  Ir e la n d  
i s  the c a l c u l a t i o n  of  " r e ta in ed  value" (RV). RV i s  the  
p r o p o r t io n  o f  output which i s  spent i n  Ire lan d  or which  
accrues  to  I r i s h  f a c t o r s .  F i r s t  round e f f e c t s  on ly  are  
c o n s id e r e d ;  m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t s  are excluded to g e th e r  w i th  
i n d i r e c t  t a x e s ,  r e - in v e s tm e n t  and d e p r e c i a t i o n  (the l a t t e r  
two must be cons id ered  as accruing  to  the c a p i t a l i s t ,  
l a r g e l y  f o r e i g n ) .
I d e a l l y  RV should be c a lc u l a t e d  fo r  two p e r io d s ,  the  
investm ent  per iod  and the operat ing  p e r io d .  However,  
because o f  data  d e f i c i e n c i e s , o n l y  the o p e r a t in g  per iod  can  
be c o n s i d e r e d .  In the op e r a t in g  p e r io d ,  r e ta in e d  v a lu e  i s  
e s t im a te d  accord ing  to  eq u a t io n  *+.1.
RV = W + P + L  + T ( k . l )
I I  I
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(*+.!) where W = wages paid fco I r i s h  labour
I
P = p r o f i t s  accru ing  to  I r i s h  c a p i t a l i s t s  
I  or s t a t e  b o d ie s
L = f i r s t  round l in k a g e  e f f e c t s 5 
purchase o f  I r i s h  in p u ts
= d i r e c t  t a x e s  on f o r e i g n  o p e r a t i o n s .
The c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  RVs was ca rr ie d  out on f i v e  major  
s e c t i o n s  f o r  the year 1971 us ing  IDA and AFF data# The 
sample o f  f i r m s  used to  provide the e s t im a t e  covered 19*+ 
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i n  the f o o d ,  t e x t i l e s ,  e n g i n e e r i n g / m e t a l s /  
e l e c t r i c a l ,  p l a s t i c s  and chem ica ls  s e c t o r s *  Although . 
th ese  s e c t o r s  are v e ry  broad,  they  serve  to i l l u s t r a t e  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  RV between s e c t o r s  and they  provide a la rg e  
enough sample to remove minor d i s t o r t i o n s .  The r e s u l t s  
o f  the e x e r c i s e  are s e t  out i n  Table *+.19*
On t h i s  r a th er  crude e s t im a te  an o v e r a l l  RV f o r  the  
f i r s t  f i v e  s e c t o r s  s u g g e s t s  that  33$ o f  the g r o s s  output  
remains i n  Ire la n d  a f t e r  f i r s t  round payments. There i s  
a grea t  d e a l  o f  s e c t o r a l  v a r i a b i l i t y  round  t h i s  f i g u r e  
w ith  the food s e c t o r  having  by fa r  the h i g h e s t  RV o f  5b% 
and p l a s t i c s  re tu r n in g  a v e r y  low p r o p o r t io n  o f  2 1 $ .  The 
f a c t o r  o f  wages c a r r i e s  most weight  e x ce p t  f o r  food where 
the l in k a g e  e f f e c t s  are h ig h  and c h e m ica ls  which a l s o  has  
a l a r g e r  share o f  l in k a g e  e f f e c t s  than wages i n  g r o s s  o u t ­
p u t .  As p o in te d  out above ,  l in k a ge  e f f e c t s  are ve ry  low 
ex ce p t  f o r  the  food s e c t o r  where I r i s h  raw m a t e r i a l s  are  
much i n  e v i d e n c e .  I r i s h  ta x e s  and the I r i s h  share o f  the
1 8 ?
p r o f i t s  are extrem ely  low because  o f  the ta x  f r e e  
export  i n c e n t i v e  p r o v i s i o n  and the p r e fe r e n c e  o f  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s  f o r  w h o l ly  owned s u b s i d i a r i e s • I n d i r e c t  t a x e s  
a l t e r  t h i s  p i c t u r e  l i t t l e  because  o f  export  o r i e n t a t i o n  
of  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  and the duty  f r e e  imported in p u ts  
p r o v i s i o n  f o r  e x p o r t in g  f irm s*
Table *4.19 Reta ined  Value as a p ercentage  o f  the output  o f  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i n  f i v e  ma.ior s e c t o r s  (1971)
S e c to r  Number o f  W 
F o r e ig n  Firms I
+ P +
I
L + T = 
I
RV
Food 23 rHi—1  .O11
. 
£ + i  + 0 .^ 2 + S  mm3 — O . ^ 1*
T e x t i l e s $k RVt = 0 .22 + 0 .0 2 + 0 . 1 3 4 0 .0 1 = 0.38
M etals  and 
E n g in e e r in g
76 RVm= 0 . 2 l + 0 .0 1+ 0 .0 8 + 0.01= 0.31
P l a s t i c s 30 RVp=0.ltf + i + 0 .0 5 + 0 .0 2= 0 . 2 1
Chemicals 11 RV = 0 .12 + : + 0.1*+ + * rz 0 .2 6
O ver a l l 19k RV = 0 .18 + 2 + 0 . 1 3 + 0 .0 1 = 0.33
Five  S e c t o r s
Source : Author! s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from c o n f i d e n t i a l  IDA
data  and An Foras Forbartha survey*
t = l e s s  than  0 .01^
Wavs to  i n c r e a s e  RV
There are s e v e r a l  p o l i c y  measures which could  be 
implemented w i th  the aim o f  r e t a i n i n g  a h ig h e r  share o f  
g r o ss  output i n  I r e l a n d .  A l l  o f  th e se  measures are l i k e l y  
to  reduce the in f lo w  o f  FDI i n t o  I r e la n d  and so the
b e n e f i t s  o f  in c r e a se d  BV must be weighed a g a in s t  a d im in ish ed  
in f lo w  o f  in v e s tm e n t .
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These means ares  ( 1 )  s t i p u l a t e  employment o f  I r i s h  
labour i n  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  thus  r a i s i n g  Wj. This  however,  
has been r u le d  out because  i t  was f e l t  to  encourage i n ­
e f f i c i e n c y .  Labour i n t e n s i v e  t e c h n iq u e s  are not u s u a l l y  
employed by f o r e i g n  f i r m s  and a move i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  
may damage the in f lo w  because  o f  the h ig h  c o s t  o f  a d a p t ­
ing  to  labour  i n t e n s i v e  t e c h n iq u e s .  (2 )  Encourage the  
e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s .  Many f o r e i g n  f irm s  do 
not welcome m in o r i ty  mode o f  o p e r a t io n s  and U .S .  f i r m s  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  p r e f e r  to  opera te  w h o l ly  owned s u b s i d i a r i e s .
The IDA attempt to g a in  e q u i t y  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  has so  f a r  
produced v e r y  minor r e s u l t s .  There i s  a f u r t h e r  drawback
i n  t h a t  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  have proved more u n s ta b le  than
kO
w h o l ly  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  (3 )  I n c r e a s e  the ta x  r a t e  
on f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  Such a move would o b v i o u s l y  cause a 
d e c re a se  i n  the in f lo w  o f  f o r e i g n  in v e s t m e n t .  I t  would 
a l s o  c o n f l i c t  w ith  the o b j e c t i v e  o f  en c o u r a g in g  e x p o r t s  
as  the tax  r e l i e f  on export  p r o f i t s  would be n u l l i f i e d .
(*0 In c r e a s e  l in k a g e s  by s p e c i a l  tax  r e l i e f  l in k e d  t o  
purchases  o f  I r i s h  i n p u t s .  Such a p o l i c y  would be e i t h e r  
e x p en s iv e  i f  the tax  r e l i e f  were h ig h e r  than now or d e t r i ­
m ental  to  the in f lo w  i f  i t  f e l l  below current  r e l i e f .  In  
a d d i t i o n ,  i t  would be o f  u n c e r t a in  impact because  i n  
many c a s e s ,  the s p e c i a l i s e d  h igh  q u a l i t y  in p u ts  are a v a i l ­
ab le  o n ly  from o u t s id e  I r e la n d  ( o f t e n  o n ly  from o th e r  u n i t s  
o f  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m ) .
Given the e l a s t i c i t y  o f  the supply  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  +
+ The h ig h  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  to  changes i n  
d o m e st ic  i n c e n t i v e s  was shown i n  Chapter I I .
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and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  the e l a s t i c i t y  i n  the supply  o f  
f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  i n  the h ig h  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  i n t e n s i v e  
s e c t o r s ,  a rap id  f a l l  i n  the in f lo w  o f  FBI may be 
e x p e c ted  from the im plem entat ion  o f  any o f  the above 
m easures .  This  d e c l i n e  may be g r e a t e r  i n  terms o f  the  
l o s s  o f  b e n e f i t s  to  I r e la n d  (employment, ba lan ce  o f  
payments e f f e c t )  than the b e n e f i t  from the in c r e a se d  RV 
which appears  to  be i n e l a s t i c  g iv e n  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  FBI ( c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y ,  h ig h  t e c h n o lo g y  i n p u t ,  export  
o r i e n t a t i o n )  and o f  the  I r i s h  economy’ s d i f f i c u l t i e s  
i n  su p p ly in g  the kind o f  in p u ts  needed by f o r e i g n  f i r m s .
Two f u r t h e r  measures may be s u g g e s te d  which may not  
a f f e c t  the supply o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  i n  t h i s  way (5 )  
s e c t o r a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  g r a n ts  (6 )  attempt to  d i v e r t  
h ig h e r  order  f u n c t i o n s  to  I r e l a n d .  The f i r s t  o f  these  
two measures i s  c o n c e p t u a l ly  sound but a g a in  i s  l i k e l y  to  
d ec re a se  c a p i t a l  in f lo w  because  h igh  l i n k a g e s  e x i s t  i n  
the s e c t o r s  where the w o r l d ' s  s e c t o r  s p e c i f i c  s t o c k  o f  
f o r e i g n  investm ent  funds i s  low .  This  p o l icy . , . i s  t h e r e f o r e  
l i k e l y  to  d e c r e a se  the FBI i n f l o w .  An attempt to  e n c o u r ­
age h ig h e r  order  f u n c t i o n s  has begun w i t h  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  a Research  Park at  Naas.  Again such a p o l i c y  w i l l  be 
e x p en s iv e  i n  terms o f  grant  a id  because  such i n c e n t i v e s  
must overcome the s tr o n g  c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  t e n d e n c ie s  f o r  
such a c t i v i t i e s  which e x i s t  w i t h i n  the modern c o r p o r a t i o n .  
The g a in s  are u n c e r t a i n  and the c o s t  i s  l i k e l y  to be h i g h .
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There are however,  rea son s  to  b e l i e v e  th a t  RV w i l l  
be i n c r e a s i n g  over t im e .  The o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  i n d i g e ­
nous e n t e r p r i s e s  to  supply  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  w i l l  be s i e z e d  
as f a m i l i a r i t y  i n c r e a s e s  and f o r e i g n  f i r m s  w i l l  s e ek  out  
dom est ic  s u p p l i e r s  as they  a d ju s t  to  the I r i s h  e n v i r o n ­
ment. Some f o r e i g n  f i r m s  w i l l  become more v e r t i c a l l y  
in t e g r a t e d  as  p r o f i t s  in c r e a s e  and r e in v e s tm en t  ta k e s  
p l a c e .  The IDA p o l i c y  o f  encouraging  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  and 
tak in g  an e q u i t y  share o f  new f o r e i g n  f i r m s  w i l l  r a i s e  
RV ( i n  those  c a s e s  where f o r e i g n  f i r m s  welcome dom est ic  
p a r t n e r s ) .  F i n a l l y ,  p r o v id in g  the permanence o f  f o r e i g n  
f irm s  i s  proved ,  the r e d u c t i o n  and e v e n t u a l  ending o f  ta x  
r e l i e f  w i l l  a l s o  in c r e a s e  RV.
C o n c lu s io n s
T h is  Chapter has shown that  inward FDI i n  I r e la n d
has in c r e a s e d  trade f l o w s  i n  both d i r e c t i o n s .  The case
o f  I r e la n d  i s  a good sample o f  the t h e o r e t i c a l  p r o p o s i t i o n
that  trade  and investm en t  f l o w s  should be c o n s id er ed
k l
w i t h i n  a s i n g l e  t h e o r e t i c a l  framework. Almost h a l f  o f  
I r e l a n d ’ s I n d u s t r i a l  Exp orts  come from f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  
and t h i s  p r o p o r t io n  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  as f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  reach  
f u l l  p r o d u c t io n .  The Chapter a l s o  showed th a t  f o r e i g n  
p r o j e c t s  have a h ig h e r  p r o p e n s i ty  to  import in p u ts  than  
th a t  o f  I r i s h  f i r m s .  The i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  the I r i s h  
balance  of  payments are d i s c u s s e d  i n  the c o n te x t  o f  a 
formal model i n  Chapter VI.
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The consequences  o f  t h i s  f i n d in g  may be e xp ressed  
by the b e n e f i t s  o f  in c r e a s e d  e x p o r ts  and the  s p i n - o f f  
from a dynamic s e c t o r  on the one hand a g a i n s t  the c o s t s  
o f  g r e a t e r  r e l i a n c e  on the world market and i n  terms o f  
the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  g a in s  between the d o m est ic  and 
f o r e i g n  s e c t o r s  on the o t h e r .  The e x p o r t s  o f  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  are red uc in g  dependence on I r e l a n d ’ s t r a d i t ­
i o n a l  markets  and d i r e c t i n g  trade much more towards the  
EEC m a rk ets .  Import s u b s t i t u t i o n  by f o r e i g n  owned grant  
aided f i r m s  was found to  be o f  a sm a l l  order  o f  magni­
tu d e ,  a l th ou gh  the sm a l l  non grant a ided  f o r e i g n  owned 
s e c t o r s  have remained i n  e x i s t e n c e  even a f t e r  the change  
o f  p o l i c y  towards f r e e r  t r a d e .
The s e c t i o n  on du a l ism  showed t h a t  d e s p i t e  the  
u s e f u l  i n s i g h t s  which the concept  a f f o r d s ,  i t  cannot be 
a p p l ie d  u n c r i t i c a l l y  i n  the I r i s h  c o n t e x t .  The f o r e i g n /  
d o m e s t i c  ownership d i v i s i o n  i s  not  s u f f i c i e n t ,  by i t s e l f ,  
to  e x p l a i n  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  ex p or t in g  and input purchasing  
b e h a v io u r ,  though i t  i s  c l e a r l y  a n e c e s s a r y  part  o f  such  
an e x p l a n a t i o n .  The c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  e x p o r t in g  must a l s o  
invoke s c a l e  f a c t o r s .  Other i n f l u e n c e s  on the d i f f e r e n c e  
i n  e x p o r t in g  behaviour  are h i s t o r i c a l  f a c t o r s  such as  
p r o t e c t i o n i s m ,  the s u p e r io r  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  
and the in h e r e n t  advantages  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i n  terms o f  
a c c e s s  to  home m arkets ,  h ig h  l e v e l  f u n c t i o n s  and s p e c i a l ­
i s e d  h ig h  q u a l i t y  i n p u t s .  The d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the  importance  
o f  imported in p u ts  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  as reg a r d s  the Cooper 
and Whelan argument t h a t  f o r e i g n  f irm s  do not procure as
much l o c a l l y  as they m ig h t .  The p r e se n t  a n a l y s i s  
showed the importance o f  s c a l e  (and o f  the i n d u s t r i a l  
mix o f  the  two g r o u p s ) .  Large I r i s h  owned f irm s  pur­
chase  much l e s s  i n  I r e la n d  than do s m a l le r  I r i s h  f i r m s .  
This  s u g g e s t s  th a t  the l a c k  o f  c a p a c i t y  amongst I r i s h  
s u p p l i e r s  may be a c o n s t r a i n t  on any attempt to  in c r e a s e  
l in k a g e  e f f e c t s .  The r ep o rted  u n w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  I r i s h  
f irm s  to approach f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  i s  a f u r t h e r  
b a r r i e r .  In a d d i t i o n ,  c e r t a i n  p r o v i s i o n s  o f  the I r i s h  
tax  sy s tem ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  the duty f r e e  a l low ance  on 
imports  f o r  e x p o r te r s  and export  tax  r e l i e f  f o r c e  I r i s h  
i n te r m e d ia te  goods producers  to  compete on equal  terms  
w ith  i m p o r t s • F i n a l l y ,  the u n a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  many o f  
the h ig h  q u a l i t y  s p e c i a l i s e d  in p u ts  r e q u ir e d  by f o r e i g n  
f irm s  h e l p s  to  account f o r  the d i f f e r e n c e .  I t  i s  not  
s u f f i c i e n t  t h e r e f o r e  to  f o c u s  on the f a c t  o f  f o r e i g n  
ownership as a complete e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  the d i s p a r i t y ,  as  
Government p o l i c y  and inadequancy o f  the  d om est ic  i n d u s t ­
r i a l  framework are a l s o  im portant .  A d u a l i s t i c  s t r u c t u r e  
appears to be a concomitant  o f  a l a r g e  f o r e i g n  owned 
s e c t o r  i n  any host".country J l a r g e l y  b ecause  o f  the i n e v i  
t a b le  i n e q u a l i t y  of  a c c e s s  to  r e a l  r e s o u r c e s  between  
f o r e i g n  owned and d o m e st ic  f i r m s .  FBI has  t h e r e f o r e  c o n ­
t r i b u t e d  to  the emergence o f  a d u a l i s t i c  s t r u c t u r e  i h  
I r i s h  i n d u s t r y .
The exam in a t io n  o f  the  "Retained Value" o f  f o r e i g n  
f irm s  i s  not  presen ted  as a complete c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i  
I t  does  not v a lu e  b e n e f i t s  except  at  market p r i c e s ,  does
not r e l a t e  b e n e f i t  to  c o s t  ( i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i t  does not  
e x p r e s s  b e n e f i t s  per u n i t  o f  Government in v e s tm en t )  nor 
does  i t  c o m p le te ly  encompass b e n e f i t s  -  ba la n ce  of  
payments e f f e c t s ,  e x t e r n a l  economies and the o p p o r tu n i ty  
c o s t  o f  g r a n ts  are a l l  o m i t t e d .  However RV h e l p s  to  
i d e n t i f y  and q u a n t i fy  the areas  o f  b e n e f i t  to  the economy 
and to  a s c e r t a i n  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  g a in s  between the  
h o s t  country  and the i n v e s t i n g  f i r m s ,  A complete c o s t  
b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  i s  c a r r i e d  out i n  Chapter V I I .
The d i s c u s s i o n  o f  RV i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  w i th  regard to
the Cooper and Whelan v iew  th a t  g r a n ts  should be more
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c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  to  v a lu e  added i n  I r e l a n d ,  RV i s  a 
s t r i c t e r  c o n d i t i o n  that  t h i s  because  RV measures r e t u r n s  
to  Ir ish -ow ned  f a c t o r s  p lu s  the secondary s t im u lu s  to  
p r o d u c t io n  w i t h i n  I r e l a n d .  S e c t i o n  5 i l l u s t r a t e d  th a t  
i n c r e a s i n g  RV (or a t t r a c t i n g  on ly  those  f o r e i g n  f irm s  
which can be expected  to  have a h igh  RV) a l s o  has  draw­
backs i n  t h a t  the t o t a l  in f lo w  o f  FBI would be reduced  
and presumably job c r e a t i o n  would s u f f e r .  I t  may a l s o  be 
a v a l i d  c r i t i c i s m  o f  the  Cooper and Whelan position th a t  
low r e t u r n s  in  RV are an i n e v i t a b l e  c o s t  o f  the r e s t r u c t ­
uring o f  the  o ld  i n d u s t r i a l  framework and the e s t a b l i s h ­
ment o f  new outward lo o k in g  i n d u s t r y .  This  argument i s  
more f o r c i b l e  i n  the e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n ,  
g iv e n  the inadequacy o f  e x i s t i n g  i n d u s tr y  to  carry  out  
t h i s  t a s k .  I t  should t h e r e f o r e  not be over looked  t h a t  a 
p o l i c y  a t tem p t in g  to  r a i s e  RV may have s u b s t a n t i a l  n e g a t i v e
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e f f e c t s  on the  in f lo w  o f  new FBI, T h is  t r a d e - o f f  
should be c a r e f u l l y  i n v e s t i g a t e d  b e fo r e  the  Cooper 
and Whelan v iew  i f  a c c e p t e d .
Chapter IV. Appendix
Import s u b s t i t u t i n g  grant  a ided FDI and T a r i f f  
l e v e l s  1966 and 197?
Firm 1 .  Year 2 . Nominal 3 .  ERP %
number E s t a b l i s h e d  T a r i f f  % 1966
1966
*+. Nominal  
T a r i f f  %
19 72
1 I 960 62 218 1 $
2 1961 29 120 6
3 1968 Free 19 Free
k 1968+ 26 87 Free
5 1967 Free - Free
6 1968+ Free - Free
7 1968 36 153 8
8 1968+ 26 120 Free
9 195^ 19 56
10 1970+ 31 120 ?
11 1959+ Mainly s e r v i c e s - n o t a r i f f
12 1966+ 18 131 Free
13 1967+ Nature o f  Product - no t a r i f f
1*+ I960 1+9 90 22
15 1968 bo 181 Free
16 1952 50 218 Free
17 1959+ 26 120 Free
18 1960 19 120 18
19 1960+ 31 120 Free
20 1961 11 120 11
21 1963 Free - Free
22 1963+ 18 - ?




1 .  Ysar  
E s t a b l i s h e d  •
2 ,  Nominal 
T a r i f f  $ 
1966
3 .  EBP $ 
1966
ko Nomine 
T a r i f f  % 
1972
2k 1963+ 2k 131
25 1965+ 18 - -
26 1967+ Nature o f product--no t a r i f f
27 1967 50 90 27
28 1967 Free - Free
29 1967 12 - Free
30 1968 39 87 ?
31 1970+ Food p r o d u c ts - su p p o r t  system
32 1968 6 - Free
33 1967 Free - Free
31* 1971 + 18 ifO 10
35 1971 + 2k 131 Free
36 1966+ 11 k? Free
3 7 1962 18 ko 18
38 1967 28 88 5
39 1962 k2 168 19
t*o 1961 2k 118 10
k l 1967+ 23 78 8
1*2 1966+ 23 78 8
*+3 1963 2*+ 131 Free
1966 2k 131 9•
^5 1966+ 29 75 7
Source  s Column 1 .  C o n f i d e n t i a l  IDA d a t a
Column 2 .  Customs and E x c i s e  T a r i f f  of  I r e l a n d  (1966)  
Crude av e rag e  n o m ina l  o r ig in sU K  and ESC 
Column 3* McAleese (1971)  o p . c i t .pp 1 9 - 2 1 (By i n d u s t r y )  
Column H• Cu s t o ms ^and .Exc i s e  T a r i f f  o f  I r e l a n d (1972 ) 
Crude a ve rag e  nomina l  o r ig in sU K  and EEC
+ I n d i c a t e s  99 -  100$ output f o r  d o m e st ic  market.
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Chapter V? The Efficiency of Foreign Subsidiaries in
Ire lan d  -  A comparative A n a ly s i s  w ith  
t h e i r  I r i s h  C o m p e t i to r s .
The aim o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  i s  to  i s o l a t e  the impact o f  
FDI on the I r i s h  economy and to  i d e n t i f y  the mechanisms  
by which the impact i s  t r a n sm it t e d  throughout the economy.
The p r e s e n t  chapter  c o n t r i b u t e s  to  t h i s  aim by a s s e s s i n g
\
the e f f i c i e n c y  ( i n  the broad s e n s s ) o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  as  
compared t o  I r i s h  owned f i r m s .  Hence the consequences  
o f  f o r e i g n  ownership and the meaning o f  t h i s  i n  terms o f  
economic performance are thrown i n t o  a c l e a r e r  p e r s p e c t ­
i v e .  S e v e r a l  case  s t u d i e s  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  are  
in c lu d e d  i n  the  Appendix.
S e c t i o n  1 M ethodology.
An attem pt to  a s s e s s  economic e f f i c i e n c y  i s  a d i f f i ­
c u l t  t a s k  under any c ir c u m s t a n c e s .  The use o f  d i f f e r e n t  
d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  p ro d u ct iv e  e f f i c i e n c y  c o m p l ic a t e s  t h i s  
i s s u e .  E f f i c i e n c y  i s  d e f in e d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  w ays ,but  u s u a l l y  
depends on the r e l a t i o n s h i p  and r a t i o  o f  in p u ts  to  o u t p u t s .  
Assuming normal maximising b e h a v io u r ,  the g o a l  o f  the f irm  
w i l l  be to  maximise p r o f i t s  and i t  may be su gges ted  th a t  
the most e f f i c i e n t  f irm  w i l l  be the most p r o f i t a b l e  o n e .  
However when e f f i c i e n c y  i s  s e en  from a s o c i a l  p o in t  o f  v i e w ,  
i t  i s  v a lu e  added; the r e t u r n s  to  both  c a p i t a l  and la b o u r ,  
which i s  used as the i n d i c a t o r  of  e f f i c i e n c y  i n  most, c a s e s .  
Refinem ents  o f  these  c o n c e p ts  to remove d i s t o r t i o n s  and 
in c lu d e  s o c i a l  v a l u a t i o n s  are a l s o  n e c e s s a r y .
E f f i c i e n c y  i s  a r e l a t i v e  c o n c e p t .  T h e r e f o r e  t h e  
prob lem  o f  w hich  y a r d s t i c k  t o  use  a r i s e s  when a s s e s s i n g  
th e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  i n  I r e l a n d .  T here  
a r e  t h r e e  su ch  y a r d s t i c k s  by which  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  e f f i c ­
i e n c y  c a n  be a s s e s s e d .  Each one p o se s  p rob lem s  i n  d a t a  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  and i n  m e th o d o lo g y .
The f i r s t  way o f  m e a su r in g  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  by a 
c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  w i t h  th e  p a r e n t  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
o r  some o t h e r  b ran c h  o f  the  f i r m .  E x t e n s i v e  d a t a  i s  
r e q u i r e d ,  w hich  can  o n ly  be o b t a i n e d  from th e  f i r m  i t s e l f  
and which  i s  g e n e r a l l y  r e g a r d e d  as  c o n f i d e n t i a l , ,  The 
i n t e r n a l  o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i r m  may be such  a s  t o  r e n d e r  
such c o m p a r i s o n s  m e a n i n g l e s s .  The f i r m  may be o r g a n i s e d  
on an  a c t i v i t y  b a s i s  w i t h  e a c h  a c t i v i t y  l o c a t e d  i n  the  
c o u n t r y  w i t h  t h e  c h e a p e s t  a p p r o p r i a t e  i n p u t s  so a s  t o  
m in im ise  w o r ld w id e  c o s t s .  I n  such  a c a s e ,  th e  p r o d u c t i o n  
o f  d i f f e r e n t  components  i n  d i f f e r e n t  l o c a t i o n s  w i l l  
r e s u l t  i n  t e c h n i q u e s ,  o u t p u t s  and i n p u t s  b e in g  v a s t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  b e tw een  u n i t s .  Even i f  such  a co m p le te  i n t e ­
g r a t i o n  o f  p r o c e s s e s  i s  n o t  the  c a s e ,  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
f u n c t i o n s  w i t h i n  th e  f i r m  t o  s p e c i f i c  l o c a t i o n s  may a l t e r  
the  i n t e r n a l  i n p u t - o u t p u t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The movement o f  
fu nd s  and t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  f i r m  w i l l  b i a s  
m easu re s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y .  C o n d i t i o n s  e x t e r n a l  t o  th e  f i r m  
w i l l  a l s o  a f f e c t  i t s  o b s e r v e d  b e h a v i o u r  -  Government 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  th r o u g h  t a r i f f s ,  t a x e s  and c o n t r o l s  i s  a 
m ajo r  d i s t o r t i n g  f a c t o r .  F i n a l l y  the  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e
v a r i o u s  u n i t s  t o  the  d i f f e r e n t  economic e n v i r o n m e n t s  i n  
which t h e y  e x i s t  can n o t  be s t a n d a r d i s e d .
The second  way o f  m e a su r in g  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  t o  compare 
th e  I r i s h  u n i t  w i t h  s u b s i d i a r i e s  i n  a n o t h e r  c o u n t r y  
which  h a s  a s i m i l a r  l e v e l  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t .  Such a com­
p a r i s o n ,  l i k e  th e  one a b o v e ,  r e q u i r e s  d a t a  from a n o t h e r  
c o u n t r y .  The paramount  p rob lem s h e r e  a r e  t h o s e  o f  
i d e n t i f y i n g . a  s i m i l a r  economic s t r u c t u r e  and l o c a t i n g  
f i r m s  w i t h  e q u i v a l e n t  o p e r a t i o n s  t o  the  I r i s h  u n i t s .
There  i s  no economy s i m i l a r  enough to  I r e l a n d  t o  remove 
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  th e  l e v e l  o f  d e v e lo p m e n t ,  s e c t o r a l  make’ 
up and p a r t i c u l a r l y  Government p o l i c y  ( e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  
r e g a r d  t o  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  i n d u s t r i a l  p r o d u c t i o n ) .  These  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r e  compounded by the  l i k e l y  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
the  i n t e r n a l  p o l i c i e s  o f  th e  f i r m s  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  d i f f e r i n  
h o s t  c o u n t r y  c o n d i t i o n s .
The t h i r d  method a v a i l a b l e  i s  c o m p a r is o n  o f  f o r e i g n  
s u b s i d i a r i e s  w i t h  I r i s h  owned f i r m s  i n  th e  same i n d u s t r y .  
The m a jo r  p rob lem  h e r e  i s  the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of  such 
" p a i r s "  o f  f i r m s ,  g i v e n  th e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  s e c t o r a l  d i s t ­
r i b u t i o n  and i n t r a - s e c t o r a l  b e h a v io u r  a n a l y s e d  i n  C h a p te r  
I I  a s  a form o f  d u a l i s m .  Such p a i r s  o f  f i r m s  must be 
p r o d u c i n g  th e  same p r o d u c t  and o t h e r  f a c t o r s  must b e ,  a s  
f a r  a s  p o s s i b l e ,  s t a n d a r d i s e d .  A r e l a t e d  o b s t a c l e  i s  
t h a t  t h i s  a p p ro a c h  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  th o se  s e c t o r s  and p r o d u c t  
l i n e s  i n  which  f o r e i g n  and I r i s h  owned f i r m s  c o e x i s t , a l ­
though t h e s e  f i r m s  may be a t y p i c a l  o f  th e  p o p u l a t i o n  of' 
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .
G iv en  t h i s  s e t  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  t h e  b e s t  c h o ic e  i s  
the  l a s t  m e th o d :  c o m p a r iso n  o f  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  w i t h  
I r i s h  owned f i r m s .  The d a t a  p rob lem s o f  the f i r s t  two 
m ethods a r e  i n t r a c t a b l e  and th e  o p e r a t i o n  i s  made mean­
i n g l e s s  by th e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  w i t h i n  the  f i r m  
and by th e  r e s p o n s e  which  even  e q u i v a l e n t  u n i t s  would have  
t o  th e  e n v i ro n m e n t  o f  an  economy o t h e r  t h a n  I r e l a n d .
E v id e n ce  from e a r l i e r  s t u d i e s  h a s  shown th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f
t h e , i n f l u e n c e  o f  th e  h o s t  economy on th e  p e r fo rm ance  o f
1
f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  There  a r e  s t i l l  s e v e r e  p rob lem s  
w i th  t h e  c h o s e n  a p p r o a c h ,  b u t  a t t e m p t s  c a n  be made t o  
m in im ise  t h e s e  a s  the  r e m a in d e r  o f  th e  c h a p t e r  shows.
M e asu res  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  em ployed .
The m ethodo logy  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  b a se d  on r a t i o
a n a l y s i s  -  th e  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  economic p e rfo rm an c e  by
the  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and co m p a r iso n  o f  i n d i c e s  o f  economic 
2
e f f i c i e n c y .  The " p a i r i n g "  o f  f i r m s  must be c a r e f u l l y  
u n d e r t a k e n  -  th e  f i r m s  must be i n  th e  same p r o d u c t  g roup  
and s h o u ld  u n d e r t a k e  r o u g h l y  the  same s t a g e s  o f  p r o d ­
u c t i o n  o r  a c t i v i t i e s ,  e . g .  an  a ssem bly  i n d u s t r y  must  n o t  
be compared w i t h  one w hich  m a n u f a c tu r e s  th e  p r o d u c t  
from b a s i c  raw m a t e r i a l s .  M a t e r i a l  i n p u t s  must  t h e r e f o r e  
c o r r e s p o n d  i n  d e g re e  o f  " f i n i s h " .  A p a r t  from t h e s e  
f a c t o r s  th e  f i r m s  w i l l  d i f f e r  i n  t e c h n i q u e ,  s c a l e  and 
m a r k e t s  s e r v e d .  I t  i s  t h e  t a s k  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  t o  d e t e r m i n e  
how f a r  t h e  f a c t o r  o f  f o r e i g n  o w n e rsh ip  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  
t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s .
The a n a l y s i s  proceeds  i n  three  major s t a g e s .
F i r s t  ’’primary” r a t i o s  are c a l c u l a t e d .  These are 2-
p r o f i t s + p e r  u n i t  o f  a s s e t s  (P r o f i t ) ,  p r o f i t s  per u n i t
A s se t s
of s a l e s  (P r o f i t ) and s a l e s  per u n i t  o f  a s s e t s  ( S a l e s ) .
S a l e s  A s s e t s
In the second s t a g e ,  a t t e n t i o n  i s  fo c u se d  on f a c t o r
in p u ts  s e p a r a t e l y  and c o l l e c t i v e l y .  P a r t i a l  p ro d u ct ­
i v i t y  i n d i c e s  f o r  both  c a p i t a l  and labour are c a l c u ­
la t e d  t o g e t h e r  w ith  the f i rm s  Cap i t a l  r a t i o .  O v er a l l
Labour
e f f i c i e n c y  i n d i c e s  r e l a t i n g  t o t a l  f a c t o r  in p u t s  to  ne t  
output are c o n s t r u c t e d  and compared. F in a l l y ?  the  
d e term in a n ts  o f  these  r a t i o s  are i n v e s t i g a t e d  by an 
a n a l y s i s  o f  the r o l e  o f  s c a l e  fa c to r ?  r e s e a r c h  and d e v e l o p ­
ment, management and degree  o f  f o r e i g n  c o n t r o l  and s a l e s  
e f f o r t s .
The type  o f  a n a l y s i s  c a r r ie d  out i s  thus  mid way 
between a c a se  study approach and a f u l l  sampling method.  
However, i t  does  have some o f  the b e s t  f e a t u r e s  o f  b o t h ,  
a l lo w in g  c l o s e  exam in at io n  o f  the f i r m s  and s u g g e s t in g  
t e n t a t i v e  i n f e r e n c e s  about the p o p u la t io n  o f  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s .
S e c t i o n  2 The B a t a .
(a )  Method o f  C o l l e c t i o n .
The enqu iry  was r e s t r i c t e d  to  t h r e e  major s e c t o r s  o f  
I r i s h  i n d u s t r y 5 p l a s t i c s  and p h a r m a c e u t ic a l s ,  m eta l
trad es  and e l e c t r i c a l  (machinery and a p p l i a n c e s ) .  The
+ Gross p r o f i t s  are used h e r e .
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s t a r t i n g  p o in t  v;as l i s t s  o f  a d d resses  from the Committee
on I n d u s t r i a l  Progress  r e p o r t s  on the M etal  Trades and
the E l e c t r i c a l  Industry  and the I n s t i t u t e  f o r  I n d u s t r i a l
Research and Standards "Survey of  the I r i s h  P l a s t i c s
In du stry" ,  supplemented by IDA l i s t s  o f  Grant Aided 
3
I n d u s tr y .  Requests  were made to 121 f i r m s  i n  th e se  
s e c t o r s  f o r  p e r m is s io n  to  in t e r v ie w  an e x e c u t iv e  o f  the  
f i rm .  Twenty f i v e  i n t e r v i e w s  were c a r r ie d  out i n  
March -  A p r i l  1973* A q u e s t io n n a ir e  was mailed to  
respondent f irm s  w ith  whom no in t e r v ie w  could be arranged  
and t h i r t e e n  completed q u e s t io n n a ir e s  were r e c e i v e d .
The main th r u s t  o f  the data c o l l e c t i o n  both through  
i n t e r v i e w  and q u e s t io n n a ir e  concerned f i g u r e s  on the  
s a l e s ,  n e t  a s s e t s ,  p r e - t a x  p r o f i t ,  labour  f o r c e ,  p a y r o l l ,  
p r o p o r t io n  o f  workers w i th  s k i l l s ,  g r a n ts  r e c e i v e d ,  e x p o r t s  
and degree  o f  f o r e i g n  c o n t r o l  o f  the f i r m s .  In form at ion  
was a l s o  r eq u ested  on r e se a r c h  and development (R & D) 
e x p e n d i t u r e ,  s a l e s  e f f o r t ,  r e l i a n c e  on f o r e i g n  parent i f  
a p p l i c a b l e ,  the e x p e r t i s e  of  management, m u l t ip l e  s h i f t  
working,  labour  turnover  and g en era l  comments on the  I r i s h  
economic environm ent .  With one or two e x c e p t i o n s  the  
i n t e r v i e w s  and completed q u e s t io n n a ir e s  were e n t i r e l y  
f r u i t f u l  i n  o b ta in in g  t h i s  in fo r m a t io n .  Whenever p o s s i b l e  
the in f o r m a t io n  g iv e n  was checked a g a in s t  IDA Annual 
Reports ( f o r  in fo r m a t io n  on grants  r e c i e v e d ) ,  the An 
Foras Forbartha survey and IDA d a t a .  Except where s t a t e d  
the da ta  r e f e r  to the f i n a n c i a l  year 197?» I f  the  
f i g u r e s  f o r  t h i s  year were a t y p i c a l  an average of  post
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f i g u r e s  and p r o j e c t i o n s  f o r  1973 were  u s e d .  T h i s  was  not  
an i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  h o w e v e r .
( b ) The " P a i r i n g "  o f  F i r m s .
The i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  on 38 f i r m s  a l lo w e d  11  
p a i r s  o f  c o m p a r a b l e  I r i s h  and f o r e i g n  f i r m s  t o  be
5
c r e a t e d .  Of t h e  11 p a i r s ,  f o u r  are in  p l a s t i c s  and 
p h a r m a c e u t i c a l s ,  f o u r  i n  t h e  m e ta l  t r a d e s  s e c t o r ,  two 
in  the e l e c t r i c a l  i n d u s t r y  and one p a i r  i s  o u t s i d e  t h e s e  
f i e l d s .  In  each  p a i r  the  f i r m s  produce s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
the same p r o d u c t  ~ i n  two p a i r s  one o f  the  f i r m s  named 
the  o t h e r  a s  a c o m p e t i t o r  t h o ug h  t h i s  was not asked as  
a d i r e c t  q u e s t i o n .  I n  a l l  c a s e s  the f i r m s  take  i n  t h e i r  
raw m a t e r i a l s  i n  much the  same d eg ree  o f  " f i n i s h " ;  th u s  
the same a c t i v i t i e s  are p er form ed .  T e c h n iq u e s ,  s c a l e  
and m a rk e ts  se r v e d  o f t e n  d i f f e r .  The e x t e n t  t o  which  
such f a c t o r s  are in d ep en d e n t  o f  o w n ersh ip  i s  d i s c u s s e d  
b e lo w .
The range o f  the  e n q u ir y  was r e s t r i c t e d  by the  
d i s c o n t i n u i t y  i n  the  c r o s s  s e c t o r a l  c o v e r a g e  o f  the two 
g r o u p s .  There are many t r a d e s  and produ ct  groups where  
t h e r e  are  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  but no comparable  d o m e s t i c a l l y  
owned o n e s .  T h is  i s  t o  be e x p e c te d  b e c a u se  o f  the  
c o n t r o l  o f  p r o p r i e t r y  t e c h n o l o g y  h e l d  w i t h i n  a r e s t r i c t e d  
group o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m s .  The e x c l u s i o n  o f  I r i s h  
f i r m s  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  n o t i c e a b l e  i n  the s e c t o r s  where  
f o r e i g n  f i r ;  e x p o r t  I ' l l "  o f  t h e i r  o u t p u t .  T h is  type
of  EDI i s  t h e r e f o r e  not  r e p re sen ted  i n  the comparisons  
here and uhe sample i s  thus b ia s e d .  The coverage by 
n a t i o n a l i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  pa r tner  i s  as  f o l l o w s s  5 U .K . ,
2 U .S .A . , ,  1 German and three  f irm s  from o th e r  p a r t s  
of  the EEC.
( c )  The r o l e  o f  "Transfer  P r i c i n g " .
Any f irm  w ith  a prod u ct io n  p r o c e s s  which i n v o l v e s  
t r a n s p o r t in g  s e m i - f i n i s h e d  goods ,  components or raw 
m a t e r i a l s  from one p lan t  to  another m ust ,  f o r  a cco u n t in g  
pu rp o ses ,  s e t  the p r ic e  at  which th e se  goods are  
t r a n s f e r r e d .  The p r i c e s  may be s e t  on tne b a s i s  o f  
c o s t s  o f  p r o d u c t io n s ,  or at the going market p r ic e  ("arms 
l e n g t h  p r ic e "  or what a t h ir d  party o u t s id e  the  f irm  
would pay)  or such p r i c e s  may be " a r b i t r a r i l y "  determined  
by the f irm  on due b a s i s  o f  i t s  i n t e r n a l  o b j e c t i v e s .
When the  u n i t s  are inco rp o ra ted  in  d i f f e r e n t  c o u n t r i e s ,  
s e v e r a l  ex tr a n e o u s  f a c t o r s  w i l l  bear on t h i s  d e c i s i o n .  
Amongst t h e s e  f a c t o r s  w i l l  be , d i f f e r e n t  tax  treatment  
i n  the c o u n t r i e s ,  v a r y in g  c o m p e t i t io n ,  r a te  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  
customs d u t i e s  and a t t i t u d e s  of  Government. The f irm  
may w ish  to  c o n c e n tr a te  p r o f i t  fo r  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  r e a s o n s ,  
or to  d i s p e r s e  i t  i n  order  tu avoid c r i t i c i s m  or to  
spread r i s k .  This  e x tr a  degree o f  freedom to s e t  
i n t e r n a l  p r i c e s  and to  move fun d s ,  which i s  open to  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m s ,  i s  r e f e r r e d  to  as  the use o f  t r a n s f e r  
p r i c i n g .
S e v e r a l  c h a n n e l s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  the  pu rpose  o f  
moving f u n d s .  The p r i c i n g  o f  goods and s e r v i c e s  
t r a n s f e r r e d  i n t e r n a l l y  i s  a n  o b v io u s  one b u t  a l s o  
i n t e r e s t  c h a r g e s  on d e b t  t o  th e  p a r e n t ,  t h e  p r i c i n g  
of  r o y a l t i e s  and f e e s ,  f o r  which t h e r e  i s  no "m arke t  
p r i c e "  and th e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  j o i n t  o v e r h e a d s  a r e  o t h e r s .  
F u r t h e r  a v e n u e s  a re  th e  p r a c t i c e  o f  " l e a d i n g  and 
l a g g i n g "  payments  and the  ex trem e c ase  o f  sm u g g l in g .
T h is  p ro b lem  o f  t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  i s  a s e r i o u s  one to  
co n ten d  w i t h  when c o n d u c t in g  co m p ar iso n s  on th e  b a s i s  
o f  s u b s i d i a r y  u n i t  d a t a .  I n  an extreme c a s e ,  th e  
f i g u r e s  o f  a s i n g l e  s u b s i d i a r y  u n i t  become m e a n in g l e s s  
e x c e p t  i n  th e  c o n t e x t  o f  g l o b a l  company p o l i c y .
T h ere  a r e  t h r e e  s e t s  o f  r e a s o n s  h o w ev er ,  which  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  th e  s e t t i n g  o f  t r a n s f e r  p r i c e s  w i l l  n o t  
have a s e r i o u s  d i s t o r t i o n a r y  e f f e c t  when a p p l i e d  t o  
the  sample  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  used i n  t h i s  e n q u i r y .
F i r s t l y ,  th e r e  i s  the e v id en ce  o f  the f i rm s  th em se lv es  
on t h i s  i s s u e .  Flows o f  in term ed ia te  products  from 
the parent  were o f  importance to  only  four  f irm s  
( f o r e i g n  f i r m s  1 ,  6 , 9 5 10 i n  Table 5*1) but machinery  
was o b ta in e d  from the parent i n  a l l  but two c a s e s  
(F5 and F l l ) + . L i t t l e  in fo r m a tio n  could  be obta ined  on 
p r i c i n g  f o r m u la s ,  most f i r m s  when asked s t a t e d  that  
market p r i c e s  v/ere u s e d .  Use o f  overcharg in g  f o r  R & U 
and t e c h n i c a l  s e r v i c e s  was found i n  three  c a s e s  ( i n c l u d ­
ing both  U .S .  owned f i r m s )  -  F*+, 9> 10.  In one case  
the I r i s h  u n i t  sa id  i t  was undercharged f o r  s e r v i c e s  ( F 5 ) .
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There i s  e v id e n c e  from o th e r  sou rces  th a t  t r a n s f e r
p r i c e s  are s e t  on c o s t  o f  p rodu ct ion  or arms l e n g th
p r i c e s .  A survey by Rook o f  300 B r i t i s h  companies
found th a t  i n  a l l  c a s e s  such c r i t e r i a  were used and
that  none o f  the f irm s  f i x e d  p r i c e s  f o r  " p r o f i t
6
sharing  p u rp o ses" .  A r e c e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  U .S .
companies a l s o  shows that  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i rm s  are much
more c o n s e r v a t i v e  in  the use o f  t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  than
7was p r e v i o u s l y  thought to  be the c a s e .  One good 
r easo n  f o r  the use o f  arms le n g th  p r i c e s  i s  the d i f f i ­
c u l t y  o f  a s s e s s i n g  the performance of  the i n d i v i d u a l  
u n i t s  i f  a r b i t r a r y  p r i c e s  are used .  An a d d i t i o n a l  
f a c t o r  i s  the  bad e f f e c t  on the morale o f  management 
o f  u n i t s  from which p r o f i t s  are d i v e r t e d .  Conse­
q u en t ly  the  p r a c t i c e  may not be as widespread as was 
t h o u g h t .
S e c o n d ly ,  tax  and re in v es tm en t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  make 
i t  u n l i k e l y  th a t  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  i s  w id e ly  u s e d .  F ive  
f irm s i n  the sample s u b s t a n t i a l l y  b e n e f i t  from export  
tax  r e l i e f  ( F l ,  F*4, F 7 } F8, F 9 ) .  Remittance o f  p r o f i t  
from I r e la n d  i s  unimpeded *nd. so source country  tax  
laws w i l l  have an important i n f l u e n c e .  European f irm s  
w i l l  have l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  t r a n s f e r r i n g  p r o f i t s  
because  o f  double  t a x a t i o n  avoidance agreem ents .  U .S .  
f irm s may have problems because  income f o r  which ta x
+ Throughout the chapter  f irm s are r e f e r r e d  to  by the  
number o f  the paii* i n  Table 5*1 w ith  a l e t t e r  F(= f o r e !  
or I (~ I r i s h )  owned.
r e l i e f  i s  a l low ed  i n  I r e la n d  (export  income) may not  
be r e c o g n i s e d  as having been taxed when returned to  
the U.S.A* One U .S .  f irm  i n  the sample could t r a n s f e r  
income to  another  u n i t  i n  Europe,  should t h i s  be 
d e s i r e d .  A tax  m in im is in g  s t r a t e g y  f o r  e x p o r t in g  f i r m s  
would l e a d  to as  much p r o f i t  be ing  made in  Ire la n d  as  
p o s s i b l e  so t h i s  may b o o s t  p r o f i t  f i g u r e s .  Host o f  the  
f irm s are engaged i n  expanding I r i s h  o p e r a t io n s  and 
re in v e s tm en t  o f  p r o f i t s  i s  an important source o f  f u n d s .  
Any e f f e c t  t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  has i s  t h e r e f o r e  l i k e l y  to  
be sm al l  but  i n s o f a r  as i t  has an e f f e c t ,  t h i s  w i l l  be to  
i n c r e a s e  p r o f i t s  i n  I r e l a n d .
T h ir d ly  i f  n a t io n a l i s m  i s  a f a c t o r  i n  the d i s t r i b ­
u t io n  o f  p r o f i t s  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  that  I r e la n d  w i l l  be 
damaged. Four f irm s are j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  (F2, F3, F^, F$)  
and I r i s h  sh a r e h o ld e r s  thus have an important i n f l u e n c e  
in  running the company. In these  f i rm s  p lu s  s i x  o t h e r s ,  
the board o f  d i r e c t o r s  c o n t a in s  at  l e a s t  one Ir ishman.
A l l  management p e r so n n e l  are I r i s h  i n  s i x  f o r e i g n  owned 
f irm s and i n  three  o t h e r s  a m a jo r i ty  i s  I r i s h .  In o n ly  
two f i rm s  i s  the bu lk  o f  the top management f o r e i g n  ( i n  
one U . S .  f irm  i t  i s  e n t i r e l y  s o ) .  I f  n a t io n a l i s m  i s  a 
f a c t o r  i n  company p o l i c y  t h e r e f o r e  i t  i s  u n l i k e l y  to  
damage I r e l a n d .
In  the  a n a l y s i s  th a t  f o l l o w s ,  where t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  
i s  i d e n t i f i e d ,  a l low ance  i s  made f o r  i t s  e f f e c t s .  I t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  th a t  t h i s  i n f l u e n c e  has not been co m p le te ly
removed and that  d i s t o r t i o n s  have r e s u l t e d .  The above  
f a c t o r s  do not e l im in a t e  t h i s  l i k e l i h o o d ,  but they  
c o n s i d e r a b l y  reduce i t .
S e c t i o n  3 The Finding o f  the  A n a lys is
( a )  Primary R a t i o s .
Table  5*1 shows the ev idence  on the  th ree  "primary
r a t i o s "  which are as f o l l o w s :  Table 5* la  P r o f i t s  ,
Net A s s e t s
which shows how s u c c e s s f u l l y  a company i s  u t i l i s i n g  i t s
c a p i t a l ,  Table  5*lb P r o f i t s  which assessess  the r a t i o
S a l e s
o f  income to  expenditure  and shows how s u c c e s s f u l  the
firm i s  i n  keeping c o s t s  down, and the S a l e s which
Net A s s e t s
shows how i n t e n s i v e l y  c a p i t a l  i s  be ing  used ( i t  a l s o
h e lp s  to  e x p l a i n  P r o f i t s  ) .  The f i n a l  column o f  each
Net A s s e t s
t a b le  shows the "score" -  the number o f  t im es  that  the  
b e s t  r e s u l t  i n  each p a i r  was ach ieved  by an I r i s h  or a 
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m .  In a l l  three  r a t i o s  o f  c o u r se ,  the  
h ig h er  the r a t i o ,  the b e t t e r  i s  the performance o f  the  
f i rm .
I t  w i l l  be seen  th a t  f o r e i g n  f irm s  g a in  a b e t t e r  
r a t i n g  on each c r i t e r i o n  than do I r i s h  f i r m s .
The s u p e r i o r  p r o f i t  r a t e  ( P r o f i t ) i s  e x p l a i n e d
(N et  A s s e t s )
b o t h  by  a more e f f e c t i v e  u s e  o f  c a p i t a l  ( S a l e s )  )
(N et  A s s e t s )
and by i n c r e a s i n g  p r o f i t  on  s a l e s  ( P r o f i t ) .  I t  must  be
( S a l e s )
b orn e  i n  mind h o w ev er  t h a t  t h i s  may r e f l e c t  market  s t r u c t u r e .
I t  i s  i n  t h e  l a s t  i n d i c a t o r  (P )  t h a t  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  a c h i e v e
TcfT
th e  b e s t  r a t i n g  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  






























































































































































































































To d e r iv e  s e c t o r a l  r e s u l t s  from such a small  sample 
i s  perhaps dangerous but i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  to  a s s e s s  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  a l l  the su p er ior  f o r e i g n  r e s u l t s  are  
c o n c e n tr a te d  i n  one area* S e c t o r a l  s c o r e s  are d er iv e d  
i n  Table 5*2* P a ir s  o f  f i rm s  1 -  *+ are p l a s t i c s  and 
p h a r m a c e u t ic a l s ,  5 - 8  are m eta l  t r a d e s ,  9 - 1 0  e l e c t r i c a l  
and p a ir  11 i s  o u t s id e  th e se  f i e l d s .
Table 5*2 Primary R a t io s  i S e c to r a l  " S cores” .
S e c to r  P/NA P/S P/NA
I r i s h  F o re ig n  I r i s h  F o re ig n  I r i s h  F o re ig n
1 P l a s t i c s /
P harm a ceu t ica ls  1 3  0 b 1 3
2 M eta ls  1 3  1 3  1 3
3 E l e c t r i c a l  1 1  1 1  0 2
S o u r c e : Table  5*1
Table  shows the number o f  case  i n  which the I r i s h  
or F o r e ig n  owned f irm s  have the ’’b e t t e r ” performance.
The r e s u l t s  are f a i r l y  uniform a c r o s s  the three  
s e c t o r s ,  which i t  should be n oted ,  are s e c t o r s  mainly  
dependent upon modern technology*
A f i n a l  p o in t  to  note  i s  that  the r e s u l t s  i n  
Table 5*1 were checked f o r  s t a b i l i t y  over  t im e .  Only 
f irm F10 su g g es ted  th a t  the  quoted r e s u l t s  was a t y p i c a l  -  
i t  was a t t r i b u t e d  to  a la r g e  f a l l  i n  demand from the
f i r m ' s  m a in  c u s t o m e r ,  who w as  i n  a n e a r  monopsony  
s i t u a t i o n .  T h i s  made t h e  p r o f i t  f i g u r e  u n u s u a l l y  
low f o r  th e  p e r i o d  c o v e r e d .  No a d j u s t m e n t  w as  made 
t o  t h i s  f i g u r e  b e c a u s e  t h e  f i r m  was  u n d e r g o i n g  r e o r g a n ­
i s a t i o n  and c o u l d  make no f i r m  f o r e c a s t  o f  f u t u r e  p r o f i t s  
due t o  s e v e r a l  u n c e r t a i n  f a c t o r s .  The l o s s  maker was  i n  
t h i s  p o s i t i o n  i n  19 7 1  a l s o  and e x p e c t e d  l o s s e s  t o  c o n ­
t i n u e  t h r o u g h  1973« T h i s  f i r m  was a. new o n e .
The p r im a r y  r a t i o s  p r o v i d e  o n l y  a s t a r t i n g  p o i n t  
f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  They a r e  i n c o m p l e t e  i n d i c a t o r s  o f  
e f f i c i e n c y .  P/NA i s  a p a r t i a l  r a t i o  r e f l e c t i n g  o n l y  
th e  i n p u t  o f  c a p i t a l  and th e  r e t u r n s  t o  t h a t  f a c t o r .
The P/NA r a t i o  h o w e v e r ,  i s  th e  most  i m p o r t a n t  i n d i c a t o r  
o f  p r i v a t e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  f o r  i t  m e a s u r e s  th e  i n c e n t i v e  
t o  i n v e s t  and th e  r e w a r d s  f o r  d o i n g  s o .  I t  i s  an  
i n t e r e s t i n g  s t a r t i n g  p o i n t ,  t h a t  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  r e c o r d  
s u p e r i o r  p e r f o r m a n c e  on  t h i s  and t h e  two o t h e r  p r im ary  
r a t i o s .  The a n a l y s i s  now c o n t i n u e s  t o  l o o k  f o r  th e  
r e a s o n s  b e h in d  t h e s e  r e s u l t s  and t o  l o o k  f o r  b e t t e r  
measures  o f  e f f i c i e n c y .
(b)  Cap ita l /Labour  r a t i o s
The v a l u a t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  i s  a l w a y s  a problem  i n  
s t u d i e s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y .  C a p i t a l  i s  t h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  c h a p t e r  
v a l u e d  i n  r e p l a c e m e n t  v a l u e  term s  a s  e s t i m a t e d  from  t h e  
f i r m ' s  i n s u r a n c e  v a l u a t i o n s .  C a p i t a l  i s  d e f i n e d  a s  f i x e d  
a s s e t s  p l u s  I n v e n t o r i e s  p l u s  " o t h e r  c u r r e n t "  a s s e t s .  
C a p i t a l / L a b o u r  r a t i o s  a r e  t h e n  e x p r e s s e d  on  t h i s  b a s i s .
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C a p i t a l  i s  valued i n  £000s and labour i n  numbers 
employed. The r e s u l t s  are shown i n  Table 5 . 3 .
A p r i o r i  e x p e c t a t i o n s  would su g g es t  that  f o r e i g n  
f irm s w i l l  u t i l i s e  more c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  tech n iq u es  
and o v e r a l l  t h i s  i s  s o .  In seven e a s e s  out o f  11 
the f o r e i g n  f irm  i s  more c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  than i t s  
I r i s h  c o u n t e r p a r t .  A d i f f i c u l t y  encountered here i s  
that  o f  s e p a r a t in g  out working c a p i t a l .  In most c a s e s  
t h i s  c a u s e s  l i t t l e  d i s t o r t i o n  i n  the comparisons.
However f irm  F6 c a r r i e s  a very  h ig h  l e v e l  o f  i n v e n t o r i e s  
and i t  appears that  the major r o l e  o f  t h i s  f irm  i s  th a t  
of  an im port ing  agency f o r  goods from the parent f i r m .
In t h i s  f irm  the manufacturing r o le  i s  secondary .
Removal o f  i n v e n t o r i e s  from the c a p i t a l  v a l u a t i o n  i s  
d i f f i c u l t  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  but i t  i s  c l e a r  tha t  the f irm  i s ,  
on i t s  manufacturing o p e r a t io n s  a l o n e ,  much more c a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i v e  than i t s  I r i s h  r i v a l .  This  f irm was not a 
r e c i p i e n t  o f  IDA grant a i d .
S e c t o r a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  appear to  be important w ith  
r e s p e c t  to  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  as Table 5*^ shows. In  
the p l a s t i c s  and pharm aceut ica ls  in d u s t r y ,  two I r i s h  f i r m s  
are more c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  than t h e i r  f o r e i g n  r i v a l s .
The r e l a t i v e  newness o f  the f irm s  (two o f  the I r i s h  
f i rm s  i n  t h i s  s e c t o r  are under four  y ea rs  o l d )  and the  
tech n o lo g y  which i s  new and t h e r e f o r e  more f l e x i b l e  are  
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C a p i t a l  i n  g e n e r a l  w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e  on e a s i e r  
terras to  the f o r e i g n  f i r m s ,  as o u t l i n e d  i n  Chapter IV.
The s u b s id i a r y  has the r e s o u r c e s  o f  the parent to  f a l l  
back on and has the p a r e n t ' s  support i n  r a i s i n g  debt  on 
easy term s .  However th e re  are s e v e r a l  c o u n te r -b a la n c in g  
f a c t o r s  i n  th a t  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  have a d e s i r e  to  
minimise t h e i r  c a p i t a l  o u t l a y ,  not l e a s t  because  o f  the
g
h ig h er  imputed r i s k s  a t ta ch ed  to  f o r e i g n  v e n t u r e s .  One 
o ther  f a c t o r  i s  the r o l e  o f  the  g rants  scheme, which  
c l e a r l y  e a s e s  the c a p i t a l  c o n s t r a i n t ,  which i t  i s  hypo­
t h e s i s e d  w i l l  be more sev er e  f o r  dom est ic  f i r m s .  I t  
does not seem th a t  the g r a n ts  scheme has had a d i f f e r ­
e n t i a l  e f f e c t  on f o r e i g n  and I r i s h  f i rm s  from the e v i ­
dence o f  t h i s  sample.  I n m o s t  "pairs" the type o f  
grant r e c e i v e d  and the r a t e  o f  grant was the  same f o r  
the I r i s h  f i r m s  as f o r  the  f o r e i g n  f irm  (Table 5*5)*
The g r a n ts  system i s  not des igned  to  d i s c r im in a t e  
between I r i s h  and f o r e i g n  owned f irm s because  o f  the  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  c a p i t a l  to  the two 
groups and c l e a r l y  does  not do s o .  The c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  
i s s u e  i s  c l e a r l y  o f  some importance to  the r o le  o f  
FDI i n  the I r i s h  economy i n  view o f  the concern f o r  
job c r e a t i o n  and the s u b j e c t  i s  now i n v e s t i g a t e d  on a 
more g e n e r a l  l e v e l .  The f i n d in g  from t h i s  sample i s  th a t  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  tend to  be more c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  but th a t  
t h i s  i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  the case  as examples from p l a s t i c s  
and p h a rm a ceu t ica ls  show.
Table 5«5 Grants R ece ived  -  Type and Rate
($ Fixed C a p i t a l ) .
Pair I r i s h  Firm 
( N . I . G . )
1 New In du stry  Grant 2 5$ N . I .G .  20%
2 Small  Industry  Grant 25% N . I .G .  25%
3 - -
k N . I .G .  25% N . I .G .  33$
5 Adaption Grant 8 .3 $ Adaption Grant
6 N . I . G .  1 5 .2$ Anco on ly
7 N . I . G .  l*+.6$ N .I .G .  25.2%
8 N . I . G .  3 9 .6$ N .I .G .  12.5%
9 N . I .G .  9 .3 $ N .I .G .  25%
10 Adaption 12$ N .I .G .  25%
11 — Requipment h%
S o u r c e : In te r v ie w  and q u e s t io n n a ir e  d a t a .
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The Capital Intensity Issue - a wider Perspective.
I n  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  s u r p l u s  l a b o u r  which  p l a y  h o s t  t  
f o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t ,  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  a re  o f t e n  
a c c u se d  o f  b e in g  o v e r  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e .  C a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i t y  i s  ju d g e d  i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  th e  
h o s t  c o u n t r y ’ s r e s o u r c e  endowment. Where l a b o u r  i s  
unemployed and underemployed and c a p i t a l  i s  s c a r c e ,  th e  
b e s t  use  o f  a v a i l a b l e  r e s o u r c e s  i s  a c h i e v e d  by l a b o u r  
i n t e n s i v e  t e c h n i q u e s .  F o r e i g n  f i r m s  do n o t  employ 
such t e c h n i q u e s  f o r  two m ain  r e a s o n s ;  f i r s t l y  im p e r ­
f e c t i o n s  i n  the  p r i c i n g  sys tem  ( r i g i d i t y  i n  w ages ,  
u n r e a l i s t i c  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s )  and th e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  p r i c e
by f i r m s ,  s e c o n d ly  l i m i t a t i o n s  i n  e x i s t i n g  t e c h n o lo g y
9
and i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  demand.
The p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e s  o f  f a c t o r s  
f a c e d  by f o r e i g n  f i r m s  may d i f f e r  from d o m e s t i c  f i r m s .  
F o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  have  a w id e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  r e s u l t ­
in g  from th e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  o p e r a t e  i n  more t h a n  one 
c o u n t r y .  They may f i n d  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  a d j u s t i n g  t o  a 
new s e t  o f  f a c t o r  p r i c e s  and may a p p ly  the  c u l t u r a l  
norms o f  the  s o u rc e  c o u n t r y  (w i th  r e g a r d  to  such c o n ­
c e p t s  a s  " a  l i v i n g  wage” ) .  F a c t o r  p r i c e s  may be 
d i s t o r t e d  by u n r e a l i s t i c  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and by im p e r ­
f e c t i o n s  i n  th e  l a b o u r  m ark e t  -  p a r t i c u l a r  g ro up s  i n  
t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  may r e s t r i c t  e n t r y  and in d u ce  c a p i t a l  
f o r  l a b o u r  s u b s t i t u t i o n .
Where t h e  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  have b e e n  o p e r a t i n g  
i n  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c a p i t a l  abundance -  such  f i r m s  may 
c o n t i n u e  t o  r e g a r d  l a b o u r  a s  a  s c a r c e  f a c t o r  and t o  
economise  on  i t s  u s e .  The t e c h n o lo g y  t h a t  th e  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  use  may n o t  be amenable t o  a d o p t i o n  o f
10t e c h n i q u e s  t o  changed c o n d i t i o n s  o f  f a c t o r  s c a r c i t y .
The amount o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  s u b s t i t u t i n g  l a b o u r  f o r  
c a p i t a l  w i l l  v a r y  a c c o r d i n g  to  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  p r o c e s s  
un d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  and how a d a p t a b l e  th e  ^demand f o r  t h e  
p r o d u c t  i s .
A f u r t h e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  on the  p rob lem  a r i s e s  from 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  th e  b e n e f i t  f rom  
FDI.  The " i n t e r n a l "  g a i n s  t o  the  h o s t  c o u n t r y  a r i s e  
o n ly  from t h a t  p a r t  o f  n e t  o u t p u t  w h ich  i s  p a id  
( u l t i m a t e l y )  t o  d o m e s t i c  f a c t o r s .  T h i s  i s  what was 
termed " R e t a i n e d  V alue"(RV) i n  C h a p te r  IV. As C h a p te r  
IV showed,  a l a r g e  p e r t  o f  RV i s  l a b o u r  r e m u n e r a t i o n .
The payment t o  c a p i t a l  i s  m a in ly  t o  f o r e i g n  o w n ers .  
C o n s e q u e n t ly  more l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  p r o d u c t i o n  means a 
l a r g e r  d o m e s t i c  s h a r e  o f  n e t  o u t p u t  -  i n c r e a s e d  RV.
I n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  c a se  o f  I r e l a n d ,  t h e  f a c t o r  
i n t e n s i t y  i s s u e  h a s  a t t r a c t e d  more a t t e n t i o n  b e c a u se  
o f  the  su pp o sed  e f f e c t  o f  the  i n c e n t i v e  scheme on 
f a c t o r  p r o p o r t i o n s .  I t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t i e i n g  
g r a n t s  t o  t h e  amount o f  f i x e d  c a p i t a l  i n v e s tm e n t  
e n c o u r a g e s  g r e a t e r  c a p i t a l  I n t e n s i t y .  T h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  
may be c a s t  e i t h e r  a s  (1 )  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r i e s
are a t t r a c t e d  t o  I r e l a n d ,  or (2 )  the f irm s  which are  
e s t a b l i s h e d  employ more c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  techn iqu es  
than they  would have done i f  o th er  forms o f  Inducement 
had been  a v a i l a b l e *  I t  i s  the second h y p o t h e s i s  which  
i s  more u s u a l l y  put forward* The f i r s t  h y p o t h e s i s  
r e q u i r e s  many assumptions amongst which i s  the v iew th a t  
o nly  c a p i t a l  or even m ainly  c a p i t a l  i s  the resource  
t r a n s f e r  and th a t  o n ly  r e tu r n s  to c a p i t a l  e n ter  the  
d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e s  o f  the f o r e i g n  in v e s t o r *  The second ,  
more r e s t r i c t e d ,  h y p o t h e s i s  i s  t e s t e d  b e lo w ,  a l b e i t  i n  
a p a r t i a l  way* Before  t h i s  however, i t  i s  worthwhile  
to  c o n s id e r  i f  there  i s  anyth ing to  be s a id  i n  favour  
o f  a t t r a c t i n g  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  p r o j e c t s *
The f i r s t  po in t  i n  favour  o f  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y
i s  th a t  the  o n ly  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  such a p r o j e c t  may
be no p r o j e c t  a t  a l l .  The p a r t i c u l a r  p rodu ct ion
f u n c t i o n  may be t o t a l l y  r i g i d  and may not a l lo w  f o r  any
labour f o r  c a p i t a l  s u b s t i t u t i o n *  (This  i s  n o t ,  however,
an argument f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  the c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  o f
p r o j e c t s ) .  Seco n d ly ,  the more labour i n t e n s i v e  are new
p r o j e c t s ,  the more v u ln e r a b le  they ?re to  f a i l u r e
11because  o f  r i s i n g  labour c o s t s .  Indeed a s t a t e d  ob­
j e c t i v e  o f  I r i s h  p o l i c y  i s  to  c l o s e  the wages d i f f e r ­
e n t i a l  which e x i s t s  between Ire land  and the U.K. T h ir d ly  
when i n d i r e c t  usage o f  labour  i s  accounted f o r ,  c a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i v e  p r o j e c t s  may have as great  an employment e f f e c t  
as th o se  which appear to  be albour i n t e n s i v e .  This  
however i s  not  a p e r s u a s iv e  argument i n  Ire la n d  because
2 2 1
o f  the  g e n e r a l l y  low v a lu e  o f  l in k a g e  e f f e c t s *
F o u r t h ly ,  i t  i s  u s u a l l y  the case  th a t  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  
p r o j e c t s  are more s k i l l e d  labour i n t e n s i v e  and th e r e fo r e  
i f  i t  i s  d e s i r e d  t o  r a i s e  the l e v e l  o f  employment then  
such p r o j e c t s  have a d e f i n i t e  b e n e f i t *  We now turn to  
some e m p i r i c a l  exam in at ion  o f  th ese  i s s u e s *
I d e a l l y ,  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  the c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  
o f  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  should compare c a p i t a l s  labour  
r a t i o s  i n  the f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r  w i th  those  o f  the  
dom est ic  s e c t o r  o f  the same industry*  In I r e la n d ,  
however,  t h i s  i s  not p r a c t i c a b l e  because  o f  the  complete  
absence o f  in fo r m a t io n  on the c a p i t a l  s t o c k  o f  I r i s h
12in d u s tr y  a t  anyth ing approaching the in d u s tr y  l e v e l .
Even i f  adequate data were a v a i l a b l e ,  such comparisons  
could be v e r y  m is le a d in g  because  o f  the fundamental  
d i f f e r e n c e s  between I r i s h  owned manufacturing in d u s tr y  
and f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s .  The non co m p ara b i l i ty  i n  
product groups and i n  o th e r  f a c t o r s  i s  documented i n  
Chapter IV and i n  t h i s  c h a p te r .
The r e s u l t  o f  the sm a l l  matched sample used i n  t h i s  
chapter  i s  t h a t ,  where I r i s h  and f o r e i g n  f i r m s  c o e x i s t  
i n  product groups ,  the presumption i s  th a t  f o r e i g n  f irm s  
w i l l  employ more c a p i t a l  per man, but t h i s  i s  by no 
means n e c e s s a r i l y  the c a s e .  I t  i s  dangerous to  e x t r a p ­
o l a t e  from th e se  r e s u l t s  to  a g en era l  s ta tem ent  on 
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  because  the bulk  o f  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  
are i n  product groups where no comparable I r i s h  investm en
e x i s t s *  ( A l s o ,  there  i s  no b a s i s  f o r  b e l i e v i n g  th a t  
I r i s h  f i r m s  have an o p t im a l  c a p i t a l  2 labour  r a t i o  
but the presum ption would be th a t  d om est ic  f i rm s  w i l l  
have a lower  c a p i t a l  2 labour r a t i o  because  o f  b e t t e r  
adjustment to  dom est ic  f a c t o r  p r i c e s ) *
Some p a r t i a l  ev id en ce  can be invoked on the q u e s t i o n  
o f  whether the c a p i t a l  grant induces  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  
to  be more c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  than they  would o th e rw ise  
have been* The p r a c t i c e  o f  g iv in g  h ig h e r  g r a n t s ,  o th e r  
t h in g s  b e in g  e q u a l ,  i n  the D es ignated  Areas a l lo w s  a 
comparison w i t h i n  the  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r  o f  h ig h  grant a r e a s  
w ith  N on-Bes ignated  Areas*
At an o v e r a l l  l e v e l ,  the past  record  o f  c a p i t a l  
grant per job  crea ted  (both measured i n  terms o f  the  
p r o j e c t i o n s  c f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s )  i s  shown i n  Table A2«2 
Over the y e a r s  1952-1970 ,  there has been a lower grant  
per job  c r e a te d  i n  the D es ig n ated  Areas than i n  the  
Non-Designated Areas* This  i s  true a f o r t i o r i  fo r  
19?0~1971 where the grant  per job ( p r o j e c t e d )  i n  the  
D e sig n a te d  Areas was roughly  h a l f  o f  the f i g u r e  f o r  Non- 
D e sig n a te d  Are^s* (1969-1970  i s  the e x c e p t i o n  to  the  
r u l e ) *  However as  such comparisons c o m p le te ly  m iss  the  
e f f e c t  o f  the d i f f e r e n t  i n d u s t r i a l  mix i n  the  two a r e a s ,
13t h i s  comparison i s  not o f  great  va lue  ( s e e  a l s o  McAleese ) .
+ This  could be n u l l i f i e d  i f  the d om est ic  s e c t o r  sub­
s t i t u t e s  c a p i t a l  f o r  sc a rc e  s k i l l e d  la b o u r .
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An attem pt was made to  r e f i n e  t h i s  t e s t  by comparing 
f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  not o n ly  i n  the same in d u s tr y  but a l s o  
w i t h i n  b r o a d ly  s i m i l a r  product groups.  A t h i r t e e n  
in d u s tr y  comparison was made f o r  the year  1971* The 
comparison i s  r e a l l y  between product groups because i t  
was f e l t  t h a t  l a r g e  v a r i a t i o n s  e x i s t e d  w i t h i n  the  SIC 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  which would a f f e c t  the comparison.  The 
data are  d e r iv e d  from the IDA f i g u r e s  and from the  An 
Foras Forbartl ia  sample .  The sample c o v e r s  13 sub­
s e c t o r s  and 101 f irm s  and the r e s u l t s  are p r e sen ted  i n  
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The rem o va l  o f  w o rk in g  c a p i t a l  a l l o w s  a b e t t e r  
in d ex  o f  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  t o  be o b t a i n e d .  A f t e r  w ork in g  
c a p i t a l  h a s  b e e n  rem oved ,  th e  r e s u l t s  a re  i n c o n c l u s i v e .
I n  s e v e n  s u b s e c t o r s ,  f i r m s  i n  the  N o n -D es ig n a te d  Areas  
a r e  t h e  most  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e ,  w h i l s t  i n  s i x  o t h e r  
g roups  o f  f i r m s  p r o d u c in g  b r o a d l y  the  same p r o d u c t s ,  
th e  f i r m s  i n  t h e  D e s i g n a t e d  Areas  a r e  more c a p i t a l  i n t e n ­
sive?, I t  t h e r e f o r e  seems t o  be the  case  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  
o t h e r  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y - d e t e r m i n a n t s  
which a r e  more i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  c h o ic e  o f  t e c h n i q u e s  
t h a n  i s  t h e  l e v e l  o f  g r a n t .  I t  would in d e e d  be e x p e c t e d  
on a p r i o r i  g ro un d s  t h a t  a  s h o r t  te rm  f a c t o r  s u b s id y  
c an n o t  a l t e r  f a c t o r  p r o p o r t i o n s  i n  a l a s t i n g  o r  s i g n i f i ­
c a n t  f a s h i o n .
I n  a s i t u a t i o n  o f  i m p e r f e c t  f a c t o r  and p r o d u c t
m a r k e t s ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o n c l u s i v e l y  a s s e s s  t h e
e f f e c t  o f  a s h o r t  te rm  s u b s id y  on f a c t o r  p r o p o r t i o n s .  I t
a p p e a r s  t h a t  the  f o r e i g n  f i r m ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  h o s t
c o u n t r y  f a c t o r  p r i c e s  and t e c h n o l o g i c a l  r i g i d i t i e s ,  w hich
make i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  a d op t  t e c h n i q u e s  more t h a n  s l i g h t l y
i n  the  f a c e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  f a c t o r  p r i c e s ,  a r e  more
i m p o r t a n t .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  an  employment
s u b s id y  r a t h e r  t h a n  a c a p i t a l  g r a n t  would have much
e f f e c t .  M oreover  i t s  c r i t i c s  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  e f f i c i e n c y
would be damaged.  The f r a g m e n ta r y  e v id e n c e  which  i s
a v a i l a b l e  -  t h a t  p r e s e n t e d  h e r e  f o r  I r e l a n d  and C h i s h o lm ’ s
l*ts tu d y  on U.K. Development  Areas  h a s  so  f a r  r e t u r n e d  a
15v e r d i c t  o f  " n o t  p r o v e n " .  T here  h a s  b e e n  a r e c e n t  c a l l
230
f o r  a s h o r t  term labour  su b s id y  to  be in tr o d u ce d ,  i n  the  
D es ig n a ted  Areas o n l y ,  w i th  the o b j e c t  o f  reducing  
unemployment, r e d r e s s i n g  the "current  c a p i t a l  b i a s " ^  
o f  the wage s t r u c t u r e  and to  h e lp  w i th  h ig h  running  
c o s t s  i n  the e a r l y  y e a r s  o f  o p e r a t i o n .  The a d m it ted ly  
crude methods used here  su g g es t  that  such a measure 
would have d o u b t f u l  impact on the c a p i t a l  % labour  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s .  I t s  e f f e c t s  i n  
the labour  market would need f u r t h e r  s tu d y .
( c )  P a r t i a l  P r o d u c t i v i t y  I n d i c e s -  Labour.
Labour input  may be measured by numbers employed or 
i n  e f f i c i e n c y  u n i t s .  E f f i c i e n c y  u n i t s  are e s t im a te d  by 
assuming t h a t  each employee i s  paid a wage e q u iv a le n t  
to  h i s  m arg in a l  v a lu e  p r o d u ct .  This  a l lo w s  f irm s the  
o p t io n  o f  c h oo s in g  more p rod u ct iv e  workers and paying a 
h igh er  p r i c e  (wage) f o r  those  workers .  Therefore on the  
assumption t h a t  the wages o f  labour are a good a p p ro x i ­
mation to  m arg ina l  v a lu e  product ,  the p a y r o l l  can be
taken as  the  input o f  labour i n  terms o f  e f f i c i e n c y  
17u n i t s .  There are many p o s s i b l e  e x c e p t i o n s  to  t h i s  r u l e :  
trade un ion  power and m anageria l  i n e f f i c i e n c y  be ing  two, 
but t h i s  measure o f  labour  input appears to be an improve­
ment on the crude i n d i c a t o r  o f  numbers employed.
Three i n d i c a t o r s  o f  labour p r o d u c t i v i t y  are p r e se n te d
i n  Table 5*&! . The cru d e s t  i n d i c a t o r  r e l a t e s  output ( i n
£000s)  to  labour  employed (number o f  w o r k e r s ) .  Outpu t
Labour
Table 5*6a .  On t h i s  i n d i c a t o r  f o r e i g n  f irm s  appear to
231
u t i l i s e  l a b o u r  much more e f f i c i e n t l y  t h a n  d o m e s t i c  
f i r m s .  The two I r i s h  " s u c c e s s e s ” a r e  i n  th e  p l a s t i c s  
ana p h a r m a c e u t i c a l s  s e c t o r ,  A s i m i l a r  p i c t u r e  emerges  
from T a b le  5 .6 c  where Value  Added p e r  U n i t  o f  Labour  
i s  t h e  i n d i c a t o r  o f  l a b o u r  p r o d u c t i v i t y .  However when 
e f f i c i e n c y  u n i t s  o f  l a b o u r  (WL = p a y r o l l )  a r e  u s e d ,  
f o r e i g n  s u p e r i o r i t y  i s  l e s s  m arked .  The c o n c l u s i o n  
drawn f rom  t h i s  i s  t h a t  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  pay r e l a t i v e l y  
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I f  our assum ption above i s  c o r r e c t  and wages are a 
f a i r  r e f l e c t i o n  o f  marginal  v a lu e  prod u ct ,  then  the h ig h e r  
wages pa id  by f o r e i g n  f irm s  w i l l  be a measure o f  h ig h er  
s k i l l  l e v e l s  i n  t h e i r  workforces*  The measurement o f  s k i l l :  
in  a w orkforce  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  Job, frau ght  w i th  problems  
of  d e f i n i t i o n .  The measure su gg es ted  to  the managements 
of  the f i r m s  in te r v ie w e d  was that  s k i l l e d  labour should  
mean t r a i n i n g  ^-equivalent to  an a p p r e n t i c e s h ip  or above” . 
A d d it io n a l  e f f o r t s  were made to  en su re  th a t  w i t h i n  each  
pair  o f  f i r m s  a s ta n d a r d ise d  measure vjas b e in g  u s e d .  A 
crude i n d i c a t o r  -  the percentage  o f  the d i r e c t  p r o d u ct io n  
workforce w i t h  an “a p p r e n t i c e s h i p - e q u i v a l e n t ” l e v e l  o f  
s k i l l s  was d e r i v e d .  The r e s u l t  i s  conta ined  i n  Table 5 .7«  
Table 5 .7  Sk i l l e d  Labour (Apprent i c e s h i p - EquivalentD as  aa i w i — w a p n M m o w w  i tf.* i UH.WI n»i i nmi wp. — :iT^ ii>,aiii ^nw. i i iri iB t ur n m ri i  m
Percentage  o f  D i r e c t  P roduct ion  Workforce.
P a ir  I r i s h  Firm F o re ig n  Firm
1 23% 25%
2 10J8 1258










So u rce t C a lc u la te d  from in t e r v ie w  and q u e s t io n n a ir e  d a ta
23*+
On t h i s  c ru d e  i n d i c a t o r  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  a p p e a r  t o  be
more s k i l l  i n t e n s i v e .  T h i s  s u p p o r t s  a f i n d i n g  by McNamara
and Sainsbury  th a t  U .S .  f irm s  are more s k i l l  i n t e n s i v e
i n  th e  p l a s t i c s  c o n v e r s i o n  i n d u s t r y  t h a n  i s  th e  a v e ra g e  
18I r i s h  company. The p r e s e n t  sample c o n t a i n s  no U .S .  
owned f i r m  i n  t h i s  i n d u s t r y .  Two o t h e r  f a c t o r s  may a l s o  
a f f e c t  t h e  h i g h e r  p a y r o l l  c o s t s  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  -  m u l t i p l e  
s h i f t  w o rk in g  and th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  w o rk fo rc e  b e tw e e n  
p r o d u c t i o n  and o t h e r  a c t i v i t i e s  -  b o th  a re  examined b e lo w .
L ab ou r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  th e  amount o f
c a p i t a l  w h ich  i s  a v a i l a b l e  t o  combine w i t h  l a b o u r .  The
l e v e l  o f  s k i l l s  i s  a l s o  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  c a p i t a l “ i n t e n s i t y .
The f i r m  w i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  C a p i t a l  r a t i o  h a s  th e  s u p e r i o r
Labour
Output r a t i o  i n  s e v en  o u t  o f  e l e v e n  c a s e s  and the  b e s t  
Labour
tut  pu t  _______________ \ r a t i o  i n  s i x  o u t  o f  e i g h t  c a s e s .f f i c i e n c y  u n i t s  o f  Labour  In  g e n e r a l  t h e  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  f a c t o r  f a v o u r s  th e  f o r e i g n
f i r m .  I n t e n s i t y  o f  l a b o u r  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  v/ifch c a p i t a l  may 
a l s o  be a f a c t o r  h e r e .  One way o f  more e f f e c t i v e l y  u s i n g  
c a p i t a l  i s  m u l t i p l e  s h i f t  w o r k in g .  Three  s h i f t  w ork ing  
was o b s e r v e d  f o r  b o t h  f i r m s  i n  p a i r  two and f o r  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s  f o u r  and t e n .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s  where o n ly  t h e  f o r e i g n  
f i rm  i s  engaged  i n  s h i f t  w o r k in g ,  a l l  t h r e e  l a b o u r  p r o d u c t ­
i v i t y  i n d i c a t o r s  a re  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  th e  I r i s h  
c o u n t e r p a r t .
I n  a d d i t i o n  to  s k i l l s  and q u a l i t y  o f  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l
s e v e r a l  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  may be adduced t o  a f f e c t  l a b o u r  
p r o d u c t i v i t y .  These a r e ,  l a b o u r ,  t u r n o v e r ,  l a b o u r  r e l a t i o n s
and g e n e r a l  w orker’ s w e l fa r e  or working c o n d i t io n s #
Labour turn o ver  in  the sample i s  low (below 8% per annum 
in  a l l  c a s e s  o v e r a l l ) }  i t  i s  however c o n c en tra ted  i n  
p a r t i c u la r  s k i l l  groups and r e g i o n a l  l o c a t i o n s .  A t t r a c t i o n s  
of  labour r a th e r  than turnover  i s  perhaps a b e t t e r  d e s c r i p t ­
ion  o f  the problem f a c i n g  one or two f i r m s .  The turnover  
problem i s  an acute  one f o r  I r i s h  f irm 7 ,  which could not  
expand or f u l f i l  a l l  i t s  orders  because o f  a shortage  o f  
s k i l l e d  too lm akers  ~ which the f irm i t s e l f  t r a i n s .  S e v e r a l  
I r i s h  f irm s  f e l t  th a t  t r a in e d  labour was b e in g  b id  away 
from d o m est ic  f i r m s  to  the f o r e i g n  s e c t o r  by h ig h e r  wages  
(a s u s p i c i o n  supported by the ev idence  h e r e ) .  This  
applied  p a r t i c u l a r l y  to  s k i l l e d  too lm akers .  The f o r e i g n  
firm i n  p a i r  7 had d i f f i c u l t y  in  a t t r a d t i n g  la b o u r ,  but  
t h i s  r e l a t e d  to  ra th er  below average wages (unusual  f o r  a 
f o r e ig n  owned f i r m ) .  R e g i o n a l l y ,  turnover was h ig h er  i n  and 
around D u b l in  and t h i s  p resen ted  f irm 15 w ith  sh o r ta g e s  o f  
female la b o u r .
Labour r e l a t i o n s  were g e n e r a l ly  f e l t  to  be good by 
most o f  the f i r m s  -  in c lu d i n g  those  surveyed but not  
inc luded i n  the pa ired  comparisons.  Unions g e n e r a l ly  were 
seen as h e l p f u l  and f a i r *  Only two f irm s  have been a f f e c t e d  
by i n d u s t r i a l  d i s p u t e s  i n  the past  f i v e  y e a r s .  Both are  
f o r e ig n  owned. One f irm (F2) was a f f e c t e d  by an i n t e r - u n i o n  
dispu te  on the  manning o f  machines which did not s e r i o u s l y  
d isru pt  p r o d u c t io n .  The o th e r  c a s e ,  however,  was a s e r i o u s  
u n o f f i c i a l  s t r i k e  over a pay d i s p u t e .  The management 
created a graded system o f  payments a cco rd in g  to  s k i l l  l e v e l s *
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Although the  o f f e r  exceeded  comparable r a t e s  i n  the area  
and was i n  l i n e  w i th  the N a t io n a l  Wage Agreement, a 
s e r io u s  d i s r u p t i o n  o c cu re d .  The f i r m ,  which i s  U .S .  
owned th r e a t e n e d  c lo s u r e  and t h i s  course  o f  a c t i o n  was 
s e r i o u s l y  c o n tem p la ted .  (See Case Study 1 i n  Appendix to  
t h i s  c h a p t e r ) .  The d i s p u t e  was s e t t l e d  w i th  union h e lp  
and p ro d u ct io n  re turned  to  nor'mal, and v e r y  p r o f i t a b l e  
l e v e l s .  An e a r l i e r  s t r i k e  a l s o  caused the f irm  some prob­
lems but was q u ic k ly  r e s o l v e d .  There i s  a f e e l i n g  amongst 
some I r i s h  managers and a d m in is t r a to r s  th a t  U .S .  owned 
f irms "do not u n d e r s t a n d I r i s h  workers and t h i s  may be 
i n  e v id en ce  i n  t h i s  c a s e .  I t  i s  a l s o  n o t i c e a b l e  th a t  U .S .  
managers are l e s s  fulsome i n  t h e i r  p r a i s e  o f  I r i s h  workers  
than European managers ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  Germans) though t h i s  
o b s e r v a t io n s  i s  based on a v e r y  small  sam ple .
In terms o f  the g e n e r a l  w e l fa r e  o f  w orkers ,  i t  was 
su gges ted  by an I r i s h  p e r so n n e l  manager o f  a f o r e i g n  
owned f irm  th a t  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  t r e a t  t h e i r  workers i n  a 
b e t t e r  f a s h i o n  than do d o m est ic  f i r m s .  An example o f  t h i s  
i s  th a t  a l l  the  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s  v i s i t e d  had workers* 
canteens  and some e x t r a  f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  workers ( s o c i a l  
club e t c . )  whereas i t  i s  the e x c e p t io n  to  f in d  I r i s h  f irm s  
prov id ing  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  t h e s e  f i e l d s .  (One I r i s h  f irm i n  
the p l a s t i c  s e c t o r  i s  an o u ts ta n d in g  e x c e p t i o n  to  the  
genera l  s t a t e m e n t ) .  Casual o b s e r v a t io n s  of  working con­
d i t i o n s  bore t h i s  out a l s o  -  s e v e r a l  I r i s h  f irm s  were 
o p e r a t in g  i n  cramped, inadequate  premises  which were not  
conducive t o  good working c o n d i t i o n s .  P a tern a l ism  i s
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c e r t a i n l y  s t r o n g e r  amongst c o n t i n e n t a l  European i n v e s t o r s .
The e f f e c t  o f  th e se  b e t t e r  c o n d i t i o n s  on labour  
p r o d u c t i v i t y  remains an imponderable .  However t h i s ,  i n  
c o n ju n c t io n  w i th  a g r e a t e r  q u a n t i ty  o f  p h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l  
to  work w i t h ,  h ig h e r  s k i l l  l e v e l s  and b e t t e r  r a t e s  o f  
pay, c o n t r i b u t e s  to  b e t t e r  f o r e i g n  performance on p a r t i a l  
in d ic e s  o f  labour  p r o d u c t i v i t y .
(d) P a r t i a l  P r o d u c t i v i t y  I n d ic e s  -  C a p i ta l
I n d i c e s  o f  c a p i t a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  r e q u ir e  a v a l u a t i o n  
to  be put on the s e r v i c e s  o f  c a p i t a l  i n  the per iod  under 
a n a l y s i s .  E s t im a t e s  o f  (1 )  the g r o ss  va lue  o f  the c a p i t a l  
s tock  and ( 2 )  a r a te  o f  r e t u r n  measurement o f  the s e r v i c e s  
o f c a p i t a l  are required  f o r  such a v a l u a t i o n .  In the 
present  a n a l y s i s ,  the insurance  v a l u a t i o n  o f  the f i r m f s 
c a p i t a l  (replacem ent  c o s t )  i s  u t i l i s e d  as the g r oss  v a lu e  
of  the c a p i t a l  s t o c k  (K).  To t h i s  f i g u r e  an o p p o r tu n i ty  
c o s t  r a te  o f  r e tu r n  o f  15$ per annum (p)  i s  a p p l i e d ,  on 
the grounds th a t  t h i s  r e p r e s e n t s  the true c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  
what i t  cou ld  have earned e ls e w h e r e .
Two i n d i c e s  o f  c a p i t a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y  are c o n s tr u c ted
from t h i s  v a l u a t i o n  on the  s e r v i c e s  o f  c a p i t a l .  They
are Output    (0 )  and
O pportunity  Cost o f  C a p i t a l  (Kp)
Value Added (VA) -  Table  5*8.
Opportunity Cost o f  C a p i ta l  (Kp7
F ore ign  f i r m s  are c l e a r l y  su p e r io r  on the  f i r s t  i n d i c a t o r  
Put t h e i r  s u p e r i o r i t y  d e c l i n e s  when Y & l m  i s  used
in s te a d  o f  output* T his  i s  because  t h e i r  g r e a t e r  c a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i t y  c a r r i e s  more w e ight  when cossparsd. t o  v a lu e  added -  
a l s o  the removal  o f  m a t e r i a l  in p u ts  be coses s  important and 
in  g e n e r a l  the m a t e r i a l  in p u t s  o f  the  f o r e i g n  f i r ®  are  o f
b e t t e r  q u a l i t y  and s p e c i f i c a t i o n .  In one o r  two c a s e s
where e x a c t  e q u iv a le n c e  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  performed by the
I r i s h  u n i t  o f  a f o r e i g n  f irm  w ith  the d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned
firm i s  not ach ieved  * th e se  in p u ts  w i l l  be a c l o s e r  approx-  
imation to  the  f i n i s h e d  a r t i c l e .  I t  was su g g es ted  i n  
Chapter I I  th a t  a c c e s s  t o  b e t t e r  in p u ts  was a major f a c t o r  
in  the b e t t e r  ach ievem ents  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  However t h i s  
i s  not such an important f a c t o r  i n  th e se  comparisons  
because e f f o r t s  have been mad© to  ensure  th a t  the f irm s  
perform the same a c t i v i t i e s .  Q u a l i ty  o f  in p u t s  w i l l  s t i l l  
be r e f l e c t e d  i n  the p r i c e ,  thus d e c r e a s in g  v a lu e  added, 
however5 The removal o f  three  p a ir s  o f  f irm s  because o f  
la ck  o f  da ta  probably b i a s e s  the " sco r e ” towards I r i s h  f i r m s .
P r o d u c t i v i t y  o f  c a p i t a l  i s  r e l a t e d  to the i n t e n s i t y  
of  use o f  t h a t  c a p i t a l .  In  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  i t  has  been  
noted t h a t  m u l t i p l e  s h i f t  working i s  more p r e v a le n t  i n  the  
f o r e i g n  group. A f u r t h e r  i n d i c a t o r  i s  c a p a c i t y  u t i l i s a t i o n .
A d i f f i c u l t y  here  was th a t  f irm s  looked upon f u l l  c a p a c i t y  
in  d i f f e r e n t  ways and so no c o n c lu s iv e  r e s u l t s  could be ob­
t a in e d .  Three f i r m s , a l l  f o r e i g n ,  rep orted  non f u l l  c a p a c i t y  
workingT One was the l o s s  maker (F7)* Firm F10 was
+ The d e f i n i t i o n  o f  f u l l  c a p a c i ty  was l e f t  to  the i n t e r v i e w e e .
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re turn in g  t o  f u l l  c a p a c i ty  working a f t e r  a slump i n  
demand* Firm F*+ was a l s o  not  a t  f u l l  c a p a c i t y  but t h i s  
firm performs w e l l  on a lm ost  every  c r i t e r i o n  o f  e f f i c i e n c y *  
I t  t h e r e f o r e  seems that  below f u l l  c a p a c i t y  working i s  
not n e c e s s a r i l y  d e t r im e n t a l  to  o v e r a l l  good performance  
( in  a r e l a t i v e  sen se )*  F u l l  c a p a c i ty  working i s  p l a u s ­
ib l e  f o r  the  remainder o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  f irm s  and f o r  I r i s h  
f irms 1) 2> 8 and 11 because  they have expans ions  i n  
progress  or exp a n s io n  p la n s  to  be put i n t o  e f f e c t  i n  the  
next two y ears*
A f u r t h e r  f a c t o r  i s  the age o f  the c a p i t a l  s tock*
New machinery and p lan t  w i l l  tend to embody improved 
technology  and can th e r e f o r e  be expected  to  y i e l d  b e t t e r  
r e s u l t s .  In  both  groups most o f  the machinery d a t e s  from 
post 196^, the  e x c e p t io n s  to  t h i s  be ing  I r i s h  f irm s  1 ,  10 
(where the in t e r v ie w e e  admitted that  some o f  the machinery  
was a r c h a ic )  1 5 > where m o d e rn isa t ion  was s lo w ly  taking  
place and 13 where f a c t o r y  r e o r g a n i s a t i o n  was i n  progress*  
Some o ld  machinery was u t i l i s e d  by both f i r m s  i n  p a ir  11 
but replacem ent  was i n  both c a s e s  tak ing  p lrce*  Apart from 
the l a s t  c a s e ,  the equipment i n  a l l  the f o r e i g n  f irm s could  
be c o n s id er ed  up to d a t e ,  the bulk o f  i t  pos t  I.968 . The 
e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  new machinery and p rodu ct ion  tec h n iq u es  i s  
c l e a r l y  r e f l e c t e d  i n  the r e s u l t s  o f  the f o r e i g n  f irm s* The 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  the te c h n o lo g y  embodied i n  the machines i s  
returned to  i n  a l a t e r  s e c t i o n *
Having con s id er ed  p a r t i a l  i n d i c e s  o f  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  
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in d ic e s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  and to  e v a lu a te  the f irm s on t h e s e  
cr i ter ia ®
e ) O v e r a l l  E f f i c i e n c y  I n d i c e s
D e s p i t e  the d i f f e r i n g  fo rm u la t io n s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  
c r i t e r i a *  i t  i s  u n i v e r s a l l y  rec o g n ise d  that  e f f i c i e n c y  
r e l a t e s  ou tp ut  to i n p u t s .  The numerous fo rm u la t io n s  o f  
e f f i c i e n c y  c r i t e r i a  d e r iv e  from v a l u a t i o n  and d e f i n i t i o n  
of  these  two c o n c e p t s .  The o v e r a l l  e f f i c i e n c y  i n d i c e s  
presented i n  Table 5*9 are arranged by degree  o f  s o p h i s t i ­
c a t i o n .
Index a (Table 5«9a) r e l a t e s  t o t a l  g r o s s  output to  
t o t a l  f a c t o r  i n p u t s .  F actor  in p u ts  are measured by p a y r o l l  
plus c a p i t a l  s e r v i c e s  va lu e d  at the o p p o r tu n ity  c o s t  
rate  o f  r e t u r n  imputed above .  This  index  ta k e s  no account  
of  the importance o f  m a t e r i a l  i n p u t s .  This  index s u g g e s t s  
that f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i n  t o t o  are more e f f i c i e n t  than t h e i r  
I r i s h  c o m p e t i to r s  but t h a t  e x c e p t io n s  to  t h i s  ru le  do e x i s t .  
(In t h i s ,  as  i n  the o th e r  two o v e r a l l  I n d i c e s  the o m is s io n  
of  three  p a i r s  o f  f i rm s  i s  l i k e l y  to  b i a s  the  Ms c o r e ” i n  
favour o f  the I r i s h  f i r m s ) .
Index b (Table 5 . 9b) p r e s e n t s  net output (value  added)  
per u n i t  o f  i n p u t .  The p i c t u r e  i s  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  the same.  
Foreign f i r m s  are i n  the  main b e t t e r  performers but t h i s  i s  
not overwhelming.  In the sample, the p r o p o r t io n  o f  v a lu e
added by t h e  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of  t h e i r  I r i s h  
competitor  -  t h i s  should not be adduced as e v id en ce  on the
whole p o p u l a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  f irm s  however as  t h i s  was a 
co n d i t io n  o f  e q u iv a le n c e  o f  the p a i r s .
The f i n a l  in d e x ,  Table 5 . 9 c ,  may be termed an index
of  s o c i a l  e f f i c i e n c y .  Net output i s  compared to  an
opportunity  c o s t  v a l u a t i o n  o f  f a c t o r  i n p u t s .  As above ,
c a p i t a l  s e r v i c e s  are p r ic e d  at  per r a t e  o f  r e t u r n .
However la b ou r  i s  now p r ice d  at  the shadow1 wage r e tu r n  o f
£ 850 per annum. This  wage i s  presumed to  r e p r e s e n t  the
a l t e r n a t i v e  e a r n in g s  o f  employed la b o u r ,  i t  i s  d e r iv ed  i n
a f u l l  c o s t - b e n e f i t  framework i n  Chapter V I I .  Together
(Kp + VTL) s where W* i s  the shadow wage r a t e ,  r ep re sen t
the s o c i a l  c o s t s  o f  the f a c t o r s  employed. To be com p lete ,
the index should  in c lu d e  o th e r  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  i n  the
19numerator and o th e r  s o c i a l  c o s t s  i n  the denominator.
E xternal  econom ies  and d isec o n o m ies  should thus be in c lu d e d .  
Because o f  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n ,  such f a c t o r s  
have been e x c lu d e d .  However they are brought up aga in  
belov;. On the index  a c t u a l l y  u sed ,  f o r e i g n  f irm s  perform 
b e t t e r  than the  I r i s h  owned o n e s ;  only  the l o s s  maker r ec o rd s  
a lower r e t u r n  per u n i t  o f  s o c i a l  c o s t  than i t s  I r i s h  counter  
p a r t .  The h i g h e r  wages o f  f o r e i g n  f i rm s  here  do not co n ­
s t i t u t e  a c o s t  as  i n  the o th e r  i n d i c e s  f o r  on ly  the opportun­
i t y  c o s t  o f  labou r  employed i s  imputed as a c o s t .
The above s e c t i o n s  have shown that  f o r e i g n  f irm s can  
be c o n s id er ed  more e f f i c i e n t  than the c l o s e s t  e q u iv a le n t
I r i s h  f irm ( i n  terms o f  product f i e l d  and range o f  a c t i v i t y )  
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The remainder o f  t h i s  Chapter a t tem p ts  to  l o c a t e  
the r ea son s  f o r  t h i s  phenomenon, A number o f  f a c t o r s  
may be r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the b e t t e r  showing o f  f o r e i g n  
f irms i n c l u d i n g  a c c e s s  to  b e t t e r  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  in p u ts  
emanating from g r e a t e r  expend itu re  on r e s e a r c h  or  
r e l ia n c e  on the  f o r e i g n  parent  f o r  knowledge, su p e r io r  
managerial  in p u t s  or a s t r o n g e r  s a l e s  and marketing e f f o r t .  
A l t e r n a t i v e l y  much o f  the observed d i f f e r e n c e s  may be due 
to the f a c t o r  o f  la r g e  s c a l e  p ro d u ct io n .  Each o f  t h e s e  
f a c t o r s  i s  examined i n  the l i g h t  o f  i t s  p o s s i b l e  c o n t r i b ­
u t io n  to  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  observed above.
( f )  The Hole o f  Sca le  F a c t o r s .
I t  may be su gges ted  that  the f i n d i n g s  o f  the a n a l y s i s  
are not the  r e s u l t  o f  f a c t o r s  r e l a t e d  to  the d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
ownership,  f o r e i g n  or I r i s h ,  but to  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the  
sc a le  o f  p r o d u c t io n  o f  the  p a i r .  The r o le  of  s c a l e  can be 
examined w i th  the a id  o f  Table 5*10. Row 1 o f  the t a b le  
shows which o f  the f i rm s  i n  the pa ir  i s  l a r g e r  -  the c r i t e r i o n  
o f  a s s e t s  or s a l e s  does not a l t e r  the s i t u a t i o n  i n  any p a ir  
of  f irm s ( i =  I r i s h  f i rm ,  f=  F o re ig n  f i r m ) .  The remainder o f  
the rows show which f irm  performed b e s t  on s s v e n  d i f f e r e n t  
i n d i c a t o r s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  (row 2 -  8) and row 9 shows which  
firm was the most c a p i t a l  -  i n t e n s i v e .
The f i n a l  column o f  the ta b le  shows the number o f  
t imes th a t  s c a l e  f a c t o r s  would p r e d ic t  "the most e f f i c i e n t  
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the s u r p r i s i n g  r e s u l t  th a t  the l a r g e s t  f irm  i n  the  
pair  i s  i n  s i x  c a s e s  out o f  e leven* the l e a s t  c a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i v e . From the  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  column i t  i s  
apparent t h a t  s c a l e  i s  a good p r e d ic t o r  o f  e f f i c i e n c y .
However* the r o l e  o f  s c a l e  f a c t o r s  f a l l s  i n t o  a 
b e t t e r  p e r s p e c t i v e  i f  the t a b le  i s  summarised i n  the  
f o l l o w in g  way* I f  the s c a l e  f a c t o r  were a p e r f e c t  
i n d i c a t o r  o f  e f f i c i e n c y *  the 26 c e l l s  i n  rows 2 to  8 
( i n c l u s i v e )  o f  Table 5 .10  should be • i ••  That i s  to  
say a l l  the i n d i c a t o r s  i n  columns 2 , 3 * 5 and 7 should  
show a s u p e r i o r  e f f i c i e n c y  r a t i n g  f o r  the I r i s h  firm*
In f a c t ,  o f  t h e s e  26 c e l l s ,  on ly  12 d i s p l a y  a su p e r io r  
r e s u l t  f o r  the I r i s h  firm* S i m i l a r l y ,  a l l  the e f f i c i e n c y  
i n d i c a t o r s  i n  columns 1 , 6 , 8 , 9 , 10 and 11 should
i n d i c a t e  s u p e r io r  performance by the f o r e i g n  owned f i r m .  
This i s  c e l l s  i n  a l l .  Forty-two o f  t h e s e  c e l l s  do 
c o n ta in  s u p e r io r  performance by the f o r e i g n  h a l f  o f  the  
p a i r .  The r o l e  o f  s c a l e  can now c l e a r l y  be seen  to  be 
o f t e n  o u t v e ig h t e d  by some o ther  a t t r i b u t e  o f  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  ( I n  the c a s e s  where the s c a l e  advantage l i e s  
w ith  the I r i s h  f i r m )  but p la y in g  a support ing  r o le  i n  the  
c a s e s  where the f o r e i g n  owned firm i s  l a r g e r .
As an adjunct  to  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s ,  i t  should be noted  
that  s c a l e  cannot be c o n s id er ed  to be independent o f  
the ownership dichotom y.  S c a le  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  the  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f a c t o r s  and te c h n o lo g y .  The f o r e i g n  f irm  
has d i s t i n c t  advantages  i n  r a i s i n g  c a p i t a l ;  a c c e s s  to
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p a r e n t ' s  f u n d s ,  c r e d i t  w o r th in e s s  and g r e a t e r  ease  i n  
r a i s i n g  e q u i t y  c a p i t a l .  The a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  know-how 
may c o n s t i t u t e  a c o n s t r a i n t  on dom est ic  f i r m s .  R e l u c t ­
ance t o  expand (because o f  f e a r  o f  l o s s  o f  c o n t r o l  or  o f  
r i s k )  was noted  on the part  o f  the management o f  more 
than one I r i s h  f i r m ,  but was absent from the f o r e i g n  
group.
In  c o n c l u s i o n  i t  may be s a id  th a t  as  an independent  
f a c t o r ,  s c a l e  i s  not o f  s u f f i c i e n t  importance to  o v e r r id e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  between f o r e i g n  and I r i s h  f i r m s  though i t  
e x e r c i s e s  some I n f lu e n c e  on e f f i c i e n c y .  Other p o s s i b l e  
sources  o f  such d i f f e r e n c e s  are now examined.
(g )  Re s e a r c h  a nd De v e lo p ment.1 ■ . i fi . rm i ■— i-------------- - --- -f
E vidence  on the amount o f  expenditure  on R & B by 
I r i s h  f i r m s  and the f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  i s  presen ted  in  
Table 5*11 .  As a percentage  o f  tu r n o v e r ,  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d ­
i a r i e s  spend more on R & D w i t h i n  Ire la n d  than do the  
I r i s h  f i r m s .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  a l l  o f  the f o r e i g n  f irm s r e l y  
to some e x t e n t  on t e c h n i c a l  in fo rm a tion  and know-how 
from t h e i r  parent f irm -  the product o f  pas t  R & D« The 
form o f  t h i s  a s s i s t a n c e  v a r i e s  -  i t  may be b l u e p r i n t s ,  
form ulae ,  p a t e n t s  or embodied i n  machinery and in te r m e d ia te  
in p u ts  from the  p a r e n t .
Table  5 .1 1  R e s e a r c h  and Developme n t
Pair R & D i n  Ire lan d  
as a $ S a l e s
Hotes on F o r e ig n  Firm




Payment to  parent f o r  
b a s i c  r e se a r c h
2 1% 2-3SS Payment f o r  know-how 
from parent
3 k% 2% " nR & D t e c h n i c a l  & |
r o y a l t y  payments” j
M
k 0 1-2$ 2$ turnover  paid f o r  
s e r v i c e s
5 0 0 R & 1) from parent -  f 
nominal payment j
6 1% 0 R & D embodied i n  in p u t s  j 
from parent
7 0 % Payment f o r  t e c h n i c a l  
s e r v i c e s
8 2% 8$ Payment f o r  t e c h n i c a l  
in fo r m a t io n
9 3% 0 Payment fo r  R & D, 
drawings -  10$ s a l e s
10 0 5% Mainly  
D e s ig n
3% s a l e s  payment f o r  
R & D
11 0 1$ R & D from parent -  
No o v e r t  payment
Score
*
k 6 NB *0* = l e s s  than  1% 
s a l e s
Source: I n t e r v ie w  and q u e s t io n n a i r e .
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Payment t o  the parent f o r  B & D i s  a d i f f i c u l t  
q u e s t io n  to  broach because  o f  the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  g iv in g  a 
p r ic e  t o  knowledge,  which has c o s t s  o f  c r e a t i o n ,  but
o 0once c r e a te d  has the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a f r e e  good.
I t  has b een  su gg es ted  th a t  one source o f  advantage o f  a
f o r e i g n  owned s u b s id ia r y  i s  th a t  B & D w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e
to  i t  a t  a p r i c e  equal  t o  the  marginal  c o s t s  o f  c r e a t i n g
the knowledge,  whereas an o u t s id e r  must pay a p r ic e
e q u iv a le n t  to  average c o s t s  to  o b t a in  the same good.  As
marginal  c o s t s  o f  t h i s  type o f  knowledge are u s u a l l y  low ,
t h i s  w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  a major advantage f o r  the f o r e i g n
s u b s i d i a r y .  A lso  much o f  the knowledge i s  " p ro p r ie to r y
knowledge", encompassed w i t h i n  a f irm but u n a v a i la b le  t o
u n i t s  o u t s i d e  the f irm -  brand names, s e c r e t  i n g r e d i e n t s
21and s p e c i a l  t e c h n iq u e s  are o f  t h i s  t y p e .  A f r e e  market  
p r ic e  f o r  t h i s  kind o f  knowledge does not e x i s t  because  
o f  b a r r i e r s  both  n a tu r a l  ( the  knowledge i s  embodied i n  
a p r o c e s s )  and a r t i f i c i a l l y  crea ted  by the owners. Two 
c r i t e r i a  p o s s i b l e  fo r  the e v a lu a t io h  o f  the worth o f  
R & B t r a n s f e r r e d  are (1 )  i t s  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c t io n ,  ( 2 )  i t s  
economic worth to  the r e c i p i e n t  (and the l a t t e r  i s  n e c e s s ­
a r i l y  a s u b j e c t i v e  judgem ent) .  As no da ta  were a v a i l a b l e  
on the  c o s t s  o f  producing the t r a n s f e r r e d  in fo r m a t io n ,  the  
s u b j e c t i v e  judgement o f  the r e c i p i e n t  f i r m ’ s e x e c u t i v e s  
was used as  the measure o f  the value  o f  t h e  t r a n s f e r r e d  
in f o r m a t io n .
A l l  e l e v e n  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s r e l y  to  some e x t e n t  on 
the parent  f o r  R & D i n  a d d i t io n  to  t h e  r e se a r c h  they  carry
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out i n  I r e l a n d .  In some c a s e s  the t r a n s f e r  r e p r e s e n t s  a 
subsidy t o  the  I r i s h  u n i t*  In one case  ( F l l )  no payment 
at a l l  i s  made, i n t r a  f irm knowledge having  the c l a s s i c  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a f r e e  good* Firm F5 pays on ly  a 
nominal sum which i s  l e s s  than the worth o f  the  knowledge  
to the f i rm  and may r e p r e se n t  an amount e q u iv a le n t  to  
the m arg in a l  c o s t s  o f  the R & B. In th r ee  c a s e s ,  F1*, F9> 
F10, the e x e c u t i v e  in te r v ie w e d  confirmed th a t  the payment 
was u n r e la t e d  to  the worth o f  the t r a n s f e r r e d  know-how and 
r ep re sen ted  an over-payment to  the p a r e n t .  In  one c a s e ,  
t h i s  was the  r e s u l t  o f  a f i x e d  payment having  been  agreed  
at  a time when the s e r v i c e s  were "worth" the amount paid  
by the s u b s i d i a r y  and t h i s  payment v;as m ainta ined  a f t e r  
the e x p e r t i s e  had become l e s s  important to  the I r i s h  u n i t*  
The o th e r  two e x p la in e d  th a t  t h i s  was a method o f  moving 
p r o f i t s  w i t h i n  the f irm  and that  the payments were not  
r e l a t e d  a t  a l l  t o  any n o t i o n  o f  economic worth or c o s t s ,  
whether average  or m a r g in a l ,  to  the p a r e n t .
D e s p i t e  t h i s  r e l i a n c e  on the p a r e n t ,  f o r e i g n  f i r m s
o v e r a l l  appear to  carry  out a g r e a te r  amount o f  R & B In
Ire lan d  than do t h e i r  I r i s h  com pet i tors*  The p i c t u r e  o f
R & B p r e s e n te d  here i s  r e f l e c t e d  at  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  -
re se a r c h  i s  d iv id e d  i n t o  82% on development,  1 %  on a p p l ie d
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r e se a r c h  and o n ly  3% on  b a s i c  r e sea rch  ( 1 9 7 2 ) .  T his  
o f  course  i s  a r e f l e c t i o n  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  dependence ,  a 
major f e a t u r e  o f  which i s  the la rg e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  f o r e i g n
f irm s i n  the h ig h  tech n o lo g y  s e c t o r s  o f  I r i s h  i n d u s t r y .
(See the f o l l o w i n g  d i s c u s s i o n ) .  The p a t t e r n  o f  t h i s  sm al l
sample i s  a l s o  repeated  w i th  regard t o  the low R & B 
spending o f  I r i s h  f i rm s  at  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l .  I f  fu tu re  
performance i s  r e l a t e d  to  presen t  B & B e x p e n d i tu r e ,  
then I r i s h  f i r m s  are l i a b l e  to  f a l l  f u r t h e r  behind  
t h e i r  f o r e i g n  co m p et i to r s  who have a c c e s s  to  ongoing  
R & D . T h is  d i s c u s s i o n  of  R & D needs to  be se t  w i t h i n  
the w ider  framework o f  t he o v e r a l l  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i m p l i ­
c a t i o n s  o f  FBI to  I r e l a n d .
(h) The t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  FBI
The te c h n o lo g y  f a c t o r  u n d e r l i e s  many p a r t s  o f  the  
f o r e g o in g  a n a l y s i s .  Th is  s e c t i o n  aims to  make the  
importance o f  t ec h n o lo gy  more e x p l i c i t  by a n a ly s in g  th r ee  
major i s s u e s  i n  the I r i s h  c o n t e x t .  These i s s u e s  are 5
( i )  the s t r e n g t h  o f  the " t e c h n o lo g ic a l  m u l t i p l i e r " ,  ( i i )  the  
phenomenon o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  dependence and ( i i i )  an a n a l y s i s  
of I r e l a n d ’ s t e c h n o l o g i c a l  "needs" and a review o f  the o p t ­
imal means o f  o b ta in in g  te c h n o lo g y .
Technology has been  i d e n t i f i e d  as a c r u c i a l  e lement  
i n  economic growth. D e n iso n ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  r e f e r r e d  to  
the importance of  growth due not to  an i n c r e a s e  i n  the  
q u a l i t y  of  p h y s i c a l  f a c t o r  i n p u t s ,  but to  an improvement 
i n  the knowledge conten t  and technique of  p rodu ct ion  ( the  
r e s i d u a l  f a c t o r  i n  economic g r o w t h ) ^  The produ ct ion  
of  t e c h n o lo g y  i s  an awkward case  f o r  w e l fa r e  economics -  
the p r o d u c t io n  of  knowledge r e q u i r e s  l a r g e  in p u ts  o f  
f a c t o r s  b e f o r e  i t  can be r e a l i s e d  and t h e r e f o r e  knowledge 
producers must  r e c e i v e  a p r o sp e c t iv e  reward. However,
once knowledge  h a s  b e e n  c r e a t e d ,  o p t i m a l i t y  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
a re  t h a t  i t  sh o u ld  be f r e e l y  a v a i l a b l e ,  b e c a u se  use  o f
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i t  by  one p r o d u c e r  does  n o t  p r e c l u d e  i t s  use  by o t h e r s .
I n  the  m odern  c a p i t a l i s t  w o r l d ,  p r o d u c e r s  o f  new know­
ledg e  a r e  r e w a r d e d  by a ( t e m p o ra ry )  monopoly p o s i t i o n .  
C o n t r o l  o f  t e c h n o lo g y  i s  t h u s  a v i t a l  f e a t u r e  i n  the  w o r ld  
economy, b e c a u s e  o f  t h i s  saonopoly s i t u a t i o n .  Because  o f  
monopoly r e w a r d s ,  th e  r e t u r n  t o  the  c r e a t o r  o f  knowledge i s  
i n f l u e n c e d  by th e  s i z e  o f  the  m arke t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  him -  
a l s o  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  l a r g e  q u a n t i t y  o f  r e s o u r c e s  r e q u i r e d  
and th e  l a r g e  i n h e r e n t  r i s k s ,  b ig  f i r m s  and o r g a n i s a t i o n s  
a re  f a v o u r e d .  Hence the  dominant  p o s i t i o n  o f  U .S .  f i r m s  
i n  knowledge c r e a t i o n  d e r i v e s  from th e  l a r g e  m arke t  (and 
the  im p o r t a n c e  o f  Government p a t r o n a g e )  and the  f a c t  t h a t  
th ey  c an  m a r s h a l l  v a s t  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  s p e c i a l i s e d  r e s o u r c e s .
Dunning  h a s  g i v e n  th e  name " p r o p r i e t a r y  t e c h n o lo g y "  
t o  knowledge owned o r  c o n t r o l l e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  by
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p a r t i c u l a r  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Such t e c h n o lo g y  i s  t r a n s m i t t e d  
a lm os t  e n t i r e l y  by FDI o r  by l i c e n s i n g  a g re e m e n ts .  Non- 
p r o p r i e t a r y  t e c h n o lo g y  i s  more e a s i l y  a v a i l a b l e  th r o u g h  
t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  i n v i t a t i o n ,  p u r c h a s e s  o f  goods 
and so o n ,  b u t  i t  i s  l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  b e c a u se  i t  i s  no t  so 
c l o s e l y  l i n k e d  t o  v i t a l  p r o d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s e s ,  t e c h n i q u e s  
and m a n a g e r i a l  c o n t r o l  a s  i s  p r o p r i e t a r y  knowledge .  I t  
i s  t h e  c l o s e n e s s  o f  th e  l i n k s  be tw een  t e c h n o l o g y ,  p r o d ­
u c t i o n  p r o c e s s e s  and m a n a g e r i a l  t e c h n i q u e s  which  p r o v id e  
the  unique advantages  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m s .  I t  i s  a l s o  
p r o p r i e t a r y  t ech n o lo g y  which i s  the most im p o r t a n t  f e a t u r e  
I n  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d e p e n d e n c e .
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X i i -  The t e c h n o lo g ic a l  m u l t i p l i e r
The p r e v io u s  ch a p te rs  have shown th a t  FBI i s  
d ir e c te d  in t o  growth s e c t o r s ,  that i t  can in co rp o ra te  
s e v e r a l  b e n e f i c i a l  f e a t u r e s  such as  market a c c e s s ,  
modern p r o d u c t io n  p r o c e s s e s  and e f f i c i e n c y  and th a t  i t  
has h e lp e d  to  ease  c e r t a i n  s e v e r e  p o l i c y  problems such  
as employment c r e a t io n .  Concern i s  here not w ith  the  
in t e r n a l  e f f i c i e n c y  and grov/th o f  th e  f o r e i g n  s e c to r  
but w ith  th e  tr a n s m is s io n  o f  tech n o logy  to  the d om estic  
s e c t o r .
In  th e o r y  the  im p o r ta t io n  o f  tech n o lo g y  through  
FDI w i l l  ( 1 )  in c r e a s e  e f f i c i e n c y  and p r o d u c t iv i t y  through­
out th o se  s e c t o r s  i n  which i t  i s  employed, (2 ) reduce  
fa c t o r  c o s t s  f o r  the u s e r s  o f  th e  o u tp u t ,  (3 ) s t im u la te  
oth er  in n o v a t io n  and (k )  encourage fu r th e r  R & D to  
maximise the  b e n e f i t s  o f  the in n o v a t io n .  The a c c e s s  o f  
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  su b s id ia r y  to  the r e se a r c h  o f  the parent  
f irm , f r e q u e n t ly  at below arm s-len gth  p r i c e s ,  (the  p r ic e  
fo r  the s u b s id ia r y  w i l l  be eq u a l to  the m arginal c o s t  o f  
the r e se a r c h  r a th e r  than  average c o s t  which an o u t s id e r  
would have to  m eet) i s  an important part o f  the su c c e s s  o f  
i n t e r n a t io n a l  f i r m s .
However, t r a n s m is s io n  o f  t h i s  knowledge through the  
economy has been l e s s  s u c c e s s f u l .  W ith in  the  same s e c t o r ,  
dualism  has provided  a b a r r ie r  to  improvement o f  the  
dom estic  s e c t o r .  D om estic  and f o r e ig n  f ir m s  do not i n  many
c a s e s  produce the same produ cts  and cannot be sa id  to  be 
i n  d i r e c t  c o m p e t it io n  because  f o r e ig n  f ir m s  s e r v ic e  the  
export market whereas many dom estic  f irm s  are engaged  
i n  import s u b s t i t u t i n g .  Weaknesses i n  the  dom estic  
economy d e r iv in g  from sm all  s c a le  f irm s and u n re sp o n s iv e -  
n e ss  to  change a l s o  i n h i b i t s  t r a n s m is s io n .  T ransm ission  
o f  new te c h n o lo g y  through in p u t-o u tp u t  l in k s  i s  In h ib ite d  
because o f  the weakness o f  such l in k a g e  e f f e c t s .  The 
output o f  f o r e ig n  firm s i s  exported  and i n  the main i s  not 
i n  in te r m e d ia te  goods p ro d u ct io n  or p rod u cer f s c a p i t a l  
goods e x ce p t  where th e se  are d e s t in e d  fo r  o th er  u n i t s  
w ith in  the  f ir m . These are some examples o f  I r i s h  f irm s  
having to  improve stan dards i n  order to  supply f o r e ig n  
f i r m s , ^  but such examples are few .
S t im u la t io n  o f  d om estic  r e se a r c h  through e f f e c t s  v ia  
d e m o n stra t io n , c o m p e t i t io n ,  r a d ia t io n  and encouragement 
have been  sm a ll  because o f  the sm all s e a l s  o f  I r e la n d ’ s 
r e se a r c h  e f f o r t ,  which i s  i n  some part a consequence o f  
r e l ia n c e  on FDI. C on sider in g  f i r s t  the p r iv a te  s e c t o r  
R & D in  I r e la n d ,  Table 5*12 shows th a t  t h i s  i s  m ainly  
develop m en t, w ith  b a s ic  r e se a r c h  in  Ire la n d  b e in g  l im i t e d  
to  the food  and dr ink  s e c t o r s .  T h is  i s  moreover s e v e r e ly  
c o n c en tr a ted  as the l i s t  bslow  shows:
P e r c e n ta g e s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t o t a l  expenditu re  on 
R & B  (1969)
F i r s t  *+ companies *+1.3$
F i r s t  8 companies 51 .8$
F i r s t  20 companies 69*0$
pQ
F i r s t  *+0 companies 81 .9 $
T a b le  5 .12  B u s i n e s s  e n t e r p r i s e  s e c t o r  -  e x p e n d i t u r e s  on
R & D a c t i v i t y  by I ndustry groups 1969 (£ 0 00s )IIW *" ,|*11 111 11,1 IT1111111 ' 1 |TT 1 ------------»-----   . . . i-H- T- mm 1ff1 ftm n n n if 1m tt h innrTi m i i» . rfii
In du stry  Group Type o f  R 5  B a c t i v i t y  (x £1000)






T o ta l
Mining & Peat - 1 3 .0 82 A 95A
E l e c t r i c a l  E l e c t r o n i c 36.0 296.9 332.9
Chemicals & Drugs - 61. l ? k .  6 2 3 6 .0
Transport Equipment - - 10*+. 2 101+.2
F a b r ica ted  M etal  
Products - - 79.2 79.2
Machinery - - 1 5 .8 1 5 .8
Food & D rink 67*0 1^5.3 1+00 A 612.7
T e x t i l e s - 5 .^ 73 A 78.9
Rubber & P l a s t i c s - 10.1 6i+.1 7l+.2
S to n e , G la s s ,  C lay ,  
Cement - 1^.0 71.9 85.9
Paper & P r in t in g - 9.0 57.2 66,2
Wood & F u r n itu r e - - 8.2 8.2
Other M anufactures - 19.9 113 .8 133.7
U t i l i t i e s - ^9*6 2 8 9A 339.0
C o n str u c t io n - - 16.9 16.9
Transport & S torage - 66.2 66 .2
Communications 5.0 *+0.0 1+5.0 1
TOTAL 67.0 368.7 1 , 9 A . 7  :’ >390,1+
Per cent ( a l l  groups) 2.8 15*^ 81.8 1 0 0 .0
Source  t D is r rau id  Murphy and D. 0 ’B r o l c h a i n  17R e se a rc h . .and. 
Development  I n  I r e l a n d ” 1969® CcS«0. O cto b e r  1971 
Table 5*^ Pago 35*
I r i s h  in d u s tr y  i s  h e a v i ly  dominated by sm all f irm s (who 
cannot command the r e so u r c e s  n ecessa ry  to  carry  out 
t h e i r  own R & D) and by f o r e ig n  owned firm s (who have 
strong  r e a so n s  to  c e n t r a l i s e  R & 1) f a c i l i t i e s  and t h e r e ­
fo re  perform no b a s ic  r e se a rc h  in  I r e la n d ) .  D e sp ite  the  
f a c t  th a t  f o r e i g n  owned f irm s in  g e n e ra l  spend more on 
R <Sc D than  t h e i r  I r i s h  co m p etito rs  w i th in  Ire la n d  
t h i s  i s  b a s i c a l l y  development expenditure  as Table 5*12 
v e r i f i e s .
Borrowing o f  know-how i s  very  im portant as Table 5 .1 3  
shows. How much o f  t h i s  i s  co n tra c ted  by f o r e ig n  f ir m s  
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The r ep o r ted  t o t a l  o f  £ 0 .93^  m i l l i o n  was an in c r e a s e  
o f  73% on kh® 1967  f ig u r e  (£0«539m) which shows an
in c r e a s in g  I r i s h  d e f i c i t  on the "balance o f  t e c h n o l o g y "
T h is  p ic t u r e  i s  fu r th e r  strengthened  when the Govern­
ment s e c t o r  i s  in tr o d u c e d . Ire lan d  has had l i t t l e  r ea so n  
to  engage i n  th e  la r g e  s c a le  u l t r a  e x p en s iv e  r e se a r c h  th a t  
the "superpow ers” have undertaken. Nor has the s t a t e  had 
o c c a s io n  to  farm out R & D to  the p r iv a te  d om estic  s e c t o r .
S ta t e  R & D has been con cen tra ted  m ainly  in  the a g r i ­
c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r s  as T ab les  5.1^ and 5*15 show.
Table 5.1*+ Government S e c to r  -  R & D exp en d itu re  by f i e l d ;  
o f  a c t i v i t y  1969 and 1967 (x 1000)
F ie ld  o f  R & D a c t i v i t y R & D exp en d itu re
A g r ic u l t u r e ,  F o r e s tr y ,  
F i s h e r i e s 3 ,1 0 0 .3 ( 6 5 .7 $ ) 2 ,2 4 0 .1 ( 7 0 .6 $ )
C o n str u c t io n 1 9 3 .2 ( 4 .1 $ ) 1 0 1 .9 ( 3 .2 $ )
T ra n sp o rt( in c .M e te r o lo g y ) 1 5 3 .0 ( 3 .2 $ ) 7 1 .7 ( 2 .3 $ )
T ele  communicat io n s o . 4 ( - ) 0 . 4 ( - )
H ealth i»5.8 ( 1 .0 $ ) 1 5 .4 ( 0 . 5 $ )
In du stry 6 7 1 .6 ( 1 4 .2 $ ) 3 8 5 .7 ( 1 2 .2 $ )
Development Areas + 1 9 5 .2 ( 4 .1 $ ) 1 9 1 .4 ( 6 .0 $ )
M is c e l la n e o u s ■ 93 .5 (2 .0$ ) 4 3 .2 ( 1 . 4 $ )
Sub T o ta l 4 ,4 3 5 .0 ( 9 4 .4 $ ) 3 ,0 4 9 .8 ( 9 6 .1 $ )
S o c ia l  S c ie n c e s 2 6 2 . 5 ( 5 *6$ ) 1 2 2 .8 ( 3 .9 $ )
TOTAL 4 ,7 1 5 * 5 (1 0 0 $ ) 3 ,1 7 2 .6 ( 1 0 0 $ )
* w i t h i n  t h e  s t a t e .  m a in ly  p h y s i c a l  p l a n n i n g
(An F o r a s  F o r b a r t h a )
S o u rce  % Murphy and O ' B r o l c h a i n  (1971)
Ta b le  5«l£,..._Goyeri3menfc S e c to r  -  T o ta l  Intram ural R £  D
,exB ond l£H ie .-b 3^ ^  £ m i l l i o n .
Agency 1969 R & D % o f
E xpenditure S e c to r a l  T o ta l
An Foras T a lu n ta is 2.^5* 5 2 .0
I n s t i t u t e  f o r  I n d u s t r ia l  
R esearch  and Standards4* 0*73* 15.*+
Department o f  A g r ic u ltu r e  
and F i s h e r i e s 0 . 72s 1 5 .3
An Foras F orb arth a4* 0 .3 0 6 A
F o re s try  D i v i s i o n  
(D ept, o f  Lands) 0.12 2 .6
F is h e r i e s  D i v i s i o n  (D ept,  
o f  A g r ic u ltu r e  & F i s h e r i e s ) 0.09 1 . 9
G e o lo g ic a l  Survey (D ept,  
o f  In d u stry  & Commerce) 0 .0^ 0 .8 5
C en tra l Bank 0.035 0 . 7
Bord I a s c a ig h  Mhsra (Sea  
F i s h e r i e s  B oard ) 0.026 0 .5 5
M e t e r a lo g ic a l  S e r v ic e  (D ept,  
o f  T ransport & Power) 0 .0 2 0 . 5
i F ig u r e s  in c lu d e  a l l  t e c h n ic a l  work and s e r v i c e s  (apart  
from R & D) performed or provided by the r e s p e c t iv e  
r e se a r c h  i n s t i t u t e s *
+ R & D ex p en d itu re  has in crea sed  markedly s in c e  1969 
and p r o v i s i o n a l  e s t im a t e s  (by the b o d ie s  th e m se lv e s )  f o r  
1972-73 are -  An Foras T a lu n ta is  £  3*60 m i l l i o n
I.I.R.S. £ 1 .6 7  m i l l i o n
An Foras Forbartha £ 0*50 m i l l i o n
Source t N a t io n a l  S c ien ce  C ouncil (1972) "Ire lan d  -  background— 1—*~*~l r m rin in iw  II 1 11 1 ■    *-!■■■ '■ I I H I I IW
r e p o r t  on S c i e n c e  and T e c h n o l o gy." * Com pi led  by  
Dairmuid Murphy.
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The a b o v e  f a c t o r s  p r o v e  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  th e  i n c e n t i v e  
to  i n v e s t  i n  R & D i n  I r e l a n d  and t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  th e  
p r i v a t e  (and t o  a l e s s e r  e x t e n t )  t h e  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  t o  do  
t h i s  h a v e  b e e n  v e r y  w e a k .  I n v e s t m e n t  i n  R & D f o r  t h e  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  i s  an  e x c e p t i o n  t o  t h i s  and i t  may be  
s a i d  t h a t  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  R & D h a s  r e f l e c t e d  s t a t i c  
c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n t a g e .  However I r e l a n d  i s  m a n i f e s t l y  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  b r e a k  away from t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  by i n d u s t -  • 
r i a l i s a t i o n .  She may be c h a r a c t e r i s e d  a s  a s o c i e t y  t h a t  
i s  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y  d e p e n d e n t  i n  the  new f i e l d s  i n t o  w h i c h  
the  d e v e l o p m e n t  s t r a t e g y  i s  l e a d i n g .  The phenomenon o f  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  d e p e n d e n c e  i s  t h e  n e x t  s t a g e  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  
o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  f e a t u r e s  o f  FBI .
( i i )  T e c h n o l o g i c a l  D ep en d en ce
The c e n t r a l i s a t i o n  and c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  R & D ( a s  
w e l l  a s  w e a l t h  p r o d u c i n g  c a p i t a l ,  m a r k e t i n g  s k i l l s  and 
so  o n )  i n  s e v e r a l  a d v a n ce d  n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m i e s  h a s  l e d  t o  a 
f e e l i n g  o f  i n s e c u r i t y  amongst  th e  " p e r i p h e r a l "  n a t i o n s ;  
t h i s  f e e l i n g  i s  e x p r e s s e d  as  a f e a r  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
d e p e n d e n c e .  T h ere  i s  a l a r g e  e l e m e n t  o f  mere n a t i o n a l i s t  
f e e l i n g  i n  t h i s  c o n c e p t .  T here  i s  a l s o ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  f e a r  
t h a t  n a t i o n a l  e co n o m ic  grow th  may be i n h i b i t e d  by t h e  
c o n t r o l  o f  t e c h n o l o g y  e x e r c i s e d  by  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m .
As w e l l  a s  t h e  prob lem  o f  r e l i a n c e  on " o u t s i d e r s " ,  c o n c e r n  
i s  a l s o  e x p r e s s e d  a t  t h e  b a r r i e r s  t o  e n t r y  i n  many i n d u s t r i e s  
w h ich  i s  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  c o n t r o l  o f  t e c h n o l o g y .  C o n t r o l  
o f  t e c h n o lo g y  i s  l i k e l y  to  be a m ajor  p a r t  o f  t h e  g l o b a l
c o m p e t i t iv e  s t r a t e g y  o f  the in t e r n a t io n a l  f i r m .3° As 
t h i s  i s  l in k e d  to  g lo b a l  m arketing c o n t r o l ,  most 
c o u n tr ie s  f e a r  the im p o s i t io n  o f  r e s t r a i n t s  on t h e ir  
freedom to  manoeuvre or the n e c e s s i t y  to  accept  
" co n d it io n s"  such as r e s t r i c t i v e  export l i c e n s e s .
Concern i s  a l s o  exp ressed  as  to  the p r ic e  to  be paid fo r  
the te c h n o lo g y ;  p a r t i c u la r ly  as th ere  are a few g u id es  
to what a c o m p e t i t iv e  p r i c e ,  l e t  alone; a " ju s t  p r ice"  
should be i n  t h i s  f i e l d .
In  th e  c a se  o f  I r e la n d ,  a d d i t io n a l  and ra th er  more
c o n cre te  problem s a l s o  a r i s e .  The "brain  drain" problem
i s  c l e a r l y  l in k e d  to  the sm all p ro p o r t io n  o f  economic
a c t i v i t y  r e q u ir in g  h igh  l e v e l  s c i e n t i f i c  manpower. A
recen t  su rvey  e s t im a te s  th a t  about 60% o f  I r i s h  graduates
31lea v e  the  country  perm anently . Such a l o s s  o f  human 
c a p i t a l ,  w i th  no c o u n te r -b a la n c in g  In flow  o f  income 
r e p r e s e n t s  a severe  econom ic, as w e l l  as s o c i a l ,  l o s s  to  
the c o u n tr y .  I t  i s  a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  o f  the in c r e a s in g  
s p a t i a l  i n e q u a l i t y  in  the d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  prod u ctive  
resou rces^  i n  p a r t i c u la r  o f  produ ction  r e q u ir in g  h ig h  
l e v e l  s k i l l s . T h i s  problem i s  a major f a c t o r  r e q u ir in g  
a t t e n t io n  i n  I r e la n d ’ s development s t r a t e g y ,  in  p a r t i c u la r  
w ith  regard  to  means o f  o b ta in in g  te c h n o lo g y .
The second concom itant problem i s  th a t  tech n o lo g y  
derived  from advanced n a t io n s  embodies a r e a c t io n  to  
t h e ir  f a c t o r  p r ic e  s t r u c t u r e ,  and th e r e fo r e  i s  u s u a l ly  
too c a p i t a l  in t e n s iv e  in  r e l a t i o n  to the f a c t o r  endowment 
o f  the r e c i p i e n t .  T h is  problem has been  rev iew ed above*
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I l l  1 ) , ^ ^ s ^ f _ o b tM n in g. J; e chnology
S e v e r a l  s t r a t e g i e s  can be su ggested  towards 
t e c h n o lo g y ? -  (1 )  a country  can perform i t s  own R & D 
and t e c h n o lo g y ,  (2 )  l i c e n s i n g  o f  tech n o lo g y  from f o r e i g n  
producers e i t h e r  by s t a t e  or p r iv a te  f irm s can be 
encouraged , (3 )  FBI w ith  a t e c h n o lo g ic a l  background 
can be a c c e p t e d ,  (b )  goods can be imported and (5 )  the  
country can  go w ith o u t t e c h n o lo g ic a l  ad van ces . Each o f  
the above c o u r s e s  has i t s  own im p l ic a t io n s  and c o s t s  
and each may i n  some c ircu m stan ces  be the ap p rop ria te  
course to  f o l l o w .
The l a s t  course  o f  a c t io n  (5 )  above i s  ru led  out
fo r  many c o u n t r ie s  because  o f  the  c lo s e  c o n n e c t io n  f e l t
to  e x i s t  betw een  growth aid t e c h n o lo g ic a l  advance ( th e
view th a t  much o f  t h i s  growth i s  sp u r iou s  or u n d e s ir a b le
must not be a llow ed  to  obscure the b e l i e f  o f  many
c o u n tr ie s  and p o l i c y  makers in  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n ) .  The
problem thu s becomes tra n sm o g r if ie d  in t o  the  q u e s t io n  o f
how to o b t a in  tech n o lo g y  r a th e r  than whether or not to
o b ta in  i t .  Dunning c o r r e c t l y  puts the  v iew  th a t  i t  i s
not the p r o d u c t io n  o f  tech n o lo g y  but the way the know-how
3*+
i s  used w hich de term in es  economic developm ent. T h is  
however i s  to  a b s tr a c t  to o  much from the problems o f  
c o n tr o l  and the p o l i t i c a l  im p l ic a t io n s  o f  economic d e v e lo p ­
ment. Economic developm ent i s  not a o n e -d im en sio n a l  c o n ­
cept and s e l f - c o n t r o l  o f  the c o u n tr y ’ s development s t r a t e g y  
i s  an im portant f a c e t .
A s e c o n d  c o u r s e  c o u l d  be  th e  i m p o r t a t i o n  o f  g o o d s  
embodying t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n c e ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  c a p i t a l  
goods* T h i s  i s  n o t  a f e a s i b l e  method o f  o b t a i n i n g  
p r o p r i e t a r y  t e c h n o l o g y ,  a s  s u c h  k n o w led g e  c a n n o t  o f t e n  
be em b od ied  i n  c a p i t a l  g o o d s*  I t  i s  more f r e q u e n t l y  
e x p r e s s e d  i n  f o r m s  s u c h  a s  b l u e p r i n t s ,  f o r m u l a e  o r  
c o n t a i n e d  w i t h i n  a c a u c u s  o f  s k i l l e d  p e r s o n n e l .
However t h i s  p r e s e n t s  a r e l a t i v e l y  c h ea p  method o f  
o b t a i n i n g  t e c h n o l o g y  i n  t h o s e  f i e l d s  w here  i t  c a n  be  
f o u n d .  T h e s e  f i e l d s  t e n d  t o  be t h o s e  w i t h  s t a b l e  f i x e d  
t e c h n i q u e s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  t h e  f a s t e s t  g r o w in g  s e c t o r s  o r  
t h o s e  w h e r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i o n  i s  l i m i t e d  ( s e c t o r s  
such  a s  t e x t i l e s ,  m e t a l  s m e l t i n g ,  wood and a p p a r e l ) .
I n  th e  a d v a n c e d  t e c h n o l o g y  f i e l d s  th e  c h o i c e  i s  
t h u s  t h r e e f o l d :  t o  c a r r y  o u t  R & B , t o  l i c e n s e  know-how  
from f o r e i g n  o w n ers  and t h u s  r e t a i n  n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  o f  
i t s  a p p l i c a t i o n  o r  t o  e n c o u r a g e  FDI. The c o s t s  o f  e a c h  
method a r e  c r u c i a l .  I n  many f i e l d s  t h e  c o s t s  o f  d o m e s t i c  
R & D,  e v e n  i f  fu n d e d  b y  the  s t a t e ,  a r e  p r o h i b i t i v e  
( n u c l e a r  p o w e r ,  c o m p u t e r s  f o r  s m a l l  s t a t e s ) .  C o m p e t i t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  U . S . ,  a c r o s s  t h e  w h o le  ra n g e  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  know­
how i s  i m p o s s i b l e  f o r  any  s i n g l e  s t a t e  i n  t h e  V /e s t .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y  i f  t h i s  means i s  t o  be  f o l l o w e d  i t  must  be  
c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  a s m a l l  a r e a .  The q u e s t i o n  o f  e x a c t l y  
where t h i s  r e s e a r c h  c o m p a r a t i v e  a d v a n ta g e  ^ i e s ” i s  an  
e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  one t o  a n s w e r .
L i c e n s i n g  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  f e l t  t o  be  a s  e x p e n s i v e  a s  
r e c e i v i n g  FDI i n  t e r m s  o f  r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  owner
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and i n  a d d i t io n  l i c e n s i n g  r e q u ir e s  complementary  
d om estic  f a c t o r s ;  management and m arketing s k i l l .  Many 
dom estic  I r i s h  f irm s have l i c e n s i n g  agreem ents w ith  
fo r e ig n  f ir m s  as t h i s  chapter  and Table 5 .1 3  demon­
s t r a t e s .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  a f u l l  s c a le  comparison o f  
c o s t s  o f  l i c e n s e s  w ith  FBI cannot be undertaken h e r s  
because o f  th e  la c k  o f  in fo r m a tio n .  The type o f  know­
led ge  t r a n s f e r r e d  may a l s o  be o f  a d i f f e r e n t  n a tu r e .
Where a d o m e st ic  firm  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  in  a p a r t i c u la r  
f i e l d ,  l i c e n s i n g  may be a good means o f  m a in ta in in g  th a t  
f ir n ^ s  advantage and payment fo r  th e  l i c e n s e  should  
r e f l e c t  i t s  worth to  the  l i c e n s e e  and assuming on approx­
im ation  to  c o m p e t it iv e  c o n d i t io n s ,  to  the r e c ip ie n t  
country a l s o .  An im portant advance in  t h i s  f i e l d  may 
be m odelled  on N i t r i g i n  E ireann  Teoranta (NET) -  the  
s t a t e  owned n itr o g en o u s  f e r t i l i s e r  in d u s tr y .  NET r e c e iv e d  
l i c e n s e d  te c h n o lo g y  from abroad and e s t a b l i s h e d  a p la n t  
to  su pp ly  the  dom estic  m arket. I t  may w e l l  be th a t  w ith  
s t a t e  f in a n c e  and b a rg a in in g  power backing advantageous  
terms were f o r c e d .  T h is  form o f  s o lu t io n  may be a good 
model where a s t a b le  home demand i s  p r e s e n t .  However the  
r i s k s  and la c k  o f  m arketing exp er ien ce  and know-how and 
la ck  o f  o v e r s e a s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f a c i l i t i e s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  
management s k i l l ,  may. l i m i t  the  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o f  t h i s  m odel.
The encouragement and acceptance o f  FBI w i l l  o f t e n  
be the o n ly  means a v a i la b le  o f  g a in in g  a c c e s s  to  new 
t e c h n o lo g y .  C ontrol o f  tech n o logy  and m arketing o u t l e t s
35are two key f a c t o r s  i n  the in t e r n a t io n a l  company*s  s t r a t e g y .
B e c a u s e  t h e s e  a re  s i g n i f i c a n t  e n t r y  b a r r i e r s ,  l o s s  o f  
c o n t r o l  m eans  i n c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  l o s s  o f  m a r k e ts  
and t h e  l o s s  o f  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  a c h i e v e  r e t u r n s  on  
p a s t  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  R & D .  The c h o i c e  must o f t e n  be  
e i t h e r  t o  do w i t h o u t  a d v a n ce d  t e c h n o l o g y  i n d u s t r i e s  or  
t o  a c c e p t  F D I .
To r e t u r n  t o  th e  s p e c i f i c  I r i s h  s c i e n c e  p o l i c y ,
o r  th e  s e a r c h  f o r  an  a r e a  o f  r e s e a r c h  c o m p a r a t i v e
a d v a n t a g e ,  s e c t o r a l  r e v i e w s  a re  b e i n g  u n d e r t a k e n  and
t h e  a r e a  o f  m i c r o b i a l  f e r m e n t a t i o n  i s  u n d er  s p e c i a l  
36a n a l y s i s .  I t  i s  c l e a r l y  i m p o s s i b l e  a t  t h i s  s t a g e  t o  
s u g g e s t  e x a c t l y  where th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  ( t o  FDI)  s t r a t e g y  
s h o u l d  b e g i n  by  im p le m e n t in g  I r i s h  R & B b u t  s e v e r a l  
p o i n t e r s  c a n  be d e r i v e d .  A g r i c u l t u r e  b a s e d  r e s e a r c h  
i s  c l e a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  and an e x t e n s i o n  i n t o  f o o d  t e c h n o l ­
o g y  i s  a l o g i c a l  s t e p  w h i c h  i s  b e i n g  e n c o u r a g e d .  O ther  
a r e a s  must  c l e a r l y  be o f  a f o o t l o o s e  n a t u r e  a s  no o t h e r  
l a r g e  n a t u i ' a l  r e s o u r c e  b a s e  i s  e x t a n t  i n  I r e l a n d  ( m i n e r a l  
t e c h n o l o g y  may be a t t r a c t e d  by  t h e  r e c e n t  d i s c o v e r i e s  
b u t  t h i s  i s  an a r e a  o f  f a i r l y  s t a b l e  t e c h n o l o g y ) .  T h i s  
p o l i c y  o f  s e a r c h  s h o u l d  be  c o n t i n u e d  a s  i n  th e  l o n g  term  
t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  r e s e a r c h  b a s e d  i n d u s t r y  ( p r o b a b l y  w i t h
e x t e n s i v e  s t a t e  s u p p o r t )  i n  one a r e a  p r e s e n t s  a p o s s i b i l i t y
37o f  r e d u c i n g  t h e  b r a i n  d r a i n .
I n  m o s t  a r e a s  h o w e v e r ,  I r e l a n d  w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  r e l y  
on  f o r e i g n  t e c h n o l o g y .  B o t h  the form o f  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  
o f  know-how and the  t e r m s  o n  w h ic h  i t  i s  o b t a i n e d  w i l l
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con tin u e  to  be im p ortan t. As the dom estic  in d u s t r i a l  
s e c to r  d e v e lo p s  and as  new a reas  o f  home demand become 
ap p aren t, the  trend w i l l  be from FDI towards l i c e n s i n g ,  
w ith  the  r o le  o f  th e  s t a t e  be ing  very  im portant. As the  
EEC p u l l s  c l o s e r  t o g e th e r ,  poo ling  o f  European r e so u r c e s  
i n  R & D may lea d  to  more r e l ia n c e  on EEC p r o j e c t s  (wri&i 
some I r i s h  in p u ts  and presumably b e n e f i t s  fo r  I r e la n d ) .  
However, d e s p i t e  the search  fo r  s e l e c t i v e  a rea s  of t e c h ­
n o l o g i c a l  advantage th ere  w i l l  remain many a rea s  where the 
c h ie f  a s s i m i l a t i o n  o f  tech n o logy  in to  Ire la n d  w i l l  rem ain  
through FDI.
(:1 ) Management and C ontro l F actors
I t  i s  f r e q u e n t ly  su ggested  that f o r e ig n  owned f irm s
owe t h e i r  su p e r io r  performance over dom estic  f irm s
l a r g e l y  to  b e t t e r  management. Servan -S ch reib er  su g g es ted
th a t  the s u p e r io r i t y  o f  U .S .  c o rp o ra t io n  in  Europe was
38due to  o r g a n is a t io n a l  s k i l l .  Caves m o d if ied  t h i s  
s u g g e s t io n  and made i t  more r e le v a n t  to  prod u ctive  e n t e r ­
p r i s e s  by d e s c r ib in g  the f o r e ig n  f i r m s ’ advantage as  
b e in g  knowledge about how to  serve a market or d i f f e r ­
e n t i a t e  a produ ct.*^  The e x is t e n c e  of such knowledge 
w it h in  t he management body means th a t  the advantage  
becomes tr a n sp o r ta b le  a c r o ss  n a t io n a l  f r o n t i e r s  w h i l s t  
rem aining w i t h in  the f ir m .
In  c o n t r a s t ,  the Committee on I n d u s t r ia l  P ro gress  
’’G eneral R eport” (1973) c r i t i c i s e s  managers of I r i s h  f irm s  
as be in g  unadventurous, o v e r -o r ie n ta te d  to  p rod u ction  and
c o n s tr a in e d  by d i r e c t o r s  who r e s i s t  change o f  f a c t o r  
1+0
p r ice s*  The q u a l i t y  o f  management i s  a very  d i f f i c u l t  
concept to  measure* E d u c a t io n a l  a tta in m en ts  are a v ery  
poor proxy fo r  management a b i l i t y  and management te c h n iq u e s  
are d i f f i c u l t  t o  compare and e v a lu a te  u n le s s  a v a s t  amount 
o f in fo r m a tio n  i s  a v a i l a b l e .
C asual o b s e r v a t io n  shows th at managers o f  f o r e i g n  
f irm s are b e t t e r  q u a l i f i e d ,  and a lthou gh  some o f  the  
I r i s h  f ir m s  employed young and w e l l  q u a l i f i e d  m anagers, 
th ese  were a m in o r ity .  Management t e c h n iq u e s ,  o r g a n is a t io n  
c h a r t s ,  t r a i n i n g  schemes fo r  managers, market r e se a r c h  and 
so on were o n ly  j u s t  g a in in g  acceptance  in  th e  I r i s h  group,  
whereas such tech n iq u es  were an i n t e g r a l  part o f  a l l  th e  
f o r e ig n  f irm s*  o p e r a t io n s .  Two in s ta n c e s  were encountered  
of o v e r - c o n s e r v a t iv e  d i r e c t o r s  in h ib i t i n g  the exp a n s ion  o f  
I r i s h  f i r m s .  One case  o f  o u tr ig h t  h o s t i l i t y  to  any modern 
management te c h n iq u e s  was a l s o  met i n  the I r i s h  group. 
Beyond such o b s e r v a t io n s  no attempt was made to  compare 
management te c h n iq u e s  because  o f  the problems above and 
because o f  c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y  problem s.
However w i th in  the f o r e ig n  group, an attempt was 
made to  d i s c o v e r  i f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  could  be r e la t e d  to  the  
degree o f  f o r e i g n  c o n t r o l .  Two proxy v a r ia b le s  were used  
to  measure the c lo s e n e s s  o f  c o n tr o l  o f  the parent over  the  
I r i s h  u n i t .  These are (1 )  the p ercen tage  o f  the d i r e c t o r s  
of the s u b s id ia r y  who are n o n -Ir is h  n a t i o n a l i t y ,  (2 )  the  
p ercen tage  o f  e q u i t y  o f  the  I r i s h  u n it  h e ld  by the  f o r e i g n
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parent (or  parents)®  The sample was extended to  Ilf by 
the a d d i t io n  o f  three f ir m s  not inc lu d ed  i n  the " p a ired ” 
comparisons*
y a b le  5*16 P r o f it_abi.ll.ty r e la t e d  to  the Percentage o f
F ore ign , D ir e c t o r s
1% o f  F o r e ig n  
D ir e c t o r s
2









0 -2 5 1 5 .7 0
26-50 6 l i t . 2 2 2 .1
51-75 3 l l . l t 3 8 .3
76-100 it l*t.6 8 6 .5
T o t a l l it l i t . l
+ T o ta l  P r o f i t s  = I k
Sum o f  Net A s s e t s  1  P i
L=1
I k
Z  NAi 
L=1
Where i  i s  t h e  f irm  i n  q u e s t io n  (L= 1 , 2 ,  *. .1*0
S o u rc e ; A u th orf s c a l c u l a t i o n  from in te r v ie w  and 
q u e s t io n n a ir e  »
As T able  $ .1 6  shows the degree o f  f o r e i g n  c o n t r o l ,  a s  
measured by t h i s  i n d i c a t o r ,  v a r i e s  g r e a t l y .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  
t o  make o n ly  a v e ry  ten uou s case  th a t  g r e a te r  c lo s e n e s s  o f
c o n tr o l  w i t h i n  the f o r e ig n  group le a d s  to  h ig h e r  p r o f i t ­
a b i l i t y  .
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Table 5*17 .—P r o f i t a b i l i t y  r e la t e d  to  the Degree o f
Ownership)
1 2 3 k
P r o p o r t io n  o f  Number 












S o u r c e : Author*s c a l c u l a t io n  from in te r v ie w  and
q u e s t io n n a ir e .
On the second proxy v a r ia b le ,  e q u ity  ow nersh ip , i t  i s  
by no means c o n v in c in g ly  shown that 100$ ownership  
produces b e t t e r  performance® However i t  i s  a su r p r is in g  
b y-p rod uct o f  the a n a l y s i s  th a t both the proxy v a r ia b le s  
o f  c o n t r o l  are c l o s e l y  r e la t e d  to  th e  p ro p o r t io n  o f  output  
which i s  e x p o r te d . I t  may be f e l t  t h a t  s a l e s  on the 
d om estic  I r i s h  market are f a c i l i t a t e d  by I r i s h  d i r e c t o r s .  
I t  should  a l s o  be noted th a t  100$ ex p o r tin g  firm s are much 
l e s s  l i k e l y  to  have l o c a l  sh arehold in g  (perhaps because  
they  have a more in te g r a te d  s a l e s  s t r a t e g y )  a s  th ese  may 
prove an u n n ecessary  encumbrance.
An a d d i t io n a l  f in d in g  i s  that f o r e ig n  f irm s employ a 
la r g e  number o f  I r i s h  n a t io n a l s  a s  m anagers. In the  
"paired*1 sample o f  e le v e n  f o r e ig n  f i r m s ,  seven  have an 
I r i s h  g e n e r a l  manager and in  a l l  but one f o r e ig n  f ir m s ,  
there  i s  a t  l e a s t  one top p o l i c y  making post  h e ld  by an 
Irishm an.
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T h is p o l i c y  o f  employing I r i s h  e x e c u t iv e s  i s  an 
im portant f in d in g  in  v iew  o f  the concern  w i t h in  Ir e la n d  
th a t  f o r e i g n  f irm s are c r e a t in g  on ly  "low grade jobs"
(k )  S a le s  and Marketing
The s a l e s  s t r a te g y  o f  a u n it  w i th in  an i n t e r n a t io n a l  
firm  dependsj to  some e x t e n t ,  on the o v e r a l l  p o l i c y  o f  
the f ir m . T h is  can vary  from a f u l l y  in t e g r a t e d  world  
network w ith  markets a l lo c a t e d  to p a r t i c u la r  s u b s id ia r i e s  
by the head o f f i c e , to  a lo o s e  form o f  d i v i s i o n  whereby 
each u n it  s e l l s  to  any market in  which i t  g a in s  a f o o t ­
h o ld .  In  the  sample the f o r e ig n  f irm s are more export  
o r ie n t a te d  than t h e i r  d om estic  co u n terp a rts  as Table 5 .1 8  
shows ( th e  f i g u r e s  are f o r  1 9 7 2 ) .  The sample o f  f o r e ig n  
f irm s i s  however much l e s s  export o r ie n ta t e d  than the  
p o p u la t io n  from which i t  i s  drav;n. T h is  a r i s e s  because  
o f  the la c k  o f  comparable I r i s h  firm s where f o r e ig n  f irm s  
are e n t i r e l y  export o r ie n t a t e d .  In the p resen t  sample 
fo u r  p a ir s  5 ,  6 ,  10 and 11 are producing pu re ly  fo r  the  
home m arket.
The s a l e s  s t r a t e g y  o f  the f irm s w ith in  the f o r e ig n  
group v a r ie d  g r e a t l y .  A comprehensive g lo b a l  m arketing  
s t r a te g y  e x i s t s  fo r  f irm s F9 and F10. In  firm  10 ,  
the u n it  i n  Ire la n d  has not been  a ss ig n ed  any e x p o r t  
markets from head o f f i c e  and th e r e fo r e  produces on ly  fo r  
the I r i s h  m arket. Whether t h i s  was fo r  reaso n s  o f  c o s t  
could not be a s c e r t a in e d .  Firm F9 has no s a l e s  department 
(ex c ep t  f o r  s p a r e s )  and th e r e fo r e  has no s e l l i n g  c o s t so
S a l e s ,  and the  d e s t i n a t i o n  o f  ex p o rts  are th e re fo re  
c o m p le te ly  c o n t r o l l e d  by the p a r e n t .
Some I r i s h  s u b s id i a r i e s  f e l t  th a t  th ey  operated  
w ith  c o n s id e r a b le  autonomy w i th in  a g lo b a l  p o l i c y  con­
t r o l l e d  by head o f f i c e .  T h is  a p p l ie s  to  f irm s F I ,  F2 
and F7. Firm F7 has a s a l e s  department f o r  Ire lan d  o n ly  -  
export s a l e s  are handled by the parent f ir m .  A lo o s e r  
s tr u c tu r e  i s  e v id e n t  f o r  f irm s  FI and F2. FI has a 
sep arate  s a l e s  and m arketing department and has c o n s id e r ­
ab le  d i s c r e t i o n  w ith in  a group p o l i c y .  The manager sa id  
th a t  r e a l  c o n t r o l  over s a l e s  was in  the hands o f  the 
s u b s id ia r y  i t s e l f .  Firm F2 o p e r a te s  rough ly  in  t h i s  way 
but the group c o -o r d in a te s  s a l e s  a c t i v e l y  -  t h i s  means 
th a t  u n i t s  are g iv en  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to s e l l  t h e i r  own 
products  though c o m p e t it io n  between the u n i t s  i s  avoided  -  
a l s o  one u n i t  does not s s l l  the p rod u ction  of another  
u n i t .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  note that the manager o f  t h i s  
firm  b e l i e v e d  th a t  market trend in fo rm a tio n  from the parent  
was more v a lu a b le  to  the I r i s h  U nit than was t e c h n ic a l  know­
how. N o t i f i c a t i o n  o f  tren d s  and s w if t  response  to  t h i s  
in fo r m a tio n  he f e l t  to  be v i t a l  in g r e d ie n t s  o f  b u s in e s s  
s u c c e s s .
T a b le  5 .1 8  The E x p o r t  O r i e n t a t i o n  o f  the  22 F i rm s (1972)
P a ir  % o f  Output Exported (1972)












1 Score* 2 6
A u th o r 's  c a l c u l a t i o n  from in te r v ie w  and 
q u e s t io n n a ir e .
The o th e r  f irm s F 3 S F1*, F8 and F l l  were g iv en  
autonomy i n  s a l s s  m a t te r s .  Firm F l l  f e l t  th a t  i t s  
independent s a l e s  e f f o r t  was very  important in  the  
company's s u c c e s s  ( i t  i s  however n o te a b le  th a t  l i t t l e  i s  
ex p o r te d )*  Firm F^ r e l i e s  on the parent firm  fo r  s a l e s  
o u t l e t s  as  the bu lk  o f  t h i s  s u b s id ia r y ' s  s a l e s  are to  
the p a r e n t ’ s home m arket. The s a l e s  departm ents in  
p a ir s  5 and 6 were unimportant because o f  the nature o f  
the produ cts  and so the f o r e ig n  p a r e n t 's  r o le  was m inim al.
2J22.
I n  m ak ing  a  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  from t h e  above d e t a i l s ,  
i t  s h o u l d  be b o r n e  i n  mind t h a t  "market a c c e s s "  i s  
f r e q u e n t l y  h e l d  t o  be a  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  p a ck a g e  o f  a d v a n t a g e s  
t h a t  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  c a r r y .  The p r e s e n t  s e t  o f  f i r & s  
a r e  n o t  t h e  b e s t  from w h ic h  t o  e x t r a p o l a t e  b e c a u s e  t h e y  
a re  u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  i n  t h e i r  e x p o r t  c o n t e n t .  However  
t h e  r e l i a n c e  on the  p a r e n t  f o r  s a l e s  i n f o r m a t i o n  and o u t ­
l e t s  i s  i m p o r t a n t .  Not a l l  a r e  p a r t  o f  a g l o b a l  s t r a t e g y  
b u t  u s e  o f  the  p a r e n t ’ s  o u t l e t s  and s a l e s  d e p a r tm en t  i s  
an  i m p o r t a n t  c o n s t i t u e n t  o f  s u c c e s s .  For  th e  im p ort  
s u b s t i t u t i n g  f i r m s ,  s a l e s  d e p a r t m e n t s  f o r  I r e l a n d  a r e  s e e n  
a s  a v i t a l  a i d  t o  s u c c e s s f u l  o p e r a t i o n  a s  th e  f o l l o w i n g  
p a r a g r a p h s  h e l p  t o  show .
A com parison o f  the s a l e s  e f f o r t s  o f  f o r e ig n  f irm s  
w ith  t h e i r  I r i s h  co m p etito rs  shows th a t  the former group 
devote  more a t t e n t i o n  and r e so u r c e s  to  t h i s  part o f  the 
b u s in e s s .  The d i v i s i o n  o f  manpower w i t h in  the firm  i s  
taken  as  a proxy o f  the t o t a l  r e so u r c e s  devoted to  the  
v a r io u s  a c t i v i t i e s .  Table 5 .1 9  p r e se n ts  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  manpower between m a n a g e r ia l /a d m in is tr a t iv e  t a s k s ,  s a l e s  
e f f o r t  and d i r e c t  p ro d u ct io n  i n  f i v e  p a i r s .
T a b le  5 .1 9  The D i v i s i o n  o f  Manpower I n  f i v e  p a i r s  o f  f i r m s .
P a i r 1 $  o f  Manpower i n
Management
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n
2 % Manpower 
D e v o t e d  t o  
s a l e s  e f f o r t
3 % Manpower 
D i r e c t l y  en g a g e d  
i n  p r o d u c t i o n
I r i s h
f i r m
F o r e i g n
f i r m
I r i s h
f i r m
F o r e i g n  
f  irm
I r i s h
f i r m
■ ■ ■ .....
F o r e i g n
f i r m
1 2 ? .0 1 5 .0 6 .2 1 0 .0 6 8 .5 73-0
2 1 6 . if 19.*+ 6 1 1 .1 71 .8 65 .2
7 1 5 .0 2 2 ,9 3 .0 5 .7 8 2 .0 71 .
8 1 0 .0 5 .8 2 .5 2 .5 8 7 .5 9 1 .8
10 l 6 . i f 2 3 .7
.  .. . .
3 .3 7 8 .7 7 1 . ‘t
S o u r c e  s A u t h o r * s  c a l c u l a t i o n  from i n t e r v i e w  and 
q u e s t i o n n a i r e .
I n  f o u r  c a s e s  out  o f  f i v e  the f o r e i g n  f i r m  d e v o t e s  a 
g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  p e r s o n n e l  t o  s a l e s  -  i n  th e  o t h e r  
c a s e  the  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  the  same.  The low  l e v e l  o f  s a l e s  
e f f o r t  i n  th e  I r i s h  group  r e f l e c t s  th e  s i t u a t i o n  t h r o u g h ­
o u t  I r i s h  owned i n d u s t r y  a c c o r d i n g  t o  th e  Committee  f o r
k2I n d u s t r i a l  P r o g r e s s .  The s a l e s  e f f o r t s  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  
are  o f t e n  a i d e d  by th e  u se  o f  w e l l  known brand names  
( a  demand s i d e  a n a l o g u e  o f  p a t e n t s )  w h ic h  c r e a t e  a r e a s  o f  
m o n o p o l i s t i c  a d v a n t a g e .  As p a r t  o f  s e l l i n g  c o s t s ,  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s  spend  h e a v i l y  on  a d v e r t i s i n g  w i t h i n  I r e l a n d s  e l e v e n  
o f  th e  t o p  20  s p e n d e r s  on  a d v e r t i s i n g  on t e l e v i s i o n  a r e  
f o r e i g n  -  a s  are  n in e  o f  th e  to p  20  on  r a d i o ,  i n c l u d i n g
if3
th e  to p  s p e n d e r  i n  e a c h  c a t e g o r y .  T h i s  i s  how ever  a 
v a s t  u n d e r s t a t e m e n t  o f  the  a d v e r t i s i n g  e f f o r t  o f  f o r e i g n  
f i r m s  who spend  h e a v i l y  on  th e  U .K.  m e d ia  ( p r e s s  and 
t e l e v i s i o n )  w h ic h  i s  a v a i l a b l e  i n  I r e l a n d .  The s a l e s
e f f o r t  o f  f o r e ig n  owned f irm s  who produce fo r  th e  home 
market c r e a te  a strong  s t im u lu s  to  demand and t h i s  
r e p r e s e n t s  a fu r th e r  source o f  advantage over  t h e i r  I r i s h  
c o m p e t i to r s .
(1 )  Mechanisms o f  T ran sm iss ion  o f  E f f i c i e n c y  to  the
D o m e s t ic a l ly  Owned S e c t o r .
T h is  ch ap ter  has so fa r  been g lm ost e x c l u s i v e l y  
concerned w ith  what may be termed " in te r n a l  e f f i c i e n c y " .  
Thus i t  h as  been  shown th a t  f o r e ig n  f irm s may be v iew ed  
as more e f f i c i e n t  than t h e i r  I r i s h  c o u n te rp a r ts  on 
v a r io u s  i n d i c a t o r s .  They w i l l  thus r a i s e  o v e r a l l  average  
e f f i c i e n c y  when in c lu d ed  i n  an aggregate  w ith  I r i s h  f i r m s .  
However i t  remains to  show i f  f o r e ig n  f irm s them se lves  
c o n tr ib u te  anyth ing to  the e f f i c i e n c y  o f  th e  I r i s h  owned 
s e c t o r .
The f i r s t  p o s s ib le  s e t  o f  mechanisms are those  
which o p e r a te  through the normal input output t r a n s a c t io n s  
m atrix  o f  the economy. The output from a f o r e ig n  firm  
used as  an inp ut to  the I r i s h  firm  may r a i s e  e f f i c i e n c y  
by f o r c in g  the a d op tion  o f  new tech n iq u es  or sim ply by 
bein g  o f  h ig h  q u a l i t y ,  ca u sin g  l e s s  waste or embodying 
t e c h n ic a l  ad van ces . A l t e r n a t iv e ly  by dersianding h igh  
q u a l i t y  or up to  date  in p u ts  from the dom estic  s e c t o r ,  
e f f i c i e n c i e s  may be im proved. Such mechanisms are l im i t e d  
however by the export o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  f o r e ig n  firm s and 
the  low l in k a g e  e f f e c t s  between the f o r e ig n  and dom estic  
s e c t o r  (ch a p ter  IV ). In the sm all sample o f  t h i s  c h a p te r ,
none  o f  t h e  I r i s h  f i r m s  s u p p l i e d  a s i z e a b l e  amount o f  
o u t p u t  t o  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  i n  I r e l a n d .
H owever  one mechanism t h a t  was i n  o p e r a t i o n  i s  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  a p o o l  o f  s k i l l e d  managers  w i t h i n  I r e l a n d  
w h ic h  e n c o m p a s s e s  b o t h  th e  f o r e i g n  owned and th e  d o m e s t i c  
s e c t o r  and b e t w e e n  w h ich  grou ps  a f l o w  o f  m anagers  i s  
d e v e l o p i n g j  i n  b o t h  d i r e c t i o n s .  Many i n n o v a t i o n s  i n  t h e  
d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned group have b e e n  b r o u g h t  about  by  
m an agers  who have  worked a t  some s t a g e  f o r  a f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m  i n  I r e l a n d ,  (Four i n s t a n c e s  o f  t h i s  t r a n s f e r  
from th e  f o r e i g n  group t o  I r i s h  f i r m s  was f o u n d ,  b u t  
t h i s  s eem s  t o o  h i g h  a f i g u r e  t o  be r e p e a t e d  a t  t h e  l e v e l  
o f  th e  p o p u l a t i o n  o f  f i r m s ) .  T r a n s f e r  o f  c o u r s e  o c c u r s  
t h e  o t h e r  way a l s o .  T h i s  phenomenon h a s  had a f u r t h e r  
m a jo r  b e n e f i t  -  a " r e v e r s e  f l o w  b r a i n  d r a in "  o f  I r i s h  
b o r n  m a n a g e r s  b a c k  t o  I r e l a n d ,  p erha p s  a t  f i r s t  w i t h  a  
f o r e i g n  company,  who e v e n t u a l l y  t r a n s f e r  t o  th e  d o m e s t i c  
s e c t o r *  Su ch  p e o p l e  o f t e n  became e n t r e p r e n e u r s  i n  t h e  
s e n s e  o f  l a u n c h i n g  new b u s i n e s s  v e n t u r e s .  T h i s  s u p p o r t s  
t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  I r e l a n d  h a s  n o t  l a c k e d  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  
b u t  r a t h e r  h a s  l a c k e d  th e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  the c h a n n e l l i n g  
o f  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  a b i l i t y *  However su ch  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  
were t r a i n e d  abroad*
Two o t h e r  a r e a s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  s p i n  o f f  may a l s o  be  
i s o l a t e d .  F i r s t l y  (and p a r t l y  a s  a c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  the  
c r e a t i o n  o f  a c r o s s  “-owner s h i p  p o o l  o f  m a n a g e r s )  m a n a g e r i a l  
t e c h n i q u e s  i n  the  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o i 1 have  p r o f i t e d  from th e
d e m o n s t r a t i o n  e f f e c t s  from t h e  f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r .
S e c o n d l y  t h e  e n t r y  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  h a s  lo w e r e d  the  
s e a r c h  c o s t s  o f  f i n d i n g  p r o f i t a b l e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  
new e n t r a n t s  and e s t a b l i s h e d  f i r m s .  A r e a s  o f  o p p o r t u n i t y  
f o r  f u t u r e  p r o f i t s  have b e e n  p o i n t e d  t o  by t h e s e  new 
e n t r a n t s .  O b s e r v a t i o n  and i n v i t a t i o n  o f  b o t h  management  
t e c h n i q u e s  and t e c h n o l o g y  a t  c l o s e  hand i s  o f  t h i s  k i n d .
T e c h n o l o g i c a l  t r a n s f e r  h a s  b e e n  l i m i t e d  by th e  
w e a k n e s s  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  and by th e  p e r v a s i v e n e s s  
o f  p r o p r i e t a r y  t e c h n o l o g y  i n  th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m  
( t e c h n o l o g y  owned o r  c o n t r o l l e d  by the  s p e c i f i c  i n s t i t u t i o n ) .  
T here  a r e  e x a m p l e s ,  i n  t h e  p l a s t i c s  and m e t a l s  s e c t o r  
where t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  h a s  t a k e n  a d v a n t a g e  o f  n o n ­
p r o p r i e t a r y  t e c h n o l o g y  by l i c e n s i n g  a g r e e m e n t s ,  demon­
s t r a t i o n s  and so  on  and h a s  a c q u i r e d  t e c h n o l o g y  from f o r e i g n  
f i r m s  o r  a f t e r  a s t i m u l u s  from them.
F i n a l l y  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  (and d e m o n s t r a t i o n s  
o f  s u c c e s s )  from f o r e i g n  f i r m s  h a s  p r o v i d e d  a " s a l u t o r y  
j o l t "  t o  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  -  i n  th e  w ords  o f  an  I r i s h  
f i r m ’ s  m a n a g e r .  T h i s  h a s ,  i n  th e  m a in ,  b e e n  l i m i t e d  t o  
v e r y  f e w  s e c t o r s  b e c a u s e  o f  die d i f f e r e n t  s e c t o r a l  b i a s  o f  
t h e  two g r o u p s ,  b u t  i n  one o r  two a r e a s  i t  h a s  p roved  an  
e f f e c t i v e  m eans  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  c o m p e t i t i o n .  The d e c l i n e  
i n  p r o t e c t i o n  ho w ev er  h a s  i n  m ost  a r e a s  done more to w a r d s  
t h i s  end  t h a n  h a s  th e  e n t r y  o f  new f i r m s ,  a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  new e n t r a n t s  ha v e  a more im m ed ia te  g a l v a n i s i n g  
e f f e c t .
To conclude  t h i s  s e c t i o n ,  the judgement must be 
th a t  the e f f i c i e n c y  in c r e a s in g  impact o f  f o r e ig n  f irm s  
on the I r i s h  owned s e c t o r  i s  l im i t e d .  I t  i s  l im i t e d  
by the la c k  o f  s e c t o r a l  o v er la p  between the two groups 
and by the low l e v e l  o f  l in k a g e s  between them. In the  
long  run however the d em on stra tion  e f f e c t s  through the 
c lo s e  c o n t a c t s  which e x i s t  between the managers o f  the  
two groups and the in terch an ge  o f  e x e c u t i v e s ,  may have 
an im portant b e n e f i c i a l  in f lu e n c e  on the e f f i c i e n c y  o f  
the I r i s h  s e c t o r .  The t e c h n o lo g ic a l  in f lo w  may a l s o  
prove o f  use to  the d om estic  s e c to r  i f  problems o f  the  
p r o p r ie ta r y  nature o f  much o f  the in fo r m a tio n  can be 
overcome and i f  the tech n o lo g y  i s  acqu ired  in  the most 
s u i t a b le  way -  which may not be FDI.
S e c t io n  k .  C o n c lu s io n s .
Any c o n c lu s io n s  about the e f f i c i e n c y  o f  f o r e ig n  
owned f ir m s  i n  Ire lan d  which d er iv e  from the above data  
must be hedged by c o n s id e r a t io n  o f  the sm a ll  and b ia sed  
sample from which the c o n c lu s io n s  are drawn. The need 
to  p a ir  f ir m s  to  draw o b s e r v a t io n s  from f irm s producing  
the same product meant th a t  many f o r e ig n  f irm s had to  be 
e x c lu d e d .  T h is  i s  p a r t i c u la r ly  true where the fo r e ig n  
f irm s are e x p o r t in g  100# o f  t h e i r  o u tp u t .  T his non 
c o m p a ra b ili ty  problem red u ces  the scope o f  t h i s  c h a p te r .
The a n a l y s i s  does show th a t  there  i s  no m y s t ic a l  
elem ent i n  the su p e r io r  performance o f  f o r e i g n  firm s and
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th a t  the p ic t u r e  i s  not one o f  u n a llo y ed  f o r e ig n  
s u p e r i o r i t y .  The ev id en ce  s u g g e s t s  th a t  some d i f f e r e n c e  
e x i s t s  i n  th e  p r o d u ct io n  f u n c t io n s  o f  the two groups*
Such d i f f e r e n c e s  e x i s t  i n  the com bination  o f  the primary 
f a c t o r s 5 c a p i t a l  and la b o u r  and i n  the use o f  in p u ts*  
F o re ig n  f ir m s  tend to  be more c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  and to  
use a  more advanced t e c h n o lo g y ,  d e r iv in g  from a g r e a te r  
r  B in p u t*  Labour to o  ten d s  to  ha mors h ig h ly  s k i l l e d .
M a te r ia l  in p u ts  i n t o  f o r e ig n  f ir m s  are o f  a h ig h e r  
q u a l i t y ;  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  know-how I s  more f r e e l y  a v a i la b le  
because o f  in fo r m a tio n  f lo w s  w ith in  the f ir m ,  such know­
how may a l s o  be a v a i la b le  a t  a p r ic e  e q u iv a le n t  to  i t s  
m arginal c o s t ,  whereas o u t s id e r s  to  the f irm  (non owners 
o f  the p r o p r ie to r y  te c h n o lo g y )  would have to  pay a p r ic e  
e q u iv a le n t  to  average c o s t  to  o b ta in  i t .  The importance  
o f  in te r m e d ia te  in p u ts  i s  shown by the d i f f e r e n c e  betw een  
output and v a lu e  added, but there  i s  l i t t l e  ev id en ce  th a t  
the f o r e i g n  f irm s i n  the sample are low v a lu e  added f ir m s  -  
per u n i t  o f  inp ut they add a h igh er  p r o p o r t io n  o f  v a lu e  
added than  do the  d om estic  f ir m s .  Such s p e c i a l i s e d  h ig h  
q u a l i t y  In p u ts  c o n tr ib u te  to  the d i f f e r e n c e s  between the  
two gro u p s .
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n  confirm ed e x p e c ta t io n s  on R <§: D 
and s a l e s  e f f o r t .  F o re ig n  f irm s r e l y  on the parent f irm  
f o r  R <3c D. However th ey  a l s o  perform more R & D per u n it  
o f  output i n  Ire lan d  than do I r i s h  f i r m s .  The va lue  o f  
the R O  su p p lie d  from the parent cannot be judged by
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th e  p r i c e  t h a t  u n i t  p a y s  or  by th e  c o s t  t o  t h e  p a r e n t .  
However s u c h  i n t r a  f i r m  i n f o r m a t i o n  and t h e  a d a p t i o n  work  
done w i t h i n  I r e l a n d  a r e  o f  g r e a t  im p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  I r i s h  
u n i t .  The s a l e s  e f f o r t  o f  t h e  I r i s h  s u b s i d i a r y  i s  t a i l o r e d  
t o  f i t  t h e  o v e r a l l  s t r a t e g y  and s t r u c t u r e  o f  the  f o r e i g n  
company t o  w h i c h  i t  b e l o n g s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  a l a r g e  s h a r e  
o f  th e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  th e  I r i s h  u n i t  i s  u s u a l l y  put  i n t o  
t h e  s a l e s  e f f o r t .  E m p h a s i s  on  the  im p o r t a n c e  o f  t h i s  s a l e s  
and m a r k e t i n g  e f f o r t  s e r v e s  a s  a c o r r e c t i v e  t o  s e e i n g  
e f f i c i e n c y  p u r e l y  i n  s u p p l y  s i d e  t e r m s .  T h i s  s a l e s  e f f o r t  
i s  n o t  c o n f i n e d  t o  f i r m s  s e l l i n g  d i r e c t l y  t o  th e  f i n a l  
c o n s u m e r ;  i n t e r m e d i a t e  and c a p i t a l  g o o d s  s u p p l i e r s  i n  th e  
f o r e i g n  g r o u p  a l s o  r e c o r d  l a r g e  s a l e s  e f f o r t s .
The r o l e  o f  management was  fou nd  t o  be  d i f f i c u l t
t o  i s o l a t e .  Through i t s  f u n c t i o n  a s  c o - o r d i n a t o r  and 
co m b in er  o f  r e s o u r c e s ,  management c l e a r l y  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  
f o r  th e  p e r f o r m a n c e  o f  th e  f i r m .  However no s e p a r a t e  
i n d i c a t o r  o f  management a b i l i t y  c o u l d  be  d e v i s e d  t o  compare  
th 8  two g r o u p s .  A l t h o u g h  th e  d e g r e e  o f  f o r e i g n  c o n t r o l  
was n o t  s t r o n g l y  r e l a t e d  t o  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  w i t h i n  th e  f o r e i g n  
group i t  w a s ,  i n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  s t r o n g l y  r e l a t e d  t o  the d e g r e e
o f  d e p e n d e n c e  o f  th e  f o r e i g n  f i r m  on e x p o r t s .
S c a l e  f a c t o r s  and c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  were  g e n e r a l l y  
more i m p o r t a n t  i n  the  f o r e i g n  g r o u p .  However s c a l e  
f a c t o r s  were  s e e n  a s  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  o n l y  when  
t h e y  w ere  n o t  o v e r r i d d e n  by  o t h e r  a d v a n t a g e s ,  such  a s  
em bodied  t e c h n o l o g y ,  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  and p resu m ab ly
b e t t e r  management. F o r e ig n  f irm s i n  g e n e ra l  used more 
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  te c h n o lo g ie s ,  but t h i s  was by no means 
always the c a s e .
The c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  the f o r e ig n  s e c t o r  to  the  
economy in  terms o f  e f f i c i e n c y  was found to  be l im i t e d  
by s t r u c t u r a l  f a c t o r s  w i t h in  the economy and by the low 
l in k a g e  e f f e c t s  o f  the f o r e ig n  s e c t o r .  However, management 
c o n t a c t s  both  form al and in form al and the c r e a t io n  o f  a 
p oo l o f  s k i l l e d  managers w i t h in  I r e la n d ,  were found to  
have produced some s p i l l o v e r s  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  and t h i s  was 
e x p e cted  to  in c r e a se  i n  the fu tu re  through in terchange  o f  
id e a s  and p e r so n n e l .
/ip p e n d ix  I  t o  C h a p te r  V -  Case S t u d i e s  o f  F o r e i g n
I n v e s t m e n t  i n  I r e l a n d■j.rmw >n«.t4 meawi
The f o l l o w i n g  c a s e s  a r e  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  i n c l u d e d  i n  
th e  p a i r e d  sample  o f  t h e  p r e c e e d i n g  c h a p t e r .
T h i s  w h o l l y  owned s u b s i d i a r y  o f  a l a r g e  American  
p a r e n t  company was  fo u n d e d  i n  the  p e r i o d  b e t w e e n  196 -^ and  
1 9 6 6 .  I t  i s  a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t e d  (9 6 $  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n  i n  1 9 7 1 )  and s u p p l i e s  m a i n l y  th e  European  
m a r k e t ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  have  b e e n  o c c a s i o n s  when e x p o r t s  
have  b e e n  d i r e c t e d  b a c k  t o  th e  p a r e n t  company* There  i s  
some d i v i s i o n  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  b e t w e e n  th e  U . S .  p a r e n t  and t h e  
I r i s h  s u b s i d i a r y .  The I r i s h  u n i t  h a s  no s e l l i n g  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  
s a l e s  a re  a r r a n g e d  from th e  U . S .  and t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a 
s e l l i n g  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  t h e  U .K .  and one o t h e r  i n  th e  BBC*
The f i r m  t h u s  h a s  no s e l l i n g  c o s t s *  A l s o  no K & D i s  
c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  I r e l a n d ,  a l l  d r a w i n g s  and s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
come from the  U . S . A .  The company was c o n s i d e r i n g  t r a n s -
Case  1
N a t i o n a l i t y  o f  P a r e n t  Firm  
$  F o r e i g n  O w nersh ip  
L o c a t i o n -  Non D e s i g n a t e d  A r e a ,
100$
Employment
S a l e s
I n d u s t r y
l a r g e  town
-  E l e c t r i c a l  M a ch in e ry
- £1 ,20 0 ,0 0 0  (1 9 7 2 )
-  230
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The p a r e n t - s u b s i d i a r y  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  v e r y  c l o s e  -  
the  s u b s i d i a r y  s e n d s  f u l l  a c c o u n t s  m o n t h ly  t o  th e  head  
o f f i c e *  T h e re  i s  a s t r i c t  p e r c e n t a g e  ( o f  s a l e s )  payment  
from t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  t o  t h e  p a r e n t  f o r  " g e n e r a l  s e r v i c e s " .  
P r o f i t s  a r e  made and h e l d  i n  I r e l a n d  -  a l a r g e  sh a r e  o f  
p r o f i t s  a r e  a t  t h e  moment b e i n g  p lo u g h e d  b a c k  and th e  
i n t e r v i e w e e  e x p l a i n e d  t h a t  the  r e s t  i s  h e l d  i n  I r e l a n d ,  
th o u g h  i n  w hat  form was n o t  s p e c i f i e d .  E x p e n d i t u r e  
t r a n s f e r s  w i t h i n  th e  f i r m  a re  l o o k e d  a t  from t h e  "group  
p o i n t  o f  v i e w " ,  w h i c h  means t h a t  t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  i s  u s e d  
t o  a l l o c a t e  f u n d s  w i t h i n  the  group and t o  a v o i d  t a x .
The f i n a n c e s  and t a x  b i l l  o f  th e  group i s  s e e n  a s  an  i n t e ­
g r a t e d  w h o l e .
The s u b s i d i a r y  h a s  f a c e d  q u i t e  s e v e r e  l a b o u r  t r o u b l e s  
i n  t h e  p a s t .  The m an ager  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  th e  p a r e n t  f i r m  
had s e r i o u s l y  c o n s i d e r e d  l i q u i d a t i n g  i t s  I r i s h  u n i t  i n  
th e  f a c e  o f  a n  u n o f f i c i a l  s t r i k e  (w h ich  may l a t e r  have  
become o f f i c i a l  -  t h e r e  v/as some c o n f u s i o n  on  t h i s  p o i n t )  
o v e r  r a t e s  o f  p a y ,  ( t h i s  c o i n c i d e d  w i t h  a t r a d e  d o w n t u r n ) .  
However a new pay package  was  a g r e e d  and under  the  N a t i o n a l  
Wage A g r e e m e n ts  o f  1971  and 1972 l a b o u r  p r o b le m s  have  
b e e n  a v e r t e d .  The m anager  i n t e r v i e w e d  s a i d  t h a t  the  u n i o n s  
were m o s t  h e l p f u l  and no f u r t h e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  were  
a n t i c i p a t e d .  However th e  manager (who was  I r i s h )  f e l t  t h a t  
some o f  h i s  A m erican  s u p e r i o r s  had f a i l e d  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  
I r i s h  w o r k e r s  and s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  U . S .  t e c h n i q u e s  o f  l a b o u r  
r e l a t i o n s  and man-management would  have  t o  be r e v i s e d  i f  
c o n t i n u i n g  i n d u s t r i a l  p e a c e  was  t o  be a c h i e v e d .  He f e l t
t h a t  a more f l e x i b l e  a p p r o a c h  from above w o u ld  be 
b e n e f i c i a l .  There  was no s i g n i f i c a n t  l a b o u r  t u r n o v e r  
ho w ev er  and th e  s u p p l y  o f  w o r k e r s  was  more t h a n  a d e q u a t e  
e x c e p t  i n  one o r  two n a r r o w l y  d e f i n e d  s k i l l s .  B e t w e e n  
one t h i r d  and one h a l f  o f  th e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  i s  s k i l l e d  
( d e f i n e d  a s  a f o u r  y e a r  a p p r e n t i c e s h i p  o r  e q u i v a l e n t )  
and i t  was  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  r a t e s  o f  pay were  s u p e r i o r  t o  
l o c a l  d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned f i r m s .  T h i s  was  n o t  i n  f a c t  
th e  c a s e  a t  t h a t  t i m e ,  b u t  th e  new a g r e e m e n t  j u s t  b e i n g  
b r o u g h t  i n  by  th e  s u b s i d i a r y  made i t  so  l a t e r  i n  t h e  
y e a r .
Raw m a t e r i a l s  were  l a r g e l y  im p o r t e d  m a i n l y  from t h e  
U .K .  ( s t e e l ) ,  a l t h o u g h  some c a s t i n g s  and g e a r s  were  
p u r c h a s e d  from  I r i s h  c o m p a n i e s .
The f i r m  had s u f f e r e d  a s e v e r e  d o w n turn  i n  t r a d e ,  
l a r g e l y  due t o  a r e c e s s i o n  i n  th e  S t a t e s  and d u r i n g  t h i s  
p e r i o d  c o n t r a c t  work was t a k e n  i n  from th e  U .K .  and 
I r e l a n d  t h u s  i n c r e a s i n g  the  sh a r e  o f  o u t p u t  g o i n g  t o  th e  
l o c a l  m a r k e t .
The s u b s i d i a r y  c l e a r l y  saw i t s e l f  a s  permanent and 
a s  p a r t  o f  a n  i n t e g r a t e d  g l o b a l  n e tw o rk  o f  c o n t r o l .  The 
m ajor  f u t u r e  prob lem  a p p e a r s  t o  be i n f l e x i b l e  management  
and p o s s i b l y  t h e r e  r e m a i n s  some r e s e n t m e n t  from p a s t  
t r o u b l e s .  T h i s  a s i d e  t h e  f i r m  i s  now b a c k  t o  h e a l t h y  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .
Case 2.
N a t i o n a l i t y  o f  p a r e n t  f i r m  
% F o r e i g n  O w n ersh ip  
L o c a t i o n
100$
D e s i g n a t e d  A r e a ,  
l a r g e  town
H o u s e h o l d  A p p l i a n c e s
£2 , 0 0 0 ,0 0 0  (1972 )
630  (*f8G women)
German
I n d u s t r y
S a l e s
Employme n t
T h i s  s u b s i d i a r y  b e g a n  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  196** and h a s  
e x p a n d ed  p r o d u c t i o n  s t e a d i l y  from t h a t  t im e  ( w i t h  t h e  
a i d  o f  e x t e n s i o n  g r a n t s ) .  P r o d u c t i o n  i s  a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  
f o r  e x p o r t ,  s a l e s  go  a l l  o v e r  t h e  w o r l d ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  
U .K .  c o n s t i t u t e s  an  i m p o r t a n t  s h a r e .  S a l e s  o n  t h e  I r i s h  
m ark et  a r e  s m a l l  b u t  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  v a l u a b l e  f o r  e m p lo y e e  
s a t i s f a c t i o n  -  rfi t  h e l p s  f o r  o u r  e m p l o y e e s  t o  s e e  t h e i r  
p r o d u c t s  i n  t h e  s h o p s 11.  ( T h i s  I s  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  th e  c a r e  
t a k e n  w i t h  l a b o u r  r e l a t i o n s ;  a  c o m p r e h e n s iv e  p o l i c y  o f  
p a t e r n a l i s m  i s  f o l l o w e d  arid l a b o u r  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  c l e a r l y  
e x c e l l e n t ) .  A l l  s a l e s  and m a r k e t i n g  a r e  c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  
Germany, a l t h o u g h  th e  s u b s i d i a r y  m a i n t a i n s  a  s m a l l  s a l e s  
d e p a r t m e n t  f o r  I r e l a n d  o n l y .  A l l  d e s i g n  and r e s e a r c h  i s  
c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  Germany. The v a l u e  added i n  I r e l a n d  I s  
h i g h ,  t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  t a k e s  i n  raw m a t e r i a l s  u n p r o c e s s e d  
and p r o d u c e s  t h e  f i n a l  g o o d s ;  t h e r e  i s  no i n t e g r a t i o n  o f  
p r o d u c t i o n  o n  p r o c e s s  l i n e s  b e t w e e n  Germany and I r e l a n d .  
The I r i s h  f a c t o r y  p r o d u c e s  a  s m a l l e r  r a n g e  o f  p r o d u c t s  
t h a n  th e  German o n e . I n  t h e  m ain  t h e  p r o c e s s e s  may be  
c o n s i d e r e d  l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  ; m o s t l y  u n s k i l l e d  l a b o u r  i s  
u s e d .
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Labour  r e l a t i o n s  are  e x c e l l e n t  b u t  t h e r e  i s  a 
h i g h  r a t e  o f  t u r n o v e r  o f  f e m a l e  l a b o u r  f o r  r e a s o n s  
u n c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  w o r k in g  c o n d i t i o n s .  The f i r m  i s  j u s t i ­
f i a b l y  proud o f  i t s  t r a i n i n g  s c h e m e s .  Wages are  h i g h  
( t h e  m a n a g in g  d i r e c t o r  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e y  were  amongst  
th e  h i g h e s t  i n  t h e  p r o v i n c e ) .  No l a b o u r  p r o b le m s  have  
o c c u r e d .
The s u b s i d i a r y  i s  c l o s e l y  i n t e g r a t e d  w i t h  th e  German 
f i r m  i n  f i n a n c e ,  m a r k e t i n g ,  d e s i g n  and R & D .  A c c o u n t s  
a re  s e n t  t o  Germany on  a two m o n th ly  b a s i s  ( ” f o r  our  own 
b e n e f i t ” ) •  I n  Germany a m o n t h ly  b a s i s  w ould  be r e q u i r e d .  
However th e  management f e l t  t h a t  i t  was  r e a s o n a b l y  a u t o n o ­
mous a n d ,  more i m p o r t a n t ,  c o u l d  i n f l u e n c e  th e  d e c i s i o n s  
t a k e n  by  th e  h e a d  o f f i c e .  I t  was f e l t  t h a t  i n  t h i s  way  
I r i s h  i n t e r e s t s  were b e t t e r  s a f e g u a r d e d  t h a n  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  
o f  more a u t o n o m y .  There  were  t e n  German p e r s o n n e l  i n  th e  
s u b s i d i a r y ,  b u t  p a r t i c u l a r  p o s t s  ( w i t h , '  f o r  th e  moment,  
th e  e x c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  m an ag in g  d i r e c t o r )  were  n o t  r e s e r v e d  
f o r  Germ ans .  German and I r i s h  m an agers  were  i n t e g r a t e d  
( a  s t a t e m e n t  a g r e e d  t o  by  th e  I r i s h  p e r s o n n e l  m a n a g e r ) .  
O r g a n i s a t i o n  c o s t s  were  h i g h ,  work s t u d y  and i n d u s t r i a l  
e n g i n e e r i n g  w ere  p l a c e d  a t  a premium.
The l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  p l a n t  was c h o s e n  w i t h  a v i e w  t o  
c l o s e n e s s  t o  t r a n s p o r t  f a c i l i t i e s  ( a i r p o r t ,  h a r b o u r ) ,  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  l a b o u r  and th e  d e s i r e  ”f o r  a good g r a n t ” . 
C o n t a i n e r  t r a f f i c  was  n o t  e x t e n s i v e l y  u s e d  and t h e  t r a n s p o r t  
f a c i l i t i e s  a s p e c t  was much l e s s  i m p o r t a n t .
o  Q.n
Asked w hat  d i f f e r e n c e s  he had fou nd  b e t w e e n  o p e r a t i n g  
i n  Germany and I r e l a n d ,  th e  managing d i r e c t o r  enum erated  
th e  f o l l o w i n g  p o i n t s  -  ( 1 )  I t  i s  e a s i e r  t o  o b t a i n  w o r k e r s  
i n  I r e l a n d ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  were  c e r t a i n  p ro b lem s  w i t h  
f e m a le  l a b o u r .  ( 2 )  I t  i s  n o t  a s  e a s y . t o  buy m a t e r i a l s  i n  
I r e l a n d .  P u r c h a s i n g  h a s  t o  be from the  U .K .  "at  l e a s t ” . 
German s u p p l i e r s  are  more q u a l i t y  c o n s c i o u s  and more aware  
o f  the n e c e s s i t y  t o  m eet  d e l i v e r y  d a t e s .  The n a t i o n a l i s e d  
co m p a n ie s  o f  t h e  U .K .  a r e  "not  th e  b e s t  s u p p l i e r s " .  ( 3 )  
T r a n s p o r t  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  more d i f f i c u l t  i n  I r e l a n d  and o f  
c o u r s e  t h e r e  i s  th e  p r o b le m  o f  s h i p p i n g  p a r t s  b a c k  and f r o  
t o  Germany. (*+) The t r a d e  u n i o n  s y s te m  i s  d i f f e r e n t .  I n  
I r e l a n d  e a c h  s e p a r a t e  company h a s  t o  d e a l  s e p a r a t e l y  w i t h  
th e  u n i o n s ,  w h e r e a s  t h i s  i s  o r g a n i s e d  on  a p r o v i n c i a l  
b a s i s  i n  Germany.  N e i t h e r  s y s t e m ,  he f e l t ,  was n e c e s s a r ­
i l y  b e t t e r ,  t h e r e  was room f o r  a d a p t i o n  and th e  s y s t e m  
d e p e n d s  so  c r u c i a l l y  on  t h o s e  who o p e r a t e  i t .  ( 5 )  T h ere  
w a s ,  he f e l t ,  a prob lem  w i t h  th e  I r i s h  e d u c a t i o n a l  s y s t e m  
w h ich  i s  n o t  g e a r e d  t o  i n d u s t r y ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  was b e g i n n ­
i n g  t o  be  r e c o g n i s e d .  The s e c o n d a r y  s c h o o l s  were  u s e l e s s  
f o r  him b e c a u s e  t h e y  s t i l l  t h o u g h t  o f  t r a i n i n g  f o r  t r a d i t ­
i o n a l  j o b s .  I n  a d d i t i o n  t h e y  are  a l s o  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e  
o r i e n t a t e d .  C e r t a i n  c r u c i a l  s k i l l s  a re  not  b e i n g  d e v e l o p e d  
and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  e n g i n e e r s  a r e  n o t  good e n o u g h .
Case 3«
N a t i o n a l i t y  o f  p a r e n t  
% o w n e r s h i p  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m
-  U .K .
-  66%* P a r t  o f  p r o j e c t  i s
a j o i n t  v e n t u r e . ,
L o c a t i o n -  D u b l i n  (m ain  l o c a t i o n ) .
I n d u s t r y P l a s t i c s
S a l e s - £2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0  
-  kkoEmployment
T h i s  B r i t i s h / I r i s h  j o i n t  v e n t u r e  h a s  s e v e r a l  p l a n t s  
t h r o u g h o u t  I r e l a n d ,  ( o n l y  p a r t  o f  i t s  p r o d u c t i o n  -  th e  
p a r t  a n a l y s e d  i n  th e  c h a p t e r  i s  r e f e r r e d  t o  a b o v e ) .  The.  
p l a n t  w as  o r i g i n a l l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s i x t i e s  t o  
ta k e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  the  p r o t e c t i o n  a f f o r d e d  t o  the I r i s h  
m a r k e t .  The p l a n t  was  t h u s  i n t e n d e d  t o  s e r v i c e  th e  
d o m e s t i c  m a rk e t  o n l y .  P a r t  o f  th e  p r o d u c t i o n  was h a n d l e d  
b y  a j o i n t  v e n t u r e  b e t w e e n  th e  B r i t i s h  f i r m  ( l / 3 r d  i n t e r e s t )  
and an  a l r e a d y  e s t a b l i s h e d  I r i s h  f i r m  ( 2 / 3 r d s  i n t e r e s t ) .  A 
d i f f e r e n t  p r o d u c t  l i n e  was  h a n d l e d  by a w h o l l y  owned 
s u b s i d i a r y .
The j o i n t  v e n t u r e  e x p o r t s  o f  i t ' s  o u t p u t  and t h e  
e x p o r t  o u t l e t s  are  o b t a i n e d  by th e  B r i t i s h  p a r e n t .  Most  o f  
t h e  e x p o r t s  go t o  the  U .K .  b u t  many c o u n t r i e s  a r e  s e r v e d .
The e n t r y  i n t o  t h s  EEC h a s  a p p a r e n t l y  made l i t t l e  d i f f e r e n c e  
t o  t h e  p r o j e c t .
The j o i n t  v e n t u r e  i s  p r o f i t a b l e  and a l l  t h e  u n i t s  
i n  th e  g r o u p  make a ’’r e a s o n a b l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n ” t o  o v e r a l l  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  However the I r i s h  p l a n t s  a re  not  o p e r a t i n g
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a t  f u l l  c a p a c i t y  -  t h i s  a p p e a r s  t o  be a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  due  
t o  a  c h a n g e d  s t r u c t u r e  o f  demand t o  w h ic h  a d a p t i o n  was  
s l o w l y  t a k i n g  p l a c e .  The f i r m  h a s  e x p e r i e n c e d  no l a b o u r  
t r o u b l e  and th e  manager  f e l t  t h a t  th e  n a t i o n a l  wage 
a g r e e m e n t s  were  "working w e l l " .
The a r ra n g em en t  b e t w e e n  th e  U .K .  p a r e n t  and t h e  
I r i s h  s u b s i d i a r y  h a s  c h a n g e d  o v e r  th e  l i f e  s p a n  o f  th e  
p r o j e c t .  The a g r ee m e n t  t h a t  t h e  U .K .  p a r e n t  s h o u l d  t a k e  
a  s i z e a b l e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  o u t p u t  s t i l l  r e m a i n s ,  H o w ev er ,  
o n  t h e  t e c h n i c a l  s i d e  t h e r e  have  b e e n  c h a n g e s .  O r i g i n ­
a l l y ,  th e  t e c h n i c a l  kn ow led ge  and e x p e r t i s e  o f  th e  p a r e n t  
was i m p o r t a n t ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  g e t t i n g  p r o d u c t i o n  g o i n g .
At t h i s  s t a g e  t h e  t o p  e n g i n e e r  and s e v e r a l  f o r e m en  ware  
s e n t  t o  I r e l a n d  from t h e  U .K .  and s e v e r a l  I r i s h  e m p l o y e e s  
were  s e n t  t o  the  U .K .  f o r  t r a i n i n g .  A t e c h n i c a l  a g r e e m e n t  
was r e a c h e d  a t  a f i x e d  payment ( £ 5 , 0 0 0  p . a . )  t o  th e  U .K .  
p a r e n t .  At t h e  t im e  t h i s  payment w a s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  th e  
i n t e r v i e w e e ,  a n  u n d e r e s t i m a t e  o f  th e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  t r a n s ­
f e r r e d  k n o w led g e  and e x p e r t i s e .  H ow ever ,  t h i s  payment  
"became u n r e a l i s t i c ” o n c e  p r o d u c t i o n  had b e e n  underway  
some y e a r s  b e c a u s e  th e  f l o w  o f  kn ow led ge  and e x p e r t i s e  
w as  now t w o - w a y .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  when th e  company un derw ent  
some o r g a n s i a t i o n a l  c h a n g e s ,  th e  payment was  e n d e d .  The 
m anager  c o n c e d e d  t h a t  " c e r t a i n  s e r v i c e s "  w ere  s t i l l  o b ­
t a i n e d  from th e  U .K .  f i r m  b u t  no payment was now made.
The r o l e  o f  g r a n t  a i d  f o r  t h i s  f i r m  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g .
An o r i g i n a l  g r a n t  was p a i d  b u t  t h e  f i r m  h a s  s i n c e  exp and ed
w i t h o u t  g r a n t  a i d .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t  w ould  
o r i g i n a l l y  have  gone ahead e v e n  i f  g r a n t  a i d  had b e e n  
r e f u s e d ,  b u t  i n  t h i s  c a s e  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  th e  o r i g i n a l  
p l a n t  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  s m a l l e r .  One p r o j e c t  was u n d e r ­
way when a g r a n t  was awarded and t h i s  e a s e d  th e  c a s h  f l o w  
s i t u a t i o n  b u t  made l i t t l e  m a t e r i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  t o  th e  
e x p a n s i o n .  Grant a i d  i s  n o t  i n s t r u m e n t a l  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n s  
o f  t h i s  f i r m  t o  e s t a b l i s h  i n  I r e l a n d ,  o r  i n  i t s  e x p a n s i o n  
p l a n s .
N a t i o n a l i t y  o f  p a r e n t  f i r m  -  German
% f o r e i g n  o w n e r s h i p  -  100$
L o c a t i o n  -  D e s i g n a t e d  A r ea ,
s m a l l  to w n .
I n d u s t r y  -  M e t a l  T r a d e s
S a l e s  -  £ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0
Employment -  2 2 3
T h i s  w h o l l y  owned German s u b s i d i a r y  was e s t a b l i s h e d  
w i t h  an  IDA g r a n t  i n  1 9 6 1 .  The f i r m  p r o d u c e s  p r e c i s i o n  
m e t a l  p r o d u c t s  from raw m a t e r i a l s  w h ic h  a re  a l m o s t  
e n t i r e l y  i m p o r t e d .  M a c h in e r y  i s  from Germany or  th e  U .K .  
The u n i t  i n  I r e l a n d  h a s  i t s  own s a l e s  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i n  th e  
U .K .  and EEC. Output i s  98$  e x p o r t e d ,  o f  w h i c h  h a l f  g o e s  
t o  th e  U .K .  and h a l f  t o  the  U . S . A .
The I r i s h  u n i t  h a s  o n l y  one German em p loyee  -  th e  
g e n e r a l  m a n a g e r ,  a l l  t h e  r e m a in d e r  a re  I r i s h .  The f i r m  
h a s  e n c o u n t e r e d  no l a b o u r  p r o b l e m s ,  a l t h o u g h  th e  g e n e r a l
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manager  s a i d  t h a t  he fo u n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  have more t h a n  
one u n i o n  t o  d e a l  w i t h ,  u n l i k e  Germany. I n  t h e  e a r l y  
y e a r s  o f  o p e r a t i o n ,  l a b o u r  t u r n o v e r  was a p r o b le m ,  b u t  
t h i s  c e a s e d  t o  be  th e  c a s e  when a s e t t l e d  l a b o u r  f o r c e  
w as f o u n d .  T here  are  some p ro b lem s  i n  o b t a i n i n g  c e r t a i n  
g r o u p s  o f  s k i l l e d  w o r k e r s  ( t o o l m a k e r s  were  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
m e n t i o n e d )  and t h e  f i r m  i s  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  t r a i n  some o f  i t s  
own w o r k e r s  i n  s p e c i f i c  s k i l l s .  The i n t e r v i e w e e ,  ( g e n e r a l  
m a n a g er )  s a i d  t h a t  he f e l t  t h e r e  was a p o t e n t i a l  f o r  more  
s k i l l s  i n  t h e  w o r k f o r c e .  T h i s  i s  i n  a c c o r d  w i t h  a i l  th e  
German-owned f i r m s  i n  t h e  s a m p le ,  a l l  o f  w h ic h  were  f u l l  
o f  p r a i s e  f o r  th e  a p t i t u d e  o f  I r i s h  w o r k e r s .  The m anager  
a l s o  s t a t e d  t h a t  a f u r t h e r  a d v a n ta g e  o f  I r e l a n d  was  w o r k i n g  
w i t h  a h o m o g en eo u s  w o r k f o r c e ,  w h e r e a s  th e  German s i t u a t i o n  
i n v o l v e s  p r o b l e m s  w i t h  " g u e s t w o r k e r s ” o f  s e v e r a l  n a t i o n ­
a l i t i e s .  He f e l t  t h a t  t h e  I r i s h  e d u c a t i o n  s y s t e m  was  n o t  
good b u t  t h a t  t h i s  was n o t  t o o  much o f  a p r o b le m .  Many o f  
h i s  w o r k e r s  had t h e i r  f i r s t  i n d u s t r i a l  j o b  i n  th e  f a c t o r y ,  
and a l t h o u g h  t h i s  had d i s a d v a n t a g e s  i n  t h a t  t h e  n e e d  f o r  
p r e c i s i o n  and e x a c t n e s s  were  not  a l w a y s  a p p r e c i a t e d ,  i t  
a l s o  meant  t h a t  th e  w o r k f o r c e  had n o t  p i c k e d  up any bad  
h a b i t s .  He s a i d  t h a t  w a g e s  were n e a r l y  e q u a l  t o  t h e  r a t e s  
f o r  t h e  same j o b  ” i n  B irm ingham ” .
The l o c a t i o n  was c h o s e n  i n  o r d e r  t o  g a i n  th e  h i g h e s t  
p o s s i b l e  r a t e  o f  g r a n t  a i d ,  w i t h  an e y e  t o  t r a n s p o r t  n e e d s  
and i n  o r d e r  t h a t  th e  f a c t o r y  s h o u ld  become an i n t e g r a l  
p a r t  o f  th e  l o c a l  com m u nity .  T h i s  d e s i r e  f o r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
w i t h  (and p e r h a p s  d o m i n a t i o n  o f )  the l o c a l  community i s  a
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much n o t e d  t r a i t  amongst German i n v e s t o r s  i n  I r e l a n d .  
The f i r m  i s  e x p a n d in g  w i t h  th e  a i d  o f  an IDA e x t e n s i o n  
g r a n t •
The I r i s h  u n i t  r e l i e s  on  R & D from th e  p a r e n t  f i r m ,  
a l t h o u g h  i t  i s  v i r t u a l l y  autonomous o n  t h e  s a l e s  s i d e .
The p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  th e  I r i s h  u n i t  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  be  
g o o d .  The I r i s h  u n i t  p a y s  t h e  German company f o r  t e c h ­
n i c a l  s e r v i c e s .  How t h i s  was p a id  c o u l d  n o t  be a s c e r t a i n e d ,  
a l t h o u g h  t h e  payment was s a i d  t o  be " r e a s o n a b l e " •
Case 5j .
N a t i o n a l i t y  o f  p a r e n t
% f o r e i g n  o w n e r s h i p
L o c a t i o n
I n d u s t r y
S a l e s
Employment
-  E u ro p ea n  ( n o t  German)
-  50# ( j o i n t  v e n t u r e )
-  D u b l i n
-  P l a s t i c s
-  £ 5 5 3 , 0 0 0
-  72
T h i s  j o i n t  v e n t u r e  b e g a n  p r o d u c t i o n  i n  th e  l a t e  
1 9 5 0 s .  E x p o r t s  a r e  u n i m p o r t a n t ,  r u n n in g  a t  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  
2% o f  t o t a l  o u t p u t s .  C a p a c i t y  h a s  s t e a d i l y  e x p a n d e d .
The o r i g i n a l  g r a n t  was  n o t  i m p o r t a n t  i n  s e t t i n g  up b u t  i s  
im p o r t a n t  now.  A new e x t e n s i o n  was g r a n t  a i d e d  and t h i s  
h e l p  was  v i t a l ,  g i v e n  th e  i n c r e a s e d  t e c h n i c a l i t y  o f  th e  
p r o c e s s .
The I r i s h  u n i t  i s  i n t e g r a t e d  w i t h i n  a group o f  com­
p a n i e s .  The I r i s h  u n i t  h a s  i t s  own s a l e s  d e p a r tm e n t  and
t h e  u n i t  i s  " f u n d a m e n t a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d "  by t h e  l o c a l  
m an agem ent .  However  th e  o v e r a l l  s a l e s  are  c o - o r d i n a t e d  
by  t h e  g r o u p  o f  f i r m s  o f  w h ic h  th e  I r i s h  u n i t  i s  a p a r t .
The u n i t s  do n o t  h o w e v e r ,  s e l l  e a c h  o t h e r ’ s p r o d u c t s .
I n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  th e  p r o j e c t  ( t h e  f i r s t  f i v e  y e a r s ) ,  
t e c h n i c a l  know-how from t h e  p a r e n t  was  vei*y i m p o r t a n t .  
H ow ever ,  th e  I r i s h  u n i t  now em p lo y s  i t s  own p l a s t i c  
t e c h n o l o g i s t  and t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  r e l i a n c e  on  know-how from  
th e  f o r e i g n  p a r e n t .  What th e  f o r e i g n  p a r e n t  d o e s  c o n ­
t r i b u t e  i s  m a r k e t  t r e n d  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  w h ic h  t h e  p a r e n t  i s  
i d e a l l y  l o c a t e d  t o  p r o v i d e *  The ( I r i s h )  manager  i n t e r ­
v i e w e d  s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  was  o f  paramount i m p o r t a n c e .  I n f o r m ­
a t i o n  o n  p r o d u c t s  and m a c h in e r y  was a l s o  g i v e n  from t h e  
f o r e i g n  p a r e n t  and was a l m o s t  e q u a l l y  v a l u a b l e .  I n s t r u c t ­
i o n s  o n  m a r k e t i n g  from th e  f o r e i g n  p a r e n t  were  t a k e n  
( t h r o u g h  a f r e e  ex ch a n g e  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n )  and t h i s  h e l p e d  
g r e a t l y  a s  t h e  p r o d u c t  had t o  be  g e a re d  t o  t h e  l a t e s t  
t r e n d s  i n  m a r k e t i n g .  T h e r e f o r e  p r o d u c t  change and i n n o v a t i o n  
and th e  e x a c t  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t s  was d e c i d e d  by  th e  
f o r e i g n  p a r e n t  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  a c c e s s  t o  s u p e r i o r  i n f o r m a t i o n .
The p r o f i t  h i s t o r y  o f  the  I r i s h  u n i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g .  
A f t e r  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  was a c h i e v e d  (and t h e  l a s t  s e v e n  y e a r s  
had g e n e r a t e d  r e a s o n a b l e  p r o f i t s ) ,  f o r  th e  f i r s t  few  y e a r s  
t h e y  w ere  p l o u g h e d  b a c k  i n  t h e  I r i s h  u n i t ,  p r e su m a b ly  t o  
e n s u r e  s t a b i l i t y  and t o  expand c a p a c i t y .  The p o l i c y  a f t e r  
t h i s  was  t o  s h a r e  th e  p r o f i t s  t h r o u g h o u t  th e  g r o u p .
The I r i s h  u n i t  had e x p e r i e n c e d  some l a b o u r  t r o u b l e s *  
The u n i t  was  t o t a l l y  u n i o n i s e d  but  had ru n  i n t o  d e m a r k a t i o n  
p r o b le m s  t h r o u g h  i n t e r - u n i o n  r i v a l r y  ab o u t  th e  manning o f  
m a c h i n e s .  The u n i t  em ployed  t h r e e  s h i f t  w o r k in g  f o r  men 
and two s h i f t  w o r k in g  f o r  women. Wages were  s a i d  t o  be  
co m p a ra b le  t o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  s o u r c e  c o u n t r y .  The m ain  
d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  l a b o u r  c o s t s  i n  I r e l a n d  and t h o s e  i n  t h e  
s o u r c e  c o u n t r y  a r o s e  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  c o n t r i b ­
u t i o n  e l e m e n t  ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y  %  o f  l a b o u r  c o s t s  i n  I r e l a n d  
bu t  up t o  3 0 $  i n  th e  s o u r c e  c o u n t r y ) .  B e i n g  l o c a t e d  i n  
D u b l i n  m o s t  o f  the  l a b o u r  had i n d u s t r i a l  e x p e r i e n c e  and  
t h e r e  w as  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  l a b o u r  t u r n o v e r  p r o b le m .  I t  w a s ’ 
f e l t  t h a t  t h e r e  was  a c o n s t a n t  b a t t l e  t o  g e t  l a b o u r  t o  c o n ­
form t o  t h e  r u l e s  and r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  the  u n i t .  The f i r m  
p a id  th e  Anco l e v y  and had a p p o i n t e d  t r a i n i n g  o f f i c e r s  
l a r g e l y  i t  seem ed t o  j u s t i f y  p a y in g  t h e  l e v y ;  th e  m anager  
f e l t  t h e r e  w as  a c o m p u l s i o n  t o  t r a i n  l a b o u r  b u t  he  was  
s c e p t i c a l  o f  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  the s ch em e .
Case 6 .
N a t i o n a l i t y  o f  p a r e n t  f i r m  
$ f o r e i g n  o w n e r s h i p  
L o c a t i o n
I n d u s t r y
S a l e s
Employme n t
-  U . S .
r
-  100$
-  N o n - D e s i g n a t e d  Area*  
l a r g e  town
-  E l e c t r i c a l  M a c h in e r y  
and A pp aratu s
- £1 , 600,000 
-  350
T h i s  w h o l l y  owned s u b s i d i a r y  o f  a U.S-.  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  
f i r m  w as  s e t  up i n  t h e  e a r l y  f i f t i e s  by  a company o f  a
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d i f f e r e n t  n a t i o n a l i t y  w h i c h  was l a t e r  a b s o r b e d  i n t o  
the  U . S .  f i r m .  The I r i s h  u n i t  was i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  
d i g e s t i o n  when th e  i n t e r v i e w  was  c a r r i e d  o u t .  The I r i s h  
u n i t  p r o d u c e s  e l e c t r i c a l  g o o d s ,  b o t h  c a p i t a l  g o o d s  and  
consumer g o o d s .  O r i g i n a l l y  the  u n i t  e n j o y e d  t a r i f f  
p r o t e c t i o n ,  b u t  t h i s  h a s  now d i s a p p e a r e d .  The f i r m  
d o e s  h a r d l y  any  e x p o r t i n g  b e c a u s e  o f  s h o r t a g e  o f  c a p a c i t y ,  
w h ic h  i s  f u l l y  em ployed  w i t h  home market  s a l e .
The m an ager  was  n o t  su re  e x a c t l y  what r a t i o n a l ­
i s a t i o n  w o u ld  be c a r r i e d  o u t  by th e  U . S .  f i r m  and s o  he  
d e s c r i b e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  p r e v i o u s  f o r e i g n  p a r e n t .
The I r i s h  u n i t  had a s e l l i n g  a g e n c y  i n  D u b l i n  and a l s o  
i m p o r t e d  and s o l d  t h e  p r o d u c t s  o f  the  p a r e n t  f i r m .  The 
d e s i g n  and m a n u f a c t u r e  s i d e  was c a r r i e d  o u t  i n  I r e l a n d  and  
t h e r e  w as  a n  R & D s e c t i o n  i n  I r e l a n d ,  a l t h o u g h  i n  t h e  m a in  
th e  f o r e i g n  p a r e n t  was  r e l i e d  on  f o r  b a s i c  r e s e a r c h .  The 
c h i e f  d e s i g n e r  was  from th e  so u r ce  c o u n t r y .  S a l e s  were  
" h e l p e d ” by  t h e  f o r e i g n  p a r e n t .  The U . S .  company w h ic h  
t o o k  o v e r  e x e r c i s e d  . c l o s e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  m o n th ly  a c c o u n t s  
b u t  i n  t h e  m a i n ,  th e  l o c a l  management was l e f t  f r e 6 t o  run  
th e  b u s i n e s s .  A payment o f  3$ on a l l  s a l e s  was p a id  t o  
th e  h ea d  o f f i c e  f o r  t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  b u t  th e  m anager  
s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  was a g r o s s  overpaym ent  w h ic h  was  a means  
o f  t r a n s f e r r i n g  p r o f i t s  o u t  o f  I r e l a n d .  The aim o f  th e  
company w as  t o  expand t h e  e x p o r t  s i d e  o f  the  b u s i n e s s  o f  
the  I r i s h  u n i t ,  b o t h  t o  tak e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  t h e  t a x  f r e e  e x p o r t  
p r o f i t s  p r o v i s i o n  and t o  remove the c o n s t r a i n t  o f  the  s m a l l  
home m a r k e t  •
The l o c a t i o n  was c h o s e n  b e c a u s e  o f  Government  
p e r s u a s i o n  and in d u c e m e n t s  (and p o l i c y  on  r u r a l  e l e c t ­
r i f i c a t i o n ) ,  t r a n s p o r t  r e a s o n s  and b e c a u s e  a s i t e  i n  
e x c e s s  o f  im m ed ia te  r e q u i r e m e n t s  c o u l d  be p u r c h a s e d  a t  
a l o w e r  c o s t  t h a n  i n  th e  l o c a l i t y  o f  D u b l i n .  The p l a n t  
was l o c a t e d  n e a r  a p o r t  w h ic h  was a n  a d v a n t a g e  b e c a u s e  
most raw m a t e r i a l s  come from th e  EEC and U .K .  and 
m a c h in e r y  m a i n l y  from Germany and th e  U .K .
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Appendix I I  t o  .Chapter V. Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  to  Firms
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
NAME OF COMPANY 
MAIN PRODUCTS MADE
1 .  ORIGINAL INVESTMENT MADE IN ( Y e a r )
2 .  GRANTS RECEIVED AMOUNTS Year
e . g .  New I n d u s t r y  Grant
S m a l l  I n d u s t r y  Grant  
Anco
R e - e q u ip m e n t
O t h e r  ( p l e a s e  s p e c i f y )
3 .  TOTAL ASSET VALUE OF COMPANY ( 1 9 7 1 ,  19 7 2  o r  1 9 7 3 )
I s  i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  g i v e  a breakdown o f  t h i s  f i g u r e  
( e . g .  f i x e d / c u r r e n t  e t c . )  ?
k .  TURNOVER (1 9 7 2  o r  1 9 7 3 )
I s  i t  p o s s i b l e  t o  g i v e  t h e  t r e n d  o f  t h i s  f i g u r e  ?
5 .  % OF OUTPUT WHICH IS EXPORTED:
6 . P l e a s e  i n d i c a t e  e x p o r t  m a r k e t s  i f  a n y ,  and t h e i r  
i m p o r t a n c e .
7 . PRE OR POST TAX PROFITS ( P l e a s e  s t a t e  w h i c h )
1 9 7 1 ,  1 9 7 2  o r  1973*
8 . TOTAL EMPLOYMENT s
Male E m p lo y m en t :  Female  Em ploym ent:
B i r e d t  P r o d u c t i o n  W o r k e rs :  O f f i c e  S t a f f :
( o f  w h i c h  number " s k i l l e d ” : )
9 .  What p e r c e n t a g e  o f  c o s t s  are  l a b o u r  c o s t s  ?
( o r  p a y r o l l  amount )
1 0 . D o e s  t h e  company c a r r y  o u t  any R e s e a r c h  and D e v e lo p m e n t  
( i f  s o  p l e a s e  g i v e  some i n d i c a t i o n  o f  th e  im p o r t a n c e
o f  t h i s  f u n c t i o n ) :
11 .D o e s  th e  company have  a s e p a r a t e  SALES DEPARTMENT ?
( i f  s o  p l e a s e  i n d i c a t e  i t s  i m p o r t a n c e )
( Q u e s t i o n s  12 -  1*+ t o  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  o n l y )
1 2 . D o e s  t h e  I r i s h  company r e l y  on  th e  f o r e i g n  p a r e n t  -
( a )  f o r  t e c h n i c a l  s e r v i c e s  ?
( b )  f o r  s a l e s  and m a r k e t i n g  ?
( c )  f o r  any  o t h e r  f u n c t i o n  ? ( p l e a s e  s t a t e )
Are p a y m en ts  made f o r  t h e s e  s e r v i c e s  ?
P l e a s e  g i v e  th e  N a t i o n a l i t y  o f  th e  D i r e c t o r s  o f  t h e  
f i r m  and o f  th e  H eads  o f  D e p a r t m e n t s  o f  the  I r i s h  
Company o
Are t h e r e  any  comments  y o u  c a n  make on  th e  I r i s h  
E c o n o m ic  E n v ir o n m e n t  ?
( e . g .  p r o d u c t i o n  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
m e t h o d s  o f  o p e r a t i o n  a s  compared t o  t h e  p a r e n t  
f i r m .  Are t h e r e  any  p a r t i c u l a r  s h o r t a g e s  ? -  
e . g .  s k i l l e d  l a b o u r ) .
E . g .  A . E .  S a f a r i a n  ( 1 9 6 6 )  F o r e i g n  O w nersh ip  o f  
C a n a d ia n  . I n d u s t r y , M cG raw -H il l  Co. o f  Canada,  T o r o n t o .
See  J . H .  D un ning  ( 1 9 6 6 )  " U .S .  S u b s i d i a r i e s  i n  B r i t a i n  
and t h e i r  U .K .  C o m p e t i t o r s  -  A c a s e  s t u d y  i n  b u s i n e s s  
r a t i o s " .  B u s i n e s s  R a t i o s .  Autumn 1 9 6 6 . A l s o  
Desmond Rea ( 1 9 6 9 )  "The F i n a n c i a l  A n a l y s i s  o f  th e  
P u b l i s h e d  A c c o u n t s  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  C om p an ie s" .  J o u r n a l  
o f  t h e  S o c i a l  and S t a t i s t i c a l  I n q u i r y  S o c i e t y  o f  
I r e l a n d . 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 0 ,  P a r t  I I  and J . H .  Dunning w i t h
J . C .  Rowan. " I n t e r - f i r m  e f f i c i e n c y  c o m p a r i s o n s :
U . S .  and U .K .  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  e n t e r p r i s e s  i n  B r i t a i n "  
i n  J . H .  D u n n in g  ( 1 9 7 0 )  S t u d i e s  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
I n v e s t m e n t . George A l l e n  and U nwin ,  London .
R e p o r t  on  E l e c t r i c a l  M a c h i n e r y , A p p a r a tu s  and 
A p p l i a n c e s  I n d u s t r y  Committee  on I n d u s t r i a l  P r o g r e s s  
( 1 9 7 1 )  P r l .  2 0 6 1  S t a t i o n e r y  O f f i c e ,  D u b l i n .  R e p o r t  
on  M e t a l  T r a d e s  I n d u s t r y  C . O . I . P .  ( 1 9 7 0 ) .  A .B .  McNamara 
and D .M . S a i n s b u r y  ( 1 9 7 2 )  A S u rvey  o f  th e  I r i s h  
P l a s t i c s I n d u s t r y  I n s t i t u t e  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  R e s e a r c h  and  
S t a n d a r d s ,  D u b l i n .
The l e t t e r  was a c c o m p a n ie d  by a c o v e r i n g  l e t t e r  from  
D r .  C h a r l e s  C a r t e r ,  V i c e - C h a n c e l l o r  o f  the  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  L a n c a s t e r ,  t o  whom I  w i s h  t o  e x p r e s s  my t h a n k s .
$ # The number o f  p a i r s  i n  the  a n a l y s i s  ( 1 1 )  com pares  
f a v o u r a b l y  w i t h  t h e  Sou tham pton  e n q u i r y  on  U . S .  
i n v e s t m e n t  i n  th e  U .K .  w h ic h  p ro d u ced  17 p a i r e d  
c o m p a r i s o n s .  See  D unning  ( 1 9 6 6 )  Op. C i t .
6 . W .A .P .  M anser  ( 1 9 7 3 )  The F i n a n c i a l  R o le  o f  M u l t i ­
n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e s  C a s s e l l ,  London q u o t i n g
A. Rook ( 1 9 7 1 )  T r a n s f e r  P r i c i n g g  The Measure o f  
Management  P e r fo rm a n ce  i n  M u l t i - D i v i s i o n a l  C o m p a n ie s .  
B r i t i s h  I n s t i t u t e  o f  Management,  S u r v e y  R ep o r t  No* 8 ,  
L o n d o n .
7 .  S t a u b o u g h  and R o b b in s  i n t e r v i e w  F o r t u ne August  1 9 7 3 •
8 . Y a i r  A h a r o n i  ( 1 9 6 6 )  The F o r e i g n  I n v e s t m e n t  D e c i s i o n  
P r o c e s s  H arvard  U . P .
9 .  R . S .  E k a u s  ( 1 9 5 5 )  "The F a c t o r  P r o p o r t i o n s  Problem  
i n  U n d e r d e v e l o p e d  Areas"  American Econ om ic  Rev iew  
S e p t e m b e r  1955»
1 0 .  See  W .P .  S t r a s s m a n  ( 1 9 6 8 )  T e c h n o l o g i c a l  Chang_e_.a_nd 
E c o n o m ic  D e v e lo p m e n t  I t h a c a  N.Y.  C o r n e l l  U n i v e r s i t y  
P r e s s .
1 1 .  Dermot M c A le e se  ( 1 9 7 2 )  " C a p i t a l  I n f l o w  and D i r e c t  
F o r e i g n  I n v e s t m e n t  i n  I r e l a n d  1952 t o  1970" JQ.ur.nal 
o f  t h e  S t a t i s t i c a l  and S o c i a l  I n q u i r y  _Society_ o_f 
I r e l a n d ,  v o l .  X X II ,  p a r t  IV ,  1 9 7 1 - 7 2 .
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1 2 .  The n e a r e s t  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h i s  i s  a 10 s e c t o r
b r e a k d o w n  o f  c a p i t a l  s t o c k  f i g u r e s  f o r  1953  -  68 
com puted  by  E.W. H e n r y ,  E.W. Henry ( 1 9 7 2 )  E s t i m a t i o n  
o f  C a p i t a l  S t o c k  i n  I r i s h  I n d u s t r y  1 9 5 .3 -6 8 .  Unpub­
l i s h e d  P a p e r  E conom ic  and S o c i a l  R e s e a r c h  I n s t i t u t e ,  
D u b l i n *
13* Dermot  M c A le e se  ( 1 9 7 2 )  Op, C i t*
1*+. M i c h a e l  C h ish o lm  ( 1 9 7 0 )  "On th e  making o f  a Myth?"
How c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  i s  i n d u s t r y  i n v e s t i n g  i n  t h e  
D e v e l o p m e n t  A r e a s ?  Urban S t u d i e s  v o l .  7 ,  n o .  3 ,  
O c t o b e r  1 9 7 0 .
15* P a t r i c k  N, O ' F a r r e l l  ( 1 9 7 1 )  "The R e g i o n a l  P rob lem  
i n  I r e l a n d s  Some R e f l e c t i o n s  upon D e v e lo p m e n t  
S t r a t e g y "  E con om ic  and S o c i a l  R ev iew  ( D u b l i n )  v o l .  2 ,  
n o .  k } J u l y  1971*
1 6 .  OfF a r r e l l  ( 1 9 7 1 )  Op , C i t .  p .  ^79
17* See  D u n n in g  w i t h  Rov/an Op. C i t .  p .  3 6 7
1 8 .  McNamara and S a i n s b u r y  Op. C i t .  T a b le  1 2 .
1 9 .  D un ning  w i t h  Rowan Op. C i t .
2 0 .  See  H a r ry  G. J o h n s o n  ( 1 9 7 0 )  "The E f f i c i e n c y  and  
W e l f a r e  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t io n "  
i n  C . P .  K i n d l e b e r g e r  ( e d )  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Corp-  
o r a t i o n  M . I . T .  P r e s s  pp 3 5 - 5 6 .
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2 1 .  J . H .  D u n n in g  ( 1 9 7 0 )  " T e c h n o l o g y , U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
I n v e s t m e n t  and E u r o p e a n  Economic  Growth" i n  
K i n d l e b e r g e r  ( e d )  Op. C i t .
2 2 .  N a t i o n a l  S c i e n c e  C o u n c i l  ( 1 9 7 2 )  " I r e l a n d  Back grou nd  
R e p o r t  o n  S c i e n c e  and T e c h n o l o g y " .  Com pi led  b y  
D ia r m u id  Murphy. S t a t i o n e r y  O f f i c e ,  D u b l i n .
2 3 .  E* D e n i s o n  ( 1 9 6 2 ) The Sou rces  o f  E con om ic  Growth  
i n  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s .  Committee  f o r  E con om ic  
D e v e l o p m e n t ,  New Y o r k .
2^ .  H arry  G. J o h n s o n  ( 1 9 7 0 )  Op * C i t .
2 5 .  H arry  G. J o h n s o n  ( 1 9 7 0 )  O p .  C i t .
2 6 .  J o h n  H. D u n n in g  ( 1 9 7 0 )  O p .  C i t .
2 7 .  One c a s e  r e p o r t e d  b y  a manager  o f  a f o r e i g n  owned
f i r m  i n  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  m a c h in er y  s e c t o r  was  t h a t
t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  c om p on en ts  b e i n g  p u r c h a s e d  from an  
I r i s h  f i r m  was im proved  a t  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  o f  th e  
f o r e i g n  owned p u r c h a s e r .
2 8 .  D ia r m u id  Murphy and D. O’B r o l c h a i n  ( 1 9 7 1 )  H e s e a r c h  
and D evelopm ent  i n  I r e l and 19 6 9  p u b l i s h e d  by  
C e n t r a l  S t a t i s t i c s  O f f i c e  D u b l i n  f o r  N a t i o n a l  S c i e n c e  
C o u n c i l ,  O c t o b e r  1 9 7 1 .
2 9 .  I b i d  p . 38 F u r t h e r  f i g u r e s  r e p o r t e d  by t h e  I r i s h
C e n t r a l  Bank s u g g e s t  t h a t  th e  d a t a  i n  T a b le  5* 1 3
a r e  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  u n d e r e s t i m a t e .
30*+
30o S ee  J o s e  R. de l a  T o rre  J r .  ( 1 9 7 1 )  " E x p o r t s  o f  
M a n u f a c t u r e d  Goods from D e v e l o p i n g  C o u n t r i e s ;
M a r k e t i n g  F a c t o r s  and the  R ole  o f  F o r e i g n  E n t e r p r i s e 11, 
J o u r n a l_ , ,o iL J n ^ m t L Q n a l  B u s i n e s s  S t u d i e s T S p r i n g  1 9 7 1 .
3 1 .  R i c h a r d  Lynn ( 1 9 6 8 )  The I r i s h  B r a i n  D r a i n  E conom ic  and  
S o c i a l  R e s e a r c h  I n s t i t u t e  Paper  No. *+3 , D u b l i n ,  
November 1 9 6 8 .
3 2 .  See R o b i n  Murray ( 1 9 7 2 )  " U n d er d e v e lo p m e n t ,  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  f i r m s  and th e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n  o f  
l a b o u r "  i n  Towards a New World Econom y. i n t r o d u c e d  
by  J a n  T i n b e r g e n ,  R o t terd a m  U . P .  1 9 7 2 .
33 . See  E . J .  M ish a n  ( 1 9 6 7 )  The C o s t s  o f  E conom ic  G ro w th . 
S t a p l e s  P r e s s ,  L ondon .
3^ .  J o h n  He D un ning  ( 1 9 7 0 )  Op. C i t .
3 5 .  M i c h a e l  z* B rooke  and H. Lee Remmers ( 1 9 7 0 )  The 
S t r a t e g y  o f  M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e . Longman, London
3 6 .  R e v iew  o f  1972  and O u t lo o k  1973  (PH3090) S t a t i o n e r y  
O f f i c e  D u b l i n ,  S e c t i o n  on  S c i e n c e  P o l i c y  pp ^ 8 - 5 0 .
3 7 .  See  C. C ooper  and N. Whelan ( 1 9 7 2 )  S c i e n c e T e c h n o l o g y  
and I n d u s t r y  i n  I r e l a n d  -  a d i a g n o s i s and some p o l i c y .  
p r o p o s a l s . P ap er  p r e s e n t e d  t o  the  N a t i o n a l  S c i e n c e  
C o u n c i l ,  I r e l a n d ,  March 19 7 2 ‘.
3 8 .  J . J .  S e r v a n - S c h r e i b e r  ( 1 9 6 8 )  The A m erican  C h a l l e n g e  
Hamish  H a m i l t o n ,  London .
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3 9 , R .S .  Caves ( 1 9 7 1 )  MI n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t i o n s :
The I n d u s t r i a l  E co n o m ic s  o f  F o r e i g n  I n v e s t m e n t ” 
E c o n o m i c a , v o l .  3 8 , pp 1 - 2 7 .
1*0. C om m ittee  on  I n d u s t r i a l  P r o g r e s s  ( 1 9 7 3 )  G e n e r a l  
R e p o r t  ( P r l . 2 9 2 7 ) )  S t a t i o n e r y  O f f i c e ,  D u b l i n .
^1.  See  B u s i n e s s  and F i n a n c e  A u g u s t .
1+2. C . O . I . P .  O p . C i t .
^ 3 .  I r i s h  Times 1 9 t h  March 1973» ( G u i n n e s s  i s  i n c l u d e d  
a s  a  d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned f i r m ) .
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nhftoter  V i s  The E f f e c t . . o f  f o r e i g n  D i r e c t  Tnvfisfcmant-. rm
t h e  B a l a n c e  o f  Paym en ts  o f  tha  I r i s h  R e p u b l i c ..
f l e c t i o n  1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
The p r e c e e d i n g  f i v e  C h a p t e r s  h a v e  a n a l y s e d  FDI u s i n g  
o b s e r v e d  m a r k e t  p r i c e s  o n l y .  The a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  b a l a n c e  
o f  p aym en ts  e f f e c t s  o f  FDI i n  t h i s  C h a p te r  and the  s o c i a l  
c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  C h a p ter  move i n t o  
the  r e a lm  o f  shadow p r i c i n g  by u t i l i s i n g  p r i c e s  o f  i n p u t s  
and o u t p u t s  d e r i v e d  from th e  r u l i n g  " w o r ld  p r i c e ” or  
" i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e ” .
The e f f e c t s  o f  FDI o n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  o f  h o s t  
c o u n t r i e s  h a s  b e e n  a s u b j e c t  o f  c o n t r o v e r s y .  I t  c o u l d  
be a r g u e d  t h a t  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  i s  a g e n e r a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  phenomenon and t h e r e f o r e  d o e s  n o t  m e r i t  s e p a r a t e  
t r e a t m e n t .  The b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  i s  die r e s u l t  o f  t h e  
i n t e r a c t i o n  be tv/e e n  th e  d o m e s t i c  economy and the r e s t  o f  th e  
w o r l d .^  An a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  FDI on  d o m e s t i c  
income w o u ld  s u f f i c e  a s  i t  would im p ly  th e  e f f e c t  on  
e x t e r n a l  p a y m e n t s .  V a l i d  th o u g h  such  an argument may b e ,  
t h e r e  a r e  c o m p e l l i n g  r e a s o n s  f o r  r e g a r d i n g  the b a l a n c e  o f  
payments  a s  a w o r t h y  o b j e c t  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  s c r u t i n y .
F i r s t l y ,  i m b a l a n c e s  i n  e x t e r n a l  paym ents  may be d i f f i c u l t  
or I m p o s s i b l e  t o  rem ove  by Government p o l i c y  m e a s u r e s .  
A djustm ent  m e c h a n is m s  do n o t  f u n c t i o n  a u t o m a t i c a l l y .
I n a d e q u a t e  p o l i c i e s  and i n c o m p l e t e  a d j u s t m e n t  ca n  r e s u l t  
from d i s t o r t i o n s  and s t r u c t u r a l  r i g i d i t i e s ,  w i t h i n  th e  econom y,  
from i m p e r f e c t i o n s  i n  c o m p e t i t i o n  and from r e s t r i c t i o n s
o n  f l o w s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n .  The f u l l  ra n g e  o f  c o r r e c t i v e  
p o l i c y  w e a p o n s  i s  o f t e n  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t o  Governments  -  
t h i s  a p p l i e s  t o  I r e l a n d ,  whose  m o n eto ry  and ex ch a n g e  r a t e  
p o l i c y  i s  c l o s e l y  t i e d  t o  t h o s e  o f  t h e  U .K .  S e c o n d l y ,  
e v e n  i f  the above  d o e s  n o t  a p p l y ,  p o l i c i e s  may have  t o  
be a d o p t e d  t o  c o r r e c t  e x t e r n a l  paym ents  i m b a l a n c e s  w h i c h  
impose  c o s t s  o n  th e  e co n o m y . These  c o s t s  may be more  
d i f f i c u l t  f o r  t h e  d o m e s t i c  economy t o  b e a r  t h a n  are  e x t e r n a l  
paym ents  i m b a l a n c e s .  T h i s  i s  t r u e  a f o r t i o r i  where t h e  
e x t e r n a l  b a l a n c e  c a n  be c h a r a c t e r i s e d  a s  a c o n s t r a i n t  on  
n a t i o n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t .  S h i f t i n g  r e s o u r c e s  i n t o  u s e s  w h i c h  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  g e n e r a t i o n  o r  s a v i n g  o f  f o r e i g n  e x ch a n g e  may 
be a c o s t l y  and d i f f i c u l t  p r o c e s s .  T h i r d l y ,  th e  above  
d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r e  compounded when th e  economy i s  s m a l l  and 
open l i k e  t h a t  o f  I r e l a n d .  Lack o f  c o n t r o l  o f  key  p o l i c y  
i n s t r u m e n t s  m eans  a l o s s  o f  room t o  m a n o e u v r e .  A l s o ,  
Government s t a t e m e n t s  v i e w  th e  b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  a s  a n  
i n d e p e n d e n t  p o l i c y  t a r g e t .  T h i s  i s  p e r h a p s  b e s t  i l l u s t r a t e d  
by the  m a j o r  p o l i c y  s h i f t  o f  the  m i d - f i f t i e s  away from  
p r o t e c t i o n i s m  t o w a r d s  f r e e r  tr a d e  i n  the  f a c e  o f  a p aym en ts  
i m b a l a n c e ,  (d o cu m en ted  i n  C hapter  I I ) .
F o r e i g n  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  and the  B a l a n c e  o f  P a y m e n t s .
T h ere  a r e  s e v e r a l  c o m p e l l i n g  r e a s o n s  f o r  e x a m in in g  
th e  e f f e c t  o f  FDI on  th e  h o s t  c o u n t r y ' s  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s .  
F i r s t l y ,  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f l o w s  o f  c a p i t a l  and g o o d s  a r e  n o t  
i n d e p e n d e n t ;  s t r o n g  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  e x i s t  b e t w e e n  f l o w s  o f  
g o o d s  and o f  f a c t o r s  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . 2 T h i s  was c l e a r l y  
i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  I r e l a n d ,  i n  C h a p ter  IV.  S e c o n d l y
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p r o b le m s  and c o s t s  o f  a c h i e v i n g  e x t e r n a l  
b a l a n c e ,  th e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  p r o d u c e s  
th e  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  t o  s e r v i c e  t h e  h o s t  n a t i o n ' s  d e b t  
h a s  b e e n  a m a j o r  p o i n t  o f  c o n t e n t i o n  am ongst  e c o n o m i s t s  .
T h i s  r a i s e s  t h e  i s s u e  o f  " th e  c o r r e c t  way" t o  a s s e s s  t h e  
b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m en ts  e f f e c t s  o f  FDI. T h i r d l y ,  where  
f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  we a re  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
market  i m p e r f e c t i o n s  b e c a u s e  su ch  i m p e r f e c t i o n s  a re  t h e - 
s o u r c e  o f  th e  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r ’ s a d v a n ta g e  and s o  t h e  
a s s u m p t i o n  o f  an  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  e q u i l i b r i a t i n g  e x t e r n a l  
b a l a n c e  c a n  no l o n g e r  be u p h e l d .  T h i s  r e q u i r e s  e l a b o r a t i o n .  
W i t h i n  t h e  n e o - c l a s s i c a l  m o d e l ,  e v e r y  i n v e s t m e n t  p r o d u c e s  
the  r e s o u r c e s  r e q u i r e d  t o  pay f o r  t h e  f a c t o r  i n p u t s  u s e d .  
P e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  e v e r y  i n d u s t r y  p r o d u c e s  a u n i fo r m  
r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on  c a p i t a l  and the  " ad d in g  up problem" d e e s  
n o t  e x i s t  ( t h e  e q u a l i t y  o f  t o t a l  r e v e n u e  and f a c t o r  r e w a r d s  
t h r o u g h o u t  th e  economy i s  e n s u r e d ) .  I m p e r f e c t i o n s  i n  t h e  
c a p i t a l  and l a b o u r  m a r k e t s  however  d e s t r o y  t h i s  n e a t  
e q u a l i t y .  B e c a u s e  o f  t h e  m o n o p o l i s t i c  c o m p e t i t i o n  e l e m e n t  
i n  FD I ,  s u p e r - n o r m a l  p r o f i t s  may be e a r n e d  by f o r e i g n  
f a c t o r s .  The r e t u r n  e a r n e d  on f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  and t e c h n o l o g y  
w i l l  i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  be g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e i r  o p p o r t u n i t y  
c o s t .  I n  n o rm a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  t h i s  w ould  p r e s e n t  a d i s t ­
r i b u t i o n  p r o b le m  f o r  th e  h o s t  Government* However s u c h  
r e t u r n s  e a r n e d  b y  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  may be r e m i t t e d  t o  th e  
s o u r c e  c o u n t r y  im p o s i n g  a l o s s  on  th e  h o s t *  The r e a l l o ­
c a t i o n  p r o b le m  im p osed  o n  th e  h o s t  c o u n t r y  i s  t h u s  t h a t  i t  
h a s  t o  s h i f t  r e s o u r c e s  i n  o r d e r  t o  e a r n  th e  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  
t o  f i n a n c e  s u c h  r e m i t t a n c e s .  T h i s  p rob lem  c a n  i n c r e a s e
o v e r  t im e  i f  th e  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r  grows t h r o u g h  r e t a i n e d  
e a r n i n g s  and t h e n  r e m i t s  a l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  i t s  
e a r n i n g s .  S e c u l a r  g r o w th  o f  r e m i t t a n c e s  from  f o r e i g n  • 
owned f i r m s  i s  a c o n s t a n t  f e a r  o f  h o s t  G o v ern m en ts .  T h i s  
r e p r e s e n t s  a n  im p o r t a n t  s o u r c e  o f  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  th e  
b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m en ts  o f  many c o u n t r i e s  and d e s e r v e s  i n v e s t ­
i g a t i o n  i n  t h e  I r i s h  c a s e .  I t  r e q u i r e s  an  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  
the  d i v i d e n d  p o l i c i e s  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s .  F o u r t h l y ,  t h e  
b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m en ts  t a k e s  on a p o l i t i c a l  d i m e n s i o n  a l s o .
H os t  n a t i o n s  have  a t e n d e n c y  t o  a t t r i b u t e  g r e a t  im p o r t a n c e  
t o  b a l a n c e  o f  paym en ts  e f f e c t s .  V ernon s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h i s  
c o n c e r n  i s  due t o  b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  c o n s e q u e n c e s  b e i n g  
r e g a r d e d  b y  h o s t  Governm ents  a s  a proxy  f o r  t h e  l o s s  o f
h o s t  n a t i o n a l  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  i n d u s t r i e s  where  d i r e c t
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f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  i s  i m p o r t a n t .  Thus t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  
paym ents  im p a c t  o f  t h e  FDI becom es  imbued w i t h  p o l i t i c a l  
r e p e r c u s s i o n s .
The A s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  E f f e c t s  o f  FDI on  th e  B a l a n c e  o f  
Paym ents  o f  H o s t  C o u n t r i e s .
The b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m en ts  e f f e c t s  o f . F D I  c a n  be ex a m in e d  
from th e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  th e  h o s t  c o u n t r y ,  t h e  s o u r c e  
c o u n t r y  o r  i n  te r m s  o f  t h e  i n v e s t i n g  f i r m ’ s i n t e r u n i t  ( s u b s i d ­
i a r y  t o  p a r e n t  o r  s u b s i d i a r y  t o  s u b s i d i a r y )  t r a n s f e r s .  Such  
e f f e c t s  c a n  be q u a n t i f i e d  a t  a macro o r  m ic r o  ( i n d i v i d u a l  
f i r m )  l e v e l .  T h ere  h a s  b e e n  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  c o n t r o v e r s y  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  " c o r r e c t  way" t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  
paym ents  e f f e c t s  o f  FD I .  I n  t h i s  C h ap ter  th e  r e m a in d e r  o f
t h i s  s e c t i o n  e x a m in e s  t h e  above  c o n t r o v e r s y .  S e c t i o n  2 
a n a l y s e s  a m o d e l  o f  b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  a d j u s t m e n t  w h i c h  
h a s  s p e c i a l  r e l e v a n c e  f o r  FD I ,  S e c t i o n  3 a p p r o a c h e s  th e  
b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m en ts  from an i n t r a  f i r m  v i e w p o i n t  and  
S e c t i o n  k  p r e s e n t s  q u a n t i t a t i v e  e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  e f f e c t  
o f  FDI o n  t h e  I r i s h  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n ts .
We a r e  c o n c e r n e d  h e r e  o n l y  w i t h  th e  e f f e c t  o f  FDI
on th e  h o s t  c o u n t r y ’ s  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s .  The c r u c i a l
t h e o r e t i c a l  i s s u e  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  i s  the  so  c a l l e d  
" a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  a s s u m p t i o n " .  T h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  
s im p ly  u s e d  t o  answ er  th e  q u e s t i o n  o f  what t h e  s i t u a t i o n  
would  be  i f  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  had n ot  
t a k e n  p l a c e .  The r e s u l t s  o f  a l l  the s t u d i e s  c a r r i e d  o u t  
on t h i s  i s s u e  are  v e r y  much i n f l u e n c e d  b y  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  
a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  w h i c h  t h e y  a s su m e .  There  a re  s e v e r a l  
c o n f l i c t i n g  v i e w p o i n t s  on  t h e  " c o r r e c t "  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n .
The v i e w  a d o p t e d  by  S t r e e t e n  and o t h e r s  i s  t h a t  t h e
c o r r e c t  way t o  exam ine  th e  e f f e c t  o f  FDI o n  th e  e x t e r n a l
if
b a l a n c e  i s  t o  c a l c u l a t e  " d i r e c t  e f f e c t s "  o n l y .  D i r e c t  
e f f e c t s  a r e  t h o s e  i n f l o w s  and o u t f l o w s  w h ic h  a c t u a l l y  c r o s s  
the  e x c h a n g e s .  Thus th e  c o m p a r i s o n  i s  b e t w e e n  ( c a p i t a l  
i n f l o w s ,  e q u i t y  and f o r e i g n  l o a n s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  e x p o r t s  
o f  the p r o j e c t )  and ( d e b t  s e r v i c i n g  c o s t s ,  d i v i d e n d s  and  
r o y a l t i e s  p l u s  im p o r t e d  i n p u t s ) .  The i m p l i c i t  a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s i t i o n  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  t h a t  a d o m e s t i c  p r o j e c t  w i t h  e x a c t l y  
tb s  same p r o d u c t i o n  c o n d i t i o n s  but  d o m e s t i c a l l y  f i n a n c e d  
would  h a v e  r e p l a c e d  t h e  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t  i f  no f o r e i g n
in vestm en t had taken p la c e .  I t  fu r th e r  im p l ie s  th a t  
a l l  " n o n -d ir ec t"  e f f e c t s  would r e s u l t  from any p r o je c t  
be i t  f o r e i g n  or d o m e s t ic .  The opposing view  to  t h i s  
i s  the assu m p tion  th a t  n o n -d ired t  e f f e c t s  do d i f f e r  betw een  
fo r e ig n  and d om estic  p r o j e c t s .
An op p osin g  v iew  i s  taken  by L i t t l e  and M irr lees^
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by the P earso n  Commission and by the UNCTAD s t u d y /  who 
su ggest  th a t  the impact o f  FDI on the balance o f  payments 
should in c lu d e  n o n -d ir e c t  e f f e c t s  which may d i f f e r  
between f o r e i g n  and d o m e s t ic a l ly  owned p r o j e c t s .  Non d i r e c t  
e f f e c t s  which are ex p ected  to  d i f f e r  betw een the f o r e ig n  
p r o je c t  and the a l t e r n a t i v e  dom estic  p r o je c t  ares  the  
rem uneration o f  la b o u r , the c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  over t im e , the  
impact on the p ro d u ctio n  o f  non traded goods and the output  
o f  the p r o j e c t  which s u b s t i t u t e s  fo r  im p orts .
S t r e e t e n ’ s argument r e s t s  on the tw ofo ld  p r o p o s i t io n  
that a d o m e st ic  p r o je c t  (or  a d o m e s t ic a l ly  f in an ced  o n e )  i s  
always an a l t e r n a t i v e  and that the dom estic  a l t e r n a t iv e  
w i l l  a lw ays have the same " in d ire c t"  impact on the ba lan ce  
o f  paym ents. Even i f  the f i r s t  part o f  the p r o p o s i t io n  i s  
a c c e p te d ,  the r e s u l t  d ocs not fo l lo w  because an a l t e r n a t i v e  
dom estic  p r o j e c t  may have d i f f e r e n t  i n d ir e c t  e f f e c t s  a r i s in g  
from d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the c o s t  o f  tech n o lo gy  and management, 
e f f e c t s  a r i s i n g  from the f o r e ig n  su b s id ia r y  b e in g  part o f  a 
la r g e r  o r g a n i s a t io n  and from d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the tim in g  o f  
f lo w s  ( f o r  t he ch o ice  may be between a f o r e ig n  p r o je c t  a t  
time t or a d o m estic  one at time ( t  + n) where n i s  the la g
which e n a b le s  the d o m estic  economy to  assem ble the  
r e q u i s i t e  package o f  r e s o u r c e s ) .  I t  seems l i k e l y  th a t  
the p r o d u c t io n  f u n c t io n  o f  a dom estic  a l t e r n a t i v e  f irm  
w i l l  d i f f e r  from a f o r e ig n  s u b s id ia r y .
A r a th e r  d i f f e r e n t  approach i s  adopted by Hufbauer 
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and A d le r .  They su g g es t  four  s e t s  o f  assum ptions c o n ­
cern ing  the e f f e c t  o f  d i r e c t  f o r e ig n  in v e s tm en t .  They r e f e r  
to  t h i s  problem a s  the " s u b s t i t u t io n  q u e s t io n " .  The 
d i f f e r e n t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  assum ptions are (1 )  the " c l a s s i c a l  
assum ptions" -  d i r e c t  investm ent supplem ents h o s t  country  
investm ent and c o m p le te ly  r e p la c e s  so u rce-cou n try  in v e s tm e n t ,  
(2 )  the " r e v e r se  c l a s s i c a l  assum ptions" , d i r e c t  investm en t  
s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  h o s t  country  investm ent and does not a f f e c t  
source in v e s tm e n t ,  (3 )  the " a n t i c l a s s i e a l  assum ptions" are  
th at no s u b s t i t u t i o n  t ake s p lace  at source or abroad and 
f i n a l l y  ( h )  the " reverse  a n t i c l a s s i e a l "  assum ptions -  o v e r ­
seas  in v estm en t  occu rs  at th e  expense o f  source country  
investm ent and d i s p l a c e s  h o s t  country in v e s tm en t .  The fo u r th  
assum ption i s  put i n  f o r  symmetry on ly  as i t  im p l ie s  th a t  
d ir e c t  in v estm en t  a c t u a l ly  d e c r e a ses  world c a p i t a l  fo r m a t io n ,  
which i s  e x tr em e ly  u n l i k e l y .  The ch o ice  amongst the o th e r  
three when we c o n s id e r  o n ly  the h ost  co u n try , a s  i n  t h i s  
stu d y , i s  b etw een  com plete replacem ent o f  h o s t  country  i n v e s t ­
ment ( r e v e r s e  c l a s s i c a l )  and a d d it io n  to  h o s t  country i n v e s t ­
ment ( c l a s s i c a l  a ssu m p tio n ) .  Therefore the assum ptions
9
in  the l i t e r a t u r e  have v a r ie d .  The v iew  taken  here i s  t h a t ,
as no c o r r e c t  answer i s  a t  hand, a number o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  
s i t u a t i o n s  must be c o n s id e r e d .  These must be r e a l i s t i c  i n
tak in g  accou nt o f  the nature o f  FDI and the c o n d it io n s  o f  
the h o s t  economy* F u r th e r ,  the non d i r e c t  areas  o f  impact 
must he e x p l i c i t l y  accounted f o r  because there  i s  no 
guarantee th a t  th ey  w i l l  ”c a n c e l  o u t” when the a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s i t i o n  assum p tion  has been f i x e d .
The f o l lo w in g  s e c t i o n  moves on to  c o n s id er  the  
re lev a n ce  o f  a r e c e n t  theory  o f  balance o f  payments a d j u s t ­
ment to  the  case  o f  Ire lan d *  We re tu rn  to  the q u e s t io n  o f  
e s t im a t in g  the balance o f  payments e f f e c t s  o f  FDI i n  the  
s e c t io n s  a f t e r  t h a t .
S e c t io n  2 .  The ”Common Cause” Theory and the I r i s h  
B alance o f  Payments.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  i s o l a t e  c a u s a l i t y  w ith in  a g e n e r a l  
e q u il ib r iu m  framework, p a r t i c u la r ly  when t h i s  in v o lv e s  the  
ex p ost  a c co u n t in g  r e l a t io n s h ip  o f  the balance o f  payments* 
However, an attem pt to  e x p la in  the balance o f  payments 
adjustm ent p r o c e s s ,  which may be r e le v a n t  to  the case o f  
Irelan d  and to  the a n a l y s i s  o f  FDI in f lo w s ,  i s  provided by 
Marina von  Newmann W h itm an .^  T his i s  the ’’common c a u se ” 
theory  o f  e x t e r n a l  ad ju stm en t. The th eory  p o s t u la t e s  th a t  
in  a s m a l l ,  open economy fa c in g  a la rg e  c a p i t a l  in f lo w ,  
movement o f  t h e  current and c a p i t a l  accou n ts  are not accommo­
datin g  to  each  o th e r  but th a t  both are the r e s u l t  o f  a 
common c a u s e ,  namely a movement i n  the m arginal e f f i c i e n c y  
of c a p i t a l  sch ed u le  (M .E .C .) in  the export s e c t o r .
The common cause th eory  i s  concerned w ith  the  
e x p la n a t io n  o f  ba lance  o f  payments adjustm ent ( t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
the b a lan ce  o f  trade i s  the cen tre  o f  t h e o r e t i c a l  a t t e n t i o n )  
In the common cause approach, long term c a p i t a l  movements 
are s p e c i f i c a l l y  c o n s id er ed  as autonomous e lem en ts  r a th e r  
than b e in g  lumped to g e th e r  w ith  short term f lo w s  as  
"accommodating movements” . C a p ita l  m o b i l i t y  i s  an im port­
ant u n d e r ly in g  assum p tion . The theory  a l s o  in c lu d e s  
K eynesian income e f f e c t s ,  c a p a c ity  and output e f f e c t s .
The c a u s a l  ch a in  embodied in  the th eory  runs as f o l lo w s  
An upward s h i f t  i n  the MSG schedule o f  the export s e c t o r ,  
the "common c a u se ” , in d u ces  an in c re a se  in  Investm ent i n  
that s e c t o r .  D om estic  investm ent in c r e a s e s  and sw itc h e s  
to  th a t  s e c t o r  and th ere  i s  an in f lo w  o f  long  term f o r e ig n  
c a p i t a l  i n t o  the e x p o r t in g  s e c to r  because o f  the in c r e a se d  
rate o f  r e t u r n .  An in c r e a se  in  ex p o r ts  occu rs w hich , 
through the m u l t i p l i e r  p r o c e s s ,  lea d s  to  an in c r e a se  in  
income. The income in c r e a se  i s  a l s o  f i r e d  by the in c r e a se d  
in v e s tm en t .  T h is  le a d s  in t o  the fa m i l ia r  s p i r a l  o f  r e a l  
wage i n c r e a s e s  (or d ecrea sed  unemployment) in crea sed  im ports  
and a secon d ary  r i s e  i n  consumption and im p orts . The e f f e c t  
of c a p a c ity  in c r e a s e  i n  the export s e c to r  i s  to  induce a 
secondary in c r e a s e  i n  e x p o r t s .  Thus the theory  su g g e s t s  
that e x p o r t - l e d  p r o s p e r i ty  may c o - e x i s t  w ith  a d e f i c i t  i n  
e x te r n a l  paym ents.
The p r lmum m ob ile i s  a s h i f t  in  the a n t ic ip a te d  r a te  
of r e tu r n  i n  the ex p ort  s e c t o r  which a t t r a c t s  long term
f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l .  The th eo ry  in  i t s  b a s i c  form s u g g e s t s  
th a t  such a change w i l l  a r i s e  from an in c r e a s e  i n  demand 
f o r  exp ort  p r o d u c ts .  In the I r i s h  case  how ever, a change 
i n  the e x p e c ted  r a te  o f  r e tu r n  i n  the export s e c to r  may 
have a r i s e n  from changed c o s t  a s  w e l l  a s  demand f a c t o r s *
On the c o s t  s i d e ,  the generous in c e n t iv e  package to  f o r e ig n  
owned f irm s  i s  the major f a c t o r .  A lso  i n  a dynamic sen se  
the c o s t  c o n d i t io n s  o f  Ir e la n d  become more fa vou rab le  as- 
long  as  the c o s t  o f  I r i s h  labour does not in c r e a se  as  
r a p id ly  as in  com p etitor  n a t io n s .  The r a te  o f  r e tu r n  in  
the exp o r t  s e c t o r  o f  Ir e la n d  thus has in c r e a se d  because o f  
f a l l i n g  c o s t s  r e l a t i v e  to  o th e r  l o c a t i o n s  i n  the per iod  we 
are a n a ly s in g .  On the demand s i c e ,  the removal o f  B r i t i s h  
t a r i f f s  (through the AIFTA) and the r e d u c t io n  o f  EEC t a r i f f s  
have r e s u l t e d  i n  an in c r e a se d  demand fo r  I r i s h  export  
p r o d u c ts .
Ir e la n d  thus seems to  f i t  the a ssum ptions o f  th e  th e o r y .  
Changing c o s t  and demand c o n d i t io n s  have meant th a t  the  
p r o s p e c t iv e  ra te  o f  r e tu r n  i n  the export s e c t o r  has in c re a se d  
over the p e r io d ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  fo r  f o r e i g n  f ir m s .  The 
s u b s t a n t i a l  in f lo w  o f  f o r e ig n  c a p i t a l  in t o  the e x p o r t in g  
s e c to r  i s  c r u c i a l  to  the  th e o r y .
Here we can su b je c t  the theory  on ly  to  rudimentary  
t e s t s .  The th eory  p r e d ic t s  th a t  a p o s i t i v e  r e l a t io n s h ip  
w i l l  e x i s t  betw een the l e v e l  o f  e x p o r ts  and the l e v e l  o f  
dom estic  investm en t because  b o th , accord in g  to  the th e o r y ,  
are f u n c t io n s  o f  s h i f t s  i n  the MEC schedu le  in  the export
sector® A sim ple  t e s t  o f  t h i s  r e l a t io n s h ip  showed t h i s  to  
+
he the c a s e ♦
The th e o r y  a l s o  p r e d ic t s  th a t  an in c r e a se  i n  e x p o r ts  
should be accompanied by an in c r e a s in g  d e f i c i t  i n  the  
balance o f  trade# T e s t s  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s i t io n  a l s o  confirm ed
+ Where Y i s  G .B .C .F . and i s  t o t a l  exp orts  and i s  
i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r t s ,  the fo l lo w in g  r e l a t io n s h ip s  were 
found f o r  tim e s e r i e s  d a ta  1956-70 .
( 1 )  Y = - 3 2 .3 1 8 ++ + 0 .0 0 1 ++ X R2 = 0 .965^
(0 . 0 0 0 0 1 )
(2 )  Y= + 1 .2 2 0 ++ X2 R2 = 0 .9 6 9 5
(0 . 058)
++ i n d i c a t e s  th a t  the c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t the  
1% l e v e l  (n  = 1 5 ) .
F ig u r e s  i n  b r a c k e ts  are standard errors#
The a s s o c i a t i o n  i s  s tr o n g e r  where i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r ts  
i s  used as  the independent v a r ia b le #  T his i s  because  
of the c l o s e r  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  the r e le v a n t  "export s e c t o r " .  
The s tr o n g  p o s i t i v e  a s s o c a t io n  i s  c l e a r .
the p r e d i c t i o n s  o f  the t h e o r y .  The s tr o n g  n eg a tiv e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  found are i n  the o p p o s ite  d i r e c t i o n  to  
a p r i o r i  b e l i e f .
F i n a l l y ,  some fragm entary ev id en ce  can be assem bled  
to  support the c r u c ia l  assum ption  th a t  the in f lo w  o f  
f o r e i g n  lo n g  term c a p i t a l  in t o  the e x p o r t in g  s e c t o r  i s  
s e n s i t i v e  to  s h i f t s  i n  the  MEC schedu le  o f  th a t  s e c t o r .
+ U sing  y^ a s  b a la n ce  o f  t r a d e ,  y2 as  t o t a l  current  
b a la n ce  to g e th e r  w ith  e x p o r ts  (x^) and i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r ts  
(X2 ) f o r  time s e r i e s  d a ta  1 9 5 6 -7 0 .
( 3 ) *1 = -10.6V+ -  0 .0 0 0 5 ++x 1 ( 0 .0 0 0 0 1 )
R2 = 0 .8^ 0 8
<>») 72 = 1 9 .9 9 5  -  0 .0 0 0 2 ++x ,  
( 0 .0 0 0 1 )  x
R2 = 0.1*173
( 5 ) *1 =
. . +4* . , + +
52.363  -  0 .6 3 “+ X ,  
( 0 . 072 ) 2
2
R = 0 .8 ^ 5 6
(6 ) y2 = k.7bS -  0 .2 3 ^ ++ x  ( 0 .0 7 0 )  2
R2 =  O . 1^ 1*
++ in d ic a t e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a t  the  1% l e v e l  (n = 1 5 )
T h is  s e t  o f  r e s u l t s  produce c o n s i s t e n t l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
n e g a t iv e  r e s u l t s .  A gain , the  most a c c u r a te ly  d e f in e d  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  terms o f  the th eory  -  ( 5 )  i s  the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  r e l a t i o n s h i p .
S h i f t s  i n  the MFC can o n ly  be in fe r r e d  from more r e a d i ly  
q u a n t i f ia b le  changes (which a f f e c t  ex p o s t  r e tu r n s  ra th er  
than a n t i c ip a t e d  r e t u r n s ) ,  such as changes i n  the 
in c e n t iv e s  t o  e x p o r t in g  and widening market p e n e tr a t io n  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  The s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  f o r e ig n  c a p i t a l  In f lo w s  
to  i n c e n t i v e s  i s  shown by the upsurge o f  investm ent fo l lo w in g  
an in c r e a s e  i n  i n c e n t i v e s ,  v id e  Table 3 .1  y e a r s  I960  
( fo l lo w in g  the e s ta b l ish m e n t  o f  SPADCo), 1967-8  (reform o f  
the IDA) and 1969-70  (1969 I n d u s t r ia l  Development A c t ) .  
S im i la r ly  the  p ro sp ec t  o f t h e  opening o f  the U.K. market to  
I r i s h  e x p o r te r s  w ith  the AIFTA agreement le d  to  an upsurge  
of f o r e i g n  in vestm en t in  th a t  y e a r .  Such f a c t o r s  can be 
exp ected  to  le a d  to  an upward s h i f t  in  the a n t ic ip a te d  r a te  
o f  r e tu r n  o f  the f o r e i g n  f irm  and, on the ev id en ce  o f  
Table 3 . 1 ,  t h i s  l e a d s  to  an in f lo w  o f  FDI.
The im p o r ta n c e  o f  t  he common cause  t h e o r y  f o r  I r e l a n d  
r e s t s  on  t h e  v iew  t h a t  lo n g  te rm  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  i s  a 
c r u c i a l  f a c t o r  i n  th e  b a l a n c e  o f  payments a d ju s tm e n t  
mechanism. The i n f lo w  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  i n t o  the  e x p o r t i n g  
s e c t o r  i n  r e s p o n s e  t o  a change i n  th e  p r o s p e c t i v e  r a t e  o f  
r e t u r n  i s  s e e n  t o  have r a m i f i c a t i o n s  on s e v e r a l  c r u c i a l  
a r e a s  o f  th e  economy. The h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  the  common cau se  
mechanism c a n  be a p p l i e d  t o  the  I r i s h  case  i s  no t  r e f u t e d  
by th e  t e s t s  a b o v e .
T h is  th e o ry  s u g g e s t s  th a t  th e  behaviour o f  f o r e ig n  
owned e x p o r t in g  f i r m s  i s  worthy o f  exam in ation , not o n ly  
b eca u se  t h e i r  a c t i o n s  a f f e c t  the  c a p i t a l  in f lo w  i n t o
d i v i d e n d ,  i n t e r e s t  and r o y a l t y  payments o u t f l o w s .  A l l  
th e s e  f l o w s  w i l l  v a r y  w i t h  the  type o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n  
a dop ted  by t h e  f i rm *  C h a p te r s  I I I  and IV examined th e  
t r a d e  f l o w s  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  i n  d e t a i l .  However 
such f l o w s  w i l l  be i n f l u e n c e d  by the  f i r m ’ s i n t e r n a l  
o r g a n i s a t i o n  a s  f o l l o w s .  The e x p o r t  b e h a v i o u r  o f  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  i s  i n f l u e n c e d  by the  e x t e n t  t o  which th e  head  
o f f i c e  a l l o w s  the  s u b s i d i a r i e s  to  s e r v i c e  th e  m a r k e t s  i n  
which t h e y  a r e  c o m p e t i t i v e  on c o s t  g rounds  a s  a g a i n s t  t h e  
e x t e n t  t o  w hich  m a r k e t s  a r e  a l l o c a t e d  amongst  u n i t s  on 
o t h e r  t h a n  c o s t  g r o u n d s .  E x p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n  c l a u s e s  may 
be a c o n s t r a i n t  on some s u b s i d i a r i e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  on th e  
import  s i d e ,  s u b s i d i a r i e s  may be g iv e n  autonomy t o  shop 
around f o r  t h e  c h e a p e s t  p o s s i b l e  i n p u t s  from w h a te v e r  so u rc e  
o r  th ey  may be f o r c e d  t o  p u rc h a se  i n p u t s  w i t h i n  th e  f i r m .  
T r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  i s  a l s o  an  i s s u e  h e re  -  goods t r a n s f e r r e d  
w i t h i n  th e  f i r m  may be p r i c e d  a t  o t h e r  t h a n  ’’a r m s - l e n g t h ” 
p r i c e s  i n  o r d e r  to  t r a n s f e r  fu nd s  be tw een  u n i t s .
The im p o r t a n c e  o f  such a r r a n g e m e n ts  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  
e v a l u a t e  i n  th e  I r i s h  c a s e .  There i s  l i t t l e  e v id e n c e  o f  
e x p o r t  r e s t r i c t i o n  c l a u s e s  b e in g  a c o n s t r a i n t  on the  
b e h a v io u r  o f  I r i s h  u n i t s . 12 S i m i l a r l y ,  e v id e n c e  on i n t r a  
f i rm  p u r c h a s i n g  and p r i c i n g  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o l l e c t  -  
t h e r e  i s  no i n c e n t i v e  t o  remove p r o f i t s  by t r a n s f e r  
p r i c i n g  where  the  f i r m  e x p o r t s  a l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  o u t p u t  
b ecause  s u c h  p r o f i t  i s  untaxe'd' and can be f r e e l y  r e m i t t e d .  
The i n c e n t i v e s  t o  t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  a re  low i n  the  case  of  
I r e l a n d .
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I r e l a n d  and I r i s h  e x p o r t s ,  b u t  a l s o  b e ca u se  o f  th e  
r e p e r c u s s i o n s  on th e  whole b a l a n c e  o f  payments  a d ju s tm e n t  
process© The s t r a t e g y  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  i s  
examined i n  th e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n .
S o c t J m J U ___
I r e l a n d  and the  I r i s h  B a lance  o f  P a y m en ts .
The b a l a n c e  o f  payments  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y  
i s  n o t  p e r  se a  m a t t e r  o f  im p o r tan c e  to  th e  f o r e i g n  
i n v e s t o r .  I t  w i l l  on ly  o c c a s i o n a l l y  e n t e r  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
v a r i a b l e s  o f  the  f o r e i g n  f i r m  -  i n  a s i t u a t i o n  where 
" f u n d a m e n ta l  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m "  f o r c e s  o r  t h r e a t e n s  to  f o r c e  
a change i n  exchange r a t e  p a r i t i e s  -  f o r  th e  s t r e n g t h  o f  
th e  h o s t  c o u n t r y ! s c u r r e n c y  may be i m p o r t a n t  to  the  
i n v e s t i n g  f i r m .  The f i r m ' s  c o n c e rn  i s  w i t h  the  r e l a t i o n ­
s h i p s  b e tw e e n  i t s  s e p a r a t e  u n i t s .  The s t r a t e g y  o f  the  
f i r m  w i t h  r e g a r d  to  th e  t r a n s f e r  o f  g o o d s ,  f u n d s ,  t e c h n o lo g y  
and the  r e i n v e s t m e n t  o f  p r o f i t s  w i l l  be a f f e c t e d  by i t s  
o r g a n i s a t i o n .  Some c o n t r o v e r s y  h a s  a r i s e n  o v e r  th e  form o f  
economic  o r g a n i s a t i o n  l i k e l y  t o  be a d o p te d  by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i r m s  -  th e  m a jo r  p o i n t  a t  i s s u e  i s  the  d e g re e  o f  i n d e ­
pendence  w h ich  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  have i n  t a k i n g  i n v e s t ­
ment d e c i s i o n s .
B e f o r e  e n t e r i n g  t h i s  c o n t r o v e r s y  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
l i s t  t h o s e  i t e m s  which  d i r e c t l y  e f f e c t  t h e  b a la n c e  o f  
payments  o f  th e  h o s t  c o u n t r y .  The m a jo r  ones  a r e  im p o r te d  
i n t e r m e d i a t e  goods and e x p o r t s ,  the  c a p i t a l  i n f lo w  and
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Of more im p o r tan c e  i s  r e  in v e s tm e n t  /d iv idend ,  
r e m i t t a n c e  b e h a v i o u r  and h e re  the t h e o r e t i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e  
on the  s t r a t e g y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m s  h a s  produced a 
c o n t r o v e r s y .  T h i s  c o n c e rn s  the  independence,  o r  i n t e r ­
dependence  b e tw e e n  th e  v a r i o u s  u n i t s  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i r m s  and t h i s  h a s  d i r e c t  r e l e v a n c e  f o r  the  b a la n c e  o f  
payments  o f  h o s t  c o u n t r i e s .  The i s s u e  s tems from the  
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n  o f  the  e a r n i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  owned s u b s i d ­
i a r i e s  a s  a n a l o g o u s  to  th e  p r o f i t s  o f  a compuls ive  gam bler  
who c o n s t a n t l y  p u t s  h i s  w in n in g s  back  i n t o  th e  game. Such 
a " g a m b l e r ' s  e a r n i n g s  h y p o t h e s i s "  was su g g e s t e d  by Barlow
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and Wender.  E d i t h  P en rose  ex tend ed  th e  h y p o t h e s i s  by. 
p r e s e n t i n g  i t  i n  te rm s  o f  the  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  and th e  "econom ies  o f  growth" o f  th e  s u b s i d i a r y  
u n i t .  Such a h y p o t h e s i s  depends  c r u c i a l l y  on the  
a s s u m p t io n  o f  s u b s i d i a r y  independence  (which Penrose  
s u g g e s t s  i s  a r e s u l t  o f  economic d i s t a n c e ,  w e igh t  b e in g  
g iv e n  t o  o n - t h e - s p o t  ju d g em en ts  and im m o b i l i ty  o f  p e rso n n e  
I n  t e rm s  o f  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s ,  i n v e s tm e n t  goes  on " lo n g  a f t e  
a c o m p a r i s o n  o f  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  on c a p i t a l  would a t t r a c t  
new i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  the  absence  o f  the  e x i s t i n g  s u b s i d i a r y ,  
i . e .  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a s u b s i d i a r y  in d u c e s  a "commit­
ment"  t o  c o n t i n u e  i n v e s t i n g  i n  t h a t  u n i t .
The p r e d i c t i o n  i s  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  o f  a b u i l d - u p  i n  the  
a s s e t  v a l u e  o f  th e  s u b s i d i a r y ,  f i n a n c e d  from i n t e r n a l  
f u n d s ,  e v e n t u a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a l a r g e  r e v e r s e  f low  o f  
d i v i d e n d s .  Such an  e v e n t u a l i t y  i s  c l e a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  f o r
the  h o s t  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  because  a l a r g e  o u t f lo w  o f
d i v i d e n d s  may prove  d e s t a b i l i s i n g .  F o r  a complete  
f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  th e  t h e o r y  however ,  we must  have more 
i n f o r m a t io n ,  on the  d i v i d e n d  p o l i c y  of  f o r e i g n  owned s u b ­
s i d i a r i e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  on th e  t im in g  o f  such  f l o w s .
The h y p o t h e s i s  i s  d ep en d e n t  on the  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  d i v i d e n d  
p o l i c y  d e p e n d s  on s u b s i d i a r y  v a r i a b l e s  o n l y .  A f i x e d  r a t i o  
o f  p r o f i t s  r e m i t t e d  a s  d i v i d e n d s  would s u f f i c e  b u t  a  
s t r i c t  v e r s i o n  o f  " g a m b l e r ' s  e a r n i n g s "  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h i s  
r a t i o  m ust  e q u a l  z e r o  f o r  some t ime a f t e r  the  s u b s i d i a r y  
a c h i e v e s  p r o f i t a b l e  o p e r a t i o n .
S t e v e n s  s u g g e s t s  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  h y p o t h e s i s  v i z :
(1 )  i n v e s t m e n t  b e h a v i o u r  i n  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  i s  n o t
d i f f e r e n t  f rom d o m e s t i c  i n v e s tm e n t  and (2 )  t h i s  i s  b e s t
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by th e  m a x i m i s a t i o n  o f  the  g l o b a l  p r o f i t
16o f  th e  o r g a n i s a t i o n .  A common in v e s tm e n t  c o n s t r a i n t ,  
o p e r a t i v e  on  a l l  u n i t s  i n  the  o r g a n i s a t i o n  i s  t h u s  p o s t u ­
l a t e d .  The c o n c l u s i o n  i s  t h a t  f u l l  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  
i n v e s tm e n t  f u n c t i o n s  w i t h i n  the  f i r m  i s  the  norm and so 
r e i n v e s t m e n t  and d i v i d e n d  p o l i c y  a re  f u n c t i o n s  o f  "whole 
f i rm "  v a r i a b l e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  o f  s u b s i d i a r y  u n i t  v a r i a b l e s  
a l o n e .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  t e s t  the  competing h y p o t h e s i s  a t  
f i r m  l e v e l  i n  th e  I r i s h  case  a s  d a t a  on p r o f i t s  and 
d i v i d e n d s  o v e r  time a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  o b t a i n .  D i s c l o s u r e  
of  such  f i g u r e s  i s  n o t  compulsory  and f i r m s  w i l l  no t  
n o rm a l ly  g iv e  such f i g u r e s  v o l u n t a r i l y .  A t t e n t i o n  i s  t h u s  
t u r n e d  t o  a g g r e g a t i v e  d a t a  i n  an a t t e m p t  t o  d e te rm in e  
i n v e s tm e n t  and d i v i d e n d . p o l i c y  a s  i t  a f f e c t s  the  b a l a n c e  
o f  p a y m e n ts .
I t  h as  been  su g g es ted  by Dermot McAleese th a t  much
o f  th e  FDI i n  I r e l a n d  i s  f i n a n c e d  by new c a p i t a l  i n f l o w s
r a th er  than by the exp an sion  o f  e x i s t i n g  f irm s through  
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r e in v e s tm e n t .  T h is  su g g e s t s  that p r o f i t s  are not 
c o n t in u a l ly  r e in v e s t e d  and p r e se n ts  a r e v e r se  "gambler*s  
e a r n in g s ” h y p o th e s i s  at the macro l e v e l .  The growth 
s t im u lu s  th u s  a r i s e s  from the a t t r a c t io n  o f  new f irm s  t o  
I r e la n d .
T h is  p r o p o s i t io n  can be examined by lo o k in g  at  
e x te n s io n  p r o j e c t s .  E x te n s io n  p r o je c t s  are exp an s io n s  
o f  e x i s t i n g  f ir m s  in  Ir e la n d  aided by IDA grant f i n a n c e .
Of the 396 l i v e  f o r e ig n  owned p r o je c t s  l i s t e d  i n  
Chapter I I I ,  69 or 1 7 . ^  o f  the t o t a l  are e x te n s io n  p r o ­
j e c t s .  T h is  in c lu d e s  f i f t e e n  f irm s which had c a r r ie d  out  
two e x t e n s io n s  and one firm  which expanded on three  
sep ara te  o c c a s i o n s .  E x te n s io n  p r o je c t s  are sm aller  than  
the average f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t ,  average investm ent i n  
e x te n s io n s  i s  £  388 ,900  a g a in s t  £ ^87,000 fo r  a l l  p r o j e c t s  
T h is  means th a t  the importance o f  e x te n s io n s  as measured  
by c a p i t a l  investm en t a t  f u l l  p rodu ction  f a l l s  to  13*9$  
o f  t o t a l  FDI.
The time p r o f i l e  o f  e x te n s io n s  must however be 
c o n s id e r e d .  As Table 6 .1  shows, the number o f  e x te n s io n s  
towards the  end o f  th e  p er iod  covered in c r e a se d  r a p id ly  
(the  f i g u r e  f o r  1971 nay  be in c o m p le te ) .
Table._6.t l  Time P r o f i l e  o f  F o r e i g n  owned E x t e n s i o n
P ro ie c t s .*
Year Number o f  E x te n s io n s Year Number o f
1961 1 1967 10
1962 1 1968 6
1963 3 1969 15
1961. 3 1970 20
1965 2 1971 7
1966
( In c lu d in g  
3 pen d in g)
’ T o ta l 72
+ F igure  may be in c o m p le te .
S o u rce : A u th o rf s c a l c u l a t io n s  from IDA d a ta .
Taken i n  c o n ju n c t io n  w ith  the tim ing  o f  the in f lo w s  o f  
f o r e ig n  c a p i t a l  (Table 3 . 1 )  and the f in d in g s  o f  the Survey  
o f  Grant Aided In d u stry  th a t  the mean time fo r  a grant  
aid8d p r o j e c t  to  a ch iev e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  i s  2 . 6  years** the  
f i g u r e s  f o r  1967-1970 are very  r e v e a l in g .  There does appear  
to  be a s i g n i f i c a n t  re “investm ent mechanism at. work.
Some su p p ortin g  ev id en ce  fo r  t h i s  c o n te n t io n  i s  g iv e n  
by the s low  growth in  d iv id en d  o u tf lo w s  from Ir e la n d .
•O  v
Table 6 .2  shows th a t  the "Income from c a p i t a l ” e n try  i n  the  
balan ce  o f  payments accou nts  has not r e g i s t e r e d  a s i g n i f i ­
cant i n c r e a s e  in  o u tf lo w s*  compared to  the  growth of  i n f l o w s
+ Median time 2 y e a r s .
However, th e s e  f i g u r e s  should be in te r p r e te d  w i t h  
c a u t io n  a s  th e y  in c lu d e  some e n t r i e s  r e l a t e d  to  ban king .
T a b q j L ^ l— Iasofflg--teoB._C.aP.ita l - I n f lo w  and Outflow  
(£  m i l l i o n )
i 2 6 0  1265. 1966 1.96? 19.68 1969 1970 1971
Income
from
C a p it a l -
I n f lo w  3 0 .9  M*.2 M+ .9  ^ 6 .1  5 1 .0  5 0 .9  5 8 .7  5 8 .9
Income
from
C a p i t a l -
Outflow 1 8 .7  2 ^ .5  2 7 .5  2 7 .7  2 7 A  32.1+ 3 9 .3  1*6.8
Source t I r i s h  S t a t i s t i c a l  B u l l e t i n . June 1970 ,
September 1971 , September 1972 .
There i s  l i t t l e  apparent a c c e le r a t io n  i n  the f i g u r e s  
fo r  o u t f lo w s  u n t i l  19 69 -1 9 7 1 , the same p er iod  in  which  
r e in v e stm en t  a l s o  in c r e a se d  r a p id ly .  Both s e t s  o f  o b s e r v ­
a t io n s  may th e r e fo r e  be the r e s u l t  o f  the in c r e a s in g  p r o f i t ­
a b i l i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  owned firm s and the f a c t  th a t many o f  
them j u s t  reached f u l l  p r o d u ct io n . In  v iew  o f  t h i s  i t  seems 
wise to  postpone a t e s t  o f  th e  behaviour o f  f o r e ig n  owned 
f irm s u n t i l  more o b s e r v a t io n s  become a v a i l a b l e .
In  r e l a t i o n  to  the balance.^of paym ents, r e in vestm en t  
behaviour has  been  the su b je c t  o f  a g r ea t  d e a l  o f  a t t e n t i o n  
because o f  the d i s t i n c t i o n  th a t  i s  o f t e n  drawn between FDI
financed, from in t e r n a l  funds as a g a in s t  th a t  f in a n ced  by an
i n f l o w  o f  new fu n d s  from the  sou rce  c o u n t r y .  There  i s
c o n c e p t u a l l y  no d i f f e r e n c e  be tw een  i n v e s tm e n t  f i n a n c e d
from t h e s e  two s o u r c e s .  However,  i t  i s  o f t e n  th e  c ase
th a t  d iv id e n d  ou tf lo w  i s  compared to  the o r ig i n a l
c a p i t a l  i n v e s tm e n t  r a t h e r  t h a n  the  f o r e i g n  owned c a p i t a l
18s t o c k  e x t a n t  a t  t h e  t i m e .  The r e a l l o c a t i o n  p rob lem  
t o  r e l e a s e  f o r e i g n  exchange  f o r  r e m i t t a n c e  may be a 
s e r i o u s  one f o r  the  h o s t  c o u n t r y  d e s p i t e  th e  e r r o n e o u s  
c o m p a r iso n  made be tw een  d i v i d e n d s  and o r i g i n a l  c a p i t a l  
i n v e s t m e n t .  T h i s  may f o r c e  the  h o s t  c o u n t r y  t o  r e s t r i c t  
d o m e s t i c  c o n su m p t io n  a n d  in v e s tm e n t  t o  g e n e r a t e  the  
r e q u i r e d  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e .  E d i t h  Pen rose  goes  on  t o  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h i s  p roblem w i l l  be worse when th e  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  a r e  e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t e d  b ecau se  t h e i r  s a l e s  
(and t h e r e f o r e  p r o f i t s )  a re  more prone t o  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  
With  r e g a r d  t o  I r e l a n d ,  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  l i k e  the  
’’g a m b l e r ’ s e a r n i n g s  h y p o t h e s i s ” must be r e g a r d e d ’ a s  no t  
p r o v e n .  The problem o f  f u t u r e  d iv id e n d  o u t f lo w s  c a u s i n g  
b a l a n c e  o f  payments  and r e a l l o c a t i o n s  p rob lem s may be 
ahead i f  the  c a p i t a l  f lo w  c o n t i n u e s  and c o n d i t i o n s  f a v o u r  
h ig h  r e m i t t a n c e  r a t e s .  However,  t h i s  s p e c t r e  h a s  no t  
a r i s e n  y e t  and w i l l  no t  do so i f  p r o f i t a b l e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
f o r  r e i n v e s t m e n t  r e m a in  open i n  I r e l a n d .
Summary
The s t r a t e g y  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i r m s  i n  moving f u n d s  
a c r o s s  t h e  e x c h a n g e s  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e i r  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
s t r u c t u r e .  The I r i s h  econoray i s  a f f e c t e d  by s u b s i d i a r y
u n its*  r e in v e s tm e n t  and rem ittan ce  d e c i s i o n s .  On l im i t e d  
ev id en ce  , caused  by the sm all number o f  o b s e r v a t io n s  over  
t im e 5 i t  appears to  be th8 case th at a re in vestm en t  
mechanism, a id ed  by e x te n s io n  g r a n ts ,  i s  tak in g  p la c e .  
Remittance o f  d iv id e n d s  has not ye t  p r e c ip i t a t e d  any 
sh o r ta g e s  o f  f o r e ig n  exch ange . However, the b u i ld  up o f  
f o r e ig n  c a p i t a l  i n  Ire la n d  may in  the fu tu re  produce a 
la rg e  o u t f lo w  o f  fu n d s , causin g  r e a l l o c a t i o n  problem s.  
Judgement on t h i s  i s s u e  m ust, fo r  the moment, be p o s t -  
ponedr f o r  the moment, the  ’’gam bler’ s e a rn in g s  h y p o t h e s i s ’1 
i s  not p ro v en .
S e c t io n  k .  Q u a n t i f i c a t io n  o f  the Balance o f  Payments 
e f f e c t s  o f  F ore ign  D ir e c t  In v es tm en t.
1 .  The model o f  b a lan ce  o f  payments im p act.
Any model o f  ba lan ce  o f  payments impact must s t e e r
a course betw een  g e n e ra l  eq u il ib r iu m  a n a l y s i s ,  where payments
are b a la n c in g  and s e l f - c o r r e c t i o n  n u l l i f i e s  d i s tu r b a n c e s ,
and p a r t i a l  e q u i l ib r iu m  a n a l y s i s ,  where the c e t e r i s  p ar ib u s
19assum ption  may e l im in a te  c e r t a i n  important e f f e c t s .
The model u t i l i s e d  here d e r iv e s  from the UNCTAD study o f  
20L&ll e t  a l .  " The approach adopted i s  a m ic r o - le v e l  study -  
the impact i s  a s s e s s e d  on a firm  by firm  b a s i s .  The 
e f f e c t s  i s o l a t e d  are at the  margin, ta k in g  ons firm  a t a t im e .  
There are s e v e r a l  a d v a n ta g e s ‘in h eren t i n  t h i s  micro approach.  
F i r s t l y ,  many param eters can be assumed unchanged by the  
entry  o f  one f o r e ig n  owned p r o j e c t .  In  t h i s  ca teg o ry  are
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t a s t e s ,  p r i c e s  and wage l e v e l s .  S e c o n d ly ,  Government 
p o l i c y  c a n  be assumed t o  rem a in  u n a l t e r e d .  P o l i c y  
c o n c l u s i o n s  c an  be a r r i v e d  a t  f o r  one f i r m ,  o r  w i t h i n  
sm a l l  a g g r e g a t i o n s  such a s  f o r  a s e c t o r .  F i n a l l y ,  a  
s e p a r a t e  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  c an  be 
made f o r  e a c h  f i r m .  T h is  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p o r t a n t  
when th e  f i r m s  u n de r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  d i f f e r  i n  s e v e r a l  
i m p o r t a n t  r e s p e c t s ,  n o t a b l y  g iv e n  the  v a r y i n g  d i f f i c u l t y  
o f  r e p l a c i n g  f o r e i g n  t e c h n o l o g y ,  s k i l l s  and management 
w i t h i n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  be tw een  s e c t o r s .
The d i s a d v a n t a g e s  d e r i v e  from two m ain  s o u r c e s .  
F i r s t l y ,  m a j o r  changes  o f  p o l i c y  canno t  be d i s c u s s e d  i n  
t h i s  f r am e w o rk .  P a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r e c l u d e s  th e  
d e r i v a t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n c l u s i o n s .  S e c o n d ly ,  
t h e r e  a r e  s e r i o u s  o m i s s i o n s .  The b a la n c e  o f  payments  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  " e x t e r n a l  e f f e c t s "  em ana t ing  from FDI have 
t o  be o m i t t e d  a n d ,  a s  p o i n t e d  ou t  e l s e w h e r e ,  e x t e r n a l  
e f f e c t s  may be an  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  the  impact  o f  FDI 
on the  h o s t  economy. L inkage  and seco n d a ry  e f f e c t s  a re  
a l s o  o m i t t e d .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  th e  i s s u e  o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
b o r ro w in g  i s  d e a l t  w i t h  i n  a c u r s o r y  f a s h i o n  and the  d i f f ­
i c u l t i e s  o f  a c c u r a t e  measurement a re  subsumed i n  a " d e g r e e  
o f  r e p l a c e m e n t "  c o e f f i c i e n t ,  which e s t i m a t e s  th e  e x t e n t  
t o  Which t h e  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t  would have b e e n  r e p l a c e d  i n  
the  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n .
The d a ta  used combines th a t from IDA sou rces  w ith  
the An F oras Forbartha survey and data  c u l le d  from the  
a u th o r ’ s i n t e r v i e w s .  The IDA data  c o n s i s t s  o f  p r o j e c t io n s  
by the f ir m s  and i s  the most complete s e t  cover in g  a l l  
l i v e  f ir m s  ( f ir m s  pending and firm s th a t  have f a i l e d  are  
exclud ed  from the balance  o f  payments a n a l y s i s ) .  The 
An Foras F orbartha and in te r v ie w  data  are used t o  a s s e s s  
the e x te n t  to  which the IDA p r o je c t io n s  have been met 
and to  c a l c u l a t e  a " fu lf i lm e n t  proportion" which i s  
a p p lie d  to  those  f irm s o f  the same n a t i o n a l i t y  and s e c t o r  
where o n ly  the IDA p r o j e c t io n  e x i s t s .  In most c a s e s ,  
t h i s  cou ld  be e s t im a te d  f o r  a l l  f irm s but i n  one or  
two s e c t o r s ,  p r o j e c t io n s  could not be checked a d eq u ate ly  
and such s e c t o r s  are noted be low , the e s t im a t e s  o f  ba lan ce  
o f  payments impact fo r  th e se  s e c to r s  are v e ry  t e n t a t i v e .
Coverage o f  the data  over tim e, how ever, i s  v ery  
l im i t e d  b ecau se  o f  t he la c k  o f  accurate  d a ta .  No time 
s e r i e s  d a ta  f o r  the c r u c i a l  parameters can be found.  
T herefore  t h e  e s t im a t io n  o f  balance o f  payments e f f e c t s  
could  be made f o r  on ly  one year -  1971* (The UNCTAD 
study c a lc u l a t e d  ba lan ce  o f  payments e f f e c t s  fo r  s e v e r a l  
yea rs  and th e n  averaged them ). The danger remains th a t  
1971 was an a t y p i c a l  year  but t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  cannot be 
a v o id e d . The dangers o f  g e n e r a l i s in g  from the e x p e r ­
ien ce  o f  one year  must be n o te d .
A ssu m p t io n s  and M ethodo logy
The two major f a c t o r s  d is c u s s e d 'h e r e  are ( i )  the  
d e s ig n  o f  the model used to  a s s e s s  the balance o f  payments 
impact o f  FDI ( i i )  the app rop ria te  a l t e r n a t iv e  p o s i t i o n  
a s s u m p t io n ( s ) .
( i )  Two m odels o f  ba lan ce  o f  payments impact
The problem s encountered in  e s t im a t in g  the ba lan ce
o f  payments e f f e c t s  o f  FDI can on ly  be ta c k le d  w i t h in
a coherent c o n c ep tu a l  framework. Two such con cep tu a l
s t r u c t u r e s  are u t i l i s e d  here t, the "long run balance
model" (LRB) d e r iv in g  from the work o f  L i t t l e  and
M ir r le e s 2 ’*- and the " in te r n a l  balance model" (IB ) which
?2r e l i e s  on b a s i c  work by Max Corden. Here we examine 
both  m odels w ith  r e s p e c t  to  an in v a r ia n t  a l t e r n a t iv e  
p o s i t io n -r e p la c e m e n t  o f  the fo r e ig n  p r o je c t  by im p o rts .  
S e c t io n  2 in tr o d u c e s  a l t e r n a t iv e  assum p tion s.
The Long Run Balance Model
The lo n g  run ba lan ce  model i s  d er iv ed  from the c o s t  
b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  form ulated  by L i t t l e  and M ir r le e s .
The LRB model a ttem p ts  to  e v a lu a te  the e f f e c t s  o f  FDI 
on the n e t  income o f  the h o s t  cou n try . In d e r iv in g  
"income e f f e c t s " ,  a l l  in p u ts  and outp uts o f  the p r o je c t  
are v a lu e d  a t  i n t e r n a t io n a l  p r i c e s .  Balance o f  payments 
e f f e c t s  are th e r e fo r e  in trodu ced  by the v a lu a t io n  o f  
a l l  in p u ts  and ou tp u ts  a t  an opp ortu n ity  c o s t  equal to  
t h e i r  tr a d e a b le  v a lu e .
A c e n t r a l  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  such a scheme i s  t h a t  o f  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  impact  o f  the  
u t i l i s a t i o n  o f  n o n - t r a d e a b l e  goods ( i n c l u d i n g  l a b o u r  and 
n o n - t r a n s f e r a b l e  c a p i t a l ,  i . e .  b u i l d i n g s  and l a n d ) .  The 
c r u c i a l  a s s u m p t io n  i n  the  LRB model i s  t h a t  th e  Govern­
ment c a n ,  and a lways w i l l ,  a c t  so a s  t o  keep  th e  s u p p ly  
and demand f o r  n o n - t r a d e d  goods i n  " lo n g  r u n  b a l a n c e " .  
C o n s e q u e n t ly  th e  f u l l  r e s o u r c e  b u rd e n  o f  p ro d u c in g  non 
t r a d e d  goods f a l l s  on the  b a la n c e  o f  paym en ts .  The 
d i v e r s i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  from the  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t r a d e d  
goods t o  non t r a d e d  goods r e s u l t s  i n  an  immediate  b a l a n c e  
o f  paym ents  i m p a c t .  ^  T h i s  a ssu m p t io n  and i t s  c o n s e ­
quences  mark  th e  c r u c i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  from the  i n t e r n a l  
b a la n c e  model_/ .  A f u r t h e r  a s su m p t io n  o f  the  LRB model 
i s  t h a t ,  a t  a l l  t im e s  and i n  a l l  s e c t o r s ,  f u l l  c a p a c i t y  
work ing  i s  m a i n t a i n e d .  I f  t h i s  a s s u m p t io n  were v i o l a t e d ,  
the  c o s t  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  the  o u tp u t  o f  goods from non f u l l  
c a p a c i t y  f a c t o r i e s  would no t  be g iv e n  by t h e i r  o s t e n s i b l e  
o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s .
G iven  t h i s  f ram ework ,  eve ry  c a t e g o r y  o f  i n p u t  and 
o u tp u t  c an  be v a lu e d  i n  t e rm s  o f  i t s  impact  on th e  b a l a n c e  
o f  payments  by the  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t / i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s  
c a l c u l u s .  The i t e m s  a re  v a lu e d  a s  f o l l o w s .
The s a l e s  o f  the  p r o j e c t  S (below th e  s u b s c r i p t  L 
r e f e r s  t h r o u g h o u t  t o  LRB v a l u a t i o n s )  a r e  v a lu e d  a t  th e  
r u l i n g  w o r ld  p r i c e  f o r  the  p ro d u c t  o r  p r o d u c t s  ( f . o . b . ) .
I n  the  I r i s h  c a s e ,  where e x p o r t s  c o n s t i t u t e  by f a r  the
the  l a r g e s t  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  th e  s a l e s  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s ,  
p r i c e s  a r e  t h o s e  g iv e n  by th e  f i r m s .  The r o l e  o f  
t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  w i l l  be l e s s  i m p o r t a n t  where such 
e x p o r t s  a r e  f i n a l  goods b e c a u se  of  the l e v e l  o f  com pet­
i t i o n  i n  w o r ld  m a r k e t s .  Where t h i s  i s  no t  t h e  c a s e ,  
and " t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g "  i s  s u s p e c t e d ,  t h e n  th e  p r i c e  u sed  
i s  t h e  a v e r a g e  p r i c e  f o r  t  he good a s  computed from 
E x t e r n a l  T rade  S t a t i s t i c s . 2 ^ Where the  o u tp u t  o f  the  
f o r e i g n  f i r m  i s  so ld  on th e  I r i s h  Market  the  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p r i c e  i s  e i t h e r  the  im por t  p r i c e  ( c . i . f . )  i n t o  I r e l a n d  
(from E x t e r n a l  Trade S t a t i s t i c s )  o r  i s  t h e  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e
p
r e d u c e d  by th e  t a r i f f  ( i . e .  St = —  . where P i s  t h e
"  ( 1 + t )
home m a r k e t  and t  the  I r i s h  t a r i f f  r a t e ) .  The p r e f e r r e d  
method i s  d i r o c t  p r i c e  com par isons  b e tw een  im p o r t s  ( c . i . f . )  
and home p r i c e ,  which  a r e  used  whenever p o s s i b l e .  The two 
methods a r e  e q u i v a l e n t  under  a s e r i e s  o f  r e s t r i c t i v e  assump- 
t i o n s ,  su ch  a s  no " w a te r "  i n  t a r i f f s .
T r a d e d  i n p u t s  a re  s i m i l a r l y  v a lu e d  a t  c . i . f .  p r i c e s  
i n t o  I r e l a n d .  T r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  may a r i s e  h e re  b u t  i s  
e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  e l i m i n a t e .
N o n - t r a d e d  i n p u t s , which under  the  a s s u m p t io n s  o f  
t h i s  m o d e l ,  c o n s t i t u t e  a r e s o u r c e  b u rd e n  on th e  b a l a n c e  
o f  p a y m e n ts ,  a r e  s p l i t  up a c c o rd in g  to  the  I r i s h  i n p u t  -
ph.
o u t p u t  t a b l e  i n t o  t r a d e d  goods so t h a t  th ey  to o  a r e  
v a l u e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e i r  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  im p a c t .  Non­
t r a d e d  goods  a r e  no t  an i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  I r i s h  c a se  
b e c a u se  ( 1 )  most  goods a r e  t r a d e d  and have a b o r d e r  p r i c e
( th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  Northern Ire la n d  as  part o f  the U.K. 
e n su r e s  t h i s )  (2 )  e v id en ce  s u g g e s t s  th a t  the  I r i s h  exchange  
r a te  i s  n o t ,  and -was not i n  1971> g r e a t l y  o v e r v a lu e d .
Where n on -trad ed  item s are s m a l l ,  th ey  can be va lued  by 
the use o f  a standard c o n v e r s io n  f a c t o r  (SCF) which i s  
the r a t i o  o f  the p r i c e s  o f  a bundle o f  goods at e x t e r n a l  
p r i c e s  to  the same goods at i n t e r n a l  p r i c e s  (or  the  
in v e r se  o f  the shadow f o r e i g n  exchange r a t e ) .  The input  
v a l u a t i o n  C  ^ i s  g iv e n  by summing traded  and non -trad ed  
g o o d s .
F a c to r - ln p u ts  are v a lu e d  at o p p o r tu n ity  c o s t s .  The 
c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  i s  awkward because  i t  must be measured over  
t im e .  C a p ita l  i s  f i r s t  d iv id e d  in t o  two e le m e n ts ,  f o r e i g n  
c a p i t a l  and d om estic  c a p i t a l .  The b a la n ce  o f  payments 
c o s t  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  i s  the amount o f  d iv id e n d s ,  
i n t e r e s t  and r e p a tr ia t e d  funds which c r o s s  the e x ch a n g es .  
These i tem s  are a lread y  denominated i n  term s o f  t h e i r  
f o r e ig n  exchange c o s t  and are rep resen ted  as D. The opp ortu n­
i t y  c o s t ’ v a l u a t i o n  o f  d o m e st ic  c a p i t a l  employed i n  a 
f o r e ig n  f irm  i s  the amount th a t  such c a p i t a l  wou3-d have 
earned had i t  been  employed e lsew h ere  i n  th e  economy. The 
c a l c u l a t i o n  i s  fo r  a s p e c i f i c  time p e r io d  -  1971* The r a te  
o f  r e tu r n  chosen  must r e f l e c t  t h i s  t im in g .  An o p p o r tu n ity  
c o s t  o f  20$ o f  the c a p i t a l  s to c k  per annum was a t t r ib u t e d  
t o  the d o m e st ic  c a p i t a l  used i n  th isv& y . The r ea so n  f o r  
the c h o ic e  o f  such a h ig h  shadow r e n t a l  on c a p i t a l  i s  th a t  
the in p u t o f  I r i s h  c a p i t a l  c o n s i s t s  m ain ly  o f  Government
+
fu n d sj c h a n n e lled  through the IDA to  f o r e i g n  in v e s to r s *
The second major d om estic  ( I r i s h )  source  o f  c a p i t a l  fo r  
f o r e i g n  f ir m s  i s  r i s k  c a p i t a l  put up by I r i s h  i n d iv id u a l s  
and companies to  c r e a te  " j o in t  ven tu res" *  In  v iew  o f  the 
d e s ir e  o f  I r i s h  p o l i c y  makers to  d e v e lo p  the  d om estic  
i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r ,  t h i s  a g a in  has a h ig h  s c a r c i t y  v a l u e .
A th ir d  source  o f  funds from I r e la n d ;  l o c a l  d e b t ,  I s  a 
r e l a t i v e l y  unimportant source o f  f in a n c e  f o r  f o r e ig n  
com panies. I f  the r a te  o f  20% i s  f e l t  to  be to o  h ig h ,  
s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a ly s i s  cou ld  be employed -  a low er shadow 
r e n t a l  would g iv e  more fa v o u r a b le  r e s u l t s  f o r  Ir e la n d  i n  
ev ery  c a se  where dom estic  c a p i t a l  i s  employed -  which means 
i n  a l l  o f  the p r o j e c t s .  The r e v i s e d  r e s u l t s  w i l l  vary  
i n  d i r e c t  p r o p o r t io n  to  the s i z e  o f  the  d o m estic  c a p i t a l  
sh a r e .  The o p p o r tu n ity  c o s t  o f  u s in g  up d o m estic  c a p i t a l  
i s  d e s ig n a te d  0^.
The same p r i n c i p l e s  govern  the b a la n ce  o f  payment
2 5impact o f  the  rem uneration  o f  labour* The wage b i l l  i s  
s p l i t  in t o  two e le m e n ts :  r e tu r n s  to  "non scarce"  labou r
and to  "scarce"  la b o u r .  Scarce  lab ou r  i s  th a t  which would  
be employed i n  the absence o f  the p r o j e c t .  Non sca rce  
labou r w ou ld , in  the absence  o f  th e  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t ,  be 
unemployed (or  em inigrant). R eturns to  sc a r c e  labour are
* Chapter VII p r o v id e s  a ccjte-fc-benefit a n a l y s i s  i n  which  
b e n e f i t s  are ex p ressed  per £ o f  p u b l ic  in v e s tm e n t .  The
ch o ice  o f  20$ i s  c l e a r l y  an a r b itr a r y  one -  to  use s e n s i t ­
i v i t y  a n a l y s i s  would how ever, unduly co m p lica te  the r e s u l t s .
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va lu ed  a t  what the workers would have earned i f  the  
p r o je c t  had not taken  p la c e  (= L ) .  Non sc a rc e  labou r  
cannot be c o n s id er ed  i n  t h i s  way because i t s  e a r n in g s  
c o n s t i t u t e  a n e t  income g a in  f o r  the h o s t  country  and i t s  
spending h a s  an adverse ba lan ce  o f  payments impact (= % )*  
The b a la n ce  o f  payments improves o n ly  to  the e x te n t  
th a t  s a v in g s  in c r e a s e .  The spending from the e a r n in g s  o f  
n o n -sc a rc e  la b o u r  (% )  th u s cau ses  income e f f e c t s  t o  
d iv e rg e  from balan ce  o f  payments e f f e c t s .  R ep resen t in g  
o v e r a l l  b a la n ce  o f  payments e f f e c t  w ith  LRB assum ptions  
as and income e f f e c t s  by I ws thus have s
= I  -  WH (E qu ation  6 .1 )
When t h e s e  e f f e c t s  are m easured, the labou r  fo r c e  must 
be d iv id e d  i n t o  scarce  and n on -scarce  lab ou r  and the con ­
sumption o f  n o n -sca rce  lab ou r  must be e s t im a te d .  An 
e s t im a te  o f  th e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  scarce  lab ou r  has to  be made 
fo r  each  f i r m .  However t h i s  e s t im a te  must a l s o  r e f l e c t  
o v e r a l l  m acro-econom ic c o n d it io n s  (6% unemployment th rou gh ­
out 1971 and c o n t in u in g  e m ig r a t io n ) .  Our assum ption i s  
th a t  s k i l l e d  workers cou ld  f in d  a l t e r n a t i v e  employment but  
not the r e s t  o f  the w o r k -fo r c e ,  where d e t a i l e d  f i g u r e s  on  
the s k i l l  p r o f i l e  f o r  p a r t i c u la r  f irm s are u n a v a i la b le ,  an  
average f i g u r e  f o r  f ir m s  i n  the  same in d u s tr y  i s  a p p l i e d .
The consum ption  o f  n o n -sc a r c e  labou r  i s  assumed t o  e q u a l  i t s  
income - s a v i n g s  o f  such labour, are assumed t o  be n e g l i g a b l e .
336
The f i n a l  elem ent in  the c a l c u l a t io n  o f  LRB e f f e c t s  
i s  the payments to  the source country o f  r o y a l t i e s  on 
t e c h n ic a l  know-how and p o s s ib ly  on management c o n t r a c t s .  
These are d i r e c t  payments and l i k e  d iv id e n d s ,  are a lr e a d y  
valued a t  t h e i r  ’’f o r e ig n  exchange e q u iv a le n t” . R oya lty  
payments and a l l  payments fo r  t e c h n o lo g ic a l  borrowing  
are denoted  by R.
U sin g  the  above symbols and the LRB assum ptions  
(w ith  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n ,  replacem ent by im ports  
b e in g  denoted  by the s u p e r s c r ip t  ) the e s t im a t in g  
eq u a t io n  i s  g iv e n  by e q u a t io n  6 .2
B* = S -  (C^ + + L + R + D) -  WM ( 6 . 2 )
where S i s  s a l e s ,  0T i s  the o p p ortu n ity  c o s t  o f  u s in g  upJLi
d om estic  c a p i t a l ,  i s  input c o s t s ,  L the payment to  
scarce  la b o u r ,  R r o y a l t y  payments, D d iv id e n d s  and 
spending from the e a rn in g s  o f  non -scarce  la b o u r , a l l  as  
d e f in e d  a b o v e .
The I n t e r n a l  Balance Model
S e v e r a l  o f  the e lem en ts  d e f in e d  above e n te r  the  
i n t e r n a l  model (IB ) in  e x a c t l y  the same form a s  under LRB 
assu m p tio n s .  These are D and R, which are  t r a n s fe r r e d  
d i r e c t l y  a c r o s s  the exchanges and the v a lu e  o f  f i n a l  output  
S which r e p r e s e n t s  in  ev ery  case a tr a d e a b le  good.
The c r u c i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw ee n  the  two models  i s  
the  a s s u m p t io n  c o n c e r n i n g  th e  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  impact  
o f  n o n - t r a i n e d  g o o d s .  The IB a s s u m p t io n  i s  t h a t  th e  
i n c r e a s e d  demand f o r  n o n - t r a d e d  goods cau se d  by th e  e n t r y  
o f  a  f o r e i g n  f i r m  i s  n u l l i f i e d  by an  e x a c t l y  e q u i v a l e n t  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  G ove rnm en t’ s own c o n su m p t io n  o f  n o n -  
t r a d e d  g o o d s .  The a s s u m p t io n  o f  the  LRB model  t h a t  the  
Government m a i n t a i n s  e q u a l i t y  betv/een s u p p ly  and demand 
f o r  n o n - t r a d e a b l e  goods p r o d u c e s  the  r e s u l t  t h a t  such  
goods have a b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  e f f e c t .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u se  
r e s o u r c e s  have  t o  be d i v e r t e d  from th e  t r a d e d  t o  the  n o n -  
t r a d e d  goods  s e c t o r .  The IB a s s u m p t io n s  im ply  t h a t  no . 
such  d i v e r s i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e  a s  the  Government s im p ly  
r e d u c e s  i t s  demand f o r  n o n - t r a d e a b l e s  by an  e q u i v a l e n t  
amount t o  t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  demand cau sed  by th e  e n t r y  o f  th e  
new p r o j e c t .
The b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  impact  o f  th e  f o r e i g n  f i r m ’ s 
c o n su m p t io n  o f  n o n - t r a d e d  goods i s  t h e r e f o r e  z s r o .  T h i s  
d o e s  n o t  mean t h a t  the r e s o u r c e  c o s t  o f  p r o d u c in g  n o n -  
t r a d e d  goods i s  z e r o  -  t h i s  i s  s t i l l  g i v e n  by th e  LRB 
framework} b u t  t h a t  t h i s  c o s t  i s  no t  r e f l e c t e d  i n  any 
b a l a n c e  o f  payments  e f f e c t .  O v e r a l l  demand f o r  n o n -  
t r a d e d  goods i s  assumed n o t  t o  change a f t e r  the  e n t r y  o f  a 
f o r e i g n  f i r m  -  m e re ly  the  i d e n t i t y  o f  th e  b u y e r  changes  
( f rom Government t o  th e  e n t r a n t  f o r e i g n  f i r m ) .  L abour  i s  
a  n o n - t r a d e d  good and t h e r e f o r e  the  i n p u t  o f  l a b o u r  and 
i t s  payment  h a s  no b a l a n c e  o f  payment e f f e c t  (The G ove rn ­
ment i s  assumed t o  r e d u c e  i t s  demand f o r  l a b o u r  by an
amount e q u iv a le n t  to  the employment o f  the f o r e ig n  
p r o j e c t ) .  In  a d d i t io n ,  the Government i s  assumed to  a c t  
so as  to  c o u n te r a c t  the b a la n ce  o f  payments impact o f  
the in c r e a s e d  spending o f  n on -scarce  la b o u r .  Only traded  
goods in p u ts  a f f e c t  t h e  e x te r n a l  b a lan ce  under IB 
assum ptions and such in p u ts  (va lued  as  under the LRB 
schem es) e n te r  the e q u a t io n  as  (where s u b s c r ip t  i  
r e f e r s  to  IB q u a n t i t i e s ) .
The same shadow r a te  o f  re tu rn  i s  a p p l ie d  to  d om estic  
c a p i t a l  but t h i s  r a te  a p p l ie s  to  traded c a p i t a l  o n ly .  
Non-traded c a p i t a l  ( b u i ld in g s  and la n d )  i s  assumed to  be 
t r a n s fe r r e d  to  the f o r e ig n  p r o je c t  from Government hands 
and so no b a lan ce  o f  payments impact r e s u l t s .  The impact 
o f  d o m est ic  c a p i t a l  on the balance o f  payments in  
o p p o r tu n ity  c o s t  terms i s  thus g iv e n  as  0^ .
The e s t im a t in g  e q u a t io n  fo r  the ba lan ce  o f  payments
Ximpact o f  f o r e i g n  f irm s  (Bj_ ) i s  thus g iv e n  by eq u a tio n  6 . 3 .
I
B i  = S -  ( 0 ± + C + R + D )  (6.3)
I
where S i s  the  s a l e s  o f  the p r o j e c t ,  0 '^ i s  the o p p o rtu n ity  
c o s t  o f  "traded c a p i t a l ” , the impact o f  traded in p u t s ,
R i s  r o y a l t y  payments and D d iv id en d  payments, a l l  v a lu ed  
under IB assum ptions as o u t l in e d  above .
The R elevance  o f  the two Models
Prima f a c i e ,  both  s e t s  o f  assum ptions are u n r e a l i s t i c .  
The LPJ3 assum ptions can be c h a llen g ed  on the grounds th a t
no Government can ensure th a t  the supply o f  a 
h e ter o g en eo u s  group o f  i n d u s t r i e s  producing non-traded  
goods w i l l  e x a c t ly  match in  a f r i c t i o n l e s s  way the  
changing demands fo r  such goods. F u l l  c a p a c ity  working  
throughout the economy i s  an extrem ely  h e r o ic  assum p tion .  
In the IB m odel, g iv en  the r i g i d i t i e s  i n  p ro d u ction  
Government a d m in is tr a t iv e  procedures and the aim o f  
a t t a i n i n g  o th e r  s o c i a l  o b j e c t i v e s ,  i t  i s  im p o ss ib le  to  
exp ect  a Government to  co n t in u o u s ly  accommodate in c r e a s in g  
demand by c u t t in g  back i t s  own demand f o r  non-traded  
goods. Such a p o l i c y  would be i n t o l e r a b l e .
The two c a s e s  can be seen  as extreme assum ptions  
between w hich the true p o s i t i o n  w i l l  be found . The UNCTAD 
study s u g g e s t s  th a t t h e  true  p o s i t i o n  w i l l  be much c l o s e r  
to  the LRB r e s u l t s . 2  ^ Government p o l i c y  i s  c l e a r l y  a 
most im portant determ inant o f  which assum ptions are more 
c lo s e  to  r e a l i t y .  In a s i t u a t i o n  o f  unemployment and 
p o t e n t i a l  e m ig r a t io n  l i k e  th at fa c in g  Ir e la n d  in  1971 the  
IB a ssu m p tio n s ,  r e q u ir in g  the Government to  reduce i t s  
demand f o r  n o n -tra d ea b le  good s , appear to  be u n r e a l i s t i c .  
The LRB assum p tion s seem to  be a c lo s e r  approxim ation  to  
r e a l i t y  but t h i s  can be no more than an approx im ation ,  
g iv e n  r i g i d i t i e s ,  e x c e s s  c a p a c ity  in  s e v e r a l  i n d u s t r i e s ,  
the im p e r fe c t io n  o f  in fo r m a tio n  f lo w s and the  in a d e q u a c ie s  
o f  Government r e sp o n se .
2 .  The A l t e r n a t i v e  P o s i t i o n  Assumption
Three a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  assumptions are u t i l i s e d .  
Assumption I i s  that  i n  the absence o f  FDI, an e x p o r t in g  
f irm i s  r e p la c e d  by no p r o j e c t  a t  a l l  and that  the f o r e i g n  
f irm which s e l l s  t o  the dom est ic  market i s  r ep laced  by 
im p o rts .  (The d i s c u s s i o n  o f  the two models above was 
p r e d ic a t e d  on t h i s  a s su m p t io n ) .  This  a p p l i e s  to  f i rm s  
which s e l l  to  both  markets pro rata  w ith  s a l e s .
Assumption II  i s  replacement o f  the f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t  
by a d o m e s t ic  p r o j e c t  s i m i l a r  i n  every  way5 ex cep t  th a t  
the rep lacem ent  p r o j e c t  i s  com p lete ly  f in a n ce d  from 
d om est ic  s o u r c e s .  A l t e r n a t i v e  I I I  r e c o g n i s e s  that  I I  may 
be u n r e a l i s t i c  from the p o in t  o f  view th a t  a l l  in p u ts  may 
not be a v a i l a b l e  from I r i s h  so u r c e s .  Therefore  (1 )  the  
c o s t  o f  t e c h n o lo g y  and management may d i f f e r  (2 )  the r e p l a c e -  
ment ( I r i s h )  f irm may bo d e f i c i e n t  i n  c e r t a i n  r e s p e c t s  
v i s - a - v i s  the f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t  and that  i t  may not be p o s s i b l e  
to  r e p la c e  the whole o f  th e  output o f  the f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t .
A degree  o f  replacement ( l e s s  than or equal  to  100^ o f  the  
output o f  the p r o j e c t )  c o e f f i c i e n t  i s  thus a p p l ie d  to  
encompass such a s i t u a t i o n .
The degree  o f  change i n  balance  o f  payments impact
as we move from assumption I to  II  w i l l  depend on the
comparative c o s t  o f  f o r e i g n  v e r s u s  d om est ic  f i n a n c i n g .  The
change w i l l  thus depend on the magnitudes o f  D (payments
I Ii n  r e s p e c t  o f  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l )  and C ^ , the  o p p o r t u n i t y
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c o s t  o f  the I r i s h  c a p i t a l  needed to  r e p la c e  the f o r e i g n  
share o f  the c a p i t a l  s t o c k .  Thus e q u a t io n  6.*+ shows the  
" f i n a n c i a l  replacement" a l t e r n a t i v e *
bL -  B^1 = D -  O^1 (6.*+)
In many c a s e s ,  f i n a n c i a l  replacement may be 
con s id ered  u n r e a l i s t i c ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  because  o f  the  
i n t e r r e l a t e d  nature o f  the f o r e i g n  company's " c o n t r i b ­
u t io n " .  T h is  i s  e s p e e t i a l l y  true i n  s e c t o r s  where I r i s h  
management i s  weak and t e c h n o l o g i c a l  dependence i s  g r e a t .
The r e a s o n  f o r  in c lu d in g  " f i n a n c i a l  replacement" i s  not  
f o r  i t s  r e a l i s m  but to  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between the pu re ly  
f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  ( c a p i t a l  p r o v i s i o n )  o f  f o r e i g n  
f irm s  and i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  i n  o ther  a r e a s .  In a r e a l  
world s i t u a t i o n  t h i s  may be a l t e r e d  by the d i f f e r e n t  
c o s t  ( i n  the  extrem e,  complete u n a v a i l a b i l i t y )  o f  f o r e i g n  
t e c h n o lo g y ,  management, market o u t l e t s  and o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
s k i l l  which f a c e s  an I r i s h  firm as compared wit tr  a f o r e i g n  
a f f i l i a t e  •
Assumption I I I  i s  adopted i n  the hope o f  ca p tu r in g  some 
o f  t he c o s t  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  mentioned a b ove .  The assum ption  
i s  made th a t  the replacement f irm would u t i l i s e  the same 
t ec h n o lo g y  as  the f o r e i g n  f irm  -  which may w e l l  not be the  
c a s e .  The I r i s h  f irm t h e r e f o r e  would u s u a l l y  pay a g r e a t e r  
amount f o r  the tec h n o lo gy  than the a f f i l i a t e .  The p r i c i n g  
o f  t e c h n o lo g y  and management i s  ex trem ely  d i f f i c u l t  to  
e s t im a te  where no " o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i a "  ( su c h  a s  s u g g e s t e d
arms l e n g t h  v a l u e s  by the f irm s where i n t e r v i e w s  were 
c a r r ie d  out or e s t a b l i s h e d  p r i c e s )  could be found. In  
these  c a s e s ,  the h i g h e s t  l e v e l  o f  r o y a l t y  payments made 
by a f o r e i g n  f irm to  i t s  parent i n  that  s e c t o r  was 
imputed on the grounds th a t  such a f i g u r e  r e p r e s e n t s  
an approx im at ion  to  the market pr ice  o f  the knowledge  
t r a n s f e r r e d .  The degree  o f  replacement c o e f f i c i e n t  
r e p r e s e n t s  even  more e s t i m a t i o n  problems.  Such a 
c o e f f i c i e n t  can be expected  to  vary from 100# i n  a r ea s  
l i k e  s im ple  food p r o c e s s in g  to  almost z e r o ,  where t e c h ­
n o lo g y ,  p a t e n t s  and know-how are u n a v a i la b le  o u t s id e  a 
t i n y  group o f  large  f i rm s  and where the l e v e l  o f  v e r t i c a l  
i n t e g r a t i o n  i s  very  h i g h .  The degree o f  replacement i s  
thus an e s t i m a t e  o f  a v e ry  t e n t a t i v e  n a t u r e .  The e s t im a t e  
i s  m ainly  based on the e x i s t i n g  s t r e n g th  o f  the d o m e s t i c a l l y  
owned s e c t o r  -  the p r o p o r t io n  o f  output c o n t r o l l e d  by 
wholly  I r i s h  owned f i r m s .  This  can be expected  to be d i r e c t l y  
p r o p o r t i o n a l  to  the ease  of  e n tr y  fo r  I r i s h  f irm s i n t o  the  
s e c t o r .  Many c a v e a t s  are n e c essa ry  when an e s t im a te  o f  
degree o f  replacement i s  made and i n  some s e c t o r s  no 
attempt was made to  provide  an e s t i m a t e .
Assumptions I I  and I I I  are u t i l i s e d  o n ly  i n  terms o f
the LRB m odel .  This  i s  because  (1 )  the LRB framework 
appears more v a lu a b le  f o r  the I r i s h  c a s e , (2 )  i t  was
found t h a t  IB d id  not d i s c r im i n a t e  between f irm s  and s e c t o r s
as e f f e c t i v e l y  as LRB. LRB a l lo w s  d i f f e r e n c e s  to  be shown 
i n  a c l e a r e r  l i g h t  and (3 )  to  l i m i t  the number of  r e s u l t s  
to  be p r e s e n t e d .
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The above d i s c u s s i o n  h i g h l i g h t s  the l i m i t s  to  
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n .  I t  i s  c l e a r  that  s e v e r a l  important  
v a r i a b l e s  have been co m p le te ly  exc lu d ed ;  n o ta b ly  
e x t e r n a l  economies and d i s e c o n o m ie s ,  and th a t  o ther  
q u a n t i t i e s  such as the c o s t  o f  t e c h n o lo g y ,  cannot be 
e s t a b l i s h e d  w i th  any r e a l  degree  of  c e r t a i n t y .  I t  i s  
hoped however,  tha t  the r e s u l t s  go as f a r  as  i s  p o s s i b l e  
at the moment and that  ;they g ive  some u s e f u l  i n s i g h t s  
i n t o  the e f f e c t s  o f  FBI on the I r i s h  ba lan ce  o f  payments.
The R e s u l t s
B alance  o f  payments e f f e c t s  are c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  each  
f irm s e p a r a t e l y .  The Appendix to  t h i s  Chapter p r e s e n t s  
the r e s u l t s  at  i n d i v i d u a l  f irm  l e v e l .  R e s u l t s  were o b ta in ed  
f o r  a l l  the f i r m s  in  the IDA data s e t  f o r  which a complete  
range o f  d a ta  i s  a v a i l a b l e .  The coverage was 233 from the  
396 ’’l i v e ” f i r m s .  Ho attempt was made to  compute ba lance  
o f  payments e f f e c t s  f o r  f a i l e d  f irm s or the o ther  c a t e g o r i e s .
The r e s u l t s  are i n  a l l  c a s e s  presen ted  as a percentage  
o f  s a l e s  f o r  th e  year 1971* Table 6 .3  shows the outcome o f  
a g g r e g a t in g  i n d i v i d u a l  f irm s  to  s e c t o r a l  l e v e l .  The 
f i g u r e s  i n  Table 6 .3  are thus p e r cen tag es  o f  s e c t o r a l  o u t ­
p u t .  In  terms o f  the numbers o f  f irm s w i t h i n  them, the  
s e c t o r s  are r a th e r  uneven. Further a g g r e g a t io n  was not  f e l t  
t o  be j u s t i f i e d ,  a l thou gh  a separate  f i g u r e  was d e r iv e d  
f o r  the food i n d u s t r i e s  i n  aggregate  (SIC 2 0 1 - 7 ) .
The t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e - p o s i t i o n  a s su m p t io n s
A l t e r n a t i v e  I (replacement by Imports)  i s  c a l c u l a t e d  . 
on both  LRB and IB assum p t ion s .  In the LRB framework,  
most s e c t o r s  c o n t a in  not only  p r o j e c t s  which c o n tr ib u te  
to  the I r i s h  ba lance  o f  payments but a l s o  some w ith  
n e g a t iv e  ba la n ce  o f  payments e f f e c t s *  (see  Appendix T a b l e ) 
However, th e  s e c t o r a l l y  aggregated  r e s u l t s  show i n  most 
c a s e s  p o s i t i v e  balance o f  payments e f f e c t s  i . e .  w i th  LRB 
a ssu m p t ion s ,  t a k i n g  replacement by imports  as  the r e l e v a n t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  c r i t e r i o n ,  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  have i n  
most c a s e s  improved the balance  of  payments* Five s e c t o r s  
have n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  and 21 p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  w i th  such  
assumptions* Negative  r e s u l t s  are g iv e n  by paper and 
paperboard (SIC 2 6 ^ /5 )  m eta l  cans and h e a t in g  apparatus  
(SIC 3?+ 2 / 3 ) ,  s p e c i a l  i n d u s t r i a l  machinery (SIC 35*+) o t h e r  
e l e c t r o n i c  equipment (SIC 365)  and ’’o th er  and unknown’’ 
products  (SIC 19)* Our r e s u l t s  mean th a t  had such p r o j e c t s  
not been undertaken the I r i s h  balance o f  payments would 
have been  improved (on t h i s  s e t  o f  a s s u m p t io n s ) .
When A l t e r n a t i v e  I i s  computed w ith  IB a ssum p t ion s ,  
the ba lance  o f  payments e f f e c t  of  every  f irm i s  p o s i t i v e  
(one f irm  has a zero r e s u l t  however)* The d i f f e r e n c e  
between the two models a r i s e s  because o f  t h e  t r a n s f e r  o f  
the burden o f  non-traded goods ( in c lu d in g  non-traded f a c t o r  
i n p u t s )  away from the ba lance  of  payments on to  the  
Government* The importance o f  non-traded goods ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y
labour s e r v i c e s  can be se en  i n  the change i n  the r e s u l t s  as
T T Iwe have from B£ to  B  ^ * Almost a l l  B^ r e s u l t s  l i e  i n  the
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range + 30J& t o  + k o $ " i t h e  v e r y  low f i g u r e  f o r  s e c t o r  19 
r e f l e c t s  the low v a lu e  added a c c r u i n g  t o  labou r  i n  t h i s  
grouping -  many o f  the f i r m s  a r e  packaging o r  f i n i s h i n g  
o p e r a t i o n s  a t  Shannon Free Airport*  The f i g u r e s  i l l u s t r a t e  
the immense burden which would be p la c ed  on the Government 
i f  i t  had t o  a c t  acco rd ing  t o  IB r u l e s *  For t h e  o t h e r  two 
a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  assum ptions o n ly  LRB assum ptions  are  
u t i l i s e d .
The " f i n a n c i a l  rep la cem en t” a l t e r n a t i v e  I I  y i e l d s  
16 n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t s  and 10 p o s i t i v e  ones  s e c t o r a l l y .
The n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t s  mean th a t  i n  t h e se  s e c t o r s ,  I r i s h  
c a p i t a l ,  a t  the margin,  i s  l e s s  c o s t l y  than th e  cont inu ed  
payment o f  d i v i d e n d s .  However, t h i s  r e s u l t  i g n o r e s  the  
f a c t  t h a t  FBI r e p r e s e n t s  a package o f  e l e m e n t s ,  i n c lu d i n g  
management s k i l l s ,  market a c c e s s  and t e c h n o lo g y  as w e l l  a s  
c a p i t a l .  I t  i s  a f a l s e  p o s i t i o n  t o  sep a ra te  r e tu r n s  to  
c a p i t a l  from th e se  complementary f e a t u r e s .  The h e a v i l y  
n e g a t iv e  r e s u l t s  d e r iv e  from those s e c t o r s  where p r o f i t s  
have b een  h i g h .  Indeed ,  d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r o f i t  e a rn in g s  
a c r o s s  s e c t o r s  are a major i n f lu e n c e  on t h e  r e s u l t s .  Such 
r e t u r n s  may be b e t t e r  Imputed to  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  borrowing  
or management s k i l l s .  The p a r t i a l  p i c t u r e  g iv e n  by the  
r e s u l t s  under t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  shown up by the number 
o f  t e c h n o lo g y  i n t e n s i v e  s e c t o r s  which r e t u r n  n e g a t iv e  
r e s u l t s .  The r e s u l t s  o f  these  s e c t o r s  improve by the  
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A l t e r n a t i v e  I I I  a t t e m p ts  to  a l lo w  f o r  t e c h n i c a l
and r o y a l t y  payments by i n c lu d i n g  such payments e x p l i c i t l y
and by e n t e r i n g  a degree  o f  replacement c o e f f i c i e n t  to
show the e x t e n t  to  which t h e  p r o j e c t  cou ld  be rep laced
from I r i s h  resources® The q u a n t i ty  o f  in fo r m a t io n  req u ired
to  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  carry  out t h i s  t r a n s fo r m a t io n  i s  immense
and so e s t i m a t e s  must be made. S e v e r a l  h ig h  t ec h n o lo g y
s e c t o r s  had t o  be exc luded  because  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f
o b t a in in g  in f o r m a t io n .  In  a l l  remaining c a s e s ,  the r e s u l t s
under A l t e r n a t i v e  I I I  improved on A l t e r n a t i v e  I I .  This
was true e v en  i n  the food s e c t o r ,  where i t  was n e c e s s a r y
to  make some a l low ance  f o r  brand names and p a t e n t s .  The
d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  i n  a l l  s e c t o r s ,  o f  a l lo w in g  f o r  the impact
o f  product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and e s t im a t in g  the c o r r e c t  "arms
l e n g t h ” p r i c e  o f  t e c h n o lo g y  are enormous. Some in fo r m a t io n
was a v a i l a b l e  f o r  some s e c t o r s  from q u e s t io n n a i r e s  and
27
some p u b l i c a t i o n s  but t h i s  in fo r m a t io n  was s c a n t .  The 
remedy chosen  was o f t e n  the im puta t ion  o f  the h i g h e s t  
percentage  o f  s a l e s  r e p r e s e n te d  by r o y a l t i e s  o f  any f irm  
i n  the s e c t o r  to  a l l  f i r m s  w i t h i n  t h e  s e c t o r .  This  was 
hoped to  r e p r e s e n t  an approxim ation  to  arm's l e n g t h  p r i c e s .  
O vera l l  r e s u l t s ,  f o r  the reduced couple  o f  s e c t o r s ,  f o r  
A l t e r n a t i v e  I I I  was 12 p o s i t i v e  r e tu r n s  and nine n e g a t iv e  
one s .
R e s u l t s  by S e c to r
The most b e n e f i c i a l  ba lance  o f  payments r e s u l t s  are
found i n  the food s e c t o r s .  This  i s  s u r p r i s i n g  i n  v iew  o f
the  low t e c h n o l o g i c a l  dependence i n  t h i s  s e c t o r  but t h i s  
f a c t o r  i s  over-com pensated  f o r  by the abundance o f  I r i s h  
inp uts  which low ers  imported in p u ts  and r a i s e s  Retained  
Value i n  I r e la n d  ( se e  Chapter IV ) ,  The b e s t  r e s u l t s  
fo r  any s i n g l e  in d u s tr y  i s  g iv e n  by d a ir y  products  (SIC 202)  
a r e s u l t  which would be su g g es ted  by the th eo ry  o f  com­
p a r a t iv e  c o s t ,  g iv e n  I r e l a n d ’ s resou rce  endowment. The
aggregate  r e s u l t  f o r  the  food in d u s tr y  (SIC 201 -  7) i s
r I Ib e t t e r  than th a t  o f  any o th e r  s e c t o r  on both B£ and B 
a lthough  i t  i s  not  the b e s t  when t e c h n o l o g i c a l  borrowing,  
product d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  and degree o f  replacement are 
brought i n t o  the c a l c u l u s .  Other s e c t o r s  record in g  s trong  
p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t s  are wood and fu r n i t u r e  (SIC 2*+), p r in te d  
m atter  (SIC 2 7) and d r u g s ,  soap and c o s m e t i c s  (SIC 2 8 3 A ) *  
The wood in d u s tr y  and drugs produ ct ion  become n e g a t iv e  i n  
the f i n a n c i a l  replacement a l t e r n a t i v e  I I  because o f  h ig h  
p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  H igh ly  n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t s  occur In m etal  
cans and h e a t i n g  apparatus  (SIC 3 ^ 2 / 3 ) ,  s p e c i a l  i n d u s t r i a l  
machinery (SIC 35*+) and the  paper and packaging i n d u s t r i e s  
(SIC 2 6 ^ , 2 6 5 ) .  High r e t u r n s  and o v e r s u b s i d i s a t i o n  (a 
concept t o  which we s h a l l  r e t u r n  i n  Chapter V II )  account  
f o r  t h e s e  r e s u l t s .
S e v e r a l  s e c t o r s  (wood (SIC 2 ^ ) ,  p r in t e d  m atter  (SIC 2 7 )  
n o n - f e r r o u s  m eta l  products  (SIC 382,33*+>335)) record
j
v e ry  h ig h  r e s u l t s  on T h is  i s  the r e s u l t  o f  the w e i g h t ­
ing  g i v e n  by IB assum ptions to  th e  non-traded  component.
Such s e c t o r s  are labour  i n t e n s i v e  -  the burden o f  labour
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a s s u m p t i o n s . Indeed  th e  r e s u l t s  o v e r a l l  r e f l e c t  th e  
d i f f e r i n g  i n p u t  s t r u c t u r e s  a c r o s s  s e c t o r s .  As A l t e r n a t i v e  I  
w i t h  IB shows th e  impact  o f  non-fcraded goods and i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  l a b o u r  i n p u t ,  so A l t e r n a t i v e  I I  shows the  e f f e c t s  
o f  r e m i t t e d  p r o f i t s  and d i f f e r e n t i a l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  
A l t e r n a t i v e  I I I  shows th e  im pac t  o f  an  a t t e m p t  t o  a c c o u n t  
f o r  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  b o r ro w in g  i n  the  w i d e s t  s e n s e .
Table 6.*+ shows how the rankings o f  the balance  o f  
payments e f f e c t s  o f  the d i f f e r e n t  s a c t o r s  change as  we 
a l t e r  the assu m p t ion s .  The change from Column I  to 2 
shows how the rankings a l t e r  when the payment t o  labour i s  
c o n s id er ed  as  a b e n e f i t  r a th e r  than as a c o s t .  Labour 
i n t e n s i v e  s e c t o r s ,  such as p r in te d  m atter  (SIC 2 ? ) ,  wood 
and f u r n i t u r e  (SIC 2^, 2 57)  and Smelted and r e f i n e d  m eta l  
(SIC 3 ^ 2 /3 )  move up the rankings  w h i l s t  more c a p i t a l  
i n t e n s i v e  s e c t o r s  move down the r a n k i n g s .  The change from 
column 1 t o  column 3 i n v o l v e s  a change i n  the a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s i t i o n ,  from replacement by imports to  the  f i n a n c i a l  
a l t e r n a t i v e  r ep la cem en t .  Here the r e l a t i v e  amounts o f  
f o r e i g n  to  dom est ic  c a p i t a l ,  and p r o f i t a b i l i t y  are the  
f a c t o r s  which a l t e r  the ran k in g .  S e c t o r s  i n  which h ig h  
p r o f i t s  are earned and r e m it te d  move down the r a n k in g s .
Com par ison  w i t h  o t h e r  s t u d i e s
The r e s u l t s  above would be more m e a n in g f u l  were i t  
p o s s i b l e  t o  compare them w i t h  r e s u l t s  f rom  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  
s i m i l a r  economic  s t r a u c t u r e s .  However t h e  H u fb a u e r  and
A d le r  and Reddaway R e p o r t s  a r e  co n ce rn e d  w i t h  th e
b a l a n c e  o f  payments  im pac t  on th e  so u rc e  c o u n t r y  and
2 8p r o v id e  no h e l p  t o  t h i s  s tudy*
The s t u d i e s  co n d u c ted  f o r  UNCTAD by a team l e d  by
S t r e e t e n  and L a l l  a r e  co n ce rn e d  w i t h  c o u n t r i e s  a t  a
2 9much lo w e r  l e v e l  o f  deve lopm en t  t h a n  I r e l a n d *  However, 
s e v e r a l  f e a t u r e s  common t o  th e  UNCTAD s t u d i e s  and the 
r e s u l t s  d e r i v e d  h e re  a r e  w or thy  o f  no te*  F i r s t  i s  the  
im p o r ta n c e  o f  Government p o l i c y  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  t a r i f f  
and p r o t e c t i o n  p o l i c y .  I t  sh o u ld  no t  be s u r p r i s i n g ,  g i v e n  
th e  m ethods  o f  a s s e s s i n g  b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  i m p a c t ,  t h a t  
t a r i f f  l e v e l s  a f f e c t  t h e  r e s u l t .  In d eed  i t  a p p e a r s  t o  be 
th e  c a se  t h a t  th e  a bsen ce  o f  h e a v i l y  n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t s  such  
a s  t h o s e  fo un d  by L a l l  e t  a l  f o r  I n d i a  a r e  l a r g e l y  a b s e n t  
from th e  c a se  o f  I r e l a n d  b e ca u se  o f  th e  l i b e r a l  t a r i f f  
p o l i c y  (and  o t h e r  in d u ce m e n ts  t o  f r e e  t r a d e )  a d o p te d  by 
I r e l a n d .
A second  common f e a t u r e  i s  the  u n im p o r ta n c e  o f  th e  
M f i n a n c i a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n ” o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  The 
m a jo r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  FDI i s  i n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  t o  be found  
e l s e w h e r e .  The most i n f l u e n t i a l  s i n g l e  f a c t o r s  i n  th e  
UNCTAD s t u d y  o f  I n d i a  and I r a n  were raw m a t e r i a l s ,  v a lu e  
o f  o u t p u t  and th e  c o s t  o f  r e p l a c e m e n t  c a p i t a l .  I n  th e  
I r i s h  c a s e ,  th e  f i r s t  two f a c t o r s  a r e  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  b u t  
the  l a s t  one i s  no t  o f  m a jo r  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  (Compare 
A l t e r n a t i v e  I  w i t h  I I  u n d e r  LRB a s s u m p t i o n s ) .
F i n a l l y  and most i m p o r t a n t ,  b o t h  s t u d i e s  em phas ise  
v e r y  s t r o n g l y  t h a t  e ach  f i r m  must  be a s s e s s e d  on the  
m e r i t s  o f  i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n ®  G e n e r a l i s a t i o n  i s  n o t  
recommended i n  e i t h e r  c a s e .  V a r i a b i l i t y  w i t h i n  s e c t o r s  
i s  v e r y  s t r o n g  i n  I r e l a n d  a s  i n  the  UNCTAD s t u d y .
A t te m p ts  t o  l o o k  f o r  " r u l e s "  on b a l a n c e  o f  payments  
e f f e c t s  a p p e a r  bound t o  f a i l .  The UNCTAD s tu d y  a t t e m p t s  
by s t a t i s t i c a l  methods  t o  i s o l a t e  o u t s t a n d i n g  f a c t o r s  
t o  p r o v i d e  p o l i c y  g u i d e l i n e s .  However a l l  such  a t t e m p t s  
a r e  shown t o  be u n s u c c e s s f u l  and the p o l i c y  must  be one 
o f  c ase  by c a se  p ra g m a t i sm .  Such i s  a l s o  th e  case  f o r  
I r e l a n d .
S m a s z
B a la n c e  o f  payments  r e s u l t s ,  c a l c u l a t e d  a c c o r d i n g  
t o  two d i f f e r e n t  a n a l y t i c a l  f ram ew orks ,  w i t h  t h r e e  
a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  a s s u m p t i o n s ,  p r o v id e  an  i n t e r e s t i n g  
d i v e r s i t y  o f  r e s u l t s  and i n s i g h t s .  The IB s e t  o f  
a s s u m p t i o n s ,  which  assumes t h a t  th e  Government f o l l o w s  a 
m yopic ,  a n t i - g r o w t h  p o l i c y  o f  r e d u c in g  i t s  p u r c h a s e s  o f  
n o n - t r a d e d  goods a s  the  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i n c r e a s e s  them, 
was g i v e n  l e s s  a t t e n t i o n  b e ca u se  of  th e  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  
n a t u r e  o f  i t s  a s s u m p t io n s .  However, i f  we c o n s i d e r  t h a t  
a l l  payment t o  l a b o u r  sh o u ld  be c oun ted  a s  a b e n e f i t  and 
n o t  a s  a b a l a n c e  o f  paym ents  b u r d e n ,  t h e n  t h i s  i s  the  more 
a p p r o p r i a t e  model t o  u s e .  The LRB a s s u m p t io n  i n  which  th e  
f u l l  r e s o u r c e  b u r d e n  o f  n o n - t r a d e d  goods f a l l s  on the  
e x t e r n a l  b a l a n c e ,  was ju d g e d  to  be a c l o s e r  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  t o  
r e a l i t y .
357
The r e s u l t s  were s e n s i t i v e  t o  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s i t i o n  a ssum pt io n *  The t h r e e  a l t e r n a t i v e s ;  r e p l a c e ­
ment by i m p o r t s  (o r  no p r o j e c t  i f  the f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t  
i s  c o m p l e t e l y  e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t e d ) ,  f i n a n c i a l  r e p l a c e ­
ment by a n  e x a c t l y  s i m i l a r  I r i s h  f i r m  and r e p l a c e m e n t  
by a n  I r i s h  f i r m  a s  f a r  a s  i s  f e a s i b l e  i n  t e rm s  o f  t h e  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  o f  FDI i n  t e c h n o l o g y ,  management and so on 
where c h o s e n  t o  h i g h l i g h t  v a r i o u s  a r e a s  o f  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
o f  th e  f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r *
The r e s u l t s  were v a r i a b l e  w i t h i n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  b e tw e e n ,  
s e c t o r s .  The most f a v o u r a b l e  r e s u l t s  were g i v e n  by the  
food  i n d u s t r i e s  and by some o f  t h e  more t e c h n o lo g y  
i n t e n s i v e  s e c t o r s .  However even  s e c t o r s  w i t h  h i g h l y  
f a v o u r a b l e  o v e r a l l  r e s u l t s  c o n ta in e d  s e v e r a l  f i r m s  w h ich  
had n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  on the  b a la n c e  o f  payments  ( see  
Appendix T a b l e ) .  . The c l e a r  i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  t h a t  an  ex  a n te  
s tu d y  o f  th e  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  e f f e c t s  o f  f o r e i g n  owned 
p r o j e c t s  i s  n e c e s s a r y  and such  a s tu d y  must  be made on a 
p r a g m a t i c ,  f i r m  by f i r m  b a s i s .  No g e n e r a l  g u i d e l i n e s  on 
s e c t o r a l  l i n e s  c an  be j u s t i f i e d .
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g ecfcion 5.  C o n c lu s io n
T h i s  C h a p te r  h a s  i n v e s t i g a t e d  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
be tw ee n  F o r e i g n  D i r e c t  I n v e s tm e n t  and th e  I r i s h  b a l a n c e  
o f  paym ents  i n  b o t h  q u a l i t a t i v e  and q u a n t i t a t i v e  te rm s*  
E a r l i e r  C h a p te r s  have e s t a b l i s h e d  th e  im p o r tan c e  o f  FDI 
i n  the  I r i s h  economy and i t  was s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  the  
f u n c t i o n i n g  o f  the  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  a d ju s tm e n t  mech­
anism a c c o r d i n g  t o  the  parad igm  o f  th e  "Common Cause 
Theory"  made th e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  even  more i m p o r t a n t .
Moving f rom  a macro t o  a m ic ro  a p p r o a c h ,  i t  was 
found  t o  be d i f f i c u l t  t o  t e s t  the  b e h a v i o u r  o f  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  such t h e o r i e s  a s  the  
" G a m b le r ' s  E a r n i n g s  H y p o t h e s i s "  b eca u se  o f  th e  l a c k  o f  
s u i t a b l e  d a t a *  However a n a s c e n t  r e i n v e s t m e n t  mechanism 
was f e l t  t o  be a t  work and the  d a t a  t h a t  a r e  a v a i l a b l e  
do c o n f l i c t  w i t h  a s t r o n g  v e r s i o n  o f  th e  Gamblers 
E a r n i n g s  H y p o t h e s i s .
Balance  o f  payments e f f e c t s  were q u a n t i f i e d  at  
i n d i v i d u a l  f irm  l e v e l  f o r  1971* The r e s u l t s  obta ined  
were shown to  be s e n s i t i v e  not on ly  to  the model o f  
impact used but a l s o  to  the a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  assum pt­
i o n .  The r e s u l t s  were a l s o  v a r ia b le  w i t h i n  as w e l l  a s  
between s e c t o r s .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  e s t a b l i s h  some 
g e n e ra l  p r o p o s i t i o n s  ex pos t  on t h e  kind o f  p r o j e c t  th a t  
y i e l d s  b e n e f i c i a l  r e s u l t s  but ex ante a p p r a i s a l  must be 
done on a f i r m  by f i r m  b a s i s .  O v e r a l l ,  the v a r i o u s  model
359
gave p o s i t i v e  or n e g a t iv e  r e s u l t s  as p r e sen ted  i n  
*— ITable 6 .5*  L The model gave e n t i r e l y  p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  
because o f  t h e  treatment o f  labour payments as  a b e n e f i t  
r a th er  than  a burden on the e x t e r n a l  ba lance  .J 7
Table  6 . 5 , , , ._Nmb^r..,of_^rplect.s. g i v ing .posi t i v e  or  n e g a t iv e ,  
b a l a n c e  o f  payments  impact  u n d e r  the  lo n g  r u n  
b a l a n c e  model w i t h  d i f f e r e n t  a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s i t i o n  a s s u m p t io n s .
Model P o s i t i v e  impact N egat ive  impact N.A. T o t a l  
B* 150 83 -  233L
B** 98 135 -  233
B11* 107  95 31 233
S o u r c e : Appendix C a l c u l a t i o n s .
The rep lacem ents  by imports  or no p r o j e c t  a l t e r n a t i v e ,
B? shows on r a t i o  of  favou rab le  e f f e c t :  .unfavourable ones
o f  almost  2 : 1 .  The " f i n a n c i a l  replacement" a l t e r n a t i v e  
TTp o s i t i o n  B shows more n e g a t iv e  r e s u l t s  than p o s i t i v e ,L
from which we can conclude t h a t ,  c o n s id ered  i n  i s o l a t i o n  
from o th e r  i n f l u e n c e s ,  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  i s  more e x p e n s i v e ,  i n  
terms o f  i t s  c o s t  to  the balance  o f  payments, t h a n  i s  
dom est ic  c a p i t a l .  F i n a l l y ,  when we make some a l low ance  f o r
the  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of  FDI, the p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  
outweigh the n e g a t iv e  o n es ;  a l though t h i s  r e s u l t  must be
t r e a t e d  w i t h  c a u t io n  g iv e n  the u n c e r t a i n t i e s  o f  measure­
ment. There are a l s o  31 c a s e s  where no e s t im a te  could  
he made u s in g  t h i s  a ssum ption .
The e f f e c t  o f  FDI on the balance  o f  payments o f  the 
h o s t  country  i s  an important parameter, bo th  f o r  a n a l y s i s  
and f o r  p o l i c y .  In a d d i t i o n ,  such r e s u l t s  h e lp  to  d e f i n e  
a c c u r a t e l y  the  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r ’ s c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  the  
dom est ic  economy. However, the r e s u l t s  should not be used  
as  the f i n a l  a r b i t e r  o f  the c o s t s  or b e n e f i t s  o f  FDI.
Many f a c t o r s  are excluded  f?om the c a l c u l u s  when e v a l u ­
a t i n g  b a la n ce  o f  payments impact and we must a l s o  account  
f o r  the trade  o f f s  between balance  o f  payments o b j e c t i v e s  
such as  d o m e st ic  e f f i c i e n c y ,  growth and d i s t r i b u t i o n .  
Chapter V attem pted to  a s s e s s  e f f i c i e n c y  e f f e c t s  and the 
f o l l o w i n g  Chapter p r o v id es  the means towards a f u l l  c o s t  
b e n e f i t  a p p r a i s a l  o f  FDI.
C h a p te r  VI# Appendix .
I n d i v i d u a l  Firm R e s u l t s .
I
Key: = Balance o f  Payments e f f e c t  under A l t e r n a t i v e  I
( s u p e r s c r i p t )  and Long Hun Balance  ( s u b s c r ip t  L)
I
= I n t e r n a l  Balance  ( s u b s c r ip t  i )
Firm 22^ = S e c to r  2 2 ,  Firm 1 e t c .
A l l f i g u r e s are $ o f s a l e s .
Firm No 2 2 i 222 223 22.k 22 5
22 „ 
o
B 1L 12$ 22$ 1 5 .3 $ -■+.3$ 8 .2 $ 1 2 .5 $
Bi 4 l . 5 $ 4 7 .7 $ 3 2 .4 $ +17.7$ 3 4 .6 $ 5 9 .5 $
B t 8 . 5 $ 2 9 .7 $ - “+1.2$ - 1 1 .3 $ 5 .4 $ 1 . 5 $
- m








bL - 7 . 6 $ 1 6 .4 $ 5 .9 $ - 1 5 .5 $ 3 . 3 $ - 8 . 3 $
I
Bi 3 6 .8 $ 5 6 .1 $ 3 7 .3 $ 5 2 .0 $ 4o.o$ 4 2 .3 $
BH
L -1 3 . 6$ 1 0 .8 $ - 2 . 0  $ - 2 0 . 0 $ - 7 .0 $ - 8 . 3 $
Firm No 2213 22n* 22 15 22 16 22 ,17
22
18
bl - 8 . 0$ 2 0 . 8$ 2 5 .5 $ 2 . 8$ 2 6 .7 $ 0 . 3 $
X
Bi 6 6 . 0$ 3 8 . 6$ 65 .1 $ ^6 . 8$ 3 0 .5 $ 1 9 .3 $
B11 B L - 8 . 0$ l b .  6% 9 A $ - 1 0 . 5 $ 2 8 . 1$ - 0 . 3 $
.,111  
B L - 8 . 05? l b .  6% 1 2 . 0$ - 7 . 7 $ 2 8 . 1$ - 0 . 3 $
Firm No 2 2 19 22 20 22 21 22 22 22 23 22 , 2^
b l 5 .6 $ 1 7 .5 $ 1 3 .2 $ 8 .3 $ - 6 . 5 $ 1 2 .9 $
B11 37.3% 3 6 . 8$ 3 7 .8 $ “+9.7$ 3 2 . 1$ 3 9 .6 $
I I
b l
-0.7% 7.7% - 0 . 5 $ 7 .9 $ - 1 0 .3 $ - 7 . 1 $
I I I  
B L -0.7% 7.7% 2 . 6$ 8 .9 $
0$ 2 . 9 $







b J 0 . 7 $ 1 2 .5 $ - 1 8 . 6$ - 5 . 3 $ 9 .6 $ 2 5 . 8$
Bi *t2 . 0$ 2 8 .^$ 5 7 .1 $ 2 1 . 6$ 3 7 .8 $ 3 b . 3%
B11 B L - 5 . 3 $ 2 . 5 $ - 2 2 . 9 $ - 5 . 3 $ 7 .6 $ 2 . 22$
I I I  
















l k  *2# - 0 . 3 $ 1 6 .0 $ - 1 4 .0 $ 2 4 .  5$ 2 8 .2 $
I
Bi 2 ^ .6 $ 2 7.5% 3 2 .5 $ 3 3 .2 $ 59 .5 $ 4 2 .0 $
I I  
B L 8.955 -h.9% 7 .0$ - 1 8 .0 $ 2 6 . 0$ 2 7 .4 $
I I I  
B L 8 . 9 $ -h.9% 7 .0$ - 1 7 .2 $ 2 6 . 0$ 2 9 .7 $
Firm No 2 \ 2 3 5 2 3 6
23
7 238 2 3 9
b l 2 . 7 $ - 1 8 .0 $ 7 .9$ - 1 3 .0 $ 1 2 .0 $ - 3 . 6 $
I
Bi 42 .4 $ 4 0 .0 $ 4 6 .5 $ 6 0 .0 $ 4 8 .2 $ 4 9 .4 $
5 . 0 % - 2 1 .3 $ 0 . 8 $ - 1 3 .0 $ - 3 . 6 $ - 1 1 . 9 $
5.**% - 2 1 .3 $ 0 . 8 $ - 1 3 . 0 $ —1 . 0 $ - 1 9 . 4 $
Firm No 2 h o 23U 2 3,12
23
13 2 3 , 14
23
15
4 -9.5% 15.5% 2 . 0 $ "18 .5$ , - 9 . 9 $ 1 9 .0 $
•i h o .  6% 52 .0 $ 4 2 .7 $ >+7.0$ 4 7 .0 $ 5 5 .0 $
R11 
B L - 17. 2% 4 5 .5 $ - 1 . 9 $ - 2 3 .0 $ - 1 0 .2 $ 6 .0 $
I I I  
B L -7 .7% 50 .5 $ - 0 . 6 $ - 2 2 .5 $ - 0 . 5 $
1 1 .0 $
Firm No 23 .  ,  23 2 3 ,„  23 23 23
16 17 18 19 20 21
5 - l b . 9% 7.1% 2 2 . 7 % - 5 3 . 1 $ 17.9% 1 3 . 8%
» ; 5 8 .9 $ 3 5 .7 $ 57.7% 22.6% 29.5% 2 6 . 1%
- 2 6 . 3 $ -0.7% 8.6% - 5 9 .8 $ 1 5 .2 $ 1 6 .0 $
n I I I  
B i»













■ j 5.2% 1 0 .3 $ -95.9% 1 3 .8 $ 3 2 . 6$ 6 . 7 $
*1 2 8 . 9 % *+1.3$ b2.b% 60 . 2$ 85.1+$ 5 5 ,5 $
I I
b l -0.1% - 3 . 0 $ -1 1 9 .5 $ - 2 . 8 $ *+0.0$ 5 .1 $
I I I  
B L - 0 . 1 $ - 1 . 0 $ -1 1 7 .1 $ +2.8$ >+0.0$ 5-1$










* 8 . 8 $ 2 8 .0 $ 0 . 7 $ 7 .8$ -0.9% 3 -0 $
• I 5 9 .7 $ 86.373 3 2 .6 $ 20 .  b% 9 0 .5 $ 2 6 . 8%
I I
b l - 2 . 9 $ 16.873 - 9 . 6 $ 5 .8 $ - 5 7 . 8 $ 1 2 .6 $
I I I  















11* 1% k 7 . 2% 7*3% 9.3% 59*6% 2.8%
1 7*7% 67. k% 28. 0% 17 * 8% 7 k .2% 16.6%!)
»? lk .0 % kk.0% 3*1% 11*9% 56.6% - 1 « 8%
I I I  
B L 12.6%
2k .0% 3*1% 11*9% 56.6/i? -1.8%














- 2 . 3% 5-7# 3 7 .8 # 2 . 5 # 3 2 .5 # 2 2 .  8#
I
Bi 5 6 .6 $ 3 9 .8 # 4 4 .9 # 53-3# 53 .2# 5 8 .1 #
11
b l
- 3 6 . 8 # 1 .0 # 4 0 .3 # 7 .5# 1 5 .4 # 2 . 1 #
I I I  













4 2 7 . 3 # 5 2 . 0# - 4 .0 # - 4 2 .  7# - 4 . 9 # - 1 2 .4 #
■ i 4 9 .0 # 6 8 .3 # 18 . 0/y 74.4# 52 .9 # 4 3 . 7#
b ’ l1 2 2 .9 # 5 2 .9 # - 1 3 .3 # - 5 6 .0 # - 1 2 . 5 # - 1 4 . 0 #
I I I  
B L 2 2 . 9 # 52 .9 # - 1 3 .3 # - 5 6 .0 # - 1 2 .5 # - 2 . 5 #
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2(M /51 2 6 V 5 2
I
bl - 9 . 1 $ 7 .9 $ 1 4 .4 $ 1 7 .5 $ - 3 0 .2 $ 2 2 .3 $
I
Bi 2 3 . 9 $ 4 4 .0 $ 1 7 .8 $ 5 0 .6 $ 1 2 .4 $ 7 2 .1 $
I I




- 5 . 7 $ 4 . 7 $ - 1 0 .6 $ 2 1 .3 $ - 5 5 .2 $ - 4 . 4 $
Firm No 2 6 4 / 5 264/5 ,
*+






B1L 3 . 7 $ - 3 . 3 $
2 0 .6 $ 1 1 .0 $ 6 .6 $ - 1 . 1 $
I
B i 7 3 .5 $ 3 5 .6 $ 3 2 .4 $ 6 1 , 5$ 3 4 .3 $ 3 6 .2 $
H11 
B L - 4 4 .  8$ - 5 . 1 $ - 4 1 .2 $ - 5 . 9$ 1 .3 $ - 3 . 4 $
I I I  
B L - 3 5 . 8 $ 1 . 1 $ 4 1 .2 $ - - -
Firm No 281, 281 281 281 281 281
4 5 6 7 8 9
3 3 . 3 $  6 .1 $  - 1 7 . 4 $  - 4 . 4 $  9 .9 $  1 5 .9 $
B* 7 8 . 8$ 2 5 .1 $  3 4 . 5 $  2 0 . 0$ 50 .9 $  3 5 .9 $
B ^  3 5 . 3 $  - 2 . 0 $  - 3 1 . 7 $  1 6 .7 $  - 8 . 2 $  2 1 .9 $
i n
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“1.2 . 0$ - 2 7 .1 $ 3 0 .9 $ 7 .5 $ 6 .0 $ 2 0 . 0 $
1
Bi h2.3%
1 6 .8 $ 6 2 . 2$ ^ . 8 $ 3 1 . 0$ *t2.0$
I I
b l
- 3 3 . 0 $ -1.1.2$ 3 l A $ - 0 . 7 $ -*t.0$ 1 8 .9 $
I I I  
B L
- 27. 0% -*+.2$ 3 3 .1 $ 1 .0 $ 6 .8 $ 20 .8 $ -










B1b l 8.7% - 1 6 . 3 $ - 1 0 .9 $ 0$ 9 .3 $ 2 6 . 0'/o
I
Bi >+3.3$ 3 0 . H$




- 2 6 , 5 $ - 9 . 7 $ 0$ 1 .8 $ 2 7 .0 $
I I I
B
L 9 . 3 %













» i 1 . 8 $ 1 . 1 $
- 0 . 6 $ 2 . 9 $ 2 . 1 $ 1 9 . 3 $
- I 3 0 .6 $ 3 1 .0 $ 2 3 .2 $ 3!». 6$ 2 ^ .8 $ 5 0 .9 $
B L -k.B% - 7 . 3 $ - 8 .0 $ 8 .7 $ - 2 .0 $ 8 .0 $
H i  
B L - 0 . 8 $ - 0 . 6 $ +2 .0$ 1 8 .7 $ 2 . 1 $ 1 1 .9 $
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BI ■-19.258 I .856 0% 5.7% 13.3%  -7 .8 $
B1! 60.056 36 A $ 31.5% k9.3% 39i6$ 19.7$
r ,H
B 1 -52 .5% -10.658 -17 .1 % -k.3% k.7%  -15 .6$
R111
B L -18.358 A . 2$ -10.9% 5.7% . I k . 6% -1 1 .7%











bl -16.1J8 8.2$ k.0% 13.178 0$ - k . 7%
i
Bi 37.65b h i .  5% 27 . 558 20.2$ 1 6 . 2$ 17.9$
i i
B L -20.5% - 9 .0 % 5.05s. k.2% -7.k%  - 2 7 . k%
I I I  
B L -1 0 .5 15.158 6.0/i 12.2% 2.6%  -17A55




283A 283A  .CT>
23  A $ >+.558 27.3% -2.2% 5.6%
A 6 3 . 8$ 53.6$ 51.0% 25. 6% 33.3%
I I  
B L 16.6$ -16 .8$ 2 k . 0% -20.0% -12 .8$
Bm
L -
- - - -
Firm  No 2 8 3 A ,
6 32\ 32^2 3 ! * 3 32i+,H- 32^5
I
b l
15 .6 $ - 3 .2 $ 1 8 . l+$ 5 .1 $ 8 .9  $ b.6%
I
Bi 2 9 .3 $ 8 3 .2 $ 60 .k% 2 5 A $ 2 8 .7 $ 3*t.7$
I I  
B L - 2 .2 $ - 1 .9 $ 1 1 .6 $ - 7 . 6 $ 1 .0 $ 6 .9 $
B L
«a» - 1 .9 $ 15*6$ 2 .5 $ 1 .0 $ 9 .1 $
Firm  No 3 3 1 , 3312 33 1 ,3
331,
k 331  * 5
3 3 1 ,
6
BX 6 . 0 $  - 2 . 7 $  8 .0 $  - 5 6 .7 $  2 5 . 0 $  11.5 '$L
BX ^ 3 . 7 $  Mt.7$  3 9 .6 $  2 3 .3 $  6 2 .0 $  3 3 .0 $
B1^ 16.0$ 3.3$ 6.5$ -50.0$ 29.0$ .^8$
BIXX 1 6 . 0 $  1 0 .0 $  8 A $  A 3 . 3 $  3 1 .0 $  1 2 .8 $L
Firm No







H1 11 ,k% - 9 .3 $ 1 .6 $ - 1 1 .3 $ 7 .3$ - 3 .1 $
bJ ^ 5 .7 $ 2 9 .2 $ 3 8 A $ 25 .0$ M+.0$ 1 6 .9 $
RI I  
B L 2 .9 $ 1 3 .5 $ - 2 .7 $ - 1 6 .3 $ - 0 .6 $ - 8 .3 $
I I I
B T. 1 2 .9 $ - 2 .5 $ - 2 .7 $ -1 0 .8 $ 1 0 .5 $ 0 »8$








b l -1 .1% - 2 2 .0 $ 1 0 .3 # *+.2# 1 5 .8 # - 7 6 .9 #
I
Bi 50 . 5% 3 5 .3 # *+9.0# 75 .0 # 72 .0# 0 .1 #




-5.3% -1 6 .0 % 2.7% ^ .2 # -1 6 .2 # -1W8.1#
Firm No 3 3 2 ? 3326 3k2l 3*+22 3 ' * 3 3*t2h
BI - 1 6 . 7% 1 2 .2 # 0.5% h.2% - 1 0 .0 # 1 1 .1 #
B l 3 8 . 0# 6 1 .6 # 2 9 .2 # h6 . 7% . 6% lA . l #
H  
B L -6.7% 52 .0# ■6 .2% - 1 .0 # -b.6% 3*3#
r J H  
B L 0% - 8 .2 # 5 . 5% 6 .9 # -b.6% 3 .3 #
Firm No 31+2 5 31+2 6 3^2 7
3 5*+i 35>+2 351*
1 - 3 1 .9 # - 1 .0 #
- 50 .0# 1W.5# -12 7 .5 # ■-*+1.2#
1
Bi 2 7 .2% 6^ .8# 55 .0 # *+.2# 2 7 .5 # 6 2 .5 #
11
b l -62 . 7% - 16 .2# -^ 9 .0 # 5 .0 # - 9 5 .0 # - 7 1 .0 #
I I I
B
L -^ 7 .3 # -1 0 .5 #
-1+0.0# 12 . 5# - 6 5 .0 # - 6 8 .1 #







b J -6.0% 0# -W.9# li+.it# 9 .2 # - 3 7 .7 #
■i 5 9 .0 # *+9.3# ^ . 6# 38 . 2# 5>+.2# 1*0 . 0#
I I  
B L - 6 . 0# - 2 . 0# - l+3.1+# 6 .7 # 13 . 2# - 3 0 .3 #
I I I  
B L - 6 . 0# 0# -2 ^ .9 # 11 . 1# 2 3 . 2# - 2 0 .3 #








Bi! - 6 . 8# 7 .5 # 7 .0 # - 5 .2 # 3 6 . 6# 3 5 .5 #
2 7 . 8# 3 5 .3 # Wl.o# 1 6 .1 # 7 9 .‘t# 7 0 .1*#
- 1 1 . 6# - 2 . 0# 3 .0 # - 10 . 8# 28 . 6# 3 1 .7 #
- I I I  
B L - 5 .6 # 8 . 0# 13 . 0# - - -
Firm No 357, 357
5





5 .5 # 3 .8 # 5 .1 # - 1 0 . K# * 2 3 .7/s ->+2.5#
i
Bi 3 9 .7 # 2 6 . 8# Wl.O# 3*+.W# 10 . 8# 20 . 0#
B11B L 2 .5 # 18 . 8# - 11 . 6# -1 8 .9 # - 6^ # -5o.o#
B111
L
- - *OW n • - - - 50 . 0#
372








b l - 1 5 .1 $ - 1 6 . 0$ 2 9 .1 $ - 1 6 .0 $ 0 .2 $
■ ,, , 
2 6 . 1t$
I
Bi
51 . 2$ i+9.0$ 51 . 8$ 3 5 .5 $ 2 3 .3 $ 61+.3$
I I  
B L - 1 2 .0 $ - 16 . 0$ 2 5 .9 $ - 2 3 .0 $ - 8 .2 $ 2 8 .6 $
I I I  
B L - 2 .2 $ - 6 .0 $ 2 5 .9 $ - 1 3 .0 $ - 1 .9 $ 2 8 .6 $
Firm No 365 365 365 365 365 365
2 3 *+ 5 6 7
- 1 1 .0 $  - 6 .5 $  0$ - 1 1 .3 $  3 .9 $  "5 .6$
bJ 3 9 .5 $  5 3 .5 $  8 9 .0 $  b6.k% 1+5.6$ 3 3 -3 $
B1^ - 2 1 .5 $  - 1 1 .5 $  0$ ->+8.8$ -1 7 .1 $  2.k%
I I I
B ,  - 1 2 ,5 $  - 2 .8 $  1 0 .0 $  -2 8 .8 $  - 7 .2 $  2.1+$__i_____________________ ____________





b l 1 .0 $ -7'. 5$ 1 3 .7 $ - 7 .3 $ 2 9 .5 $ 0$
Bi 1+6.0$ 2 7 .0 $ 3 0 .0 $ 2 3 .3 $ 5!+.7$ 3 7 .8 $
B11 B L - 1 0 .5 $ - 9 .0 $ 1 0 .0 $ -2 8 .7 $ 2 9 .5 $ 1 .8 $
I I I  
B L - 1 0 .5 $ 1 .0 $ 1 3 .7 $ -1 8 .7 $ 3*+. 7$ !+.!+$
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Firm No





- 5 5 . 0 $ 13. 8$ 1 1 .7 $ - 8 . 3 $ 12. 4$ 17. 3$
I
Bi 72. 0$ 5 5 .0 $ 4 2 .0 $ 4 2 .0 $ 4 0 .9 $  4 1 . 8 $
I I  
B L - 67. 0$ 1 4 .0 $ 4 . 3 $ -11 .7$ - 8 . 7 $  1 4 J 5$
I I I  
B L - 65. 0$ 1 4 .5 $ 9 .3 $ - 0 . 3  $ - -
F i rm  No







4 . 0$ 0 .7 $ 3 .3 $ - 2 . 3$ 0 . 7 $ - 2 . 3 $
I
Bi 2 2 . 9 $ 3 3 .3 $ 4 8 .8 $ 49.3$ 2 2 .4 $ 4 9 . 8 $
I I  
B L 2 . 4$ 0$ - 19. 0$ - 13. 7$ 0 .7 $ - 3 9 . 4 $
B L 1 . 0$ - - - 0 .7 $ - 1 6 . 5 $
Firm No 384 384 384 384_ 384,, 384
2 3 it 5 6 7
X2.i+Sb 1 7 .3 $  4 . 0 $  0 .7 $  3 . 3 $  - 2 . 3 $
B* 4 o . 9 $  *+1.856 2 2 . 9 $  3 3 .3 $  4 8 . 8 $  49*3$
I I
B L - 8 . 7$  l 1*.5$  2 .i+$ 0$ - 19. 0$ - 1 3 . 7 $
B11.1 - 5 . 2 $  1 9 .1 $  1 1 .9 $  9 .1 $  -**■•0$ - 3 . 0 $
37^
Firm No i?i 192 % 1 9 5 196
4 0 .  7JS - 6. 2$ - 3 8 .7 $ o A $ - 1 0 .7 $ - 27. 0$
4 22.k% 0% - 32. 0$ 9 .9 $ 1 8 .3 $ 1 1 .3 $
b1; 0.7% - 1 . 2$ - 26. ? $ - 5 . 9 $ - 1 8 .3 $ - ^ 1 . 0$
b11,1 0.7% 25. 0$ - 2 5 .3 $ - 2 . 6$ - 1 7 .3 $ - ^ 1 . 0$
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f
S e c t i o n  1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
The p r o c e e d i n g  C h a p te r s  have a t t e m p t e d  t o  i d e n t i f y  
and q u a n t i f y  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  FDI on t h e  I r i s h  economy*
The aim o f  t h i s  C h a p te r  i s  t o  b r i n g  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  
t o g e t h e r  i n  a  c o h e r e n t  f ram ework  i n  o r d e r  t o  p r o v i d e  a  
d e c i s i o n  r u l e  so t h a t  f u t u r e  d e c i s i o n s  c an  be t a k e n  on a 
m u t u a l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  b a s i s  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  maximum p o s s i b l e  
b e n e f i t  t o  t h e  economy*
Commenting on th e  i n c e n t i v e s  g i v e n  t o  FDI i n  I r e l a n d ,  
Cooper and Whelan c o r r e c t l y  s p e c i f y  th e  problem when 
th ey  s t a t e  t h a t  t h e i r
" C r i t i c i s m s  a r e  d i r e c t e d  t o  th e  q u e s t i o n  w h e th e r  
t h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  amounts  o f  I r i s h  i n v e s t i b l e  
r e s o u r c e s  d e v o te d  t o  i n d u s t r i a l  programmes co u ld  
have  b e e n  used  i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways w i t h  h i g h e r  n e t  
b e n e f i t s * "  2
T h i s  i s  a v e r y  v a l i d  means o f  a s s e s s i n g  th e  c o s t  t o  th e  
economy o f  FDI* However o n ly  one c o s t  ( I r i s h  i n v e s t i b l e  
r e s o u r c e s )  i s  i n c l u d e d  i n  th e  d e b i t  s i d e  o f  the  c a l c u l u s ,  
t h e r e f o r e  t h e  c r e d i t  s i d e  sh o u ld  show n e t  b e n e f i t  ( i * e *  
b e n e f i t s  minus a l l  c o s t s  e x c e p t  i n v e s t i b l e  r e s o u r c e s ) *  
Cooper and Whelan t h e n  f o l l o w  t h i s  up w i t h  s e v e r a l  d e d u c t ­
i o n s  a b o u t  th e  e f f e c t  o f  FDI on th e  I r i s h  economy, d e r i v e d  
from c a s u a l  em p ir ic i sm *  T h e i r  m ain  c o n c l u s i o n s  may be 
summarised a s  f o l l o w s .
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( 1 )  V a lue  a d d ed ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  v a l u e  added a c c r u i n g  
t o  I r i s h  f a c t o r s  i s  a  sm a l l  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  the  
t o t a l  o u t p u t  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s *
( 2 )  L in k a g e  e f f e c t s  f rom f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  a r e  s m a l l .
( 3 )  I r i s h  c a p i t a l i s t s  a r e  s t a r v e d  o f  c a p i t a l  b e c a u se  
o f  g r a n t s  p a id  t o  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l i s t s .
(k)  A low l e v e l  of  v e r t i c a l  i n t e g r a t i o n  e x i s t s  i n  
f o r e i g n  f i rm s *
(5 )  A " s h a l l o w  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e "  h a s  r e s u l t e d  a s  
a  conseq u en ce  of  (1 )  and (* 0 .
( 6 )  More r e s o u r c e - b a s e d  in v e s tm e n t  i s  n e e d e d ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  I n  t h e  food i n d u s t r y .
P o i n t s  ( 1 )  and (2 )  were q u a n t i f i e d  i n  C h a p te r  IV 
u n de r  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  " R e ta in e d  V a l u e " .  I t  i s  t o  be 
n o t e d  t h a t  " s m a l l "  and "low" a re  r e l a t i v e  t e rm s  and t h e  
Cooper and Whelan a r t i c l e  makes no c o m p a r is o n  of  v a l u e  
added i n  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  r e l a t i v e  to  I r i s h  ones  o r  t o  o t h e r  
q u a n t i t i e s .  I t  i s  co n te n d ed  h e re  t h a t  such  m easu re s  o f  
b e n e f i t  must  be compared t o  c o s t s  i f  any se n se  i s  t o  be 
made o f  t h e  f i n d i n g s .
From t h e s e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  * Cooper and Whelan d e r i v e  
a s e t  o f  p a r t i a l  c r i t e r i a  t o  be used f o r  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  
o f  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s .  The c r i t e r i a  a r e  t h a t  t h e  p r o j e c t s  
sho u ld  be v e r t i c a l l y  i n t e g r a t e d  e x p o r t i n g  f i r m s  w i t h  
s i z e a b l e  l i n k a g e  e f f e c t s  and a  h i g h  v a l u e  added s h a r e  i n  
I r e l a n d .  The c r i t e r i a  s u f f e r  from th e  f o l l o w i n g  d e f e c t s .
( 1 )  No e x p l i c i t  a t t e n t i o n  i s  p a id  t o  c o s t s ,  a l t h o u g h  
e m p h a s i s  i s  g i v e n  t o  g r a n t  p a y m e n ts .
(2 )  No a t t e m p t  i s  made t o  v a lu e  b e n e f i t s  e x ce p t  i n  
t e r m s  o f  m ark e t  p r i c e s  and such  b e n e f i t s  a r e  n o t  
r e l a t e d  t o  c o s t s  so a s  t o  p r o v i d e  a d e c i s i o n  r u l e .
(3 )  A l th o u g h  th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  to  g r a n t  a i d  f o r  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  i s  s p e c i f i e d  a s  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  t h e  
d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r ,  no e x p l i c i t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  a s s u m p t io n  i s  s p e c i f i e d .
( D e s p i t e  t h i s  a n  i n t e r e s t i n g  p r o p o s a l  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  
t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  th r o u g h  m e r g e r s  and c o n c e n t r a t i o n
. i s  g i v e n .  P e r h a p s  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a body l i k e  th e  
f o r m e r  U.K. I n d u s t r i a l  R e o r g a n i s a t i o n  C o r p o r a t i o n  
(IRC) i s  e n v i s a g e d .  T h i s  i s  w o r th y  o f  more a t t e n t i o n  
and i s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  th e  c o n c l u s i o n ) .
T h i s  C h a p te r  exam ines  th e  whole c o n t e n t i o u s  a r e a  i n  a 
more c o h e r e n t  f ramework t h a n  th e  p a r t i a l  c r i t e r i a  
s u g g e s t e d  a b o v e .  The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  exam ines  s e v e r a l  
methods o f  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a p p r a i s a l , S e c t i o n  3 p r e s e n t s  th e  
two c o s t - b e n e f i t  m ethods  f e l t  t o  be most a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  
t h e  a p p r a i s a l  o f  FDI i n  I r e l a n d ,  and S e c t i o n  k g i v e s  t h e  
r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  a p p r a i s a l .
S e c t i o n  2 Methods o f  C o s t - B e n e f i t  A n a l y s i s
The c o s t - b e n e f i t  method chosen  must be  f l e x i b l e  enough 
t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  th e  p e c u l i a r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
FDI and must  o p e r a t e  w e l l  i n  the  f a c e  o f  s e v e r e  d a t a
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c o n s t r a i n t s .  T h is  S e c t i o n  p r e s e n t s  th e  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
th e  use  o f  t  he two m ethods  c h o se n ;  D om est ic  R esource  
Cost  A n a l y s i s  and Net B e n e f i t s  p e r  £ o f  P u b l i c  I n v e s t m e n t ,
The p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  t h e s e  two m ethods  a r e  now 
a n a l y s e d  and t h e i r  d e f i c i e n c i e s  n o t e d ,
1 .  P r o f i t a b i l i t y
The u se  o f  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  a s  a  d e c i s i o n  r u l e  f o r  t h e  
a c c e p t a n c e  o r  r e j e c t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  r a i s e s  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  v e r s u s  s o c i a l  p r o f i t a b i l i t y .  The 
c r i t e r i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  r e s t s  o n  t h e  a c c e p t a n c e  
o f  th e  m a r k e t  v a l u a t i o n  of  r e l a t i v e  s c a r c i t y  a M  b e n e f i t .
I n  a n o n - o p t i m a l  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  d i s t o r t i o n s  c au se d  by  
monopoly pow er ,  t a r i f f s  and c o n t r o l s ,  s u c h  a  v a l u a t i o n  may 
n o t  be a c c e p t a b l e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  where u i id e re n p lc y n e n t  and 
underem ployed  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  e x t a n t .  M o reo v er ,  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s  have  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s c r e t i o n a r y  power I n  p r i c i n g  
t h o s e  goods  and s e r v i c e s  which  a re  t r a n s f e r r e d  w i t h i n  t h e  
f i r m  and i n  th e  a l l o c a t i o n  of  J o i n t  o v e r h e a d s ,  M arke t  p r i c e s  
a r e  u n r e l i a b l e  and hence  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  f o r  shadow p r i c i n g .  
E x t e r n a l i t i e s  and o t h e r  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s ,  i n c l u d i n g  d i s t r i b ­
u t i o n a l  f a c t o r s ,  a re  i g n o r e d ,
A f u r t h e r  s e r i o u s  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  u se  o f  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  
i s  t h a t  t h e  " b e n e f i t "  w h ich  i t  m e a su re s  ( p r o f i t  p e r  u n i t  
o f  c a p i t a l  employed)  c an n o t  be  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  s o l e l y  a c c r u ­
in g  t o  t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y .  The b u l k  o f  t h e  p r o f i t s  may i n
f a c t  be a p p r o p r i a t e d  by th e  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r .  The
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p r o p o r t i o n  o f  p r o f i t s  r e t a i n e d  i n  I r e l a n d  may be 
v e r y  small*. Also  i n  t h i s  scheme, a m a jo r  so u rc e  o f  
b e n e f i t  t o  t h e  h o s t ,  w hich  i s  the  c r e a t i o n  of  employ­
m en t ,  i s  t r e a t e d  a s  l a b o u r  c o s t . Thus ,  by t r e a t i n g  
g a i n s  a s  p r i v a t e  r a t h e r  t h a n  s o c i a l  g a i n s  and i g n o r i n g  
t h e i r  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  t h i s  method c o m p l e t e ly  m i s - s p e e i f i e s  
th e  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  o f  FDI t o  th e  h o s t  c o u n t ry *
2 .  The Measurement  o f  Secondary  M u l t i p l i e r  E f f e c t s
Hans S i n g e r  a r g u e s  t h a t  th e  o n ly  t r u e  t e s t  o f  t h e  
i n t e g r a t i o n  of  FDI i n t o  th e  d o m es t ic  economy i s  th e  
s i z e  o f  t h e  s e c o n d a ry  s t i m u l u s  g iv e n  t o  th e  h o s t  economy 
v i a  l i n k a g e  e f f e c t s . ^  M o reover ,  he s u g g e s t s ,  on th e  
p rem ise  t h a t  FDI can  on ly  be a b e n e f i t  i f  i t  i s  a b s o r b e d  
i n t o  th e  d o m e s t i c  economy, t h a t  t h i s  i s  t h e  p r o p e r  t e s t  
o f  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  FDI, A l though  the  d a n g e r  o f  e n c l a v e  
growth  makes the  b a s i c  p o i n t  a v a l i d  o n e ,  t h e  method d o es  
no t  p r e s e n t  a  good means o f  a p p r a i s a l  b e c a u s e  i t  i g n o r e s  
the  o v e r a l l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of  the  f o r e i g n  f i r m  t o  th e  g row th  
o f  r e a l  o u t p u t  and i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  o t h e r  s o c i a l  
o b j e c t i v e s  su ch  a s  the  employment o r  emmigrant  r e s o u r c e s  
and t o  th e  b a l a n c e  o f  payments*
An e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h i s  c o n ce p t  l e a d s  t o  an  a p p r a i s a l  
b a se d  on " r e t a i n e d  v a lu e "  (RV) a s  i n  C h a p te r  IV# However, 
even  su ch  an  e x t e n s i o n  c an n o t  be c o n s i d e r e d  a  com ple te  
e v a l u a t i o n  method b e c a u se  i t  i g n o r e s  th e  c o s t  o f  a c h i e v ­
in g  t h i s  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  r e t a i n e d  v a l u e .
R .V . i s  however u s e f u l  a s  an a d j u n c t  t o  a  more 
com ple te  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  b e c a u se  R.V* i n c l u d e s  
f i r s t  ro un d  l i n k a g e  e f f e c t s  and h e l p s  t o  i s o l a t e  the  
b e n e f i t s  o f  i n v e s tm e n t  w hich  a c c ru e  t o  the  h o s t  n a t i o n .
The L abour  I n t e n s i t y  C r i t e r i o n
The t e n d e n c y  o f  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  t o  be 
c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  i s  a m a jo r  i s s u e  o f  d i s c u s s i o n  a s  
C h a p te r  V showed. I t  i s  n a t u r a l  f o r  t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y  
t o  a p p r a i s e  inw ard  in v e s tm e n t  i n  te rm s  o f  j o b s  c r e a t e d  
b eca u se  t h i s  may be the  m a jo r  b e n e f i t  o f  FDI.  However,  
the  c r e a t i o n  o f  such j o b s  i s  a c h ie v e d  a t  a  c o s t  which  
shou ld  be  r e l a t e d  t o  th e  b e n e f i t s .
The l a b o u r  i n t e n s i t y  c r i t e r i o n  g i v e s  a s im ple  
d e c i s i o n  r u l e  -  e s t a b l i s h  p r o j e c t s  i n  o r d e r  o f  j o b  c r e a t ­
in g  c a p a c i t y ,  u n t i l  t h e  b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t  on g r a n t  a i d  
i s  e x h a u s t e d .  However,  o v e r  t ime a h i g h  f a i l u r e  r a t e  may 
r e s u l t  a s  r i s i n g  wages (a  s t a t e d  aim o f  I r i s h  economic 
p o l i c y )  i n c r e a s e  c o s t s  more t h a n  p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  i n  l a b o u r -  
i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s .  O th e r  o b j e c t i o n s  c e n t r e  on  th e  u n b a la n c e d  
and i n c o n s i s t e n t  shadow p r i c i n g  sys tem  w hich  i s  em ployed .
The c r i t e r i o n  r e j e c t s  th e  m a r k e t ’ s v a l u a t i o n  o f  l a b o u r  
b u t  a c c e p t s  m ark e t  p r i c e s  f o r  i n p u t s  o f  c a p i t a l  and i n t e r ­
m e d ia te  goods and f o r  f i n a l  p r o d u c t s .  The sys tem  i s  
i n c o n s i s t e n t  b eca u se  l a b o u r  i s  an  i n p u t  i n t o  e ac h  o f  t h e s e  
o t h e r  e l e m e n t s .  Many o t h e r  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s ,  such  a s  
b a la n c e  o f  payments  e f f e c t s ,  the  r e m i t t a n c e  and d i s t r i b u t i o n
o f  p r o f i t s  and s o c i a l  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  a r e  i g n o r e d «,
I t  i s  a l s o  w o r th y  o f  n o te  t h a t  i n d u s t r i e s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
and expanded  u n d e r  such  a r u l e  a re  l i k e l y  t o  be ones  
w i t h  l e s s  t h a n  ave rage  s p i l l o v e r  and d e m o n s t r a t i o n  
e f f e c t s  f o r  t h e  s k i l l  and t e c h n o lo g y  c o n t e n t  w i l l  t e n d  
t o  be s m a l l e r  t h a n  i n  more c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  p r o j e c t s .
The employment e f f e c t  must be i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n  any 
c o s t  b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  b e c a u se  i t  i s  on  e x t r e m e l y  i m p o r t a n t  
a r e a s  o f  b e n e f i t .  I t  sh o u ld  no t  how ever ,  be s e e n  a s  th e  
o n ly  b e n e f i t ,  n o r  sh o u ld  employment c r e a t i o n  be r e g a r d e d  
a s  c o s t l e s s  ( im provements  i n  employment sh o u ld  n o t  be 
r e g a r d e d  a s  i f  t h e y  were a c h ie v e d  a t  minimum c o s t ) .  The
c r i t e r i o n  i s  p a r t i a l  and i g n o r e s  many i m p o r t a n t  e f f e c t s .
hjt The L i t t l e  and M i r r l e e s  (OECD M anual)  T echn ique  o f
A p p r a i s a l .
The L i t t l e  and M i r r l e e s  (LM) schema i s  s u p e r i o r  t o  
the  m e th o ds  above b e c a u se  i t  p r o v i d e s  a s e l f - c o n s i s t e n t  
i n t e g r a t e d  a p p ro a c h  i n c l u d i n g  a s u i t a b l e  method o f  
shadow p r i c i n g .  Any c o h e r e n t  scheme o f  -c o s t - b e n e f i t  
a h a l y s i s  i s  m e re ly  a  means o f  v a l u i n g  th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  a 
p r o j e c t  o r  g roup  o f  p r o j e c t s  w i t h i n  a m u t u a l l y  s e l f -  
c o n s i s t e n t  f ram ew ork .  The c o s t  e lem en t  i s  th e  u s in g  up 
o f  f a c t o r s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  w h ich  have a l t e r n a t i v e  u s e s  
( o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s ) .  B e n e f i t s  c o n s i s t  o f  th e  i n c r e a s e  i n  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  ( p r o c e s s e d )  i n p u t s .  The p ro b lem  o f  v a l u a t i o n
of  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  i s  g r e a t .  Most means of  a s s e s s m e n t
u t i l i s e  m a r k e t  p r i c e s  a s  the  c o r r e c t  v a l u a t i o n .  However, 
d o m e s t i c  d i s t o r t i o n s ,  p r i c e  r i g i d i t i e s  and d i v e r g e n c e s  
from o p t i m a l i t y  i n t r o d u c e d  on p o l i c y  g ro un d s  ( su ch  a s  
t a r i f f s )  mean t h a t  m arke t  p r i c e s  a re  no t  t r u e  i n d i c a t o r s  
o f  the  r e l a t i v e  s c a r c i t y  o f  goods and f a c t o r s .  C onse ­
q u e n t l y ,  t h e  a n a l y s t  must  u t i l i s e  some a l t e r n a t i v e  
v a l u a t i o n  s y s te m .
When f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  a re  und e r  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e r e
a re  s e v e r a l  s p e c i a l  f a c t o r s  which the  f ramework must he
a b le  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e .  The a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  must be 
I*,
s t a t e d *  A l s o ,  no t  a l l  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  th e  a c t i v i t y  
a c c ru e  t o  t h e  h o s t  c o u n t r y  -  p a r t  of  the  v a l u e  added i s  
r e m i t t e d  a s  p r o f i t s  t o  n o n - n a t i o n a l s  o f  the h o s t  c o u n t r y .  
P a r t  o f  th e  r e s o u r c e s  used up a re  c o n t r i b u t e d  from o u t ­
s i d e  th e  h o s t  c o u n t r y .  P ro v id e d  such  r e s o u r c e s  do n o t
d i s p l a c e  h o s t  c o u n t r y  f a c t o r s ,  they  r e p r e s e n t  an  a d d i t i o n
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t o  the  a v a i l a b l e  r e s o u r c e s  o f  the h o s t .  They do n o t  
t h e r e f o r e  have  an  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  t o  the  h o s t  -  t h e i r  
c o s t  i s  b o rn e  by f o r e i g n e r s  who f o r e g o  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
i n  o r d e r  t o  i n v e s t  a b r o a d .
The L i t t l e  and M i r r l e e s  method (LM) a s  s e t  o u t  i n  
the  OECD Manual , p r o v i d e s  a framework which  i s  w e l l  
s u i t e d  t o  c o p in g  w i t h  t h e s e  p ro b le m s .  A l l  i n p u t s  and 
o u t p u t s  t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  a re  v a l u e d  i n  t e rm s  o f  t h e i r  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  e a r n i n g  o r  s a v in g  f o r e i g n  e x ch a n g e .
Traded  goods a r e  v a l u e d  a t  b o r d e r  p r i c e s ;  e x p o r t s  f . o . b . ,
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i m p o r t s  c . i . f .  N o n - t r a d e d  goods a re  v a l u e d  on the  same 
b a s i s  by u s i n g  the i n p u t - o u t p u t  t a b l e  t o  s p l i t  non­
t r a d e d  goods i n t o  t r a d e d  goods e q u i v a l e n t .  I n  th e  LM 
schema, f a c t o r  i n p u t s  a re  v a lu e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  the  
f o l l o w i n g  r u l e s .  C a p i t a l  goods a re  t r e a t e d  j u s t  l i k e  any 
o t h e r  i n p u t .  C a p i t a l  i s  v a lu e d  a c c o r d i n g  to  i t s  f o r e i g n  
exchange e q u i v a l e n t  -  i t  i s  s p l i t  i n t o  t r a d e d  goods and 
imputed t o  c o s t  i n  th e  y e a r  i n  which the  c o s t  a r i s e s .
Labour  i s  v a l u e d  a t  a shadow wage r a t e  (SWR) which  r e f l e c t s  
n o t  o n ly  t h e  l o s s  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  e l s e w h e re  due t o  employ­
ment i n  th e  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t ,  bu t  a l s o  the  i n c r e a s e d  
commitment t o  consum ption  induced  by i t s  employment i n  
the  p r o j e c t , + . ( t h u s  i n t r o d u c i n g  s o c i e t y ’ s t ime p r e f e r e n c e  
i n t o  th e  SWR).
B e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  a re  t h e n  d i s c o u n t e d  by the
a c c o u n t i n g  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  (ARI) which r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  r a t e
o f  r e t u r n  t o  th e  m a r g i n a l  p r o j e c t .  T h i s  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  i s
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c h o s e n ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t o  e x h a u s t  the  i n v e s tm e n t  f u n d .  C o s t s  
b o rn e  by f o r e i g n e r s  can  e a s i l y  be e l i m i n a t e d ,  a s  can  
payments  a b ro a d  ( th e  l a t t e r  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  e a sy  t o  remove 
a s  th ey  a r e  a l r e a d y  i n  " f o r e i g n  exchange e q u i v a l e n t ” 
v a l u e s ) .
The d i f f i c u l t y  i n  a p p ly i n g  the  LM method i s  i n  t h i s  
c ase  l a c k  o f  a d eq u a te  d a t a .  The LM method i s  d e s ig n e d  t o  
e v a l u a t e  a sm a l l  number o f  p r o j e c t s  on w hich  a com ple te  
s e t  o f  d a t a  can  be e s t i m a t e d  over  the  whole l i f e  o f  the
+ See S e c t i o n  3 . b  (15.) f o r  a f u l l  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  th e  c a l c u ­
l a t i o n  o f  SWR o
p r o j e c t .  However data ,  o f  s u c h  q u a l i t y  p rov ed  t o  he 
u n o b t a i n a h l e  5 even  th e  d e t a i l e d  i n t e r v i e w s  d i d  no t  
produce  d a t a  which  c o v e re d  th e  whole t ime sp a n  o f  the  
p r o j e c t .  C o n s e q u e n t ly  a method had t o  be e v o lv e d  w hich  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  the  b e s t  f e a t u r e s  o f  the  LM a n a l y s i s  b u t  
allo\-jed a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  the method t o  a l a r g e  number o f  
p r o j e c t s  on w hich  d a t a  o v e r  t ime a re  s e v e r e l y  r e s t r i c t e d .  
Such a m ethod i s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  th e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n ,
5 ,  D o m e s t ic  R esource  Cost  A p p r a i s a l .
The most  c r u c i a l  c o n s t r a i n t  on t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  
FDI i s  t h a t  d a t a  o v e r  t im e i s  non e x i s t a n t .  The method 
ch o sen  must  be s u i t a b l e  f o r  the  a n a l y s i s  o f  a l a r g e  
number o f  p r o j e c t s  on w hich  d a t a  i s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  o n ly  
a  l i m i t e d  t im e  p e r i o d .  Such a method i s  th e  d o m e s t i c  
r e s o u r c e  c o s t  (DRC) mode o f  a n a l y s i s ,  which  was o r i g ­
i n a l l y  u t i l i s e d  by Anne K ru e g e r  t o  e v a l u a t e  p r o t e c t -  
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i o n i s t  r e g i m e s .
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  DRC a n a l y s i s  g i v e s  a c o s t - b e n e f i t  r a t i o  
e v e r  a c e r t a i n  t ime p e r i o d ;  i t  i s  t h u s  i d e a l  f o r  the  
a n a l y s i s  o f  FDI i n  I r e l a n d .  The r a t i o  compares th e  
d o m e s t i c  c o s t  o f  an  a c t i v i t y  (DCj_) w i t h  th e  v a lu e  added 
a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s  a c c r u i n g  t o  I r i s h  owned f a c t o r s  
( N a t i o n a l  Value  Added (NVA^),) The d o m e s t i c  c o s t  o f  an  
a c t i v i t y  i s  s im p ly  the  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  th e  use o f  th e  
d o m e s t i c  f a c t o r s  employed i n  t h a t  a c t i v i t y .  The b e n e f i t s  
a r e  d e f i n e d ,  a s  i n  th e  LM fram ework ,  a s  v a l u e  added a t
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s *  Only t h a t  p a r t  o f  v a l u e  added 
which a c c r u e s  t o  I r i s h  owned f a c t o r s  i s  i n c l u d e d ,  t h u s  
removing p ro b lem s  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  b e n e f i t s .
The c o s t  b e n e f i t  r a t i o  f o r  a c t i v i t y  i s  t h u s  DRC^ = DC^
( 7 . 1 )  nvaT
T h i s  m e th o d ,  w h ich  may be d e s c r i b e d  a s  a t r u n c a t e d  
( o r  d a t a  c o n s t r a i n e d )  LM method was one o f  two c o s t  
b e n e f i t  a n a l y s e s  a p p l i e d  t o  FDI i n  I r e l a n d ,  P rob lem s 
o f  m e th o do lo g y  and o f  a p p l i c a t i o n  a r e  d i s c u s s e d  i n  
d e t a i l  b e lo w .
60 B e n e f i t s  p e r  £ o f  P u b l i c In v es tm e n t
I n  t h e  g e n e r a l  c a s e ,  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  i s  r e l a t i v e l y
e a sy  t o  a p p l y .  I t  s im p ly  r e q u i r e s  th e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  th e
r a t i o  Net B e n e f i t  ( 7 . 2 )
I n p u t  o f  Government Funds 
P r o j e c t s  w i t h  t h e  h i g h e s t  r a t i o  o f  b e n e f i t  t o  p u b l i c
fu n d s  a r e  c h o s e n ,  i n  o r d e r  u n t i l  th e  b u d g e t  i s  e x h a u s t e d .
However, i n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n s  be low ,  d a t a  d e f i c i e n c i e s
meant  t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  c o u ld  be c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  o n ly  one y e a r .
I t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h e r e f o r e  t o  r e d u c e  ongo ing  c a p i t a l  c o s t s
t o  t h a t  y e a r  o n l y ,  which  p r e s e n t s  v e r y  r e a l  p r o b le m s .
S e c t i o n  R. Methodology and O p e r a t i o n a l  P rob lems
1 .  D e f i n i t i o n .
( a )  ^Do m e s t i c  Resource  C o s t s .
DRC i s  a r a t i o  o f  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  o f  d o m e s t i c
r e s o u r c e s  use  t o  v a lu e  added a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s .
T h e r e f o r e  DRCi = DCi^ (7*1)  where NVAi i s  v a lu e
NVAi
added  a c c r u i n g  t o  d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned re so u rce s©
O p e r a t i o n a l l y 5 DRC i s  d e f i n e d  a c c o r d i n g  to  (7 * 3 )^
DRCi = ( 7 . 3 )
P i q i
where  V j i  i s  the  amount o f  th e  j t h  d o m e s t i c  f a c t o r  used  
a s  a n  i n p u t  i n t o  a c t i v i t y  i .
S3 i s  t h e  shadow p r i c e  o f  the  3t h  d o m e s t i c  f a c t o r ,
d n i  i s  th e  amount o f  th e  n t h  non t r a d e d  good used
i n  th e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  i .
P i ,  P3 a r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s  o f  o u t p u t  i  and
i n p u t  3 .
q i  i s  th e  q u a n t i t y  o f  o u tp u t  i .
M3i i s  t h e  q u a n t i t y  o f  i n p u t  3 i n t o  o u tp u t  i .
i s  the  r e p a t r i a t e d  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  f t h  f o r e i g n  
f a c t o r .
vf l  i s  t h e  amount o f  f o r e i g n  f a c t o r  f  used  i n  
a c t i v i t y  i .
R i  i s  th e  r o y a l t y  payment ab road  f o r  a c t i v i t y  i .
T h i s  d e f i n i t i o n  r a i s e s  s e v e r a l  i s s u e s .  F i r s t l y ,  
v a l u a t i o n  o f  i n p u t s  ana o u t p u t s .  Two v a l u a t i o n s  a re  
u s e d ,  one w i t h  o b se rv ed  m ark e t  p r i c e s ,  the  o t h e r  on shadow 
p r i c e s  d e r i v e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a s s u m p t io n s  s e t  o u t  b e lo w .  
S econ d ly  th e  p roblem of n o n - t r a d e d  i n p u t s  a r i s e s .  The 
d e n o m in a to r  o f  ( 7 . 3 )  r e p r e s e n t s  the  improvement i n  th e  
b a l a n c e  o f  payments  b r o u g h t  about  by th e  o p e r a t i o n  of
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d o m e s t i c  f a c t o r s  i n  c o - o p e r a t i o n  w i t h  f o r e i g n  owned 
o n e s  i n  a f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t  (on  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  
g ro u n d s )*  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  i n c l u d e  non 
t r a d e d  goods  i n  th e  n u m e ra to r  b ecau se  such  goods a r e  
i n t r i n s i c a l l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n ts^ im p ro v e ­
ment* T h i s  c an  be s e en  t o  be c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  t o  the  
a n a l y s i s  o f  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  e f f e c t s  o f  C h a p te r  VI*
I n  th e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  C h a p te r  VI the  two a l t e r n a t i v e  
m odels  t o o k  n o n - t r a d e d  goods a s  a r e s o u r c e  b u r d e n ;  
e i t h e r  on t h e  b a la n c e  o f  payments  ( lo n g  r u n  b a l a n c e )  o r  
on Government r e s o u r c e s  ( i n t e r n a l  b a l a n c e ) .  I n  b o t h  
c a s e s ,  i t  was a c o s t  d e r i v i n g  from the  change i n  th e  
b a la n c e  o f  payments* The t r a n s p o r t  c o s t  b a r r i e r  p r e v e n t s  
n o n - t r a d e d  goods from e n t e r i n g  the  t r a d e d  goods s e c t o r ,  
b u t  the  p r o d u c t i o n  of  n o n - t r a d e d  goods u s e s  up r e s o u r c e s *  
(Thus i n  DRC a n a l y s i s  n o n - t r a d e d  goods i n p u t s  must be 
i n c l u d e d  a s  a c o s t  b e c a u se  i n  t h i s  s e nse  t h e y  a re  an  
e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  th e  a c t i v i t y ) .  I n  th e  case  o f  I r e l a n d  
t h i s  i s  a v e r y  m inor  p roblem q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  -  b e c a u se  o f  
th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  N o r t h e r n  I r e l a n d  and th e  c lo s e  l i n k s  
w i t h  the  U.K. economy, a lm o s t  a l l  goods a r e  t r a d e d  and 
t h e r e f o r e  have a " b o r d e r  P r i c e " ,  (Thus th e  f a c t o r  
^  d n i  V jh  Sj i n  e q u a t i o n  (7*3)  i s  u s u a l l y  m i n u t e ) ,
( b )  Net B e n e f i t  p e r  £ o f  P u b l i c  In v e s tm e n t
T h i s  c r i t e r i o n  i s  a p p l i e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  the  f o l l o w i n g
f o r m u l a ; Net S o c i a l  Ben e f i t  (7*2 )
In p u t  o f  "Government Funds
Net b e n e f i t  i s  d e f in e d  as va lue  added accru ing  to  
I r i s h  f a c t o r s  from the o p e r a t io n  of f o r e i g n  owned 
f i r m s  a t  a pp rop r ia te  p r i c e s .  The formula i s  f i r s t  
computed u s in g  market p r i c e s  and then  shadow p r i c e s .  
I d e a l l y  the f u l l  secondary s t im ulu s  to  the h o s t  economy 
should be in c lu d e d  i n  net  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t .  In p r a c t i c e ,  
f i r s t  round l in k a g e  e f f e c t s  are inc lu ded  as an approx­
im at ion  to  the f u l l  s t im u lu s .  Shadow p r i c e s  are a p p l ie d  
only  to  I r i s h  c a p i t a l  and labour -  no attempt i s  made 
here to  r e v a lu e  o ther  in p u ts  or o u tp u t .
The f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n  i n v e s t i g a t e s  the s e r io u s  
o p e r a t i o n a l  problems encountered by both  methods.
2 .  Ope r a t i o n a l  Problems.
( a ) The A l t e r n a t i v e  P o s i t i o n
The u s u a l  premise of  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  i s  a 
"with p r o j e c t "  v e r s u s  "without pro jec t"  d e c i s i o n  r u l e . 
This  f o r m u la t io n  i m p l ie s  tha t  a f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t  i s  not  
r e p la c in g  an e x a c t l y  s i m i la r  domestic  p r o j e c t .  However,  
the f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t  i s  drawing I r i s h  r e s o u r c e s  away from 
a l t e r n a t i v e  u s e s  e lsew h ere  i n  the economy and such in p u ts  
have an o p p o r tu n i ty  c o s t .  I t  i s  the v a l u a t i o n  o f  th e se  
o p p o r tu n ity  c o s t s  w ith  which the shadow p r i c i n g  frame­
work i s  concerned .
The d i s c u s s i o n  i n  Chapter VI su g g es ted  th a t  d i r e c t  
replacement was not a l i k e l y  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  and 
that  a "without p r o jec t"  a l t e r n a t i v e  was j u s t i f i e d  i n  
many c a s e s .
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( b ) Shadow P r i c i n g  o f  I n p u t s  and O u tp u t s
i .  M a t e r i a l  Inputs and Outputs
In  the Net B e n e f i t  per £ o f  p u b l i c  investm ent (NBI) 
a p p r a i s a l ,  a l l  m a t e r i a l  in p u t s  and o u tp u ts  are valued at  
market p r i c e s  o n l y .
As shown above,  the  DRC method v a l u e s  secondary
inp uts  a t  the  v a lu e  o f  e q u iv a le n t  imports ( c . i . f . )  and
o utp uts  a t  the  e q u i v a l e n t  export  p r ic e  ( f . o . b . )  Non-
traded goods are s p l i t  i n t o  traded goods e q u iv a le n t  by
10the use o f  the input output T a b le .
i i .  The Shadow Wage Rate (SWR)
The method used f o r  d e r iv i n g  the SWR f o l l o w s  L i t t l e  
and M i r r l e e s . ^  This  method i s  w e l l  s u i t e d  to  the DRC 
approach because  b e n e f i t s  are d e f in e d  i n  the same way as  
the LM approach.  The r e s u l t s  o f  the c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  SWR 
are a l s o  a p p l ie d  to  the NBI a n a l y s i s .
The SWR should r e f l e c t ,  not on ly  the d ecrease  i n  
pr o d u ct io n  e lsew h ere  through labour b e in g  drawn i n t o  the  
p r o j e c t ,  but a l s o  the e f f e c t  such employment has on con­
sumption l e v e l s  i n  the economy. I f  the  Government w ish e s  
to  a t t a c h  a h igh  va lue  to  sa v in g s  then  i t  w i l l  choose a 
SWR which r e f l e c t s  t h i s  by a t t a c h in g  a h ig h  ( n e g a t i v e )  v a lu e  
to  the consumption of  la b o u r .  This  w i l l  r a i s e  the a c c o u n t in g
p r i c e  o f  labou r  r e l a t i v e  to  c a p i t a l  and w i l l  l ea d  to  
l e s s  labour  i n t e n s i v e  p r o j e c t s  be ing  ch o se n .  The e s t i m ­
a t i o n  o f  the SWR should provide  a v a lu e  f o r  f i r s t l y  the  
l o s s  o f  p r o d u c t io n  e l s ew h ere  and se co n d ly  a r e l a t i v e  
v a l u a t i o n  o f  consumption v i s - a - v i s  s a v i n g .
The SWR measures the o p p o r tu n i ty  c o s t  o f  the input  
of  labour  i n t o  the p r o j e c t .  Therefore  we need t o  know 
the use to  which labour  would be put i n  the absence of  
the p r o j e c t .  Under the a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  adopted  h e r e ,  
that  o f  no a l t e r n a t i v e  d om est ic  p r o j e c t ,  the  labour would 
remain i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  emigrate  or remain unemployed.
Unemployment i s  a major problem i n  I r e l a n d ,  As 
Table 7 ,1  shows, unemployment h a s ,  s in c e  1968,  not been  
below 5% o f  the  labour  f o r c e .  In May 1 9 7 3 > i t  was 5*9% 
( 66,000).
T ab le  7 .1  Unemployment i n  I r e l a n d  1968-1973
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Unemployment a s  % ----------- --- - — ~  — — —
'6 ,0
May May
L abour  F o rc e 5 . ^ 5 .1  6 .0 6 .1  5*9
Unemployment -
T housands 61 $8 68 68 72 66
S o u r c e : 1968-1971 "Review of  1971 and O u t lo o k  f o r  1972
T ab le  10 and T ab le  E .
1972-1973 "B u s i n e s s  and F i n a n c e ” 3 1 s t  May 1973*
E m ig r a t io n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o f  s k i l l e d  and educated  
workers ,  has  long  been a problem f o r  I r e l a n d .  Indeed,  
a major r e a so n  f o r  the p o l i c y  o f  encourag ing  FDI was 
the hope t h a t  such investm ent  would c r e a t e  jo b s  i n  
I r e l a n d .  However, the trend o f  e m ig r a t io n  f i g u r e s  i s  
downwards and the a b s o lu t e  s i z e  o f  the f l o w  i s  sm al l  i n  
r e l a t i o n  to  unemployment, d e s p i t e  i t s  s o c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .
The o p p o r tu n i ty  c o s t  to  be imputed t o  an emigrant  
i s  the amount he rem it s  to  the country he l e a v e s .  Table  
7 .2  shows the number o f  m igrants  and t o t a l  r e m it ta n c e s  
1960 -19 7 0 .
T a b le  7 .2  E m i g r a t i o n  and R e m i t t a n c e s  1960-1970
Y ear I9 6 0 1961 1962 1963 1961+ 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 19 70
Emi­
g r a t i o n 699^ 5721 5 2^8 6133 5791 5088 ¥+17 1+1+78 1+385 Na Na
(a)U.K.
R e m i t t ­
a n c e s
£000 5883 6 5^9 6326 5662 5607 5726 7017 5766 Nas Nas Nas
(b ) 0 t h e r  
C o u n t ­
r i e s  
£000 7 2^3 71+23 7381+ 71+1+9 7865 8789
-  - -1
8161+.. 10999 Nas Nas Nas




13 710 13111 131+72 S+515 15181 16765 2020C' 21JX) £ 9 $
S o u r c e : S t a t i s t i c a l  A b stract  o f  I r e la n d  : Various I s s u e s .
I r i s h  S t a t i s t i c a l  B u l l e t i n  : Various
A l th o u g h  r e m i t t a n c e s  i n  t o t a l  a re  an  im p o r t a n t  i t e m  
i n  the  I r i s h  b a l a n c e  of  p a y m e n ts ,  t o t a l l i n g  £ 23.9 m i l l i o n s  
i n  1970 ,  r e m i t t a n c e s  p e r  e m ig ra n t  a re  low.  The U.K.
Census (1 9 7 1 )  showed t h a t  720,985 r e s i d e n t s  o f  the  U.K. were 
b o r n  i n  th e  I r i s h  R e p u b l i c .  On the  a s s u m p t io n  t h a t  th e  
U.K. 2 R e s t  o f  th e  World e m ig ra n t  p r o p o r t i o n  was th e  same as  
i n  1967 ( t h e  l a s t  y e a r  i n  which  a d i s t i n c t i o n  was made i n  
the  s t a t i s t i c s ) ,  r e m i t t a n c e s  from the U.K. were £ 7>966 ,600 .  
R e m i t t a n c e s  p e r  head p e r  y e a r  from B r i t a i n  t h e r e f o r e  were 
o n ly  £ 1 1 .  *+0. The e f f e c t  o f  e m i g r a t i o n  on the  SWR t h e r e ­
f o r e  must  be v e r y  s m a l l .
The SWR sh o u ld  r e f l e c t  t h e  d e c r e a s e  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  
e l s e w h e r e  c a u s e d  by the  l a b o u r  b e in g  drawn i n t o  t h e  p r o j e c t  
under  a n a l y s i s  and the e f f e c t  t h i s  ha s  i n  i n c r e a s i n g  c o n ­
su m p t io n .  Most o f  the l a b o u r ,  i f  no t  employed i n  th e  i n d u s t  
r i a l  s e c t o r ,  would be employed i n  a g r i c u l t u r e .  The o p p o r ­
t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  of  the  l a b o u r  f o r c e  i s  t h u s  th e  
m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y ' o f  l a b o u r  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  (AMPL).
The AMPL i s  e s t i m a t e d  by th e  minimum w eek ly  wage i n  a g r i ­
c u l t u r e  ( t h i s  i s  more s a t i s f a c t o r y  t h a n  e q u a t i n g  AMPL w i t h  
a v e ra g e  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  a s  LM s u g g e s t s  b e c a u se  
we can  assume t h a t  the  m a r g in ,  the  minimum wage,  i s  e q u a l  t o  
m a r g i n a l  p r o d u c t i v i t y ) .  I n  December 1 9 7 1 j th e  minimum
weekly  wage i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  was £ 16 .  2 7 o r  £  813 .50  p e r
annum.12 The f i g u r e  o f  £ 81 3 .5 0  p e r  w o rk e r  was im puted  a s
the  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  l a b o u r  -  the  f a l l  i n  p r o d u c t i o n  e l s e
where i n  th e  economy.
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The SWB sh o u ld  a l s o  a c c o u n t  f o r  the  e f f e c t s  o f  
the  i n c r e a s e d  c o n sum p t io n  t o  which the  e x t r a  employ­
ment g i v e s  r i s e .  I f  a c o m p a r iso n  i s  made b e tw ee n  a 
s i t u a t i o n  where an  e q u a l  a d d i t i o n  t o  o u t p u t  w i th o u t  
th e  employment o f  an  e x t r a - m a n  and th e  s i t u a t i o n  w i t h  
the  e x t r a  employment ,  t h e n  th e  i n c r e a s e  i n  con sum p t ion  
i s  e q u a l  t o  th e  co nsu m pt io n  o f  the  wage e a r n e r .  I n  o t h e r  
words ,  th e  employment o f  an  e x t r a  man c a u s e s  a n a t i o n a l  
d e c r e a s e  i n  th e  amount o f  f u n d s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i n v e s t ­
ment by an  amount (C -  AMPL), where C i s  th e  c o nsu m p t io n  
l e v e l  o f  th e  wage e a r n e r .  The SWR i s  t h e r e f o r e  c a l c u ­
l a t e d  a s  th e  con sum p t ion  o f  the  wage e a r n e r  minus the  
e x t e n t  t o  w hich  th e  Government w ish e s  t o  w e ig h t  the  i n c r e a  
i n  c o n su m p t io n  t h u s  cau sed  a g a i n s t  s a v i n g s .
F o r m a l l y  t h e r e f o r e ,
SWR = c o n su m p t io n  b e n e f i t s  of  em ploying  one more w o rk e r  
i n  th e  p r o j e c t  minus th e  e x t e n t  t o  which  t h e  Government 
w ish e s  t o  d i s c o u n t  c o n su m p t io n  i n  f a v o u r  o f  in v e s tm e n t
i . e .  SWR = C -  1 (C-AMPL) C ? A )13
Go
r
where Go = Governm ent’ s r e l a t i v e  v a l u a t i o n  o f  c o n su m p t io n  
a g a i n s t  s a v i n g .
C, AMPL a s  ab ove .
To e s t i m a t e  C, we need t o  know the  e a r n i n g s  o f  l a b o u r  
and th e  s a v i n g s  p r o p o r t i o n .  Average w eek ly  e a r n i n g s  (Dec­
ember 1971)  were £ 21 .  7 9 9 o r  £  1 , 0 8 9 . 5  p e r  annum. I n  
1970,  p e r s o n a l  s a v i n g s  were £ l*+5 m i l l i o n s  from a N a t i o n a l  
income o f  £ m i l l i o n .  The i m p u t a t i o n  o f  a s a v i n g s
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  1 g i v e s  an  a v e rag e  c o n su m p t io n  f i g u r e ,
10t h
p e r  wage e a r n e r ,  o f  £ 981*
The f a c t o r  Go must  be deduced from Government p o l i c y  
s t a t e m e n t s  and a c t i o n .  The " T h i rd  Programme f o r  Economic 
and S o c i a l  Development  1 9 6 9 - 7 2 " ,  IDA p o l i c y  s t a t e m e n t s  
and the  "Review o f . 1971 and O u t lo o k  f o r  1972" show t h a t
e f f o r t s  have  b e e n  made t o  i n c r e a s e  the  p r o p o r t i o n  of  i n v e s t
l a ­ment i n  GNP a s  a d e l i b e r a t e  aim of p o l i c y .  T h is  h a s
b e en  a t t e m p t e d  u n d e r  New I n d u s t r y ,  Small  I n d u s t r y  and Home
I n d u s t r y  Programmes.  Such s t a t e m e n t s  h o w ev er ,  g iv e  no
gu ide  to  t h e  q u a n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  such  a p r e f e r e n c e  f o r  s a v in g
The r e l a t i v e  v a l u a t i o n  o f  in v e s tm e n t  t o  c o n su m pt ion  was
if cj
chosen  a s  and , on a r b i t r a r y  g r o u n d s .  Applying
th e s e  p r o p o r t i o n s  g i v e s  -
SWR = 981 -  1 (981 -  8 1 3 .5 )  = £ 8 W . 5  (from 7 . 1*)r/k
and SWR = 9 8 1 - 1  (981 -  8 1 3 .5 )  = £ 8 5 5 .8  (from 7 .^ )
' 3
Given t h e  low (zero)  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  unemployed and 
e m ig r a n t  l a b o u r ,  a f i g u r e  of £ 8p0 p e r  annum was c h o sen  
t o  r e f l e c t  the  r e l a t i v e  l i k e l y  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  unemployment ,  
e m i g r a t i o n  and a g r i c u l t u r a l  employment.  T h i s  f i g u r e  r e p ­
r e s e n t s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  a m an -y e a r  o f  work;  c o n s e ­
q u e n t l y  c a r e  h a s  to  be t a k e n  t o  s t a n d a r d i s e  f o r  p a r t  t im e  
w o rk e rs  (m a in ly  fem ale  l a b o u r ) .
iii, The Shadow Rental of Capital
I n  t h e  f u l l  LM a n a l y s i s ,  c a p i t a l  i s  s p l i t  i n t o  
g rad e d  goods e q u i v a l e n t  and imputed  i n  t h e  y e a r  i n  which  
i t  a r i s e s  a s  a c o s t .  The s o c i a l  r a t e  o f  t im e  p r e f e r e n c e  
i s  i n c l u d e d  v i a  th e  SWR, a s  a b o v e ,  where  i t  d e t e r m i n e s  
the  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e s  o f  c o n su m pt ion  and s a v i n g .  D i s c o u n t i n g  
i s  t h e n  c a r r i e d  ou t  by the  A ccoun t ing  Ra te  o f  I n t e r e s t  -  
the  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  o f  the m a r g i n a l  p r o j e c t  o r  th e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .
I n  th e  t r u n c a t e d  form p r e s e n t e d  h e r e  t h e r e f o r e ,  th e  
v a l u a t i o n  o f  c a p i t a l  must  r e f l e c t  no t  the  s o c i a l  r a t e  o f  
t ime p r e f e r e n c e ,  which  i s  a l r e a d y  I n c l u d e d  i n  the  SWR, b u t  
the  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l .
Only th e  usage  o f  I r i s h  d o m e s t i c  r e s o u r c e s  sh o u ld  e n t e r  
the  c o s t - b e n e f i t  c a l c u l u s  -  th e  c o s t  o f  f o r e i g n  i n p u t s  a r e  
b o rn6 by  f o r e i g n e r s .  I r i s h  c a p i t a l  i n p u t s  c o n s i s t  o f  the  
g r a n t s  r e c e i v e d  by the  f o r e i g n  f i r m ,  I r i s h  c a p i t a l  i n  j o i n t  
v e n t u r e s  and d e b t  r a i s e d  from I r i s h  s o u r c e s .
A h i g h  shadow r e n t a l  sh o u ld  be imputed  t o  d o m e s t i c  
c a p i t a l .  "High" i s  a r e l a t i v e  term and h e r e  i t  i s  used  
r e l a t i v e  t o  th e  comm erica l  r e t u r n s  on d o m e s t i c  c a p i t a l .  The 
c a p i t a l  u s e d ,  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d ,  h a s  a s c a r c i t y  v a lu e  i n  
e x c e s s  o f  t h a t  a t t r i b u t e d  by the  m a r k e t .  The IDA g r a n t  
r e p r e s e n t s  a d i r e c t  a l l o c a t i o n  of  Governm enta l  f u n d s  f o r  
p r o d u c t i v e  u s e .  Such fu n d s  i n  Government hands  a re  h i g h l y
f l e x i b l e  and c a n ,  i n  p r i n c i p l e ,  be a l l o c a t e d  a c r o s s  a 
wide ra n g e  o f  a c t i v i t i e s  t o  promote the  p e r c e i v e d  ” s o c i a l  
good” . A l t e r n a t i v e  u s e s  a r e s  th e  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  of  the 
d o m e s t i c  i n d u s t r i a l  s e c t o r ,  Government e n t e r p r i s e  o r  a 
s t a t e  h o l d i n g  company. Such fu n d s  have t h e r e f o r e  a h i g h  
s o c i a l  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s ,
I r i s h  e q u i t y  i s  employed.  The o bv ious  a l t e r n a t i v e  use 
he re  i s  I r i s h  owned e n t e r p r i s e s  and we sh o u ld  a g a i n  impute  
a h i g h  shadow r e n t a l .  I t  may be a rgued  t h a t  th e  r a t i o n a l e  
f o r  em plo y in g  a shadow r e n t a l  g r e a t e r  t h a n  th e  m arke t  
r a t e  d ep en d s  on  th e  e x i s t e n c e  of  c h a n n e l s ,  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  
f o r e i g n  f i r m  t o  t r a n s f o r m  t h e s e  fu n d s  i n t o  p r o d u c t i v e  
i n v e s t m e n t .  However, a t  the  m a r g i n , such  c h a n n e l s  do e x i s t  5 
I r i s h  f i r m s ,  s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  and the s m a l l  and home 
i n d u s t r i e s  g r a n t  scheme. T h i s  does  no t  however p r e j u d i c e  
the  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  a s s u m p t io n ,  which  i s  m ere ly  t h a t  no 
i d e n t i c a l  d o m e s t i c  p r o j e c t  i s  r e p l a c e d .  I n  o t h e r  w o rd s ,  
a " w i t h ” and " w i t h o u t ” c o m p ar ison  does  n o t  imply  t h a t  the  
o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  i n p u t s  i s  z e r o .
I d e a l l y ,  s e n s i t i v i t y  a n a l y s i s  sh o u ld  be employed t o  
see  how much d i f f e r e n c e  th e  c h o ic e  o f  v a r y i n g  shadow 
r e n t a l s  on I r i s h  c a p i t a l  makes t o  the  r e s u l t s .  However,  
i t  was d e c i d e d  no t  t o  p r e s e n t  such a p l e t h o r a  o f  r e s u l t s ,  
g iv e n  th e  l a r g e  number o f  p r o j e c t s  a n a l y s e d .  A shadow 
r e n t a l  o f  20$ was imputed  on the  b a s i s  o f  the  c o n s i d e r ­
a t i o n s  a b o v e .  Some e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n  w i t h  r a t e s  o f  15$ 
and 30$ was c a r r i e d  o u t ,  b u t  t h i s  was found  t o  make l i t t l e  
d i f f e r e n c e  t o  the  c a l c u l a t e d  c o s t - b e n e f i t  r a t i o s *
bOl
iv. The Distribution of Benefits and possible Omissions
I n  t h e  same way t h a t  o n ly  I r i s h - o w n e d  i n p u t s  e n t e r  
th e  c o s t  s i d e  o f  t h e  a c c o u n t ,  so o n ly  t h o s e  b e n e f i t s  
which a c c r u e  t o  I r i s h  f a c t o r s  e n t e r  a s  b e n e f i t s .  I t  may 
be a rg u e d  t h a t  th e  a n a l y s i s  a s  c onduc ted  h e re  g i v e s  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  em phasis  to  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n .
I t  would be p o s s i b l e  t o  w e ig h t  the  b e n e f i t s  i n  a s y s t e m ­
a t i c  way a c c o r d i n g  t o  who r e c e i v e d  them. Tax revenu e  and 
the  income o f  lo w e r  p a id  w o rk e r s  c o u ld  be h i g h l y  w e i g h t e d .
I t  was f e l t  however t h a t  i n  v iew of  the p rob lem s  e n c o u n t e r e d  
i n  d e v i s i n g  su c h  w e ig h ts  ( w i th  s c a n t  h e l p  from Government 
p ro n o u n c e m e n t s ) ,  i t  was no t  a f r u i t f u l  e x e r c i s e .
The t r e a t m e n t  o f  r e - i n v e s t e d  f o r e i g n  p r o f i t s  i s  a 
f a c e t  o f  t h i s  p rob lem .  I f  such p r o f i t s  a re  r e - i n v e s t e d ,  
th ey  sh o u ld  be c o n s i d e r e d  a s  p a r t  o f  i n v e s tm e n t  and n o t  
imputed a s  c o s t s  t o  t h e  h o s t .  To assume t h a t  a l l  p r o f i t s  
a re  r e m i t t e d  i n d u c e s  a  b i a s  a g a i n s t  FDI.  An i n d u s t r y  
ave rag e  r e i n v e s t m e n t  r a t i o  was t h e r e f o r e  a p p l i e d  t o  a l l  
f i r m s  i n  th e  i n d u s t r y .  T h is  r a t i o  was c a l c u l a t e d  f rom a s  
many f i r m s ,  and t ime p e r i o d s  a s  were a v a i l a b l e .
E a r l i e r  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h i s  work have shown t h a t  e x t e r n a l  
economies and d i s e c o n o m ie s  may a r i s e  from the  o p e r a t i o n  o f  
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  Such g a i n s  and l o s s e s  a r e  v e r y  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  q u a n t i f y  and a re  t h e r e f o r e  e x c l u d e d .  C o n c e p t u a l l y  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  t o  i n c l u d e  such  f a c t o r s  -  i n  th e  DRC a n a l y s i s  
e x t e r n a l  b e n e f i t s  shou ld  be added to  th e  d e n o m in a to r  and 
e x t e r n a l  s o c i a l  c o s t s  t o  the  n u m era to r  and i n  the  RBI a n a l y s i s  
n e t  e x t e r n a l  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t s  can be added t o  the  d e n o m i n a t o r .
gection b Results
( a )  D o m e s t ic  R esource  Cost  A n a l y s i s
The r e s u l t s  o f  th e  DRC a n a l y s i s  a re  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
T a b le s  7 .3  and 7.*+ and Appendix  I .  Appendix I  shows 
i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m  DRC r e s u l t s .  Table  7*3 g iv e s  t h e s e  r e s u l t  
a g g r e g a t e d  on  a b a s i s  s i m i l a r  t o  th e  I r i s h  Census o f  
P r o d u c t i o n  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  (which i s  p r e s e n t e d  a s  Appendix 
I I )  t o  a l l o w  c o m p ar ison  w i t h  t h a t  C en sus .  T ab le  7*3 
p r e s e n t s  th e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of  DRC a t  m arke t  p r i c e s  and a t  
th e  shadow p r i c e s  d e r i v e d  ab o v e .  The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  u sed  
i n  T ab le  ?.k  i s  the  S t a n d a r d  I n d u s t r i a l  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n .  
(Here the  c o v e ra g e  i s  more c o m p l e t e ) .
I t  was hoped t h a t  i t  would be p o s s i b l e  t o  c a l c u l a t e  
th e  DRC o f  t h e  t o t a l  I r i s h  i n d u s t r y ;  t h u s  p r o v i d i n g  a 
s t a n d a r d  o f  co m p a r iso n  a g a i n s t  which t o  m easure  th e  
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  Such e s t i m a t e s  c o u ld  however n o t  be 
made b e c a u s e  o f  th a  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  o b t a i n i n g  d a t a  on th e  
c a p i t a l  s o t c k  o f  I r i s h  i n d u s t r y .
The " n o n - f u l f i l m e n t  o f  t a r g e t s "  columns i n  each  
t a b l e  r e q u i r e  e x p l a n a t i o n .  I n  most c a s e s ,  th e  r e s u l t s  
a c h i e v e d  by th e  f o r e i g n  f i r m s ,  ju d g ed  by the  AFF Survey  
r e s u l t s ,  a r e  q u i t e  c l o s e  t o  th e  p r o j e c t i o n s  which  th e  f i r m  
made t o  the  IDA. Where t h i s - i s  n o t  th e  g e n e r a l  r u l e ,  
a l lo w a n ce  c a n  u s u a l l y  be made from AFF and IDA i n f o r m a t i o n  
f o r  c a s e s  where p r o j e c t i o n s  have n o t  a c t u a l l y  b e en  a c h i e v e
However i n  t h r e e  SIC g r o u p s ,  c h e m ic a l s ,  p l a s t i c s  and 
s y n t h e t i c s  and r u b b e r  p r o d u c t s ,  t h e r e  i s  e v id e n c e  t h a t  
s e v e r a l  ( u s u a l l y  l a r g e )  p r o j e c t s  have f a i l e d  t o  a c h i e v e  
t h e i r  t a r g e t s  and th e  a v a i l a b l e  s o u r c e s  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  
on t h e s e  p r o j e c t s  i s  l e s s  r e l i a b l e .  I n  t h e s e  s e c t o r s  
an e s t i m a t e  was made on th e  b a s i s  o f  o t h e r  IDA i n f o r m a t i o n  
and the  AFF Survey  where ap p rop r ia te*?  however such  e s t i m a t e s  
a re  l e s s  r e l i a b l e  t h a n  f o r  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  s a m p le ,
A s im p le  d e c i s i o n  r u l e  f o r  a c c e p t i n g  o r  r e j e c t i n g  
p r o j e c t s  ex a n t e  can  be d e r i v e d  from c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
DRC r e s u l t s .  I t  w i l l  n o r m a l ly  be the  c a se  t h a t ,  w i t h  
s a t i s f a c t o r y  shadow p r i c i n g ,  a l l  p r o j e c t s  w i t h  a DRC e q u a l  
t o  o r  l e s s  t h a n  1 ,0 0  sh o u ld  be a c c e p t e d .  C o s t s  a re  l e s s  
o r  e q u a l  t o  b e n e f i t s .  I f  d a t a  a re  a v a i l a b l e  ov e r  th e  
d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t ,  t h e n  a d i s c o u n t i n g  p ro c e d u re  sh o u ld  
be a d o p t e d .  However,  i f  such d a t a  a re  n o t  a v a i l a b l e ,  t h e n  
the  method o f  a n a l y s i n g  the  DRC of  the p r o j e c t  a t  a y e a r  o f  
f u l l  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  a good a p p r o x i m a t i o n ,  p r o v id e d  t h a t  a n  
ag reed  v a l u a t i o n  of  c a p i t a l  can  be d e v i s e d .  In v e s tm e n t  
d e c i s i o n s  w i t h  l i m i t e d  amounts o f  c a p i t a l  t o  employ ( c a p i t a l  
r a t i o n i n g )  sh o u ld  be c a r r i e d  ou t  by r a n k i n g  th e  p r o j e c t s  by 
DRC and im p le m e n t in g  them i n  o r d e r  from the  l o w e s t  u p w a rd s .  
T h is  w i l l  g iv e  the  h i g h e s t  b e n e f i t - c o s t  r a t i o  p o s s i b l e  f o r  
the  l i m i t e d  r e s o u r c e .
The 233 l i v e  p r o j e c t s  a n a l y s e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  (Appendix  
I )  g ive  r e s u l t s  a s  f o l l o w s s -  100 g ive  a DRC g r e a t e r  t h a n  
one ,  i n c l u d i n g  two w i t h  a n e g a t iv e  r e s u l t  (which  means t h a t
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t h e  v a l u a t i o n  o f  b o th  i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s  a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p r i c e s  and t h e  d e d u c t i o n  of  r e t u r n s  t o  f o r e i g n  f a c t o r s  l e a d s  
to  a n e g a t i v e  NVA, i . e .  th e  v a l u e  of  o u t p u t  i s  l e s s  t h a n  
v a lu e  o f  i n p u t  a t  shadow p r i c e s ) ,  f o u r  g iv e  a r e s u l t  e q u a l  
t o  one and 129 have a  DRC l e s s  t h a n  o ne .  On a s t r i c t  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  the  r u l e ,  i g n o r i n g  l i n k a g e  e f f e c t s  and 
e x t e r n a l  e c o n o m ie s ,  o n ly  133 o f  the  p r o j e c t s  o p e r a t i n g  a t  
f u l l  p r o d u c t i o n  r e s u l t  i n  b e n e f i t s  e x c e e d in g  c o s t s  ( 58$ o f  
th e  t o t a l ) .
On a sec to r*a l  b a s i s  th e  26 s e c t o r s  i n  T ab le  7.*+ 
d i v i d e  a s  f o l l o w s  -  17 g ive  a r e s u l t  l e s s  t h a n  one and 
n in e  a r e  g r e a t e r  t h a n  o n e .  However t h r e e  s e c t o r s ;  Food 
p r o d u c t s  ( O .98) ,  Motor V e h i c l e s  ( 0 . 9 9 )  and o t h e r  E l e c t r o n ­
i c  Equipm ent  ( 1 . 0 1 )  a re  v e r y  c lo s e  to  th e  d i v i d i n g  p o i n t  
where b e n e f i t s  e q u a l  c o s t s .  A m a rg in  of  e r r o r  must be 
a l lo w ed  i n  c a l c u l a t i o n s  such  as  t h e s e  and t h e s e  t h r e e  
s e c t o r s  c a n n o t  be u n e q u i v o c a l l y  a s s e s s e d  b e c a u se  o f  t h i s  
m a rg in .
The d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw ee n  DRC a t  m ark e t  p r i c e s  and a t  
shadow p r i c e s  i s  shown i n  T ab le  7*3* T h is  d i f f e r e n c e  
a r i s e s  b e c a u s e  o f  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  v a l u a t i o n  o f  m a t e r i a l  
i n p u t s ,  o u t p u t s  and the  i n p u t s  o f  c a p i t a l  and  l a b o u r .  A l l  
th e  m ark e t  p r i c e  DRCs a re  g r e a t e r  t h a n  one b e c a u se  o f  t h e  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  t a r i f f s  and d o m e s t i c  d i s t o r t i o n s .  F o r e i g n  
f i r m s  w h ich  e x p o r t  a l l  t h e i r  o u tp u t  w i l l  be o p e r a t i n g  v e r y  
c lo s e  to  th e  p o i n t  where DC -  Value Added a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p r i c e s  b e c a u s e  th ey  pay no im por t  d u ty  on i n p u t s .  R e t u r n s
t
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t o  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  must be d e d u c te d  from t h i s  and i n
many c a s e s  h i g h  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  w i l l  r a i s e  the  DC f r a c t i o n .
NVA
In  such  100% e x p o r t  c a s e s ,  m a t e r i a l  i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s
w i l l  have a l r e a d y  b e e n  v a l u e d  a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e s .
When f o r e i g n  f i r m s  a re  e v a l u a t e d  a t  shadow p r i c e s  th e  most
im p o r t a n t  change i s  u s u a l l y  i n  the  v a l u a t i o n  of  l a b o u r
s e r v i c e s .  F o r e i g n  f i r m s  pay h i g h e r  wages t h a n  do d o m e s t i c  
15f i r m s  and th e  " n o n - c o s t "  p a r t  o f  the  wage b i l l  a t  
shadow p r i c e s  ( i . e .  t h a t  above £ 8J0 p e r  annum p e r  f u l l  
time em p loy ee )  i s  u s u a l l y  th e  most i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r .
On th e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  shadow p r i c i n g  im p u te s  a h i g h e r  
v a l u a t i o n  t h a n  the  m ark e t  r a t e  t o  th e  s e r v i c e s  o f  c a p i t a l .  
T h is  i s  n o t  u s u a l l y  o f  a l a r g e  enough m agn i tude  t o  o u t ­
weigh th e  wage f a c t o r .  However c a s e s  o f  " o v e r s u b s i d i s a t i o n "  
do o c c u r .  C a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s  r e l y i n g  h e a v i l y  on 
d o m e s t i c  c a p i t a l  a re  th e  e x c e p t i o n s  to  t h i s  r u l e .  The 
i n f l u e n c e  o f  t a r i f f s ,  d o m e s t i c  d i s t o r t i o n s  and c o m p a ra t iv e  
a d v an tag e  a r e  a l l  i n f l u e n c e s  on the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  i n p u t s  
t o  o u t p u t , w h i c h  e x e r c i s e  an  i n f l u e n c e  on DRC. These comments 
l e a d  t o  a  s u r v e y  o f  the  r e a s o n s  why some r e s u l t s ,  b o t h  a t  
f i rm  and i n d u s t r y  l e v e l  were g r e a t e r  t h a n  o n e ,  i . e .  why 
c o s t s  e x c e e d e d  b e n e f i t s .
No s i n g l e  r e a s o n  can  be g iv e n  f o r  th o s e  c a s e s  where 
c o s t s  e x c e e d  b e n e f i t s ,  b u t  s e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  a r e  i m p o r t a n t  
i n  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  t h e s e  r e s u l t s .  The m a jo r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  
of  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  t o  s o c i a l  b e n e f i t  i s  t h r o u g h  the  p r o v i s i o n  
of jo b s*  T h i s  b e n e f i t  i s  r e f l e c t e d  by th e  SWR which  i s
be low r u l i n g  m ark e t  wage r a t e s .  T h is  r e d u c t i o n  i n  
measured  c o s t s  i s  u s u a l l y  g r e a t  enough t o  c o u n t e r ­
b a la n c e  th e  i n c r e a s e d  c o s t  o f  d o m es t ic  c a p i t a l  when 
v a lu e d  a t  t h e  shadow r e n t a l .  There  a r e ,  however ,  t h r e e  
d i s t i n c t  c a s e s  where t h i s  does  not  a p p l y .
(1 )  Where th e  f o r e i g n  f i r m  i s  h i g h ly  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e .  
C o n se q u e n t ly  a l a r g e  p a r t  o f  v a lu e  added a c c r u e s  t o  
f o r e i g n e r s  and  payment t o  l a b o u r  i s  s m a l l .  T h i s  t e n d e n c y  
to w ard s  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  was d i s c u s s e d  a b o v e .  The IDA 
a t t e m p t  t o  e n c o u ra g e  l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r y  b u t  where  
growth  p r o s p e c t s  a r e  good,  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  p r o j e c t s  
a r e  a i d e d ,  ( 2 )  Where f o r e i g n  p r o f i t s  a re  h i g h .  T h is  
need n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  be c o n f in e d  to  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  f i r m s  
and in d e e d  i t  was n o t i c e d  i n  a s u b - s e c t o r  o f  t h e  food  
i n d u s t r y .  F o r e i g n  p r o f i t s  a r e  ex c lu d ed  from KVA ( th e  
b e n e f i t  p a r t  o f  t h e  DRC f r a c t i o n )  and where h ig h  p r o f i t s  
a r e  combined w i t h  a l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  of  c a p i t a l  from 
d o m e s t i c  s o u r c e s  ( g r a n t ,  d e b t )  i t  w i l l  cause  the  DRC r a t e s  
t o  exceed  o n e .  (3 )  The case  o f  o v e r s u b s i d i s a t i o n .  I n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  th e  c a p i t a l  g r a n t ,  the  IDA may g ive  r e n t  s u b s i d ­
i e s ,  i n t e r e s t  s u b s i d i e s  and o t h e r  h e lp  from th e  p a n o p ly  o f  
i n c e n t i v e s  a t  i t s  d i s p o s a l .  Labour t r a i n i n g  g r a n t s  a r e  a l s o  
a v a i l a b l e  from AnCo and g r a n t s  to w ards  e x p o r t i n g  from Coras  
T r a c h t a l a .  The n e t  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  i n p u t  o f  I r i s h  fu n d s  
(v a lu e d  a t  the  shadow r e n t a l )  i s  i n  some c a s e s  to  r a i s e  
d o m e s t i c  c o s t s  above NVA ( l i t t l e  o f  t h i s  I r i s h  c a p i t a l  
r e c e i v e s  a d i r e c t  r e t u r n  from the  f o r e i g n  f i r m )  and DRC 
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Table 7*k Domestic Resource Costs of Foreign Firms at
Shadow P r i c e s  •- SIC C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
1 S e c t o r  and SIC Number 2 Number 
o f  F i rm s
3 DRC 
Shadow 
P r i c e s
if DRC -  
Non-Fulj 
ment
Meat P r o d u c t s  (201) 3 0.21 mm
D a i ry  P r o d u c t s  (202) 10 0 .3 1 -
Food P r o d u c t s  (206) 7 0.98 -
C o n f e c t i o n e r y  (207) 3 0 . ^ 9 -
T e x t i l e s  (2 2 ) 33 0 .7 3 -
A ppare l  (2 3 ) 21 0 .6 7 -
Wood & F u r n i t u r e
(2*f & 2 5 7 ) 6 0.70 -
Paper  & P a p e r b o a r d ,  B o xes  
& C o n t a i n e r s  ( 2 6 ^ ,2 6 5 ) 5 1.21 -
P r i n t e d  M a t t e r  (27) 2 0.62 -
A g r i c u l t u r a l  & I n d u s t ­
r i a l  C h e m ic a l s  
( 2 8 1 , 2 8 7 ,2 8 9 ) 9 1.60
P l a s t i c s  & S y n t h e t i c s  
( 282) 30 - 1 A 5
D rug s ,  Soap & C o sm e t ic s  
(2 8 3 ,  2Qk) 6 0 . 5 5 -
Rubber & T y r e s  ( 3 ,3 0 1 ) 3 - I . k 2
S to n e ,  G l a s s ,  C la y ,  
C o n c re te  ( 32l A ) 5 0 . 7 3 -
I r o n ,  S t e e l ,  N o n - f e r r o u s  
P r o d u c t s ,  O th e r  Non- 
f e r r o u s  m e t a l  (331) I k 0 . 7 6 —
Smelted & R e f in e d  
M e ta l  ( 3 3 2 , 3 3 ^ , 3 3 5 ) 6 0 . 8 5 -
M eta l  C ans ,  H e a t in g  
A p p a ra tu s  ( 3*+2 , 3^3) 7 1 .9 0 -
Table 7A  Continued
1 2 3 1+
S p e c i a l  I n d u s t r i a l  
M a c h in e r t  (3 5 ^ ) 7 1 .6 5
G en e ra l  I n d u s t r i a l  
M ach in e ry  (3 5 6 ) 5 1 . 3 0 •
O f f i c e  cS: Computing 
M a ch in e ry  ( 3 5 7 ,3 5 § ) 8 0 .5 3 -
Household  A p p l i a n c e s  
(363) 6 0.82 -
O ther  E l e c t r o n i c  
E quipm ent  (3 6 5 ) 7 1.01 —
Motor. V e h i c l e s  (371) ** 0 . 9 9 ■-
I n s t r u m e n t s  & P r e c i s i o n  
Goods (38 m inus  38^-) 13 0 .7 9 -
M ed ica l  I n s t r u m e n t s  
(381-0 7 0 .6 3 -
O ther  & Unknown 
P r o d u c t s  ( 1 9 ) 6 1.08
TOTAL 233
Source  s A u t h o r ' s  c a l c u l a t i o n  from IDA and 
AFF d a t a .
V l l
A f u r t h e r  cause  of  e x c e s s  d o m e s t ic  c o s t s  o c c u r s  
more s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  w i t h i n  an  i n d u s t r y  s im p ly  because  
the c h o ic e  o f  p r o j e c t  i s  wrong.  Such c a s e s  o c c u r  i n  th e  
f o l l o w in g  s e c t o r s :  I n d u s t r i a l  Chemicals  (2 8 1 ,  2 87 ,  289)
Rubber and T y r e s  ( 3 , 3 0 1 )  M e ta l  Cans,  H e a t in g  A p p a r a t u s ( 3 ^ 2 / 3 )  
and S p e c i a l  I n d u s t r i a l  M achinery  (35*+) . T h i s  may be
because  th e  f i r m  or  i n d u s t r y  o p e r a t e s  a t  low v a lu e  added 
and,  more i m p o r t a n t l y ,  low NVA w i t h i n  I r e l a n d .  I t  may be 
b eca u se  t h e  p r o t e c t i v e  wedge o f  the  t a r i f f  s t r u c t u r e  
e n c o u ra g e s  i n e f f i c i e n c y  o r  b eca u se  c e r t a i n  n e c e s s a r y  
s u p p o r t i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  ( i n t e r l i n k e d  i n d u s t r i e s ,  e x t e r n a l  
econom ies)  a r e  u n a v a i l a b l e  i n  I r e l a n d .  I n  a n u t s h e l l ,  such  
f i r m s  o r  i n d u s t i r e s  have a DRC g r e a t e r  t h a n  one b e ca u se  
even w i t h  s u b s i d i s a t i o n  and a d d i t i o n a l  h e l p ,  th ey  have no 
c o m p a ra t iv e  a d v an tag e  when o p e r in g  i n  I r e l a n d  and t h i s  
shows t h r o u g h  i n  the  DRC r a t i o .  D e s p i t e  th e  r e s u l t  t h a t  
the  i n f l u e n c e  o f  c o m p a ra t iv e  advan tage  i s  d o m in a n t ,  t h e  
s e c t o r s  i n  T a b le  7*5 a re  w id e ly  d e f i n e d  and so  w i t h i n  
s e c t o r s  p r o d u c t  s p e c i a l i s a t i o n  and s c a l e  e f f e c t s  mean t h a t  
t h i s  d oes  n o t  a p p ly  t o  a l l  f i r m s .
To r e t u r n  t o  th e  r e s u l t s  a t  i n d u s t r y  l e v e l  (SIC 
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n  T ab le  7.*+), the  b e s t  r e s u l t s  a r e  a c h ie v e d  
by t h r e e  i n d u s t r i e s  i n  th e  food s e c t o r s ;  meat p r o d u c t s ,  
d a i r y  p r o d u c t s  and c o n f e c t i o n e r y ,  f o l lo w e d  by o f f i c e  
and com put ing  m a c h in e r y ,  d r u g s ,  soap and c o s m e t i c s ,  p r i n t e d  
m a t t e r  and m e d i c a l  i n s t r u m e n t s .  The w o r s t  r e s u l t s  a r e  
r e c o r d e d  by th e  t h r e e  s e c t o r s  where n o n - f u l f i l m e n t  o f  
t a r g e t s  i s  s e r i o u s  ( a g r i c u l t u r a l  and i n d u s t r i a l  c h e m i c a l s ,
*+12
p l a s t i c s  and s y n t h e t i c s ,  r u b b e r  and t y r e s ,  where the  
r e s u l t s  a r e  v e r y  t e n t a t i v e )  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  m e ta l  cans  
and h e a t i n g  a p p a r a t u s  and s p e c i a l  i n d u s t r i a l  m a c h in e ry .
A n a ly s in g  which  6f  th e  above f a c t o r s  f i t s  t h e s e  
c a se s  i s  no e a s y  t a s k .  However two g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  a re  
p o s s i b l e  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  th e  good p e r f o r m e r s ;  f i r s t l y ,  i n  
the  food s e c t o r s ,  p r i n t e d  m a t t e r  and d r u g s ,  soap and c o s ­
m e t i c s  t h e r e  i s  v i g o r o u s  c o m p e t i t i o n  from the  d o m e s t i c  
s e c t o r  w h ich  may have b o t h  s t i m u l a t i n g  e f f e c t s  and e x t e r n a l  
economies* The second g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  i s  t h a t  f o r  computing  
m achinery  and m e d ic a l  i n s t r u m e n t s  (and t o  some e x t e n t  f o r  
fo od )  t h e r e  i s  a t r u l y  E u ro p e a n  market  and v i g o r o u s  com­
p e t i t i o n  on t h a t  marke t*  G e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  f o r  the  poor  
p e r f o r m e r s  f i t  i n t o  th e  d i s c u s s i o n  above (DRC r e s u l t s  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  o n e ) .  C a p i t a l  i n t e n s i t y  i s  a common f e a t u r e  
and i n  t h e  r u s h  t o  a t t r a c t  advanced t e c h n o lo g y  i n d u s t r i e s  
(w i th  f u t u r e  g row th  p r o s p e c t s  i n  mind) i t  i s  l i k e l y  t h a t  i n  
some c a s e s ,  o v e r s u b s i d i s a t i o n  has  o c c u r e d .  The n o n - f u l f i l m e n t  
of p r o j e c t i o n s  g iv e n  to  th e  IDA by l a r g e  f i r m s  i n  th e  t h r e e  
s e c t o r s  o f  Column b T ab le  7 *b may be a tem p o ra ry  phenomenon 
bu t  f o r  th e  moment poor r e s u l t s  a re  b e in g  r e c o r d e d .  High 
r e m i t t a n c e  o f  p r o f i t  and r o y a l t y  payments  i n  t h e s e  s e c t o r s  
( p a r t i c u l a r l y  35*+, 356 and 3*+2/ 3 ) i s  a f e a t u r e  which  i n c r e a s e s  
DRC. I n  summary, i t  seems t h a t  the  ” t r a d i t i o n a l "  e x p l a n a t i o n s  
o f  s u c c e s s f u l  pe r fo rm an ce  -  c o m p e t i t i o n  and ’’c o m p a ra t iv e  
a d v a n ta g e ” r e m a in  f o r c e f u l ,
Table 7 .5  Net,, Benefit per pound of Public Investment
o f  F o r e i g n  F i rm s  
1 S e c t o r  and SIC Number
Meat P r o d u c t s  (201)
D a i r y  P r o d u c t s  (202)
Food P r o d u c t s  (206)  
C o n f e c t i o n e r y  (207)
T e x t i l e s  (2 2 )
A p pa re l  (2 3 )
Wood & F u r n i t u r e  ( 2 ^ ,2 5 7 )
Paper  & P a p e r b o a r d ,  Boxes 
& C o n t a i n e r s  (26*+,265)
P r i n t e d  M a t t e r  (27)
I n d u s t r i a l  & A g r i c u l t u r a l  
C he m ica l s  (2 81 ,2 8 7 * 2 8 9 )
P l a s t i c s  & S y n t h e t i c s  (282)
D ru g s ,  Soap & C o sm e t ic s  
( 2 8 3 ,  2Sb)
Rubber & T y r e s  (3*301)
S to n e ,  G l a s s ,  Clay & 
C o n c re te  (321,*+)
I r o n  & S t e e l  (331)
Sm elted  & R e f in e d  K e t a l
( 3 3 2 , 3 3 ^ , 3 3 5 )
M eta l  C ans ,  H e a t in g  
A p p a r a tu s  ( 3 * 0 / 3 )
S p e c i a l  I n d u s t r i a l  
M ach ine ry  (35*0
G e n e ra l  I n d u s t r i a l  
M ach ine ry  (356)
SIC C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
Number 3 Market  if Shadow
of  P r i c e s  P r i c e s
Firms
3 6*0 b.9
10 6.1 if. 8
7 if. 6 3 . 6
3 b.9 3 . 9
33 5 .1 if. 6
21 b.7 *+•5
6 b.5 3 . 8
5 3 .2 3 . 0
2 5 .3 b , l
9 ( 2 . 6) ( 1 . 9 )
30 (2 . 1 ) ( 1 . 9 )
6 2.8 2.8
3 ( 2 . 9 ) ( 2 . if)
5 '  3 . 3 3 . 6
lb 3 . 1 2 . 7
6 3 . ^ 3 A
7 2.6 2.1
7 2 . 9 2 . if
5 ln 0 3*6
Table 7.5 Continued
1 2 3 if
O f f i c e  & Computing 
M a ch in e ry  ( 3 5 7 98) 8 5 .2 *+.9
Household  A p p l i a n c e s
(363) 6 3 .8 3 . 6
Other  E l e c t r o n i c  E q u i p ­
ment (365) 7 2*6 2 . 7
Motor V e h i c l e s  (371) 3 .2 2*9
I n s t r u m e n t s  & P r e c i s i o n  
Goods (38 m inus  38*f) 13 5 .0 5 .1
M e d ica l  I n s t r u m e n t s  (38*0 7 *+. 9 ^ •5
Other  & Unknown 
P r o d u c t s  (1 9 ) 6 2.0 1 . 7
TOTAL 233
S o u r c e : A u t h o r 1s c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA and
AFF d a t a *
( b) Neb B e n e f i t  per £ o f  P ub l ic  I n v e s t m e n t
The e v a l u a t i o n  o f  net  b e n e f i t  per pound of  p u b l ic  
investment proceeds  on the l i n e s  s e t  out above. Net 
b e n e f i t  i s  d e f in e d  as v a lu e  added accru ing  to I r i s h  
domestic  f a c t o r s  and the input of  p u b l ic  funds i s  c a l c u ­
la t e d  per annum. C a p i ta l  grants  are c a p i t a l i s e d  over an 
( a r b i t r a r i l y  chosen)  20 year per iod  and under shadow 
p r i c i n g ,  the shadow r e n t a l  o f  c a p i t a l  i s  u s e d .  The r e s u l t s  
are shown w i th  both  market p r i c e s  and shadow p r i c e s  i n  
Table 7 . 5 .
The f i g u r e s  i n  Table 7*5 should i d e a l l y  be taken i n  
comparison w i th  b e n e f i t s  accruing  from a l t e r n a t i v e  u ses  o f  
pu b l ic  f u n d s ,  such as encouragement of  dom est ic  e n t e r ­
p r i s e s ,  v a lu e d  on the same b a s i s .  As they s ta n d ,  however,  
they a l low  o n ly  c r o s s - s e c t o r a l  comparisons w i t h i n  the 
f o r e i g n  group. The f i g u r e s  r e v e a l  a wide d i s p a r i t y  between  
i n d u s t r i e s .  The b e s t  r e s u l t s  are found i n  the fo o d ,  t e x ­
t i l e s ,  and p r e c i s i o n  goods (357) 358. 38)  s e c t o r s .  The 
worst r e s u l t s  occur in  t h o s e  s e c t o r s  where n o n - f u l f i lm e n t  
of  t a r g e t s  i s  most s e r i o u s  -  f i g u r e s  i n  b r a c k e ts  i n  Table 7 .5  
and i n  some s e c t o r s  of  the m eta ls  and e n g in e e r in g  i n d u s t r i e s .
The importance of  th e  amount of annual subs idy  to  the  
c a l c u l a t i o n  should be emphasised .  As the denominator o f  
the net  b e n e f i t  per pound of  p u b l ic  in v e s tm e n t ,  the amount 
of subs idy  c a r r i e s  a great  d e a l  o f  weight  i n  determ ining  
outcomes. Those s e c t o r s  which are o v e r - s u b s i d i s e d  r e l a t i v e
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t o  t h e i r  n e t  b e n e f i t  g ive  a low f r a c t i o n  and th o se  s e c t o r s  
where th e  s u b s i d y  i s  sm a l l  r e l a t i v e  to  g e n e r a t e d  b e n e f i t s  
g ive  a h i g h  o n e .
The use  o f  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  would i n v o lv e  a n  a p r i o r i  
c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  n e t  b e n e f i t  and the  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  the  
annua l  s u b s i d y  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  the g r a n t  and c o n c e s s i o n s  
to  be g i v e n ,  b e f o r e  a p p r o v a l  o f t h e  p r o j e c t .  T h i s  would 
b o th  p r o v i d e  a r a t i o n a l  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  the  amount o f  t h e  
c a p i t a l  g r a n t ,  r e l a t e d  to  t h e  b e n e f i t  t o  th e  economy and 
would e l i m i n a t e  the  d a n g e r  o f  o v e r s u b s i d i s a t i o i u
( c ) The two m ethods  compared
T a b le  7 . 6  shows t h s  r a n k in g  by i n d u s t r y  g iv e n  by th e  
two a p p r a i s a l s .  I t  a p p e a r s  from t h i s  T ab le  t h a t  the  
r a n k i n g s  a r e  s i m i l a r  and t h i s  i s  con f i rm ed  by a r a n k  
c o r r e l a t i o n  a n a l y s i s  (Spearm an’ s r an k  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c ­
i e n t  r_  = 0 , 851? which  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  0,01 l e v e l ) .
The d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the  rank ings  a r i s e  b eca u se  o f  th e  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  the  shadow p r i c i n g  sys tem s i n v o lv e d  and 
because  o f  the  r e - o r d e r i n g  o f  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s .  I n  the  
DRC s y s te m ,  a l l  i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s  a re  v a lu e d  a t  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  p r i c e  e q u i v a l e n t s ,  w hereas  th e  NBI sys tem  o n ly  
v a l u e s  p r i m a r y  i n p u t s ;  c a p i t a l  and l a b o u r  a t  shadow p r i c e s .  
The DRC sy s te m  p r e s e n t s  a pure  c o s t  b e n e f i t  r a t i o  DC : NVA 
w hereas  th e  NBI sys tem s i n g l e s  out  one i m p o r t a n t  e le m e n t  -  
i n p u t  o f  Government fu n d s  a s  the  d e n o m in a to r  o f  i t s  c o s t
b e n e f i t  r a t i o ,  p u t t i n g  a l l  o t h e r  e le m e n t s  i n t o  a n e t  
b e n e f i t  r a t i o .  T h is  h a s  the  e f f e c t  o f  g i v i n g  e x t r a  w e i g h t ,  
t o  th e  i n p u t  o f  Government f u n d s .
A l th o u g h  r a n k i n g  by the  two methods d oes  no t  s i g n i f ­
i c a n t !  y a f f e c t  t h e  o v e r a l l  o r d e r i n g  by s e c t o r s ,  t h e r e  a r e  
some f a c t o r s  w h ich  a re  w or thy  o f  comment. The most s p e c t a c ­
u l a r  change i s  t h a t  o f  i n s t r u m e n t s  and p r e c i s i o n  goods 
( 38 m inus  38^ )  which moves from 1 3 th  r a n k  by DRC t o  f i r s t  
r an k  u n d e r  NBI -  p a r t l y  t h i s  change i s  due t o  the  change  
i n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i n p u t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a s  i n p u t s  a re  m a in ly  
im p o r ted  and more s i g n i f i c a n t l y  they  a re  l a r g e l y  im p o r te d  
from o t h e r  u n i t s  of  the  same f i r m .  Such i n p u t s  may be 
u n d e r - v a l u e d  i n  o r d e r  t o  make p r o f i t s  i n  t a x - f r e e  I r e l a n d ,  
t h u s  v a l u a t i o n  a t  t r u e  f r e e  m arke t  p r i c e s  i n c r e a s e s  c o s t s .  
More s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  such f i r m s  a re  e n t i r e l y  f o r e i g n  owned 
and p e r h a p s  s u r p r i s i n g l y ,  have r e c e i v e d  a low er  l e v e l  o f  
s u b s i d i s a t i o n  t h a n  a v e ra g e  -  p e rh a p s  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a re  
g e n e r a l l y  c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e .  The r e v e r s e  case  o f  ’’o v e r -  
s u b s i d i s a t i o n ” a p p l i e s  t o  d r u g s ,  soap and c o s m e t i c s  (283, 28^ 
which moves from 5 t o  18 unde r  NBI and t o  i r o n  and s t e e l  
(331)  w h ich  moves from 12 t o  e q u a l  1 9 t h ,  T h i s  o v e r s u b s i d ­
i s a t i o n  a p p e a r s  t o  be th e  r e s u l t  o f  a d e s i r e  t o  e s t a b l i s h  
t h e s e  two i n d u s t r i e s  i n  I r e l a n d ,  even  i f  t h e  c o s t s  were 
h i g h e r  t h a n  n o r m a l .
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X S e c t o r  and SIC Number 2 DRC 3 NBI
Ranking Ranking
Meat P r o d u c t s  (201)  1 =2
D a i ry  P r o d u c t s  (20 2 )  2 k
Food P r o d u c t s  (206)  16 =12
C o n f e c t i o n a r y  (207)  3 9
T e x t i l e s  ( 2 2 )  =10 5
A p pa re l  ( 2 3 )  8 =6
Wood & F u r n i t u r e  (2*+,257) 9 11
Paper  & P a p e r b o a r d ,
Boxes & C o n t a i n e r s  (26*+,265) 20  16
P r i n t e d  M a t t e r  (27 )  6 8
I n d u s t r i a l  & A g r i c u l t u r a l
C h e m ica l s  ( 2 8 1 ,2 8 7 ,2 8 9 )  2*+ =2*+
P l a s t i c s  & S y n t h e t i c s  (282)  23 =2^
D ru gs ,  Soap & C o sm e t ic s
(28 3 ,2 8 1 0  5 18
Rubber & T y r e s  ( 3 , 3 0 1 )  22 =21
S t o n e ,  G l a s s ,  C la y ,
C o n c re te  (32 1 ,32 * 0  =10 =12
I r o n  & S t e e l  ( 331) 12 =19
Smelted  & R e f in e d  M e ta l  15 15
M eta l  C a n s ,  H e a t in g
A p p a r a tu s  ( 3^2/ 3 ) 26 23
S p e c i a l  I n d u s t r i a l  M ach ine ry
(35*0 25 =21
G enera l  I n d u s t r i a l  M ach ine ry  
( 356) 21 =12
Table 7*6 Continued
1 2 3
O ff ic e  & Computing 
M a ch in e ry  (357,358) V 2
Household  A p p l i a n c e s  (363) IV =12
O ther  E l e c t r o n i c  Equipment (365) 18 =19
Motor V e h i c l e s  (371) 17 =17
I n s t r u m e n t s  & P r e c i s i o n  
Goods (38 m inus  38V) 13 1
M edica l  I n s t r u m e n t s  (38V) 7 6
O th e r  & Unknown P r o d u c t s  (19) 19 26
Source : Column 2 from T ab le  7*V Columns 3 & V 
Column 3 from T ab le  7*5 Column V
N o te :  S p e a rm a n 's  r a n k  c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t
r s = 0.851 s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  0,01 l e v e l .
section 5 Conclusions.
The r e s u l t s  o f  a c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  cannot  be 
c o n s i d e r e d  i n  i s o l a t i o n  from the  methods used  t o  d e r i v e  
those  r e s u l t s .  Such methods must cope a d e q u a t e l y  w i t h  
c o n c e p tu a l  p ro b lem s  and be s u i t e d  to  th e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
imposed by l a c k  o f  a d e q u a te  d a t a .  There  a r e  a l s o  s p e c i a l  
p roblems when FBI i s  b e in g  i n v e s t i g a t e d .  I n  t h i s  c a t e g o r y  
i s  the  c o r r e c t  c h o ic e  o f  " a l t e r n a t i v e  p o s i t i o n "  and th e  
d i v i s i o n  o f  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  be tw een  the  f o r e i g n  p a r t n e r  
and the d o m e s t i c  economy.
The m a jo r  p rob lem s which  a c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  
must s o lv e  a r e  th e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  and v a l u a t i o n  of  c o s t s  
and b e n e f i t s .  When m arke t  p r i c e s  a re  i n a d e q u a t e  i n d i c a t o r s  
of  s o c i a l  v a l u e s  -  and t h i s  must g e n e r a l l y  be th e  p r e s u m p t i o n  
where unemployed r e s o u r c e s  show ev id e n ce  o f  a s e r i o u s  
r e s o u r c e  im b a lan c e  -  a sys tem  o f  shadow p r i c e s  must be 
d e v i s e d .  The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of n a t i o n a l  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  
i s  c o m p l i c a t e d  where f o r e i g n  r e s o u r c e s  a r e  u s e d .
Two m eth od s  of  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  were su g g e s t e d  
above a s  b e i n g  a p p r o p r i a t e  methods g iv e n  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  
s t r i n g e n t  d a t a  c o n s t r a i n t s .  As a p p l i e d ,  n e i t h e r  method 
can  be c o n s i d e r e d  a comple te  a n a l y s i s  b e c a u se  changes  o v e r  
time a r e  no t  a d e q u a t e l y  a l lo w e d  f o r  -  no means o f  d i s c o u n t ­
ing  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  c an  t h e r e f o r e  be u t i l i s e d .  (T h i s  
a r i s e s  b e c a u s e  o f  d a t a  c o n s t r a i n t s  and i s  no t  a.n i n h e r e n t  
d i f f i c u l t y  o f  e i t h e r  m o d e l ) .
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E x t e r n a l  e f f e c t s  and l i n k a g e  e f f e c t s  a r e  d e a l t  w i t h  o n ly  
p e r i p h e r a l l y ,  o r  no t  a t  a l l .  However, b o t h  methods a l lo w  
c o m p u ta t io n  o f  h o s t  c o u n t r y  b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  i n  ways 
which l e a d  t o  s im p le  d e c i s i o n  r u l e s .  The DRC a n a l y s i s  
a l lo w s  p r o j e c t s  t o  be r a n k e d  i n  o r d e r  o f  d e s i r a b i l i t y  and 
f a c i l i t a t e s  t h e  c o m p ar iso n  of  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  w i t h  
d om es t ic  o n es  o r  w i t h  th e  d o m es t ic  i n d u s t r y  as  a whole 
( tho u gh  t h i s  e x e r c i s e  cou ld  no t  be c a r r i e d  o u t  b ecau se  o f  
the  l a c k  o f  a d e q u a te  d a t a . )  DRC r a t i o s  can  be a g g r e g a t e d  
from the  f i r m  l e v e l  to  t h e  I n d u s t r y  l e v e l  i n  o r d e r  t h a t  
s e c t o r a l  c o m p a r i s o n s  can  be made. T h is  a l l o w s  d e d u c t i o n s  
to  be made a s  t o  th e  " n e a r e s t  t o  o p t im a l"  d i s t r i b u t i o n  and 
m agni tude  o f  FDI.  The KBI c r i t e r i o n  a l l o w s  co m p ar ison  o f  
the  n e t  b e n e f i t  d e r i v e d  from an i n p u t  o f  Government f u n d s  
i n t o  f o r e i g n - o w n e d  p r o j e c t s  w i th  a l t e r n a t i v e  u se s  o f  such  
fu nd s  -  t h u s  a l l o w i n g  a r a t i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s c a r c e  
r e s o u r c e s  t o  be made.
I t  i s  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  t h e s e  two m ethods  o f f e r  a b e t t e r  
means o f  e v a l u a t i n g  the b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  o f  FDI t h a n  
o t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  b e ca u se  t h e y  p r e s e n t  n e i t h e r  a s i n g l e -  
v a lu e  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  ( p r o f i t s ,  l a b o u r  i n t e n s i t y ,  l i n k a g e  
e f f e c t s ,  o u t f l o w s  v e r s u s  i n f lo w s  on the  b a l a n c e  o f  p ay m e n ts )  
o r  a s e t  o f  p a r t i a l  c r i t e r i a  ( a s  f o r  i n s t a n c e  s u g g e s t e d  by 
Cooper and W h e lan ) .  The c r i t e r i a  used i n  f a c t  i d e n t i f y  c o s t s  
and b e n e f i t s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  and p ro v id e  a means o f  comparing  
c o s t s  w i t h  b e n e f i t s  i n  a manner which i s  f l e x i b l e  enough t o  
a l low  c h an ges  i n  c r u c i a l  p a r a m e t e r s  such  a s  the  a l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s i t i o n  and p o l i c y  c h a n g e s .
The r e s u l t s  o f  the  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a n a l y s i s  show a wide 
v a r i e t y  o f  r e s u l t s  a t  the  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o j e c t  l e v e l .  As 
a p o s t J ioc. means o f  a s s e s s i n g  p e r fo rm a n c e ,  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  
pe rfo rm ed  w e l l ,  under  b o t h  c r i t e r i a  i n  the  f o l lo w in g  
s e c t o r s ;  th e  food  i n d u s t r y ,  t e x t i l e s  and a p p a r e l ,  m e d ic a l  
i n s t r u m e n t s ,  o f f i c e  and computing m ach in e ry  and i n s t r u m e n t s  
and p r e c i s i o n  goods ( a l t h o u g h  the  l a s t  gave v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  
r e s u l t s  u n d e r  th e  d i f f e r e n t  s y s t e m s ) .  However, i n  a l a r g e  
number o f  c a s e s ,  a c c o r d i n g  to  DRC m easu rem en t ,  many p r o j e c t s  
have imposed a g r e a t e r  c o s t  on t h e  economy t h a n  t h e i r  c o n ­
t r i b u t i o n  t o  i t ,  u n l e s s  th e y  have g e n e r a t e d  u n u s u a l l y  l a r g e  
e x t e r n a l  e f f e c t s .  Many of  t h e s e  c a s e s  have a r i s e n  b e c a u se  
the  p r o j e c t s  have no t  a c h i e v e d  the  p e r fo rm ance  which t h e y  
f o r e c a s t e d  t h e y  would a t t a i n .  Such c a s e s  a re  c o n c e n t r a t e d  
i n  the  p l a s t i c s  and s y n t h e t i c s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  c h e m ic a l s  and 
r u b b e r  and t y r e s  s e c t o r s :  t h e y  t en d  t o  be l a r g e  p r o j e c t s  
and t h e r e f o r e  have a l a r g e  i n f l u e n c e  on th e  s e c t o r a l  r e s u l t s .
O v e r a l l ,  the  DRC a p p r a i s a l  g iv e s  133 i n d i v i d u a l  
p r o j e c t s  whose b e n e f i t  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  c o s t  from 233 s u r v e y e d .  
T h is  i s  a 58% " s u c c e s s "  r a t i o  of  th o se  p r o j e c t s  a n a l y s e d .
T h i s  i s  n o t  a  complete  p i c t u r e  because  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  w hich  
f a i l e d  o r  were  t a k e n  o v e r  b e f o r e  f a i l i n g  a r e  e x c lu d ed  ( b e ­
cause  o f  l a c k  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n ) .
The NBI c r i t e r i o n  i s  no t  amenable t o  d i v i d i n g  p r o j e c t s  
i n t o  "good" o r  "bad" a s  i t  i s  a r e l a t i v e  c r i t e r i o n .  The 
v a r i a t i o n  i n  s u c c e s s  of  the p r o j e c t s  a p p e a r s  j u s t  a s  f o r c e ­
f u l l y  a s  i n  th e  DRC r e s u l t s .  We need much more i n f o r m a t i o n
t o  u t i l i s e  t h i s  c r i t e r i o n  p r o p e r l y  however -  namely th e  
y i e l d  on p u b l i c  i n v e s tm e n t  from o t h e r  u s e s  of  f u n d s .  A l l  
we can  a t  p r e s e n t  show from the  c a l c u l a t i o n s  i s  the  r e l ­
a t i v e  y i e l d  o f  s e c t o r s  and the  d i s p e r s i o n  i n  r e t u r n s .
B o th  s e t s  o f  r e s u l t s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  a more r i g o r o u s  
and s y s t e m a t i v e  c o s t - b e n e f i t  a p p r a i s a l  shou ld  be made by 
the  IDA b e f o r e  g i v in g  a g r a n t  to  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  
( t h i s  a p p l i e s  e q u a l l y  to  I r i s h  owned g r a n t  a id e d  f i r m s . )
Such an a p p r a i s a l  would no t  r e q u i r e  much more d a t a  t h a n  
the IDA r e c e i v e s  a l r e a d y  and a l t h o u g h  i t  cou ld  no t  remove 
those  c a s e s  where p r o j e c t i o n s  a re  not  f u l f i l l e d ,  i t  would 
ensu re  a b e t t e r  use of I r i s h  i n v e s t a b l e  r e s o u r c e s .  F i rm s  
which d i d  n o t  meet t a r g e t s  cou ld  be p e n a l i s e d  by r e c e i v i n g  
lower  p r o p o r t i o n a t e  g r a n t  payments  o r  o t h e r  b e n e f i t s  from 
the s t a t e  ( t a x  r e l i e f  f o r  i n s t a n c e ) .  Such a p o l i c y  c o u ld  
be l i n k e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  p r o j e c t e d  
and a c t u a l  employment;  though  l a b o u r  s u b s i d i e s  a r e  n o t  
recommended a s  an  o v e r a l l  p o l i c y .
Such a p o l i c y  of  r i g o r o u s  ex a n te  a p p r a i s a l  by th e  
IDA would r e q u i r e  an  i n p u t  of  e x p e r t i s e  b u t  t h i s  sh o u ld  be 
a sm a l l  p rob lem  g i v e n  the s k i l l s  w i t h i n  the  IDA and the o u t ­
pu t  of  s u i t a b l e  I r i s h  g r a d u a t e s .  The a p p r a i s a l  cou ld  be 
conduc ted  a t  f i r s t  a t  the  macro l e v e l  u s in g  th e  NBI c r i t e r i o n  
t o  e v a l u a t e  the  b e n e f i t  o f  the  t o t a l  amount o f  i n v e s t a b l e  
funds  a s  compared w i t h  o t h e r  u s e s  of Government fu n d s  and 
t h e n  a t  t h e  m ic ro  l e v e l ,  u s in g  a DRC c r i t e r i o n .  T h is  
e v a l u a t i o n  would i n c r e a s e  s e l e c t i v i t y  i n  g r a n t - g i v i n g  and
would c u t  down f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  a c c e p te d  f o r  g r a n t  a i d  
( indeed  a l l  a c c e p t a n c e s )  i n  the  s h o r t  r u n ,  bu t  i t  would 
ensure  t h a t  the b e n e f i t s  of  FDI a re  maximised f o r  a g i v e n  
o u t la y  o f  I r i s h  d o m e s t i c  r e s o u r c e s .  I t  would n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
lead  t o  a more l a b o u r  i n t e n s i v e  p r o d u c t i o n  s t r u c t u r e  
w i t h i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  f i r m .  However, the  employment o f  l a b o u r  
would no t  be o u tw e ig h te d  by c o s t s  b u t  would be c o r r e c t l y  
e v a lu a t e d  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  o t h e r  b e n e f i t s  ( g i v e n  an  a g re e d  
shadow w a g e ) .
The f a c t  t h a t  h2% o f  l i v e  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  a r e  
not b e n e f i c i a l  t o  the  economy i n  a c o s t  b e n e f i t  sense  sho u ld  
be a s u f f i c i e n t  s t i m u l u s  t o  a more c a r e f u l  and r i g o r o u s  
s c r e e n in g  o f  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s .  However, t h i s  f i g u r e  sh o u ld  
not be a p p l i e d  w i t h o u t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t o  p r e s e n t  day p r o j e c t s .  
Many such p r o j e c t s  were a c c e p t e d  when I r e l a n d  was i n  an  
i n f e r i o r  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n ,  t h a n  she i s  now, when e x p e r i e n c e  
of the  i n c e n t i v e  l e v e l  n e c e s s a r y  to  b u i l d  a sound economic 
framework was l i m i t e d  and b e f o r e  I r i s h  e n t r y  i n t o  th e  E&C.
A much t o u g h e r  b a r g a i n i n g  a t t i t u d e  can  now be a d o p te d ,  w h i l s t  
s t i l l  m a i n t a i n i n g  a n  a t t r a c t i v e  programme,of  i n c e n t i v e s .
Fu tu re  p o l i c y  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  the  c o n c lu d in g  C h a p te r .
Appendix I  I n d u s t r i a l  Firm Domest ic  R esource  C o s t s : 
Shadow P r i c e s















Meat P r o d u c t s  
D a i r y  P r o d u c t s
Food P r o d u c t s
C o n f e c t i o n a r y
T e x t i l e s
A p p a r e l
Wood & F u r n i t u r e
P a p e r ,  P a p e r b o a r d ,  
B o x e s ,  C o n t a i n e r s
P r i n t e d  M a t t e r
I n d u s t r i a l  e t c .  
C h e m ica l s
P l a s t i c s  esc 
S y n t h e t i c s
Number
of
F i rm s
D om est ic  Resource  Cost  






















1 .1 4  
0 . 5 6  
o . 4 o  
0.98 
0 .?2  














0 . 6 4
1 . 1 70.52
1 .1 5  
0 .8 2  




0 . 38, 0 . 10, 0 . 60, 
0 . 80, 0 . 31, O .96, 
0 . 28.
0 . 12, 1 . 4 3 ,  1 . 8 1 ,  
1 . 3 9 ,  1 . 3 1 .
0 . 2 3 ,  0 .7 5
0 . 7 9 ,
I .607
0 . 2 7 ,
1 .0 2 ,
0 . 7 9 ,
0 - 5 5 ,
0 . 4 2 ,
0 . 3 9 ,  
8 . 6 0 ,  
0 . 8 8 , 
0 . 3 9 ,  
0 . 81 , 
1 . 2 4 .  
1*3 7, 
0 . 6 3 ,
1 . 5 3 ,
0 . 6 3 ,
1 . 2 3 ,
0 . 8 9 ,
0 . 2 5 ,
0 . 28,
1 . 2 5 ,
1 .0 1 ,
0 . 4 7 ,  0 . 20, 0 . 7 7 ,  
0 . 7 5 ,  1 . 5 9 ,  0 . 5 7 ,  
I . 39, 0 . 61, 0 . 9 5 ,  
1 , 2 4 ,  0 . 4 1 ,  1.1+9, 
0 . 4 6 ,  4 . 2 1 ,  0 . 3 9 ,
0 . 56, 6. 00, O .56, 
0 .82 .
4 . 8 8 ,  0 . 1 5 ,  0 . 82, 
1 .12.
0 . 5 4 .
0 . 6 4 ,  1 . 26* 1 . 0 9 ,  
2 . I I 7 2 . 5 7 ,  1 . 80,
1 . 7 5 ,  0 . 51, 0 . 5 9 ,  
0 , 49, 0 . 69, 2 . 21 , 
1 . 0 4 ,  0 . 3 3 ,  1 . 8 9 ,  
0 . 9 4 ,  1 . 0 9 ,  0 . 8 5 ,  
•2 .3 5 ,  0 . 7 3 ,  l . p i ,  
1 .8 7 7  1*34,  1 . 4 4 ,  
0 . 9 0 ,  0 . 8 3 ,  0.4_j, 
1 . 2 5 .
Appendix I Continued
SIC S e c to r  Number Domestic Resource Cost
o f  o f  I n d i v i d u a l  F i rm s
Firm s
2%?’28k
D r u g s ,  Soap,  
C o sm e t i c s
6 O .36,
0 . 8 3 ,
0 . 8 1 ,
O e ^ .
0 . 28, 1 . 09,
3 ,
301
Rubber  & 
T y r e s
3 1 .^ 0 + 1.66* 1 . 02.
321 ,
32**
S t o n e ,  G l a s s ,  
C l a y ,  C o n c re te
5 1 . 0 5 ,
0 . 82.
0 .5 ^ , ' 0 . 6 5 , 0 . ^ 8 ,
331 I r o n ,  S t e e l ,  
N o n - f e r r o u s  Prod * s . i*t 0 . 8  7, 
0 . 5 6 ,  
0 . 9 0 ,  
1 . 0 3 ,
1.0W,
0 . 3 9 ,
1 . 80,
I . 67.
0 . 58, 
0 . 65, 
0 . 5^,
1 8 , 0 0 ,
1 . 5 6 ,
1 . 2 9 ,
3 3 2 /
V 5
S m e l te d  & R e f in e d  
M e t a l s
6 0 . 6 1 ,
0 . 6 0 ,
l . o o ,
2 . 3 8 .
0«,5 6 , 1 .  6k ,
3(t2,
3^3
M e t a l  Cans ,  
H e a t i n g  A p p a ra tu s
7 0 . 9 3 ,  
1 Neg
0 . 8 7 ,  
, 1 .02
1 . 3 0 ,
, 2 .0 0
0 • 5 l  ,
•
35^ vSpeeial I n d u s t r i a l  
M ach in e ry
7 1 . 7 5 ,
l . o o ,
6.  l o t  
i M i
2 . 3 7 ,
0.*t2.
1 . 1 3 ,
356 G e n e r a l  I n d u s t r i a l  
M a ch in e ry
5 0 . 70,0 . 76.
2 . 16, 1.6W, 0 . 63,
3 57 ,
358
O f f i c e  & Computing 
Equipment
8 1 . 8 8 ,
0 . 7 9 ,
0 . ^ 6 ,
0 . 3 9 ,
0 . 5 9 ,
1 . 5 1 ,
0 . 7 1 ,
3 . 1 5 .
363 H ouseho ld
A p p l i a n c e s
6 3 . 8 3 ,
1 . ^ 9 ,
I 0 6 ,
0 . 9 9 .
1 . 3 6 , 0 . 3 5 ,
365 O th e r  E l e c t r o n i c  
Equipment
7 0 . 5 1 ,






371 M otor  V e h i c l e s k 0 . 9 1*, 1 . 16, 0 . 6 6 , 1 . 3 1 .
38 P r e c i s i o n  Goods 
& I n s t r u m e n t s
13 0 . 28, 0 . 6 c , 
1 . 01, 
0 .86*
l . o o ,
1 . 25,
0 . 5 3 ,
2 . 1 0 ,
0 . 52,
0 . 53,
0 . 7 2 ,
2 . 2 5 ,
1 . 5 0 ,
Appendix I  C o n t in u e d
SIC S e c t o r  Number Dom est ic  Resource  Cost
o f  o f  I n d i v i d u a l  F irm s
Firm s
38*+ M e d i c a l
I n s t r u m e n t s
7 1 . 3 8 ,
0 . 9 7 ,
0 . 1 9 ,0.66,
o.*+6,
1 . 0 5 .
0 . 6 9 ,
19 O t h e r  &
Unknown P r o d ’ s •
6 0 . 5 0 ,
6 . 3 5 ,
N e g . ,
l .*+3 .
k . i k , 0 . 7 1 ,
TOTAL 2 3 3
S o u r c e : A u t h o r ’ s  c a l c u l a t i o n s  from IDA d a t a .
+ U n f u l f i l l e d  t a r g e t s  -  f i g u r e  t e n u o u s .
Appendix I I  The I r i s h  Census o f  I n d u s t r i a l  P r o d u c t i o n
C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
I n d u s t r y  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
01  M in in g  and Q u a r r y i n g .
0 2  T u r f  P r o d u c t i o n  and Bog D e v e l o p m e n t .
03  B a co n  F a c t o r i e s .
0^ S l a u g h t e r i n g ,  p r e p a r a t i o n  and p r e s e r v i n g  o f  meat  
o t h e r  t h a n  0 3 .
05  Creamery b u t t e r ,  c h e e s e  and o t h e r  e d i b l e  m i l k  p r o d u c t s .
0 6  C anning  o f  f r u i t  and v e g e t a b l e s ,  m a n u f a c t u r e  o f  
p r e s e r v e s ,  jam e t c .
0 7  G r a in  m i l l i n g  and a n i m a l  f e e d i n g  s t u f f s .
08  B r e a d ,  b i s c u i t  and f l o u r  c o n f e c t i o n e r y .
0 9  M a n u f a c t u r e  and r e f i n i n g  o f  s u g a r .
10  M a n u f a c t u r e  o f  c o c o a ,  c h o c o l a t e  and s u g a r  c o n f e c t i o n e r y .
11  M a r g e r i n e , compound c o o k i n g  f a t s  and b u t t e r  b l e n d i n g .
12 M i s c e l l a n e o u s  f o o d  p r e p a r a t i o n s  ( i n c l u d i n g  f i s h ) .
13  D i s t i l l i n g .
1*+ M a l t i n g .
15  B r e w i n g .
1 6  A e r a t e d  and M i n e r a l  W a t e r s .
17  T o b a c c o .
18 W o r s ted  and W o o l l e n  ( e x c l u d i n g  c l o t h i n g )  L i n e n  and  
C o t t o n  s p i n n i n g ,  w e a v i n g  & m a n u f a c t u r e s .
1 9  J u t e ,  c a n v a s ,  r a y o n ,  n y l o n  c o r d a g e  & m i s c e l l a n e o u s  
t e x t i l e s .
20  H o s i e r y .
21  B o o t  and sh o e  f a c t o r i e s .
22 C l o t h i n g  m a n u f a c t u r e  o f  made up t e x t i l e s  e x c e p t  a p p a r e l .
*+29
I n d u s t r y  C l a s s i f i c a t i o n
2 3  M a n u f a c t u r e  o f  wood & c o r k  e x c e p t  f u r n i t u r e
2 k  M a n u f a c t u r e  o f  f u r n i t u r e  & f i x t u r e s ,  b r u s h e s  & b r o o m s .
2 5  M a n u f a c t u r e  o f  p a p er  and p a p er  p r o d u c t s .
26  P r i n t i n g ,  p u b l i s h i n g  and a l l i e d  t r a d e s .
2 7 F e l l m o n g e r y ,  T a nn in g  and d r e s s i n g  o f  l e a t h e r .
2 8  M a n u f a c t u r e  o f  l e a t h e r  and l e a t h e r  s u b s t i t u t e s  
e x c e p t  f o o t w e a r .
2 9  F e r t i l i s e r s .
30  O i l s ,  P a i n t ,  I n k s  and P o l i s h e s .
31  C h e m i c a l s  and D r u g s .
32  S o a p ,  d e t e r g e n t s  and c a n d l e s .
33  G l a s s  and g l a s s w a r e ,  p o t t e r y ,  c h i n a  and e a r t h e n w a r e .
3*+ S t r u c t u r a l  c l a y  p r o d u c t s ,  a s b e s t o s ,  p l a s t e r ,  gypsum 
and c e m e n t .
35  M e t a l  t r a d e s  ( e x c l u d i n g  m a c h i n e r y  and t r a n s p o r t  
e q u i p m e n t ) .
i
36  M a n u f a c t u r e  and a s s e m b l y  o f  m a c h i n e r y  e x c e p t  e l e c t r i c a l  
m a c h i n e r y .
3 7  M a n u f a c t u r e  o f  e l e c t r i c a l  m a c h i n e r y ,  a p p a r a t u s  and 
a p p l i a n c e  s .
38 S h ip  and b o a t  b u i l d i n g  and r e p a i r i n g .
39  M a n u f a c t u r e  o f  r a i l r o a d  e q u i p m e n t .
k o  A s s e m b l y ,  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  m e c h a n i c a l l y  p r o p e l l e d  
r o a d  v e h i c l e s .
k l  A ssem b ly  e t c .  o f  v e h i c l e s  o t h e r  t h a n  m e c h a n i c a l l y  
p r o p e l l e d  road  and l a n d  v e h i c l e s .
*+2 M i s c e l l a n e o u s  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r i e s .
^3 L a u n d r y ,  c l e a n i n g  and d y i n g  i n d u s t r y .
***+ P l a s t i c s ,
U30
C h a p te r  V I I  N o tes  and R e f e r e n c e s
1 .  C h a r l e s  Cooper  and N o e l  W helan  ( 1 9 7 2 )  "S c i e n c e . 
T e c h n o l o g y  and I n d u s t r y  i n  I r e l a n d  -  A D i a g n o s i s  
and some P o l i c y  P r o p o s a l s " . P ap er  p r e s e n t e d  t o  th e  
N a t i o n a l  S c i e n c e  C o u n c i l ,  I r e l a n d  i n  March 1 9 7 2 .
2 .  Cooper  and Whelan ( 1 9 7 2 )  Op. c i t . p .  3 9 .
3 .  Hans S i n g e r  "The d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  g a i n s  b e t w e e n  
i n v e s t i n g  and b o r r o w i n g  c o u n t r i e s " .  A m erican  
E c o n o m ic  R ev iew  May 195»0®
U .  On t h i s  p o i n t  s e e  a l s o  W . B . Reddaway e t  a l  "E f f e c t s  
o f  U .K .  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  O v e r s e a s  -  An I n t e r i m  
R e p o r t " . Cambridge' U . P . 1 9 6 7  and Reddaway e t  a l  
"E f f e c t s  o f  U .K .  I n v e s t m e n t  O v e r s e a s  -  F i n a l  R e p o r t " . 
Cambridge U . P .  1968  and G .C .  H u fb a u er  and F.M. A d l e r  
" O v e r s e a s  M a n u f a c t u r i n g  I n v e s t m e n t  and th e  B a l a n c e  o f  
P a y m e n t U. S .  T r e a s u r y  D e p t , ,  W a s h i n g t o n  D .C .  1 9 6 8  
a l s o  R ev iew  o f  H u fb a u er  and A d le r  by  R .N .  C o o p e r .  
J o u r n a l  o f  E con om ic  L i t e r a t u r e  D ecem ber  1 9 6 9 .
5 .  P a u l  S t r e e t e n  "The R ole  o f  P r i v a t e  I n v e s t m e n t " .  
V e n t u r e  V o l .  22 No.  1 .  J a n u a r y  1 9 7 0 .  S u g g e s t s  t h a t  
d i s p l a c e m e n t  d o e s  t a k e  p l a c e .
6 .  I . M . D .  L i t t l e  and J . A .  M i r r l e e s  (1 9 6 8 ) Manual o f  
I n d u s t r i a l  P r o j e c t  A n a l y s i s  i n  D e v e l o p i n g  C o u n t r i e s  
V o l .  I I ,  D e v e lo p m e n t  C e n tr e  O .E .C .D .  P a r i s .
7* L i t t l e  and M i r r l e e s  i b i d . C h a p te r  XIV.
8 .  Anne 0 .  K r u e g er  ( 1 9 6 6 )  "Some e c o n o m ic  c o s t s  o f  
e x c h a n g e  c o n t r o l  : The T u r k i s h  C a s e " .  J o u r n a l  o f  
P o l i t i c a l  Economy.
F u r t h e r  d e v e l o p e d  i n  Anne 0 .  K r u e g er  ( 1 9 7 2 )
" E v a l u a t i n g  R e s t r i c t i o n i s t  Trade R e g i m e s .  T h eo ry  
and M e a su r e m en t" .  J . P . 5 . J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y  1 9 7 2 .
See  a l s o  B .  B a l a s s a  and D.M. S c h y d lo w s k y  ( 1 9 7 2 )  
" D o m e s t i c  R e s o u r c e  C o s t s  and E f f e c t i v e  P r o t e c t i o n  
one A g a i n " ,  J . P . B . J a n u a r y / F e b r u a r y  1 9 7 2 .
9 .  T h i s  f o r m u l a  i s  a d a p t e d  from K r u e g er  ( 1 9 7 2 )  Op. c i t .
The f o r m u l a  i n  th e  t e x t  d i f f e r s  from  K r u e g e r ' s  
b e c a u s e  i t  h a s  n o t  b e e n  " n o r m a l i s e d "  -  d i v i d e d  by t h e  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r i c e  o f  t h e  f i n a l  o u t p u t .  The n o r m a l ­
i s a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  was  u s e d  by K r u e g e r  s o  t h a t  she  
c o u l d  show th e  s i m i l a r i t y  o f  h e r  m ethod  w i t h  th e  s t a n d ­
ard  f o r m u l a  f o r  the  e f f e c t i v e  r a t e  o f  p r o t e c t i o n  f o r
an a c t i v i t y .  See  K ru g er  ( 1 9 7 2 )  page  53*
1 0 •  I n p u t - O u t p u t  T a b l e s  f o r  1 9 6 ^ . ( P r l  9 8 5 )  J a n u a r y  1970?  
C e n t r a l  S t a t i s t i c s  O f f i c e ,  D u b l i n .
E x t e r n a l  Trade S t a t i s t i c s  197 1  ( P r l  3 0 ^ 7 )  C . S . O .
D u b l i n  A p r i l  1 9 7 3 .
1 1 .  L i t t l e  and M i r r l e e s  Op. c i t . C h a p t e r  X I I I .
1 2 .  R ev iew  o f  1971  and O u t l o o k  f o r  1 9 7 2 . ( P r l  2 3 5 7 )  P*95 
T a b l e  1 5 ,  S t a t i o n e r y  O f f i c e ,  D u b l i n  ( 1 9 7 2 ) .
V32
13*  L i t t l e  and M i r r l e e s  Op. c i t ,  p. 1 67.
1*+. T h ird  Programme * E co n o m ic  and S o c i a l  D e v e lo p m e n t  
1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 2 . ( P r l  *+31).
S t a t i o n e r y  O f f i c e ,  D u b l i n  March 1969*  p a s s i m .  See  
a l s o  IDA p o l i c y  s t a t e m e n t s ,  R ev iew  o f  1 9 7 1  ana O u t­
l o o k  f o r  1 9 7 2 .  Op. C i t , e t c .
15* See t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  i n  C h a p te r  V and 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Chamber o f  Commerce i n  I r e l a n d .
S u r v e y  o f  A m erican  M a n u f a c t u r i n g ;  P r e s s  R e l e a s e . 
( S u r v e y  i s  c o n f i d e n t i a l )  2 3 r d  A u g u s t ,  1 9 7 3  w h ic h  
shpws t h a t  th e  a v e r a g e  w e e k l y  wage i n  U . S .  f i r m s  was  
£  3 0 .  50 p e r  w e ek ,
1 6 ,  T h i s  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  i n  v i e w  o f  the r e c e n t  l a r g e  
i n f l u x  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i n t o  t h i s  i n d u s t r y  i n  
I r e l a n d .  See  Sunday T i m e s . 1 3 t h  A p r i l ,  1975*
^33
C h a p te r  V I I I  C o n c lu s io n s
T h i s  C h a p ter  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  t h r e e  s e c t i o n s .
The f i r s t  r e v i e w s  th e  n a t u r e  and m a g n i t u d e  o f  FDI i n  
I r e l a n d .  The s e c o n d  s e c t i o n  a n a l y s e s  t h e  m ost  
i m p o r t a n t  a r e a s  o f  im p a c t  o f  FDI on  t h e  h o s t  eco n o m y .  
The f i n a l  s e c t i o n  p r o v i d e s  an  o v e r a l l  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  
t h e  e f f e c t  o f  FDI on  r e a l  income and draw s  t o g e t h e r  
t h e  p o l i c y  c o n c l u s i o n s .
S e c t i o n  1 t F o r e i g n  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  i n  I r e l a n d
The I r i s h  R e p u b l i c  h a s  r e c e i v e d  a s u b s t a n t i a l  and  
i n c r e a s i n g  i n f l o w  o f  FBI from t h e  mid f i f t i e s  o n w a r d s .  
At t h e  end o f  1 9 7 0 ,  t o t a l  i n v e s t m e n t  u n d e r  f o r e i g n  
c o n t r o l  amounted t o  £  l ^ U . 3  m i l l i o n s .  F o r e i g n  f i r m s  
a c c o u n t e d  f o r  8% o f  G r o s s  F i x e d  C a p i t a l  F o r m a t i o n  i n  
1 9 7 0 .  T h i s  p r o p o r t i o n ,  by i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s t a n d a r d s ,  i s  
h i g h  b u t  n o t  o u t s t a n d i n g l y  s o .  H o w ev er ,  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t  
ment r e p r e s e n t s  a much h i g h e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  f i x e d  
c a p i t a l  i n  th e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o r .
The i m p o r t a n c e  o f  FDI i s  p e r h a p s  b e s t  i l l u s t r a t e d  
by  i t s  s h a r e  o f  o u t p u t .  F o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  a c c o u n t e d  
f o r  1 3 * 3 %  o f  th e  o u t p u t  o f  t h e  T r a n s p o r t a b l e  Goods  
I n d u s t r i e s  i n  1 9 7 0 .  When f o o d ,  d r i n k  and t o b a c c o  a r e  
e x c l u d e d ,  t h i s  p r o p o r t i o n  r i s e s  t o  17 , k f 0 o f  o u t p u t .  
F o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  h a v e  made a m ajor  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  
em ploym ent  w h ic h  i s  c r u c i a l  f o r  I r i s h  e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y
m a k in g .  Employment i n  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  was  
e s t i m a t e d  t o  be around ^ 0 , 0 0 0  i n  1 9 7 2 •
F o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  a r e  m a i n l y  e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t e d  -  o v e r  
8 1 $  o f  t h e i r  o u t p u t  g o e s  t o  f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s .  The 
e x p o r t s  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  i n  1970  w ere  e s t i m a t e d  
a t  2 9 . 5 $  o f  t o t a l  I r i s h  e x p o r t s  and a t  l+ 6 .1 $  o f  e x p o r t s  
when f o o d ,  d r i n k  and t o b a c c o  a r e  e x c l u d e d .  T h i s  i s  a  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  t h e  t r a d e  b a l a n c e ,  b u t  o t h e r  b a l a n c e  o f  
p a y m en ts  e f f e c t s ,  s u c h  a s  t h e  im p o rt  b i l l  of. f o r e i g n  f i r m s  
m u st  a l s o  be  c o n s i d e r e d .
Su ch  i n c r e a s e s  i n  o u t p u t ,  employment and e x p o r t s  
h a v e  n o t  b e e n  a c h i e v e d  w i t h o u t  c o s t s .  T h e re  h a s  b e e n ,  
from t h e  l a t e  1 9 5 0 ' s ,  a s u b s t a n t i a l  programme o f  
i n c e n t i v e s  t o  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s .  The i n s t i t u t i o n  o f  
t h i s  programme went  hand i n  hand w i t h  t h e  move away from a 
p o l i c y  o f  e co n o m ic  p r o t e c t i o n i s m  t o w a r d s  one o f  f r e e r  
t r a d e .  T h i s  programme h a s  i n v o l v e d  t a x  r e l i e f  on p r o f i t s  
e a r n e d  on e x p o r t  s a l e s  and c a p i t a l  g r a n t s  t o  n ew ly  e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  p r o j e c t s  a s  i t s  two m ajor  i n c e n t i v e s .  From t h e  
i n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  programme up t o  t h e  end o f  1971? t h e r e  
h a v e  b e e n  c a p i t a l  g r a n t s  o f  £  *+9*2 m i l l i o n s  t o  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s .  G r a n ts  t o  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  h a v e ,  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  
a v e r a g e d  o v e r  75$ o f  t h e  t o t a l  i n d u s t r i a l  g r a n t s  d i s b u r s e d  
by t h e  G o vern m en t ,  r e a c h i n g  a maximum p r o p o r t i o n  o f  8 5 $  
i n  any one y e a r .  Over t h e  same t im e  p e r i o d ,  t o t a l  t a x  
r e v e n u e s  f o r e g o n e  u n der  t h e  e x p o r t  t a x  r e l i e f  scheme h a s
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b e e n  £  3 9 • 9  m i l l i o n s  o f  w h i c h  a t  l e a s t  £  1 8 . b  m i l l i o n s  
w as r e l i e f  t o  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .
An e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r  o f  I r i s h  
i n d u s t r y  a t  a m i c r o  l e v e l  r e v e a l s  s e v e r a l  i m p o r t a n t  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  The f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r  i s  n o t  d o m in ­
a t e d  by  any one s o u r c e  c o u n t r y .  The U .K .  and U . S . A .  
a r e  t h e  m ost  i m p o r t a n t  c o u n t r i e s  o f  o r i g i n ,  w i t h  r o u g h l y  
e q u a l  numbers  o f  p r o j e c t s .  Germany i s  a l m o s t  a s  w e l l  
r e p r e s e n t e d  by  numbers o f  p r o j e c t s  and t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a 
c o n s i d e r a b l e  number o f  D u t c h ,  S o u th  A f r i c a n  and C a n a d ia n  
owned p r o j e c t s .  The !J a p a n e s e  i n v a s i o n 1 had n o t  a c h i e v e d  
any s i g n i f i c a n t  i n c u r s i o n s  a t  th e  t im e  o f  t h i s  i n v e s t i ­
g a t i o n .  T a k in g  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  s i z e  o f  i n v e s t m e n t s ,  
r a t h e r  t h a n  j u s t  t h e  number o f  p r o j e c t s ,  U . S .  i n v e s t m e n t  
i s  t h e  m ost  i m p o r t a n t  b e c a u s e  U . S .  p r o j e c t s  a re  much 
l a r g e r  t h a n  U .K .  and German o n e s .  T h e re  are  a l s o  some 
v e r y  l a r g e  p r o j e c t s  am ongst  t h e  ' o t h e r  n a t i o n a l i t i e s '  
g r o u p .
When t h e  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r  i s  d i v i d e d  i n t o  i n d u s t r y  
g r o u p s ,  no one i n d u s t r y  o r  s e t  o f  i n d u s t r i e s  i s  predom ­
i n a n t .  The m arket  o r i e n t a t e d  ' h o r i z o n t a l '  i n v e s t m e n t  
t y p e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  o u t w e i g h s  th e  s u p p l y  o r i e n t a t e d  ' v e r t i c a l '  
i n v e s t m e n t s .  Raw m a t e r i a l  b a s e d  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t s  o c c u r  
i n  t h e  f o o d  i n d u s t r y  and i n  t h e  e x t r a c t i v e  i n d u s t r i e s .
The v a s t  m a j o r i t y  o f  i n v e s t m e n t s  h o w e v e r  a r e  e x p o r t  
m arket  o r i e n t a t e d ;  t h e  m a j o r  m a r k e t s  w h i c h  a r e  s e r v i c e d  
from I r e l a n d  b e i n g  th e  U .K .  and EEC. S e v e r a l  h i g h
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t e c h n o l o g y  a r e a s  are  w e l l  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  d i s t ­
r i b u t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  by  i n d u s t r y ,  n o t a b l y :  p l a s t i c s  
and s y n t h e t i c s ,  d r u g s  and p h a r m a c e u t i c a l ,  i n d u s t r i a l  
c h e m i c a l s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  m a c h i n e r y ,  i n s t r u m e n t s  and p r e ­
c i s i o n  g o o d s .  More t r a d i t i o n a l  a r e a s  w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  are  t e x t i l e s ,  a p p a r e l  and a r e a s  o f  t h e  
m e t a l  t r a d e s .
M ost  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  p r e f e r  1 0 0 $  o w n e r s h i p  o f  
t h e i r  I r i s h  s u b s i d i a r i e s .  H ow ever ,  p r e s s u r e  from I r i s h  
s o u r c e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  IDA, h a s  l e d  t o  a n  i n c r e a s i n g  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  w i t h i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r .
T h i s  i s  an i m p o r t a n t  d e v e l o p m e n t  and one  w h i c h  o p e n s  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  g r e a t e r  b e n e f i t s  t o  I r e l a n d .  The d ra w ­
b a c k  a p p e a r s  t o  be  t h e  g r e a t e r  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  
w h i c h  h a s  l e d  t o  a f a i l u r e  r a t e  o f  1 5 *2$  -  w e l l  above  t h e  
o v e r a l l  f a i l u r e  r a t e  o f  1 1 . 7$* I n c r e a s i n g  e q u i t y  p a r t i c i ­
p a t i o n  by  t h e  IDA may go some way t o w a r d s  c o u n t e r a c t i n g  
t h i s  t e n d e n c y .
The s e v e r a l  r e g i o n a l  d i s p a r i t i e s  w h i c h  e x i s t  i n  
I r e l a n d  w ere  exam ined  i n  C h a p ter  I .  F o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  
was e n v i s a g e d  a s  p l a y i n g  an  im p o r t a n t  r o l e  i n  t h e  a l l i e v i -  
a t i o n  o f  t h i s  d i s p a r i o y ^ _  i n  , o v e r  36$  o f
^  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  w ere  l o c a t e d  i n  D e s i g ­
n a t e d  A r e a s .  F u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  showed h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  
t h e  l e a s t  d e v e l o p e d  a r e a s  were  c o m p l e t e l y  n e g l e c t e d  by  
f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  and t h a t  w i t h i n  t h e  DAs t h e r e  was  a  
l a r g e  d i s p a r i t y  w h ic h  had b e e n  l e f t  u n t o u c h e d .  I n t e r ­
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m e d i a t e  a r e a s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  b e n e f i t t e d  from  
f o r e i g n  i n v e s t m e n t  and t h e  employment t h u s  c r e a t e d 0
I n  summary, th e  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
i n  I r e l a n d  e x h i b i t  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  d i v e r s i t y .  I n  
t o t a l  h o w e v e r ,  t h e i r  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  economy i s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  d u a l  r o l e  a s  
e m p l o y e r s  and e x p o r t e r s .
S e c t i o n  2 s The m a jo r  a r e a s  o f  Impact  o f  FKI on
t h e  I r i s h  economy
F o r e i g n  d i r e c t  i n v e s t m e n t  o f  t h e  m a g n i tu d e  
i n d i c a t e d  ab o v e  must have- a s u b s t a n t i a l  im p a c t  on  
t h e  h o s t  eco n o m y .  T h i s  s e c t i o n  r e v i e w s  t h e  most  
i m p o r t a n t  a r e a s  o f  i m p a c t ,  v i z .  d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m ic  
s t r u c t u r e ,  e m p lo y m en t ,  e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p ,  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
and e f f i c i e n c y  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  t h e  im p a c t  o n  t r a d e  and  
t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s ,  f i n a l l y ,  c o n t r o l  and p o l i c y  
i m p l i c a t i o n s .
C l )  The d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m ic  s t r u c t u r e
The i n f l u x  o f  FBI i n t o  t h e  I r i s h  R e p u b l i c  h a s  
i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  m ake-up o f  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
s e c t o r ;  i n  a d d i t i o n  FDI h a s  l e d  t o  some im p o r t a n t  
d e v e l o p m e n t s  w i t h i n  i n d u s t r i a l  g r o u p s .
The 'm o d e r n 1 s e c t o r  o f  I r i s h  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  i s  
d o m in a t e d  by f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s ,  p r o d u c i n g  l a r g e l y  f o r  
e x p o r t .  The a l l o c a t i o n  o f  f u n d s  from Government s o u r c e s  
h a s  l a r g e l y  f a v o u r e d  s u c h  f o r e i g n - o w n e d  f i r m s .  Two 
p o s s i b l e  d a n g e r s  e x i s t  f o r  the  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r s  f i r s t l y  
t h a t  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s  w i l l  b e  d i s p l a c e d  by f o r e i g n  owned 
p r o j e c t s  and s e c o n d l y  t h a t  e x i s t i n g  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s  may 
b e  s t a r v e d  o f  c r u c i a l  i n p u t s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c a p i t a l  and  
s k i l l e d  la b o u r *
The s t a t e  o f  t h e  m a n u f a c t u r i n g  s e c t o r  s t r o n g l y  
s u g g e s t s  t h a t  d i s p l a c e m e n t  may have  b e e n  m i n i m a l ,  
e v e n  n o n  e x i s t a n t .  L i t t l e  e v i d e n c e  c a n  be  adduced  t o  
show t h a t  p r o j e c t s  w h i c h  c o u l d  have  b e e n  c a r r i e d  o u t  
b y  d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned f i r m s  have  b e e n  p r e - e m p t e d  by  
f o r e i g n  owned o n e s*  T h i s  i s  r e i n f o r c e d  by  t h e  IDA 
s t i p u l a t i o n  t h a t  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  i n  r e c e i p t  o f  g r a n t  
a i d  s h o u l d  be non c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  d o m e s t i c  o n e s .  This-  
a p p l i e s  o f  c o u r s e  t o  e x i s t i n g  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s  b u t  
c o g n i s a n c e  i s  t a k e n  by t h e  IDA o f  f u t u r e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  
( p a r t i c u l a r l y  s i n c e  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  new e n t r e p r e n e u r s  
p r o g r a m m e ) .  The w e a k n e s s  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  a f t e r  ’ 
t h e  p e r i o d  o f  p r o t e c t i o n i s m  and t h e  a l l e g e d  l a c k  o f  
e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  s t a b i l i t y  (e x a m in ed  i n  d e t a i l  b e l o w )  
add f u r t h e r  w e i g h t  t o ' t h i s  a r g u m e n t .
The s e c o n d  d a n g e r ,  s t a r v a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  i n  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r ,  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  c a s e .  Con­
c e n t r a t i o n  on  t h e  e n c o u r a g e m e n t  o f  new p r o j i e c t s ,  p a r t i c u ­
l a r l y  e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t e d  o n e s ,  and t h e  f i n a n c i n g  o f  t h e  
g r a n t s  scheme have  p l a c e d  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  b u r d e n  on th e  
d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r .  As shown a b o v e ,  t h e  g r a n t s  and t a x  r e l i e f  
sch em es  i n v o l v e  a t r a n s f e r  o f  f u n d s  from  e x i s t i n g  manu­
f a c t u r i n g  i n d u s t r y  t o  new e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t e d  p r o j e c t s .
Upon t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  new p r o j e c t s ,  t h e r e  i s  
c o m p e t i t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  'new'  and t h e  ' o l d 1 s e c t o r s  f o r  
s c a r c e  r e s o u r c e s .  The S m a l l  I n d u s t r i e s  and Home I n d u s t r i e s  
programmes do n o t  a p p e a r  t o  r e d r e s s  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t h e  
c o m p e t i t i v e  d i s a d v a n t a g e  w h i c h  d o m e s t i c  i n d u s t r y  f a c e s  i n
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  a t t r a c t  c a p i t a l .  F o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  
c a n  r e l y  on  t h e i r  p a r e n t  f i r m s  b o t h  f o r  s u p p l i e s  o f  
c a p i t a l  and a s  g u a r a n t o r s  f o r  l o a n s .  S e v e r a l  d o m e s t i c ­
a l l y  owned f i r m s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h o s e  p r o d u c i n g  f o r  
t h e  home m a r k e t ,  u n d o u b t e d l y  a re  c o n s t r a i n e d  i n  t h e i r  
e x p a n s i o n  p l a n s  by l a c k  o f  c a p i t a l .  The c o m p e t i t i o n  
f o r  r e s o u r c e s  i s  a l s o  a c u t e  i n  c e r t a i n  a r e a s  o f  t h e  
m ark et  f o r  s k i l l e d  l a b o u r .  C o m p e t i t i o n  f r o m  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s ,  who a r e  a b l e  t o  pay b e t t e r  w a g e s ,  h a s  l e d  
t o  c u r t a i l m e n t  o f  e x p a n s i o n  p l a n s  o r  t o  an  i n c r e a s e  i n  
c o s t s  f o r  s e v e r a l  d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned f i r m s .  A g a in  t h e  
a c t i v i t i e s  o f  s t a t e  b o d i e s ,  n o t a b l y  Anco a r e  t o  some 
e x t e n t  a p o l l i a t i v e ,  b u t  t h e s e  e f f o r t s  h a v e  so  f a r  p r o v e d  
t o  be  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  p r e v e n t  t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s  from  
o p e r a t i n g  on t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r .
A r a t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t  o f  th e  p r o b le m  o f  t h e  
c o - e x i s t e n c e  o f  f o r e i g n  owhed and d o m e s t i c  f i r m s  i s  t h e  
em erg en ce  o f  a d u a l i s t i c  s t r u c t u r e  i n  I r i s h  i n d u s t r y .
The e v i d e n c e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  C h a p ter  IV shows t h a t  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r  h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  
t o  s u c h  a s t r u c t u r e .  The d ic h o t o m y  i s  shown by th e  
p a t t e r n  o f  e x p o r t i n g  and t h e  i m p o r t i n g  o f  i n p u t s .  To 
some e x t e n t  t h e  d i s p a r i t i e s  a r e  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  by th e  
i n f l u e n c e  o f  the i n d u s t r i a l  m ix  and o f  s c a l e  f a c t o r s  b u t  
d u a l i s m  i s  m o s t l y  due t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  b e h a v i o u r  
w i t h i n  i n d u s t r i e s .  T h i s  d i v i s i o n  i s  e n d e m ic  b e c a u s e  
l i n k a g e  e f f e c t s  b e t w e e n  th e  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  s e c t o r s  
a re  s m a l l .  T h i s  i s  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  due t o  d e f i c i e n c i e s
i n  th e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r ,  i n  t h a t  i t  i s  u n a b l e  t o  
s u p p l y  t h e  q u a n t i t y  and q u a l i t y  o f  r e s o u r c e s  n eed ed  
by th e  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  a t  c o m p e t i t i v e  p r i c e s *  I t  
i s  a l s o  due t o  th e  p r e f e r e n c e  o f  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  
f o r  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t r a d i t i o n a l  s u p p l i e r s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  
f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  do n o t  p e r f o r m  th e  f u l l  r a n g e  o f  
f u n c t i o n s  w i t h i n  I r e l a n d  and t h e y  im p o r t  m a t e r i a l  
i n p u t s  and s e r v i c e s  from  o t h e r  u n i t s  o f  t h e  f i r m *  
S u b s t a n t i a l  l i n k a g e  e f f e c t s  emanate  from  t h e  f o o d  
i n d u s t r i e s  b u t  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r  a p p r o x i ­
m a t e s  t o  e n c l a v e  g r o w t h .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  s e c o n d a r y  
s t i m u l u s  t o  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  from t h e  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  
i s  s m a l l *
( 2 )  Employment
FDI i n  I r e l a n d  h a s  c r e a t e d  ^ 0 , 0 0 0  j o b s  w i t h i n  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  i n  1 9 7 2 .  T h i s  i s  v e r y  c l o s e  t o  a n e t  
f i g u r e  o f  d i r e c t  j o b  c r e a t i o n  b e c a u s e  we c a n  assume t h a t  
d i s p l a c e m e n t  was n o t  g r e a t .  C o n s t r a i n t s  o n  e x p a n s i o n  
o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  c a u s e d  by d i v e r s i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  
t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r s  may h a v e  c o s t  some j o b s , .  b u t  i n  
c o m p a r i s o n  t h i s  a p p e a r s  t o  have  b e e n  m i n o r .
D e s p i t e  t h i s  j o b  c r e a t i o n  i n  new i n d u s t r y ,  th e  
em ploym ent  s i t u a t i o n  r e m a i n s  g r a v e .  Unemployment i s  
s t i l l  a t  6% o f  t h e  l a b o u r  f o r c e  and t h e  d e c l i n e  i n  
t h e  numbers a t  work i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  c o n t i n u e s  t o  p o s e  
p r o b le m s  f o r  t h e  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  f u l l  e m p lo y m en t .  The
d e c l i n e  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  im p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i n g  i n d u s t r y  
means  t h a t  new i n d u s t r y  i s  t h e  m a jo r  employment  
c r e a t i n g  f o r c e  i n  th e  s t a t e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  FDI h a s  
p r o v e d  t o  b e  a m ajor  f o r c e  i n  b r i n g i n g  a b o u t  th e  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  e m i g r a t i o n .
The t y p e  o f  em ploym ent c r e a t e d  b y  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  
i s  a l s o  o f  i n t e r e s t .  F o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  h a v e  c r e a t e d  
em ploym ent  i n  t h e  u n s k i l l e d ,  s e m i - s k i l l e d  and c l e r i c a l  
t y p e  m a n a g e r i a l  c a t e g o r i e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  e n t r y  o f  
f o r e i g n  f i r m s  h a s  c r e a t e d  e x c e s s  demand f o r  c e r t a i n  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  s k i l l e d  l a b o u r .  FDI h a s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e  
r a t e s  o f  pay f o r  s k i l l e d  l a b o u r .  The m a in  gap i n  t h e  
j o b  c r e a t i o n  sp e c t ru m  i s  i n  t h e  h i g h l y  t r a i n e d  s c i e n t i f i c  
w o r k e r s ,  t e c h n o l o g i s t s  and r e s e a r c h  w o r k e r s .  The t e n d e n c y  
o f  m u l t i - n a t i o n a l  e n t e r p r i s e s  t o  c e n t r a l i s e  c e r t a i n  
f u n c t i o n s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  R & D and m a r k e t i n g ,  h a s  l e d  t o  
t h e r e  b e i n g  l i t t l e  i n c r e a s e  i n  demand w i t h i n  I r e l a n d  f o r  
s u c h  w o r k e r s .  T h i s  i s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n c e r n  b e c a u s e  o f  
t h e  b r a i n  d r a i n  from I r e l a n d .  The e f f o r t s  o f  t h e  G o v e r n ­
ment t o  a t t r a c t  s u c h  f a c i l i t i e s  t o  I r e l a n d  seem l i k e l y  t o  
a c h i e v e  o n l y  l i m i t e d  s u c c e s s ,  g i v e n  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  
c e n t r a l i s i n g  t e n d e n c i e s  w i t h i n  t h e  m u l t i n a t i o n a l  f i r m .
I n  t h e  l o n g  t e r m ,  more s u c c e s s  may r e s u l t  from moves  
to w a r d s  a s c i e n c e  p o l i c y  w h i c h  c a n  k e e p  s u c h  w o r k e r s  i n  
I r e l a n d .
The f o r e i g n  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  employm ent i n  th e  
l a g g i n g  r e g i o n s  o f  I r e l a n d  h a s  b e e n  o f  c o n s i d e r a b l e
i m p o r t a n c e .  P r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  many f u n c t i o n s  a re  
p e r f o r m e d  a b r o a d ,  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  a r e  o f t e n  more  
f o o t l o o s e  t h a n  t h e i r  d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned c o u n t e r p a r t s .
The d e c l a r e d  aim o f  Government p o l i c y ,  t o  p r o v i d e  
em ploym ent i n  th e  DAs,  h a s  b e e n  f a c i l i t a t e d  by t h i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  -  r e i n f o r c e d  o f  
c o u r s e  by h i g h e r  r a t e s  o f  g r a n t  a i d .  Over $6% o f  f o r e i g n  
p r o j e c t s  a r 6  l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  DAs.
T h e re  a r e  h o w e v e r ,  s e v e r a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  t o  be  
m ade.  F i r s t l y ,  f a i l u r e  r a t e s  o f  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  h a v e  
b e e n  g r e a t e r  i n  t h e  DAs.  S e c o n d l y ,  a c l o s e r  e x a m i n a t i o n  
o f  l o c a t i o n  p a t t e r n s  show s t h a t  some o f  t h e  m ost  n e e d y  
a r e a s ,  i n  employment t e r m s ,  h a v e  b e e n  i g n o r e d .  ( T r a n s p o r t  
l i m i t a t i o n s ,  l a c k  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  and o t h e r  e x t e r n a l  
d i s e c o n o m i e s  have  ov e rw h e lm ed  th e  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  h i g h e r  
g r a n t  i n  s u c h  a r e a s ) .  T h i r d l y ,  t h e r e  i s  s t i l l  a c o n c e n ­
t r a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  on th e  E a s t  c o a s t  and arou nd  
D u b l i n  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  The p r o p o s e d  c o u n t e r  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  
t h e  West  h a s  o n l y  b e e n  i m p o r t a n t  i n  t h e  L i m e r i c k - S h a n n o n  
r e g i o n .
( 3 )  E n t r  e o r e n e u r s h i p
T h e r e  i s  a v i e w ,  s t r o n g l y  h e l d  i n  I r e l a n d ,  t h a t  a 
m a j o r  c o n s t r a i n t  o n  d e v e l o p m e n t  i s  th e  l a c k  o f  e n t r e ­
p r e n e u r i a l  a b i l i t y .  I t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  t h e  c a s e  t h a t ,  i n  
t h e  p a s t ,  e n t r y  i n t o  t h e  c h u r c h  o r  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  h a s  
b e e n  f a v o u r e d  s o c i a l l y  t o  t h e  d e t r i m e n t  o f  t h e  b u s i n e s s  
p r o f e s s i o n .  O th er  t r a d i t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  t h a t  o f  e m i g r a t i o n  
t o  g a i n  e x p e r i e n c e  and a s  a p r o o f  o f  manhood have  d r a i n e d
I r e l a n d  o f  s k i l l e d  e n t r e p r e n e u r s .
H o w e v er ,  e n t r e p r e n e u r s h i p  i s  a f u n c t i o n  r a t h e r  
t h a n  a n  a t t r i b u t e  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  g r o u p  o f  p e o p l e .
Up t o  t h e  l a t e  f i f t i e s ,  c o n d i t i o n s  f a v o u r i n g  t h e  
e x e r c i s e  o f  t h i s  f u n c t i o n  w ere  l a c k i n g .  The p r o t e c t ­
i o n i s t  p o l i c i e s  and t h e  a n t i - c o m p e t i t i v e  o u t l o o k  o f  
Government p o l i c y  m ak ers  a r e  t h e  r o o t  c a u s e s .  The s i z e  
o f  a v a i l a b l e  m a r k e t s  and t h e  c o s t  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  
economy meant  t h a t  t h e  r e w a r d s  f o r  r i s k  t a k i n g  and 
i n n o v a t i o n  w ere  s m a l l .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  i n n o v a t i o n s  w e re  
f ew  and d i r e c t o r s  and m a n a g er s  w ere  c o n s e r v a t i v e  and  
o f t e n  p e s s i m i s t i c  a b o u t  e x p a n s i o n  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .
The s w i t c h  o f  p o l i c y  t o w a r d s  f r e e r  t r a d e  and an  
' o p e n  d o o r 1 p o l i c y  t o  FDI h a s  done much t o  r e l e a s e  
t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  
f u n c t i o n .  The r e t u r n  t o  I r e l a n d  o f  I r i s h  b o r n  
M a n a g e r s ,  who have  l a i d  t h e  b a s i s  o f  a s u c c e s s f u l  c a r e e r  
e l s e w h e r e ,  i s  t e s t i m o n y  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t a l e n t  h a s  
b e e n  l a t e n t  i n  I r e l a n d  f o r  some t i m e ,  -T h e s e  M anagers  
a r e  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  a p o o l  o f  t a l e n t  c u t t i n g  a c r o s s  
t h e  o w n e r s h i p  d i v i s i o n  b e t w e e n  f o r e i g n  owned and I r i s h  
f i r m s .  I n  t h e  l o n g  r u n ,  t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a c r o s s - o w n e r ­
s h i p  p o o l  o f  I r i s h  e x e c u t i v e s  and m a n a g e r s  s h o u l d  p r o v e  
t o  be  a m a j o r  b e n e f i t  from  t h e  i n f l o w  o f  F D I .  The 
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  e x e r c i s e  o f  t h e  e n t r e p r e n e u r i a l  
f u n c t i o n ,  w i t h  r ew a r d s  com m ensurate  w i t h  i t ,  a re  e m e r g i n g .
T h i s  w i l l  b e n e f i t  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  -  
e s p e c i a l l y  a s  th e  IDA programme t o  f o s t e r  young e n t r e ­
p r e n e u r s  i s  a l s o  r e a c h i n g  t a k e  o f f .
.(>.). - - T e c h n o l o g y
FDI i s  one way o f  o b t a i n i n g  p r o p r i e t a r y  t e c h n o l o g y .
I t  may n o t  h o w ev er  be  t h e  b e s t  o r  t h e  c h e a p e s t  way o f  
o b t a i n i n g  s u c h  k n o w l e d g e .  The a l t e r n a t i v e s  f o r  a 
c o u n t r y  s u c h  a s  I r e l a n d  a r e  l i c e n s i n g  and Government  
u n d e r t a k i n g s .
A n a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g y  b a s e d  on l i c e n s i n g  r e q u i r e s  a  
s t r o n g  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  c o n t a i n i n g  f i r m s  a b l e  t o  a b s o r b  
and e f f e c t i v e l y  u s e  t h e  t e c h n o l o g y .  Up t o  now, t h i s  
h a s  n o t  b e e n  a f e a s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e  e x c e p t  i n  v e r y  
r e s t r i c t e d  a r e a s  ( t h o u g h  i t  h a s  b e e n  u s e d  when a l l i e d  t o  
Government s u p p o r t  a s  i n  th e  c a s e  o f  N .E .T • )  I t  s h o u l d  
become f e a s i b l e  o v e r  a w i d e n i n g  r a n g e  o f  i n d u s t r i e s  
a s  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  d e v e l o p s .
M ajor  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  i n n o v a t i o n s  r e q u i r e  a l o n g  
m o b i l i s a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s ,  w h i c h  must be  s u s t a i n e d  o v e r  
a l o n g  t im e  p e r i o d .  O f t e n ,  r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  c a p i t a l  
m a rk et  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  and Government f u n d i n g  i s  r e q u i r e d .  
T h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  h a s  p r o v e d  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
N . E . T .  I t  w ou ld  be u n w i s e  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  
i s  f e a s i b l e  a c r o s s  t h e  w h o le  r a n g e  o f  i n d u s t r i e s ,  g i v e n  
t h e  l i m i t e d  commitment o f  t h e  I r i s h  Government i n  t h i s
d i r e c t i o n .  F u r t h e r  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t s  
r o l e  i n  f o s t e r i n g  d o m e s t i c  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n ce  
c o u l d  p r o v e  a s u c c e s s f u l  c o m p le m e n t a ry  p o l i c y  t o  t h e  
c o n t i n u e d  i m p o r t i n g  o f  f o r e i g n  t e c h n o l o g y .
I n  many f i e l d s  a c r o s s  t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  speefe&utt,
FDI w i l l  c o n t i n u e  t o  b e  t h e  m ost  i m p o r t a n t  way o f  
o b t a i n i n g  t e c h n o l o g y .  G iv e n  t h i s ,  i t  i s  v i t a l  t o  a s s e s s  
t h e  e f f e c t s  w h ic h  have  so  f a r  b e e n  e v i d e n t .  The 
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  t e c h n o l o g y  by f o r e i g n  f i r m s  h a s  
had b o t h  ’ i n t e r n a l ’ and ’ e x t e r n a l ’ e f f e c t s .
I n t e r n a l  e f f e c t s  -  t h o s e  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  f o r e i g n  
s u b s i d i a r y  -  d e r i v e  from  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  f o r e i g n  t e c h n o l o g y  
o f t e n  g i v e s  t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  a c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e .  
T e c h n o l o g y  b a s e d  s u b s i d i a r i e s  a r e  e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t e d  i n  
t h e  m a in  and a re  a b l e  t o  com bine  f o r e i g n  t e c h n o l o g y  w i t h  
r e l a t i v e l y  c h ea p  I r i s h  l a b o u r .  T o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  
i n c e n t i v e  p a c k a g e ,  t h i s  c o n s t i t u t e s  a f o r m i d a b l e  c o m p e t ­
i t i v e  b a s e .
The e x t e r n a l  e f f e c t s  h o w e v e r  g i v e  c a u s e  f o r  c o n c e r n .  
T h ere  a p p e a r s  t o  be l i t t l e  ’ s p i n o f f ’ o r  ' s p i l l o v e r ’ 
o f  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n c e s  from  th e  f o r e i g n  owned t o  t h e  
d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r .  T h i s  i s  p a r t l y  b e c a u s e  o f  th e  w e a k n e s s  
o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r ,  b u t  i s  m a i n l y  due t o  the  n a t u r e  
o f  modern t e c h n o l o g y .  Most  im p o r t a n t  (and p r o f i t a b l e )  
k n o w le d g e  i s  i n  th e  form o f  p r o p r i e t a r y  k n o w l e d g e ,  owned 
and c o n t r o l l e d  by a p a r t i c u l a r  c o r p o r a t i o n .  The
c o r p o r a t i o n  t h u s  k e e p s  a c l o s e  h o l d  o n  t h i s  income -  
c r e a t i n g  a s s e t .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  u n r e a s o n a b l e  t o  
a c c e p t  FBI and t o  e x p e c t  a g r e a t  d e a l  o f  d i f f u s i o n  from  
s u b s i d i a r i e s .
H o w e v e r ,  some d i f f u s i o n  o f  b e n e f i t s  c a n  be  
o b s e r v e d  i f  we d e f i n e  t e c h n o l o g y  somewhat l e s s  r i g o u r -  
o u s l y .  P e r h a p s  th e  m ost  im p o r t a n t  s p i n o f f  i s  t h e  
c r e a t i o n  o f  an  i n d u s t r i a l  e t h a s  w i t h i n  I r e l a n d .  The 
t r a n s f e r  o f  l a b o u r  and management r e f e r r e d  t o  a b ove  a l s o  
t r a n s f e r  i d e a s  and p r a c t i c e s .  O th er  ' e m b o d i e d 1 t r a n s f e r s  
may t a k e  p l a c e  w i t h  t h e  s a l e  o f  b l u e p r i n t s ,  f o r m u la e  
and a l t e r  i d e a s  by  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s  t o  d o m e s t i c  f i r m s
i n _  Trade,  Trade P o l i c y  and the B alance  o f  Payments
The im p a ct  o f  FBI h a s  b e e n  most  p r o n o u n c ed  i n  t h e  
t r a d e  s e c t o r .  F o r e i g n  ov/ned f i r m s  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  a l m o s t  
one h a l f  o f  I r i s h  i n d u s t r i a l  e x p o r t s  i n  1 9 7 0 .  Some 
s e c t o r ' s  e x p o r t s  a re  c o m p l e t e l y  d o m i n a t e d  b y  f o r e i g n  
owned f i r m s .  The ghowth o f  e x p o r t s  h a s  b e e n  d e p e n d e n t  
o n  t h e  i n f l o w  o f  FD I .  I n d e e d ,  I r i s h  e x p o r t s  ha v e  b e e n  
g r o w in g  a t  a more r a p i d  r a t e  t h a n  t h e  m a r k e t s  t h e y  s e r v e .
The r a p i d  r a t e  o f  e x p o r t  gro w th  h a s  e n a b l e d  t h e  
c o u n t r y  t o  expand i t s  im p o r t  b i l l .  I t  s h o u l d  a l s o  be 
n o t e d  t h a t  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  im p ort  a h i g h e r  p r o p o r t i o n  
o f  i n p u t s  t h a n  do d o m e s t i c  f i r m s .  F o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  
have  been  i n s t r u m e n t e d  i n  t i e i n g  I r e l a n d  more c l o s e l y  
t o  th e  EEC -  an e s t i m a t e d  38 /^  o f  f o r e i g n  s u b s i d i a r i e s
o u t p u t  g o a s  t o  th e  o l d  EF.C o f  the  S i x  and a f u r t h e r  3 7% 
t o  t h e  U .K .  The g r o w t h , a m o u n t , d e s t i n a t i o n  and s e c t o r a l  
c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  I r i s h  e x p o r t s  a r e  c r i t i c a l l y  d e p e n d e n t  
on  i n f l o w s  o f  FDI* T h i s  t r e n d  c a n  "be e x p e c t e d  t o  c o n ­
t i n u e ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  g i v e n  th e  a d v a n t a g e s  o f  f o r e i g n  
s u b s i d i a r i e s  i n  e x p o r t i n g ,  v i z :  a c c e s s  t o  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  
m a r k e t i n g  f a c i l i t i e s  and c h a n n e l s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a b r o a d .
The e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  
e n c o u r a g e d  by th e  i n c e n t i v e  scheme h a s  meant  t h a t  I r i s h  
t a r i f f s  ha v e  b e e n  o n l y  a m in or  i r r i t a n t .  The s w i t c h  i n  
t r a d e  p o l i c y  h a s  b e e n  a l m o s t  f u l l y  c o m p l e t e d  b u t  t h e  
e a r l i e r  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p o l i c y  h a s  l e f t  a s m a l l  group  o f  
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  w h ic h  e n g a g e  i n  im p o r t  s u b s t i t u t i o n .  
Inward o r i e n t e d  FDI h a s  b e e n  l i m i t e d  by  t h e  s m a l l  s i z e  
o f  th e  d o m e s t i c  m a r k e t .
D e s p i t e  t h i s  o v e r w h e lm in g  e x p o r t  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  i t  
i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  th e  c a s e  t h a t  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  c o n ­
t r i b u t e  p o s i t i v e l y  t o  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m en ts  o f  t h e  
h o s t  c o u n t r y .  The p r o p e n s i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  t o  im p o r t  
and t h e  payment o f  r e t u r n s  t o  f o r e i g n  c a p i t a l  may be  
i m p o r t a n t  and we must c o n s i d e r  what th e  s i t u a t i o n  w o u ld  
have  b e e n  w i t h o u t  FD I ,  The f o r m a l  m o d e l s  c o n s t r u c t e d  
t o  e x p r e s s  t h e s e  e f f e c t s  a t  t h e  f i r m  l e v e l  showed a n  
enorm ous  d i v e r s i t y  o f  r e s u l t s  -  w i t h i n  a s  w e l l  a s  b e t w e e n  
s e c t o r s .  T h i s  e m p h a s i s e s  t h e  wisdom o f  a n a l y s i s  on  a 
c a s e  by  c a s e  b a s i s  when c o n s i d e r i n g  s u i t a b i l i t y  f o r  g r a n t  
a i d .  The r e s u l t s  v a r i e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e
p o s i t i o n  a s su m e d ,  b u t  t a k i n g  th e  v i e w  t h a t  th e  c o r r e c t  
a l t e r n a t i v e  i s  no p r o j e c t ,  p o s i t i v e  r e s u l t s  o u t ­
numbered n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t s  by  j u s t  un der  2 : 1 ,  On t h i s  
b a s i s  FDI h a s  c o n t r i b u t e d  p o s i t i v e l y  t o  t h e  e x t e r n a l  
b a l a n c e  -  b u t  t h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  c o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  much 
g r e a t e r  had a more c a r e f u l  p r o j e c t  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  
b e e n  f o l l o w e d ,
l £ I _  C o n t r o l  and n o l i c v  e f f e c t s
When f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  c o n s t i t u t e  a n  im p o r t a n t  
p a r t  o f  d o m e s t i c  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  h o s t  G overn ­
m e n t s  f r e q u e n t l y  f e a r  a  l o s s  o f  c o n t r o l  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  
eco n o m y .  Two m ain  d a n g e r s  a re  f e a r e d .  F i r s t l y  t h a t  
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  w i l l  b e  u n r e s p o n s i v e  t o  h o s t  G o v e r n ­
ment p o l i c y  so  t h a t  a d d i t i o n a l  ’ p e r s u a s i o n  c o s t s ’ w i l l  
b e  im p o se d  on  th e  h o s t  G o vern m en t ,  S e c o n d l y ,  t h e r e  i s  
t h e  d a n g e r  t h a t  th e  s o u r c e  c o u n t r y  Government w i l l  i n t e r ­
f e r e  i n  e c o n o m ic  p o l i c y  t h r o u g h  th e  a g e n c y  o f  th e  s u b s i d ­
i a r y .
The o r g a n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  KNB i s  f e l t  t o  e x a c e r b a t e  
t h i s  c o n t r o l  p r o b le m .  As shown a b o v e ,  f u n c t i o n a l  s p e c u ­
l a t i o n  m akes  th e  MNE i n  many c a s e s  a k i n  t o  a n e t w o r k ,  
p a r t  o f  w h i c h  c a n n o t  f u n c t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  s e p a r a t i o n  
from  t h e  w h o l e .  I n  some c a s e s ,  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  
k e y  p a r t s  o f  t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  i n  t h e  s o u r c e  c o u n t r y  a l l o w s  
t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  l i t t l e  f r e e d o m  o f  a c t i o n .  S u ch  a v i e w  i s  
b a s e d  o n  an  i d e a l t y p e  o f  t h e  MNE, w h i c h  d o e s  n o t  f i t  a l l  
c a s e s .  H o w ev er ,  many r e s t r i c t i o n s  c a n  b e ,  and a r e ,  p l a c e d
o n  t h e  I r i s h  s u b s i d i a r y  by t h e  p a r e n t ,  E x p o r t  
r e s t r i c t i o n  c l a u s e s  may p r e v e n t  th e  s u b s i d i a r y  from  
s e r v i c i n g  a l l  t h o s e  m a r k e t s  w h ic h  i t '  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  
r e a c h i n g ,  d u a l  l o y a l t i e s  may a f f e c t  t h e  d e c i s i o n  
m a k ers  and t h e  s u b s i d i a r y  may. be  an  a g e n t  o f  t h e  
e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  s o u r c e  c o u n t r y  la w s  
and p r a c t i c e s ,  MNEs c a n  a l s o  a v o i d  h o s t  c o u n t r y  
p o l i c i e s  by a c c e s s  t o  th e  f a c i l i t i e s  o f  t h e i r  p a r e n t .
For  e x a m p l e ,  h o s t  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  c a n  be  a v o i d e d  
b y  a t r a n s f e r  o f  f u n d s  w i t h i n  th e  KNE and by  t r a n s f e r  
p r i c i n g  o f  i n t e r m e d i a t e  g o o d s  and s e r v i c e s . ■ A new s o u r c e  
o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  may t h u s  b e  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  p o l i c y  
d e c i s i o n s  o f  h o s t  c o u n t r i e s .
T h e se  s o u r c e s  o f  power a re  p o t e n t i a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  
o v e r t .  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  f i n d  e x a m p l e s  o f  s u c h  
p r a c t i c e s  by  MNEs i n  I r e l a n d  -  b u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  
a s  u s e  w o u ld  be c o v e r t .  On th e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e r e  a re  
i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  o f  s u b s i d i a r i e s  t o  
Government p o l i c y  -  r e g i o n a l  i n c e n t i v e s  a r e  a good  
e x a m p l e ,  T h ere  have b e e n  o c c a s i o n s  o f  t h r e a t s  o f  c l o s u r e  
b y  c e r t a i n  f o r e i g n  owned s u b s i d i a r i e s  and a l t h o u g h  s u c h  
t h r e a t s  a r e  not  unknown by n a t i o n a l  f i r m s ,  t h e  f o o t l o o s e  
n a t u r e  o f  KNE s u b s i d i a r i e s  makes  t h i s  more p o t e n t .
I t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d ,  by  Raymond V ern o n  amongst  
o t h e r s ,  t h a t  f e a r s  o f  l o s s  o f  c o n t r o l  t o  f o r e i g n  f i r m s  
c a n  be  r e d u c e d  by  th e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s .  
T h i s  i n v o l v e s  a t r a d e  o f f  b e t w e e n  th e  commitment o f
5+51
d o m e s t i c  c a p i t a l  and. t h e  amount o f  r e a l  c o n t r o l  g a i n e d  
( t h i s  may be i l l u s o r y ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  t e c h n o l o g y  r e m a i n s  
u n d e r  f o r e i g n  c o n t r o l ) .  I n  a d d i t i o n  an  e x t r a  d e g r e e  o f  
i n s t a b i l i t y  may be i n j e c t e d  -  a f a c t  r e f l e c t e d  by t h e  
g r e a t e r  f a i l u r e  r a t e  o f  j o i n t  v e n t u r e  p r o j e c t s .
In.  t h e  r u s h  t o  a t t r a c t  FDI t o  I r e l a n d ,  t h e r e  h a s  
b e e n  l i t t l e  a t t e m p t  t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  im p a c t  o f  f o r e i g n  
c o n t r o l  o n  p o l i c y  m aking  and e x e c u t i o n .  Up t o  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  
t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  l i t t l e  c o n f l i c t ,  f o r  p o l i c i e s  w h ic h  f a v o u r  
FDI h a v e  b e e n  s e e n  by  t h e  h o s t  Government a s  o p t i m a l  f o r  
t h e  I r i s h  d e v e l o p m e n t .  The e x t e n t  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  
f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r s  w i l l  be s e e n  o n l y  i f  t h e r e  i s  a r a d i c a l  
ch an ge  o f  Government p o l i c y .
S e c t i o n  3 ;  O v e r a l l  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  FDI 
on th e  I r i s h  economy and - p o l i c y  c o n c l u s i o n s
( 1 )  The means  o f  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  FDI
A m a in  theme o f  t h i s  t h e s i s  h a s  b e e n  t h a t  a f o r m ­
a l i s e d  c o s t  b e n e f i t  a p p r a i s a l  s h o u l d  be  a p p l i e d  t o  
p r o s p e c t i v e  f o r e i g n  (and I r i s h )  p r o j e c t s  w i s h i n g  t o  
r e c e i v e  g r a n t  a i d .  The c r i t e r i a  a p p l i e d  by th e  IDA a r e  
d e s i g n e d  t o  e n s u r e  v i a b i l i t y  b u t  t h e y  a l s o  i n c l u d e  
some s o c i a l  b e n e f i t  v a l u a t i o n s .  E m p h a s i s  i s  a l s o  g i v e n  
t o  employm ent c r e a t i o n .  The IDA c r i t e r i a  c a n  be l i s t e d  
a s  f o l l o w s ;  ( 1 )  t h e  m a r k e t  f o r  t h e  p r o d u c t  must  be an  
e x p a n d i n g  o n e ,  ( 2 )  l o n g  term  s t a b i l i t y  ( a  low r i s k  o f  
t e c h n o l o g i c a l  o b s o l e s c e n s e ) ,  ( 3 )  a h i g h  m a le  c o n t e n t  i n  
t o t a l  e m p lo y m en t ,  ( k )  h i g h  v a l u e  added  when t h e  f u l l  
im p a c t  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  o n  n a t i o n a l  incom e  i s  a c c o u n t e d  
f o r ,  ( 5 )  e a s e  o f  e x p o r t a b i l i t y , ( 6 )  low c a p i t a l  r e q u i r e ­
ment p e r  j o b  c r e a t e d  o r  good l i n k s  w i t h  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
eco n o m y .^  Such c r i t e r i a ,  c o u p l e d  w i t h  a l i s t  o f  ' p r i o r i t y  
a r e a s '  a l l o w  a v e r y  l a r g e  r a n g e  o f  p r o j e c t s  t o  q u a l i f y  
f o r  g r a n t  a i d .  I n  f a c t ,  t h o s e  p r o j e c t s  w h i c h  have  b e e n  
r e f u s e d  g r a n t s  are  u s u a l l y  t u r n e d  down o n  g r o u n d s  o f  
'weak  f i n a n c e '  or  ' l a c k  o f  a d e q u a t e  m a r k e t i n g  f a c i l i t i e s ' ’ -  
f e a t u r e s  r e l a t i n g  m a i n l y  t o  th e  p a r e n t  f i r m  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t o  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  I r i s h  s u b s i d i a r y .
A more f o r m a l  s e t  o f  c r i t e r i a ,  w i t h  a c o h e r e n t
d e c i s i o n  r u l e ,  are  n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n s u r e  t h a t  th e  
g a i n  from t h e  p r o j e c t  o u t w e i g h s  th e  c o s t s .  F u r t h e r  i t
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s h o u l d  e n s u r e  t h a t  a l l  t h e  g a i n s  a r e  n o t  a p p r o p r i a t e d  
b y  th e  f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r .  Two p o s s i b l e  m e th o d s  o f  
a n a l y s i s  t o  e n s u r e  t h i s  w ere  u t i l i s e d  i n  C h a p ter  V I I .  
A n a l y s e s  o f  t h i s  t y p e  c a n  be c a r r i e d  o u t  w i t h  t h e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  IDA on a n  a p r i o r i  b a s i s .  
C h a n g in g  p o l i c y  and c o n d i t i o n s  c a n  be r e f l e c t e d  i n  
c h a n g i n g  shadow p r i c e s  and a s s u m p t i o n s .  S e p e r a t e  
employm ent e f f e c t s  need  n o t  be  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  t h e s e  
e f f e c t s  a r e  a l r e a d y  i n c l u d e d  and v a l u e d .  The IDA afre 
i n d e e d  now f o l l o w i n g  a p o l i c y  o f  g r e a t e r  s e l e c t i v i t y  
i n  g i v i n g  g r a n t  a i d  t o  f o r e i g n  owned p r o j e c t s .  T h i s  i s  
b a s i c a l l y  c o r r e c t ,  e x c e p t  t h a t  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e s s  
s h o u l d  be  f o u n d e d  on g e n e r a l  b e n e f i t  c o s t  c r i t e r i a  r a t h e r  
t h a n  on  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  ' p r i o r i t y  a r e a s '  w h i c h  i s  a 
•second b e s t  p r o c e d u r e .
I d e a l l y ,  t h i s  s u g g e s t i o n  s h o u l d  be t i e d  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  a ch a n g e  i n  th e  g r a n t s  s c h e m e .  G r a n t s  s h o u ld  be  
l i n k e d  d i r e c t l y  t o  th e  n e t  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  t o  
I r e l a n d .  Thus th e  l o c a t i o n a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  s h o u l d  be  
s u b s i e m e d  w i t h i n  a s l i d i n g  s c a l e  o f  g r a n t  a i d .  I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  g r a n t  a i d  s h o u l d  be made c o n t i n g e n t  on  t h e  
c o m p l e t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o j e c t  a s  p r e s e n t e d  t o  t h e  IDA, a 
p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  i s  im p le m e n t e d  i n  F r a n c e .
F i n a l l y ,  more i n f o r m a t i o n  on  f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s  
s h o u l d  be made a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  IDA and t o  p o l i c y  m a k e r s .  
D i s c l o s u r e  o f  a n n u a l  r e c o r d s  by f i r m s  i n  r e c e i p t  o f  
g r a n t  a i d  s h o u l d  be o b l i g a t o r y  and more a n a l y s i s  o f  s u c h
p r o j e c t s  s h o u l d  he a v a i l a b l e  t o  p o l i c y  m akers  i n  t h e  
D A  and i n  G overnm ent .  An o n g o i n g  r e v i e w  o f  t h e  
e f f i c i e n c y  o f  FDI i n  a c h i e v i n g  G o v e r n m e n ta l  t a r g e t s  
s h o u l d  be  an  e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  p o l i c y .  Such a r e v i e w  
c o u l d  k e e p  i n  b a l a n c e  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  d e p e n d e n c e  on FDI 
and t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  s t r e n g t h  o f  th e  d o m e s t i c  s e c t o r  so  
a s  t o  a l l o w  t h e  l a t t e r  t o  i n c r e a s e  i n  i m p o r t a n c e .
( 2 )  The e f f e c t , o f  FDI on  r e a l  income and g r o w th  p o t e n t i a l
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  c o s t  b e n e f i t  a n a l y s e s  o f  f o r e i g n  
p r o j e c t s  shows a g r e a t  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  r e s u l t s ,  a s  
p e r h a p s  w o u ld  be e x p e c t e d .  A g g r e g a t i o n  from  t h e  f i r m  
l e v e l  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r  a s  a w h o le  i s  d i f f i c u l t  b u t  
i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t  th e  o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  c a n  be d e s c r i b e d  a s  
b e n e f i c i a l ,  a l t h o u g h  n o t  o u t s t a n d i n g l y  s o .  T a b le  8 . 1  i s  a 
s c h e m a t i c  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s ,  b o t h  d i r e c t  






































































o  CO 
•H
4-3 O  
•rH  *1-1 
4-3 + 3
CD CO 
P i  CD
a  a  





CO 43 d o
CP CO o
O o o 43
•H o CD d
P . a
P i r—1 o *H
cd •H P
P 43 43 43




<d o 'd CD
P P CO B
43 •H *VH 43 O
V -/ > o CO o
d o d
CO CD r-f a M
© O
CO 'd P rH «M
0} d 43 cd O
CD CCS d O
1H o *H d
O d o W) o
d o o
•H *rH rH 43
43 O O u
O il> d d o
6 r - t CO , a 43
*H rH CO o CO
d O O CD •rH














CiO CO co ©
*H •H CD
© d CO d
d M cd o
O CD •H
<M O fH 43
■H 43 O cd
cd CDo a CO d 43
43 CO
to to •H Q> d
© CD o o
bO « O •H B
















d P i i—t O
a rH
cd •H •H d
jh o
43 CO CO *H
43 43
bD d 'd d
d © d r>»
•H CO a Cd •rH rH
nd 43 K*» in d
d a cd i—1 43 o
i—i © P i cd ©
o rM o •H rH
d <M «M •H rd cd
•H © O no d
o rH o
«M © © rH cd ~iH
&0 o O d 43
o cd d d o O
d cd rtf
•H d i—I o bO
P i •H cd © ©
03 id OQ EH PS +
An in c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  income f o r  the  h o s t  country  
can come about only  by the n o n -a p p r o p r ia t io n  o f  a l l  
the b e n e f i t s  o f  investm ent  by the f o r e i g n  i n v e s t o r .
T h is  has occured i n  I r e la n d  i n  four  main a r e a s .  F i r s t l y ,  
employment has been in c r e a s e d  (over  the d l t e r n a t i v e  
p o s i t i o n ) .  Seco n d ly ,  t r a n s m i s s io n  e f f e c t s  to  the d o m est ic  
s e c t o r  has occured i n  v a r i o u s  forms: l in k a g e  and 
de m o n s tra t io n  e f f e c t s ,  secondary employment c r e a t i o n ,  
p r o f i t s  to  j o i n t  v e n tu r e  p a r tn e r s  and a sm a l l  tax  payment 
e le m e n t .  T h ir d l y ,  the o p e r a t io n s  o f  f o r e i g n  f irm s  have  
gone some way to  reduc ing  r e g i o n a l  income d i s p a r i t i e s .  
F i n a l l y ,  the o v e r a l l  b e n e f i c i a l  e f f e c t s  on the ba lan ce  
o f  payments have a v e r ted  c o s t l y  r e a l l o c a t i o n  problems.  
Other p o s s i b l e  b e n e f i t s  -  n o ta b ly  p r i c e  d e c r e a s e s  -  have  
been minimised because  o f  the export  o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  
f o r e i g n  p r o j e c t s .
There have been s i g n i f i c a n t  c o s t s  imposed a l s o .
The do m est ic  s e c t o r  has been squeezed by i t s  i n a b i l i t y  
t o  compete f o r  score  r e s o u r c e s  i n  c e r t a i n  l i m i t e d  
c r u c i a l  a r ea s  -  s k i l l e d  labour  and c a p i t a l  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  
Although a c t u a l  d isp la ce m en t  o f  dom est ic  p r o j e c t s  by 
f o r e i g n  ones has been adjudged to  be s m a l l .  A u s e f u l  
a d d i t i o n  to  p o l i c y  would be a scheme to  i d e n t i f y  and h e lp  
in d ig e n o u s  f irm s  i n  such c a s e s .  Other major c o s t s  are  
the  obv io u s  ones -  the o u t f lo w  of  funds i n  r e s p e c t  o f  
FDI (d iv id e n d s  and r o y a l t i e s )  and the c o s t  o f  s u b s i d i e s .
An i n c r e a s e  i n  p r i c e s  due to  t r a n s f e r  p r i c i n g  o f  i n t e r ­
m ediate  goods w ith  the KHE may have a f f e c t e d  I r e l a n d ’ s
import b e l l  and tax  revenues to  some e x t e n t .  I n d i r e c t  
c o s t s  a r i s e  from p o l l u t i o n ,  widening o f  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  income when h ig h er  wages and s a l a r i e s  are in v o lv e d  
and t e c h n o l o g i c a l  c o s t s .  The p o s s i b l e  p o l i t i c a l  c o s t s  
o f  l o s s  o f  c o n t r o l  must a l s o  be i n c lu d e d .
The c o s t  b e n e f i t  a n a l y s e s ,  c a r r ie d  out by v a l u i n g  
as  many o f  the above e f f e c t s  as  p o s s i b l e ,  showed a 
p o s i t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  r e a l  income on the assum ption  
th a t  a s t r a ig h t fo r w a r d  summation o f  i n d i v i d u a l  p r o j e c t s  i s  
a true  g u i d e .  This  r e s u l t  occured because  the major g a i n '  
was wages paid to  workers who would o th e rw ise  be unemployed 
or underemployed and t h i s  g a in  outweighed d i r e c t  c o s t s  
which were mainly  s u b s i d i e s  p lu s  the o u t f lo w  o f  funds#
The e x t r a  w e ig h t in g  a p p l i e d  to  e x p o r ts  a l s o  c o n tr ib u te d  
to  t h i s  r e s u l t #
S e v e r a l  p r o v i s o s  must be added. D e s p i t e  an o v e r a l l  
c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  r e a l  income growth, s e v e r a l  bad f o r e i g n  
p r o j e c t s  have been a c ce p ted  f o r  grant a i d .  This  a p p l i e s  
to  some which have f a i l e d  but a l s o  to  many l i v e  p r o j e c t s  
which cannot be j u s t i f i e d  on a c o s t  b e n e f i t  t e s t .  What­
ever  the ne t  ga ins  have b e e n ,  they would have been g r e a t e r  
had such p r o j e c t s  been r e j e c t e d  at  the o u t s e t .  Some 
would not have g iv e n  a n e g a t i v e  r e s u l t  had the grant been  
c o n t in g e n t  on a c h ie v in g  p r o j e c t e d  r e s u l t s ,  as  su g g e s te d  
above# O th e rs ,  even a t  f u l l  o u tp u t ,  are a net  c o s t  to  the  
economy and t h e s e  are the ones which must be r e j e c t e d  when 
they  apply f o r  a g r a n t .
S e c o n d ly ,  the permanence o f  the f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r  
o f  I r i s h  in d u s tr y  has not y e t  been proven .  I t  has been  
su g g es ted  that  the t e r m in a t io n  o f  the export  tax  r e l i e f  
scheme i n  1990 w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  many f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s  
c l o s i n g  down and l e a v i n g  I r e l a n d .  I t  i s  u n l i k e l y  that  
most o f  the f irm s i n  I r e la n d  have so sh or t  a time h o r i z o n ,  
even  i f  some o ther  form o f  inducement under the EECs 
r e g i o n a l  p o l i c y  i s  not a p p l i e d .  Moreover, those  f i rm s  
w it h  heavy f i x e d  c a p i t a l  equipment would have to  take  
a v e ry  heavy l o s s  i n  l e a v i n g .  An informed g uess  would 
put the p r o p o r t io n  o f  f i r m s  which w i l l  c l o s e  under such an 
e v e n t u a l i t y  at  below 1 0$ ,  a f f e c t i n g  a much lower p r o p o r t io n  
inv es tm en t  than t h i s  f i g u r e .
T h i r d l y ,  there  are s e v e r a l  e f f e c t s  o f  FDI which have  
not y e t  been w i tn e s s e d  i n  Ire lan d  because  o f  the r e l a t i v e  
newness o f  most in v e s tm e n t .  The most important o f  t h e s e  
e f f e c t s  i s  the o u tf low  o f  d iv id e n d s  from I r e l a n d ,  The 
time t o  a c h ie v e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a r e l a t i v e l y  
h ig h  r a te  o f  re in ves tm en t  has l im i t e d  o u t f lo w s  up to  now. 
Reinvestm ent  r a t e s  w i l l  probably remain h ig h  w i th  the ESC 
market expanding r a p i d l y ,  a l though  the o u t f lo w  o f  funds  
can c e r t a i n l y  be expected  to  i n c r e a s e .  I t  i s  u n l i k e l y  th a t  
L a t i n  American p r o p o r t io n s  w i l l  be reached f o r  many, many 
y e a r s ,  i f  e v e r ,  provided th a t  currency s t a b i l i t y  i s  main­
t a i n e d .
The e f f e c t  on growth p o t e n t i a l  depends on the nature  
of  the development of  the dom est ic  s e c t o r . '  Here,  much more
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a t t e n t i o n  must be devoted  to  maximising the l in k a g e  
e f f e c t s  w i t h  the dom est ic  s e c t o r  and red uc in g  imported  
i n p u t s .  P a r t l y ,  t h i s  can be a ch ieved  by the dom est ic  
s e c t o r  i t s e l f ,  in  that  i t  has i n  the p a s t  f a i l e d  to  
make the most o f  i t s  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  o f  s e l l i n g  to  
f o r e i g n  owned f i r m s .  Some c o n s o l i d a t i o n  and r a t i o n ­
a l i s a t i o n  o f  the dom est ic  s e c t o r  w ith  a programme of  
(Government i n s p i r e d )  mergers would h e lp  overcome the  
s c a l e  b a r r i e r  and the new breed o f  e n tr e p r e n e u r s  are  
much more aware of  the o p p o r t u n i t i e s  o f  s e l l i n g  to  f o r e i g n  
s u b s i d i a r i e s .  Time, IDA pressu re  and mors c a r e f u l  
p r o j e c t  s e l e c t i o n  w i l l  a l s o  h e l p .  I t  w i l l  however be 
some time b e fo r e  the dual ism  even b e g in s  t o  d e c l i n e ,
"Hr In  t h i s  sense ,F D I must be v iewed as a ’b r id g in g  loan* 
u n t i l  the dom est ic  s e c t o r  can undertake s e l f  g e n e r a t in g  
growth i n  the more open economy and i n  the ’modern1 
s e c t o r s
H )  Future development s t r a t e g y
S e v e r a l  b r o a d ! a l t e r n a t i v e  s t r a t e g i e s  can be 
d e l i n e a t e d  f o r  the f u tu r e  development o f  I r e l a n d .  
I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  can be f o l lo w e d  by cont inu ed  r e l i a n c e  
on f o r e i g n  in v e s tm e n t ,  w i th  p o s s i b l e  dan gers  o f  
dependence ,  over c a p i t a l  i n t e n s i v e  i n d u s t r i e s  and l a r g e  
o u t f lo w s  o f  fu n d s .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i n d u s t r a l i s a t i o n  can 
be pursued by r e l i a n c e  on dom est ic  r e s o u r c e s ,  w i th  
e i t h e r  the p r iv a t e  s e c t o r  or p u b l ic  e n t e r p r i s e  b e in g
given the leading role.*
Sole  r e l i a n c e  on the  do m est ic  s e c t o r  has problems:  
the  h i s t o r i c a l  record i s  a g a i n s t  the s u c c e s s  o f  a 
s t r a t e g y  based on do m est ic  p r iv a t e  i n d u s t r y  a l o n e .  More­
o v e r ,  th e r e  are severe  o b s t a c l e s  i n  the way o f  
o b t a in in g  tec h n o lo gy  and g a in in g  a c c e s s  t o  the la r g e  
f o r e i g n  markets which are n e c e s s a r y  f o r  e f f i c i e n c y .  The 
dom est ic  c a p i t a l  market i s  not s trong  enough to  support  
demands f o r  la r g e  s c a l e  p r o j e c t s  and s k i l l e d  labour i s  
s t i l l  at  a premium. R e l ia n c e  on s t a t e  e n t e r p r i s e  means 
expanding the range o f  s o l u t i o n s  s i m i l a r  to  N i g r i t i n  
E ire a n n  T eoranta ,  which has  proved a most s u c c e s s f u l  
ex p er im en t .  S ta te  u n d erta k in g s  have been  c r i t i c i s e d  f o r  
a f a i l u r e  to  adapt q u ic k ly  and such a s o l u t i o n  seems b e s t  
s u i t e d  to  a r e a s  w i th  a s t a b l e  t ec h n o lo g y  and an e s t a b ­
l i s h e d  home market r a th e r  than c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  a Europe -  
wide market .
+ (A f i n a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  -  th a t  I r e la n d  should not  
attempt to  i n d u s t r i a l i s e  f u r t h e r ,  but d e v e lo p  tourism  
and a g r i c u l t u r e  only  to  become the ' r e s t  cen tre  of  Europe'  
has not been cons id ered  because  i t  does  not appear to  
r e f l e c t  the w ish es  of  the p o p u la t io n .  Such a s o l u t i o n  a l s o  
condemns Ir e la n d  to  b e in g  a low income, depopulated  c o u n tr y ,  
dependent on t o u r i s t  r e c e i p t s .  The r e a l  q u e s t io n  i s  how 
b e s t  to  a c h ie v e  f u r t h e r  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  and how b e s t  to  
ininirnise i t s  bad e f f e c t s . )
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T h e r e f o r e ,  a mix o f  the three  s o l u t i o n s  i s  the  
way towards d e f i n i n g  a s t r a t e g y .  FDI can be regarded  
as  f i l l i n g  a gap i n  many a rea s  u n t i l  a dom est ic  e n t e r -  
p r i s e  can be c r e a t e d .  Much more e f f o r t  should be 
devoted  to  encouraging do m est ic  s o l u t i o n s  and to  
d ev e lo p  a dom est ic  s t r u c t u r e  which m axim ises  s p i n - o f f  
b e n e f i t s  from the f o r e i g n  owned s e c t o r .  In mahy 
s e c t o r s ,  FDI w i l l  cont inu e  as the major e lement because  
the package o f  r e s o u r c e s  i t  p ro v id e s  are a v a i l a b l e  i n  no • 
o th e r  form, or at l e a s t  on ly  at a h ig h e r  c o s t .  In many 
a rea s  no f o r s e e a b l e  d o m est ic  a l t e r n a t i v e s  are a v a i l a b l e  
i n  the near f u t u r e .  Much depends on the Governments 
c h o ic e  o f  d i s co u n t  r a te  f o r  the fu tu r e  -  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  
q u ic k ly  must mean FDI i n  many s e c t o r s ,  a low d i s c o u n t  r a te  
i m p l i e s  a l a r g e r  d o m e s t i c a l l y  owned s h a r e ,  but s lower  
growth. The p o l i c y  o f  g r e a t e r  s e l e c t i v i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  
owned p r o j e c t s  and a f o r m a l i s e d  a sses sm en t  of  net  b e n e f i t s  
means a lower f o r e i g n  share than the p r e s e n t  p o l i c y .  B u t ,  
t h i s  p o l i c y  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a f o s t e r i n g  o f  n ascent  d o m est ic  
f i rm s  and a s t r e n g th e n in g  o f  l i n k s  means a more i n t e g r a t e d  
d o m est ic  economy, w i t h  a f u l l e r  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f  the p o t e n t i a l  
b e n e f i t s  o f  FDI.
No f u t u r e  development s t r a t e g y  can ignore  the d e v e l o p ­
ment o f  the EEC. The T reaty  o f  A c c e s s io n  o f  the I r i s h  
R epubl ic  to  the EEC in c lu d e d  a s p e c i a l  appended p r o t o c o l  
for. the maintenance o f  s t a t e  a id s  to  be as e f f e c t i v e  i n
promoting i n d u s t r i a l  development as the present  sys tem .  I t  
seems l i k e l y  th a t  there  w i l l  be no e x t e n s i o n  of the export
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ta x  r e l i e f  scheme a f t e r  1990 .  A rev iew  of  s t a t e  a i d s  
w i t h i n  the Community i s  l i k e l y  to  f i n d  th a t  t h i s  scheme 
c o n tra v e n e s  A r t i c l e  92 o f  the Treaty  of  Rome which  
s t a t e s  th a t  a id s  should not ’d i s t o r t  c o m p e t i t i o n ’ . Aids  
must a l s o  he tran sp arent  -  th a t  i s ,  r e a d i l y  q u a n t i f i a b l e .  
U n t i l  an agreement i s  reached on t h i s  p o i n t ,  the IDA can  
o f f e r  f u l l  r e l i e f  u n t i l  1990 and a l l  p r o j e c t s  a lre a d y  
a c ce p ted  under the scheme w i l l  be a l low ed  r e l i e f  u n t i l  • 
the c o m p le t io n  d a t e .  A f u l l  review o f  r e g i o n a l  a i d s  i s  
at p re sen t  underway. L im i t s  on s t a t e  a i d s  were imposed 
on ’c e n t r a l  a r e a s '  i n  1971* Ire la n d  has been d e s ig n a te d  
as  a l e s s  d e v e lo p e d 'p e r i p h e r a l '  area  and w i l l  be ab le  to  
g iv e  l a r g e r  i n c e n t i v e s  to  a t t r a c t  i n d u s t r y .  H e lp 'W i l l  be 
forthcom ing  i n  the form o f  Community funds  such as  
European Investment Bank lo a n s  ( l o a n s  and lo a n  g u a r a n te e s ,  
f o r  the p r o v i s i o n  o f  i n f r a s t r u c t u r e  and d i r e c t  a id  t o  
i n d u s t r i a l  e n t e r p r i s e s ) ,  the European I n t e r e s t  Rebate 
Fund (d e s ig n e d  to  c u sh io n  repayment on lo a n s  f in a n c e d  by 
the  Community), cash g r a n ts  f o r  the p r o v i s i o n  o f  j o b s  and 
a c c e s s  to  the European s o c i a l  fund,  which p ro v id e s  f o r  
r e t r a i n i n g  and r e s e t t l e m e n t  g r a n t s .
The development s t r a t e g y  which I r e la n d  i s  l i k e l y  
t o  c h o s e ,  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  be moulded w i t h i n  a European  
sys tem .  I t  w i l l  be to  I r e l a n d ’ s b e n e f i t  i f  the Community 
can prevent  c o u n t r i e s  competing a g a i n s t  each o ther  t o  
a t t r a c t  s u b s i d i a r i e s  o f  KNEs. The EEC i s  u n l i k e l y  to  
s e v e r e l y  c u r t a i l  the i n c e n t i v e  scheme, a l th ou g h  i t  i s  
l i k e l y  to be changed and the export  tax  r e l i e f  system
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r e p l a c e d  by a more t r a n s p a r e n t  a i d .  B e in g  p a r t  of  a 
wide E u r o p e a n  Market  h a s  b e e n  o f  t rem en d o u s  v a lu e  t o  
I r e l a n d f s deve lopm ent  s t r a t e g y ,  and w i l l  c o n t i n u e
Chapter Vlll Notes and References
1 IDA : I n d u s t r i a l  Development i n  I r e l a n d . 
IDA, D u b l in .
B i b l i o g r a p h y
(1) Official Publications - Ireland.
( a )  O f f i c i a l  P u b l i c a t i o n s  -  A l l  S t a t i o n e r y  O f f i c e .  D u b l i n .
Census o f  P o p u l a t i o n  i n  I r e l a n d  ( v a r i o u s ) .
Custom and E x c i s e  T a r i f f  o f  Ire la n d  ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
E x t e r n a l  Trade S t a t i s t i c s  ( v a r i o u s )  p a r t i c u l a r l y  E x t e r n a l  
Trade S t a t i s t i c s  1971 (P r l  30*+7) ( p r e v i o u s l y  Trade 
S t a t i s t i c s  o f  I r e l a n d ) .
O f f i c i a l  Im port  and E x p o r t  L i s t s  ( v a r i o u s )•
I r i s h  S t a t i s t i c a l  B u l l e t i n  (v a r io u s  -  q u a r t e r l y ) .
N a t i o n a l  Income and E x p e n d i t u r e  ( v a r i o u s ) .
S t a t i s t i c a l  A b s t r a c t  o f  I r e l a n d  ( v a r i o u s ) .
Trade S t a t i s t i c s  o f  I re lan d  ( v a r i o u s )  ( l a t e r  E x te r n a l  
Trade S t a t i s t i c s ) .
Economic Development (1958)  (P r l  *+803).
Second Programme f o r  Economic Expansion s Part I (1963)
(P r l  7239) P a r t  I I  (196*0 (P r l  7670 ) .
R e p o r t  of  Committee on Development  C e n t r e s  and 
I n d u s t r i a l  E s t a t e s  (196*+) (P r l  **86l).
F ree  Trade  Area Agreement (1965)  (Pr 8623)*
Accession of Ireland to the General Agreement on
T a r i f f s  and Trade. (1967)  (P r l  969*0.
Survey o f  Grant Aided In d u stry  (1967)  (P r l  117)*
I n d u s t r i a l  Development Act (1969)*
Third Programme fo r  Economic and S o c i a l  Development  
1.9.6.9-72 (1 96 9 )  (P r l  * 0 1 ) .
Input Output T ab les  f o r  196*+ (1970)  (P r l  9 8 5 ) .
Membership o f  the European Communities ( P r l  1 1 1 0 ) .
Bevie_w_Qf 1 971 and Outlook f o r  1972 (19 7 2 )  ( P r l  2 3 5 7 ) .
The A c c e s s io n  of  Ire lan d  to  the European Communities 
( I 9 7 2 ) (P r l  206*+).
Review o f  1972 and Outlook f o r  1973 (1 9 7 3 )  (P r l  3 0 9 0 ) .
( b )  P u b l i c a t i o n s  o f  S t a t e  and Semi S t a t e  B o d ie s
( 1 )  An Foras  Forbartha ( N a t io n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  P h y s i c a l  
Planning  and C o n s tr u c t io n  R e se a r c h ) .
R e g io n a l  Development & I n d u s t r i a l  L o c a t io n  i n  I r e l a n d , 
volume 1. L o c a t io n a l  D e c i s i o n s  E x p e r ie n c e s  of  New 
I n d u s t r i a l  E s ta b l i s h m e n ts  (1 9 6 0 -7 0 )  (1972)  by 
Padraig  O’Huggin, D u b l in .
( 2 )  An Foras T io n s c a l  (The Grants B o a r d ) .
Central  Bank of  I r e l a n d ,
Q u a r ter ly  B u l l e t i n  ( v a r io u s ) *
Report o f  the C entra l  Bank of  I r e la n d  ( v a r i o u s ) .
Committee on I n d u s t r i a l  O r g a n is a t io n  -  CIO.
I n d u s t r i a l  Grants ( 1 9 6 2 ) *ffch In ter im  Report ( P r . 692^ ) .  
Report on the Surve y of  the E l e c t r i c a l  Equipment and 
Apparatus Industry  ( 1 9 6 3 ) (Pr 70 20 ) .
A S y n t h e s i s  o f  Reports  by Survey Teams (1965)  (Pr 788 3 ) .  
F i n a l  Report ( 1 9 6 5 ) (Pr 8 0 8 2 ) .
Committee on I n d u s t r i a l  P rogress  -  CIP.
R eports  p a r t i c u l a r l y
Report on Metal Trades  In du stry  (1 97 0 )  (P r l  1355)®
Report, on E l e c t r i c a l  Machinery,  Apparatus and 
Appl i a n c e s  (1971)  (P r l  2 0 6 1 ) .
General Report (1972)  (P r l  2 9 2 7 ) .
Coras  T r a c h t a l a  -  The I r i s h  E x p o r t  B o a r d .
Annual Reports  ( v a r i o u s ) .
Department of  F o r e i gn A f f a i r s .
F a c t s  about Ire lan d  ( 1 9 7 2 ) .
The I n d u s t r i a l  Development A u tho r ity  -  IDA 
Review of  I n c e n t i v e s  fo r  Industry  i n  Ir e la n d  ( 1 9 6 7 ) 
Arthur D. L i t t l e  In c .
Review o f  the  S tru c tu re  of  t he I n d u s t r i a l  Development  
A u th o r i ty  ( 1 9 6 7 ) .  Arthur D. L i t t l e  I n c .
R e g io nal  I nd u s t r i a l  P i l o n s  1973-77  ( 1 9 7 2 ) .
Ioh a . t o  the People ( 1 9 72 ) .
R e c u r r e n t  p u b l i c a t i o n s s -  
Annual R e p o r t s  ( v a r i o u s ) .
Guide t o  th e  S u b m is s io n  o f  R & D p r o j e c t s  
I n d u s t r i a l  Development  i n  I r e l a n d .
I n d u s t r i a l  I r e l a n d  t o d a y .
P r i n c i p l e  I n d u s t r i e s  w i t h  F o r e i g n  P a r t i c i p a t i o n . 
R e s e a r c h  Par k ,  N a a s .
Taxes and Tax R e l i e f  i n  I r e l a n d .
Tax R e l i e f  f o r  Export P r o f i t s .
U .S .  Firms Manufacturing i n  I r e l a n d .
( 9 )  I n s t i t u t e  f or I n d u s t r i a l  Research and Standards I IRS. 
I n s t i t u t e  f o r I n d u s t r i a l  Research and S ta n d a r d s . 
S H £ m - O C - lb e . .J r i s h  Pl a s t i c s .  Industry.  (1971)  by 
Aidon B. McNamara and Donald M. S a in sb u r y .
( 1 ° )  N a t io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  Economic Council  NIEC
Comments on Report o f  Committee on Development C entres  
and Indus t r i a l  E s t a t e s  (1 9 65 )  (Pr 8^ 76) .
R e p o r t  on F u l l  Employment (1965)  (Pr 9 1 8 8 ) .
Report on Rev iew o f  I n d u s t r i a l  P r o g r e s s  ( v a r i o u s ) .  
Report on I n d u s t r i a l  Adoption and Development (1968)  
( P r l  1 1 6 ) .
Report on P h y s ic a l  P lanning (1 9 6 9 ) (P r l  6*tl).
(1 1 )  N a t io n a l  P r i c e s  Commission 
Monthly Report ( v a r i o u s ) .
(1 2 )  N a t io n a l  Sc ien ce  C o u n c i l .
Research and Development i n  Ire la n d  1 9 69 (1971)  by 
Diarmuid Murphy and Donal 0 B r o lc h a i n .  .
Ire la n d  -  Background Report on S c ie n c e  and 
Technology (1972)  compiled by Diarmuid Murphy.
S t u d ie s  in  I r i s h  S c ie n c e  P o l i c y  (1 97 3 )  Report by 
P o l i c y  Research C entre ,  U n i v e r s i t y  C o l l e g e ,  D u b l in .
( 1 3 )  Shannon Free Airport  Development Company (SFADCO).
Annual Report ( v a r i o u s ) .
F a c t s  B u l l e t i n  ( v a r i o u s ) .
Ir e la n d  Mid West ( v a r i o u s ) .
F iv e  Year Programme f o r  the I n d u s t r i a l  Development 
o f  the C la r e .  Lim erick  and T ipperary  N.R. R eg io n  ( 1 9 6 9 ) .  
Supplements to  F ive  Year Programme ( 1 9 7 0 ) .
Shannon Airport  House -  I r e la n d  (1972)  •
( 2 )  O f f i c i a l  P u b l i c a t i o n s  -  E lse w h e r e .
Board o f  Trade J o u rn a l  -  U.K. v a r i o u s  (L ater  Trade 
and I n d u s t r y ) .
B u s i n e s s  Monitor : M*+ Overseas T r a n s a c t io n s  (1970-197^)  
U.K.
Gray H. (1972)  F o re ig n  D i r e c t  Investment i n  Canada 
(The Gray Report)  Ottowa: Queen’s P r i n t e r .
Hufbauer G.C. and M.H. Adler (19&7) Overseas Manufact­
ur ing  Investment and the Balance of  Payments U .S .  
Treasury  Department, Washington D.C.
OECD Economic Survey -  I re la n d  . V ar ious
OECD Trade by Commodities . V a r io u s .
OECD (1965)  F i s c a l  I n c e n t i v e s  f o r  P r iv a te  Investment  
on D ev e lo p in g  Areas P a r i s .
OECD (1970)  I n v e s t in g  i n  D eve lop in g  C ou n tr ie s  :
F a c i l i t i e s  f o r  the Promotion of  F o r e ig n  P r iv a te  
Investment i n  D eve lop ing  C o u n t r i e s * P a r i s .
OECD (197*0 Interim Report o f  the In d u s tr y  Committee 
on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e s , P a r i s .
S t e u e r ,  M.D. e t  a l  (1973)  The Impact o f  F o re ig n  D i r e c t  
Investment on the U n ited  Kingdom. (The S te u e r  R e p o r t ) .  
HMSO, London.
Trade and Industry  -  U.K. v a r io u s  ( p r e v i o u s l y  Board o f  
Trade J o u r n a l ) .
U n ited  N a t io n s  (Dept,  o f  Economic & S o c i a l  A f f a i r s )  (1 9 68 )  
F o re ig n  Investment i n  D ev e lo p in g  C o u n t r i e s < New York.
U n ited  N a t io n s  (1973)  M u l t i n a t i o n a l  C orporat ion s  i n  
World Developm ent . New York.
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board (19 7 1 )  Balance o f  
Payments and Income E f f e c t s  o f  P r iv a t e  For e i g n  Investment  
i n  Manufacturing; Case S t ud i e s  o f  In d ia  and Iran  by 
S .  Lall-A'nd A. E le k ,  Geneva.
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board (1973)  Methodology  
used i n  S t u d i e s  on P r iv a t e  F ore ign  Investment i n  
S e l e c t e d  D evelop ing  C o u n tr ie s  P .P .  S t r e e t o n  and S .  L a l l  
Geneva.
United  S t a t e s  Department o f  Commerce ( i 9 6 0 ) U . S .
B u s in e s s  Investment In F o r e i gn C o u n t r i e s . Washington D.C.
U n ited  S t a t e s  Department o f  Commerce (19 7 0 )  U . S . D i r e c t  
In ves tm en ts  Abroad 1966 Part I Balance o f  Payments da ta  
(1972)  Part I I  Investment p o s i t i o n  F i n a n c i a l  and Operating  
d ata  Washington D.C. (The benchmark s t u d i e s ) .
United  S t a t e s  Dept ,  o f  Commerce (1972)  The M u l t i ­
n a t i o n a l  C orporat ion ,  volumes 1 and 2 .
U n ited  S t a t e s  Dept ,  o f  Commerce Survey o f  Current 
B u s i n e s s  v a r i o u s .
U nited  S t a t e s  T a r i f f  Commission (1973)  I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  Firms f o r  World Trade and Investment and 
f o r  U .S . .T ra d e  and Labour, U .S .  P r i n t i n g  O f f i c e ,
Washington D.C.
Watkins M (1970)  F o r e ig n  Ownership and the S tr u c tu r e  
o f  Canadian I n d u s t r y , (The Watkins R ep o r t )  Queen’ s 
P r i n t e r ,  Ottowa.
Abbre v i a t i o n s  used f o r  Journal s  i n  B ib l io g r a p h y  
S e c t i o n s  1 and
A .E .R .  = American Economic Review.
B .N .L .Q .R .  = Banca N az iona le  d e l  Lavoro Q uarter ly  Review
B . O . U . I . S .  = B u l l e t i n  o f  the Oxford U n i v e r s i t y
I n s t i t u t e  o f  S t a t i s t i c s  and Economics .
B .R .  = B u s i n e s s  R a t i o s .
C .J .E .  -  Canadian J o u rn a l  o f  Economics .
C.J.W.B. = Columbia Journa l  o f  World B u s in e ss . .
E .D .C .C .  = Economic Development and C u ltu r a l  Change.
E . J .  = Economic J o u r n a l .
E .R .  = Economic Record.
E .S .R .  = Economic and S o c i a l  Review, D u b l in .
I . E . P .  = I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic P apers .
J . D . S .  = J o u r n a l  o f  Development S t u d i e s .
J . E . L .  = Jo u r n a l  o f  Economic L i t e r a t u r e ,
J . I . B . S .  = J o u r n a l  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B u s in e s s  S t u d i e s .
J . P . E .  = Jo u r n a l  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy,
J . S . S . I - . S . I .  = J o u r n a l  o f  S t a t i s t i c a l  and S o c i a l  In q u iry
S o c i e t y  o f  I r e la n d .
O .E .P .  = Oxford Economic P apers .
O .J .E .  = Q u a rter ly  Jou rn a l  o f  Economics
R . D . P . I . I .  * = Reading D i s c u s s i o n  Papers i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Investment and B u s in e s s  S t u d i e s .
R .E .A .S . ,  = Review o f  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s .
S . E . J .  = Southern Economic J o u r n a l .
S . J . P . E .  = S c o t t i s h  Journa l  o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy.
( 3 )  I r e la n d  -  Books and A r t i c l e s  (As F o o tn o te )
A d m in is t r a t io n  (1972)  S p e c i a l  I s su e  -  The I n d u s t r i a l  
Development A u thor ity  v o l .  2 0 ,  no.  1 ,  Spring 1972 .
Andrews M.E. (1972)  A Survey o f  American Investment  
i n  I r i s h  I n d u s t r y . Unpublished S e n io r  Honours T h e s i s  
Harvard U n i v e r s i t y .
B lackborn  A. (1972)  ’’The L o c a t io n  o f  Foreign-Owned 
M anufacturing P la n t s  i n  the Republic  o f  I r e l a n d ” 
T y d s c h r i f t  voor  Economises e n S o c i a l e  Geographic  
LXIII no .  6 ,  N ov . /D ec .  1972 .
Brook C. (19^9) ’’P u b l ic  P o l i c y  and P r iv a t e  I n d u s t r i a l  
Development” i n  J . A .  B r is to w  and A.A. T a i t  ( E d s . )  
Economic P o l i c y  i n  I r e l a n d , I n s t i t u t e  o f  P u b l ic  
A d m in i s t r a t io n ,  D u b l in .
Brody, Hugh (1973)  I n i s h k i l l a n e : Change and D e c l in e  i n  
the West o f  I r e l a n d . A l l e n  Lane, Harmandsworth.
B r is to w  J . A .  and A.A. T a i t  ( E d s . )  ( 1 9 6 9 ) Economic 
P o l i c y  i n  I r e l a n d . I n s t i t u t e  of  P u b l i c  A d m in i s t r a t io n ,  
D u b l in .
Buchanan, C o l in  and P a r tn e r s  (19&9) R eg io n a l  S t u d i e s  i n  
I r e l a n d ,  D u b l in .
B u c k le y ,  P e te r  J .  (197*+) ’’Some A spects  o f  F o re ign  D i r e c t  
Investment i n  the M anufacturing S e c to r  o f  th e  Economy o f  
the I r i s h  R e p u b l ic ” . ESR v o l .  5) no.  3 5 A p r i l .
Business and Finance, various issues.
Chubb, B a s i l  (1971*) The Government and P o l i t i c s  o f  
I r e l a n d ,  Oxford U .P .
Chubb, B a s i l  and P a t r i c k  Lynch ( E d s . )  Economic 
Development and P la n n in g , I . P . A .  D u b l in .
Cooper, Charles  and Noel  Whelan (1972)  S c i e n c e ,
Technology and In du stry  i n  I r e la n d  -  A D ia g n o s i s  
o f  some P o l i c y  P r o p o s a l s .  Paper p r e s e n te d  to  N a t io n a l  
S c ien ce  C o u n c i l ,  D u b l in ,  March 1972.
Development v a r io u s  i s s u e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  "IDA Ir e la n d  -  
S p e c i a l  I s s u e ” January 1972 and "Limerick -  Shannon -  
the co u n ter  magnet” May 1970 .
D on a ld son ,  Lorraine  (19 6 6 )  Development P lanning i n  
I r e la n d  P r e a g er ,  New York.
F i r s t  N a t io n a l  C ity  Bank (1972)  Investment i n  I r e l a n d .
F i t z g e r a l d ,  Garret (1972)  Towards a New Ir e la n d  G i l l  and 
MacMillan, D u b l in .
Hultman, Charles  ( 1 9 6 9 ) I r e la n d  i n  World Commerce 
M ercier  P r e s s  Cork.
I r i s h  Banking Review v a r i o u s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  December 1961 
”The Shannon I n d u s t r i a l  E s t a t e ” and "Annual F o r e c a s t ” .
I r i s h  T imes v a r i o u s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  "How Ir e la n d  Fares  i n  
EEC", F r iday  March 23rd 1973 .
Kennedy, Kiernon A. (1971)  P r o d u c t i v i t y and I n d u s t r i a l  
Growth s The I r i s h  E x p e r i ence* Oxford U .P .
^75
Kennedy, Kiernon A. (1968)  "Growth o f  Labour P r o d u c t i v i t y  
i n  I r i s h  Manufacturing 1953 -  1967” J *S . S . I . S . I .  
v o l .  XXII part  I 1968 - 6 9 .
Kennedy, Kiernon A. and B .R .  Dowling (1 97 0 )  " P r o d u c t iv i t y  
E arn in g s  and the Composit ion  o f  Labour $ I r i s h  Manufact­
ur in g  I n d u s t r i e s  19 5 3 -6 6 " ,  BSR v o l  1 . ,  no .  2 .
Keynes ,  J .M . (1933)  S t u d i e s  ( 1 7 7 ) .
L e s e r ,  C .E.V. (1968)  "Problems o f  I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  i n  
D ev e lo p in g  C ou ntr ies  and t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  Ire land"
j . s . s . i . s . i .  1967 - 6 8 .
T .P .  Linehon (1 9 6 2 ) "The S tr u c tu r e  o f  I r i s h  Industry"
j  . s . s . i . s . i .  1961 - 6 2 .
Lucey,  D e n is  I . F .  and Donald R. Kaldor ( 1 9 6 9 ) Rural  
I n d u s t r l a l l s a t i o n  G eo ffrey  Chapman, London.
Lynn, Richard ( 1 9 6 8 ) The I r i s h  B r a in  D r a i n , Economic  
and S o c i a l  Research I n s t i t u t e  Paper No. ^3 D u b l in .
M a c C a r v i l l  P.D.  (1971)  The P ro m o t io n  o f  D i r e c t  F o r e i g n  
I n v e s tm e n t  : A Sys tems Approach U n p u b l i s h e d  MBA t h e s i s  
U .C .D .
M cAleese ,  Dermot (1970)  A Study of  Demand E l a s t i c i t i e s  
f o r  I r i s h  Imports ESRI Paper No. 53*
M cAleese ,  Dermot (1971)  E f f e c t i v e  T a r i f f s  and the  
S tr u c tu r e  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  P r o t e c t i o n  i n  I r e la n d  Economic  
and S o c i a l  Research I n s t i t u t e  Paper No, 6 2 , D u b l in .
M cAleese ,  Dermot (1972)  "C apita l  In f low  and D ir e c t  
F o r e ig n  Investment i n  I r e la n d  1952-70" J .S .S .1 .S . 1 . 
v o l .  XXII part  IV, 1 9 7 1 - 7 2 .
M cAleese ,  Dermot and John M artin  (1973)  " I r e la n d ’ s 
Manufactured E xports  t o  the EEC and the Common 
E x t e r n a l  T a r i f f s "  BSR 1973*
McGilvray,  J .  (1970)  I r i s h  Economic S t a t i s t i c s  
I n s t i t u t e  o f  P u b l ic  A d m in is t r a t io n  D u b l in .
McMenamdn P . S .  (1973)  The I n d u s t r i a l  Development P r o c e s s  
i n  the R epu bl ic  of  I r e la n d  1953 -  72 . Unpublished IDA 
Paper.
McNamara, Aidon Bond, Donald M. Sainsbury  (1971)  A 
Survey o f  th e  I r i s h  P l a s t i c s  I n d u s t r y . I n s t i t u t e  o f  
I n d u s t r i a l  Research and Standards D u b l in .
Meenan, J ,  (1970)  The I r i s h  Economy s in c e  1922 
L iv e r p o o l  U .P .
Murphy, Biarmuid (1972)  I r e la n d  Background Report on 
S c ie n c e  and T ech n o lo g y . N a t io n a l  S c ien ce  C o u n c i l ,
D u b l in ,  November 1972 .
O’M alley  P .J . (1965)  "The S t r u c t u r e  and Performance  
o f  I r i s h  I n d u s t r y  1953-68" Unpublished M.A. T h e s i s .  
U n i v e r s i t y  C o l leg e  D u b l in .
O'M alley ,  P . J .  (1971)  I r i s h  Industry  ; S tr u c tu re  and 
Performance G i l l  and MacMillan, D u b l in ,
O ' N e i l l ,  Helen  B. (1.971) S p a t i a l  P lanning  i n  the 
Small Economy : A Case Study o f  I r e la n d  Praeger  1971*
Q u ig le y ,  Paul (1961)  "The Shannon A irport  Development  
Programme" i n  Winsemius and P incus  (E d . )  Methods 
o f  I n d u s t r i a l  Development OECD, P a r i s .
Ryan, W.J .L . (1961)  "Investment C r i t e r i a  i n  Ireland"
j . s . s . i . s . i .  1961 - 6 2 .
T a i t ,  A.A. and J . A .  B r is to w  ( E d s . )  (1972)  I r e la n d  -  
some problems of a d e v e lo p in g  economy. G i l l  and 
MacMillan, D u b l in .
Whyte, John (1971)  Church and S ta te  i n  Modern I r e l a n d ,
G i l l  and MacMillan, D u b l in .
Murphy, Biarmuid and Donal O 'B ro lch a in  Research and 
Development i n  Ire la n d  196 1 .  S t a t i o n e r y  O f f i c e ,  D u b l in .
N evin ,  E .  (1962)  The I r i s h  T a r i f f  and the EEC ; A F a c t u a l  
Survey ERI Paper No. 3 D u b l in  January 1 9 6 2 .
N ev in ,  E.  (1963)  Wages i n  Ir e la n d  19^-6-62 ERI Paper No. 12 
D u b l in .
N e v in ,  E .  (1963)  The C a p i t a l  Stock o f  I r i s h  In du stry  
ERI Paper No. 17 D u b l in .
N ev in ,  E (196*0 The Cost S tr u c tu r e  o f  I r i s h  In du stry  
1950-60  ERI Paper No. 22 D u b l in .
N i g r i t i n  E ireann  Teoranta (1973)  Company P r o f i l e  
Supplement t o  B u s in e s s  and F in a n c e ,  1 6 t h .A u g u s t ,  197 3 .
N o r t h c o t t ,  Jim (1970)  "New P a t te r n s  o f  Development"
J . S . S . I . S . I . v o l .  XXII Part I I  1 9 6 9 -7 0 .
0 1F a r r e l l ,  P .N .  (1971)  "The R egiona l  Problem i n  
Ir e la n d  s Some R e f l e c t i o n s  upon Development S tra tegy"
BSR J u ly  1971 .
O'Huggin, Padraig  (1972)  R eg iona l  Developments and 
I n d u s t r i a l  L o c a t io n  i n  Ir e la n d  v o l .  I s  L o c a t io n a l  
D e c i s i o n s  and Exp e r i e n c e s  o f  New I n d u s t r i a l  E s t a b l i s h -  
ments 1 9 6 0 - 7 0 .  An Foras  Forbartha D u b l in .
0 'Mahony, David (1 9 6 7 ) The I r i s h  Economy (second e d i t i o n )  
Cork U . P .
(*+) Other Books and A r t i c l e s .
A b e l l ,  P e te r  (197*0 "Parent Companies' C ontro l  o f  
S u b s i d i a r i e s  Evidence from the U.K. " M u l t in a t io n a l  
B u s in e s s  197** No. 1 ,  March.
A d le r ,  J .H .  (E d .)  (1 9 6 7 ) C a p i ta l  Movements and Economic 
Development MacMillan, New York.
Ady, P e t e r  (Ed) (1971)  P r iv a te  F ore ig n  Investment and the 
D ev e lo p in g  World Praeger  New York.
Agarwala, A.N. and S .P .  S ingh (Ed) ( I 9 6 3 ) The Economics  
o f  Underdevelopment Oxford U .P .
A h a r o n i ,  Y a i r  ( 1 9 6 7 ) The F o r e i g n  I n v e s t m e n t  D e c i s i o n  
P r o c e s s  H a rv a rd  U .P .
A l i b e r  R .2 .  (3-970) ”A Theory o f  D i r e c t  F o r e ig n  In v es tm en t” 
i n  C.P.  K indlebarger  (Ed) The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Corporat ion  
M .I .T .  P r e s s .
A l ib e r  R .Z. (1971)  ’’The M u l t in a t io n a l  C orporat ion  i n  a 
m u l t i p l e  currency w o r ld ” i n  J .H .  Dunning (Ed) The 
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n te r p r is e  A l l e n  & Unwin London.
Arpan, J e f f r e y s  (1972)  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  In tra c o rp o ra te  
P r i c i n g  P ra e g er ,  New York.
B a in ,  Joe S (1968)  I n d u s t r i a l  O r g a n is a t io n  (second  
e d i t i o n )  John Wiley & S o n s ,  New York.
B a l a s s a ,  B e la  and A s s o c i a t e s  (1971)  The S tru c tu r e  o f  
P r o t e c t i o n  i n  D eve lop in g  C o u n t r i e s . John Hopkins 
B alt im ore  and L on d o n .*
B a l a s s a ,  B e la  and Darnel M. Schydlowsky (1 97 2 )  ’’Dom estic  
Resource C osts  and E f f e c t i v e  P r o t e c t i o n  Once Again”
J .P .E .  J a n . / F e b .  1972 .
Balasubramanyarn, V.N. (1973)  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T ra n sfer  o f  
Technology to  In d ia  P raeger  New York.
B aldw in ,  R.E.  (1970)  ” I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade i n  Inputs  and 
O utputs” A.E.R. v o l .  60 ,  no .  2 .
B a lo g h ,  Thomas (1966)  The Economics o f  P o v er ty :  The 
Mechanism o f  N e o ~ c o lo n ia l i s m .
B a log h ,  Thomas and P .P .  S t r e e t o n  ( i 9 6 0 ) ’’Domestic  v e r s u s
F o r e ig n  In ves tm en t” B .0 .U .1 .S * v o l .  2.2, i 9 6 0 .
kBO
Bandera ,  V.N. (1968)  F o r e ig n  C a p ita l  as an Instrument o f  
N a t io n a l  Economic P o l i c y  (second e d i t i o n )  Martimus 
N y h o ff .  The Hague.
Bandera, V.N. and J . T .  White (1968)  ”U .S .  D i r e c t  
Investment and Domestic  Markets i n  Europe” Economica  
I n t e r n a z i o n a l e  v o l .  2 1 ,  August 1 9 6 8 .
Bannock, G. (1971)  The Ju g g ern au ts  W eidenfe ld  and 
N i c h o l s o n ,  London.
Baron, P .A .  and P. Sweezy (1968)  Monopoly C a p ita l  
Pengiun Harmondsworth.
Baranson,  Ja ck  (1 9 6 7 ) Manufacturing Problems i n  I n d ia :  
The Curwins D i e s e l  E xp er ien ce  Syracuse U .P .
Baranson ,  Jack  ( 1 9 6 9 ) I n d u s t r i a l  T e c h n o lo g ie s  f o r  
D ev e lo p in g  Economies P ra e g e r ,  New York.
Baranson,  Jack  (1970)  ’’Technology T r a n s fe r  through the  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Firm” AER v o l .  60 ,  no .  2 .
B ark in ,  S, W.  Dymond, E.M. K a ssa lo v ,  F .  Meyers and
C.A. Myers (Eds) (1967)  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Labour Harper & 
Row, New York.
Barlow, E .R.  and I . T .  Wender (1955)  F o r e ig n  Investment  
and T a x a t io n  P r e n t i c e - H a l l  New J e r s e y .
Behrm<an, Ja ck  N. ( i 9 6 0 ) ” Promo t i n g  Free World Economic 
Development through D i r e c t  In ves tm en t” AER May, i 9 6 0 .
Behrman, Jack  N. (1970)  N a t io n a l  I n t e r e s t s  and the  
M u l t in a t io n a l  E n te r p r is e  -  T ens ion s  among the North  
A t l a n t i c  C ou ntr ie s  P r e n t i c e - H a l l , New J e r s e y .
B e r i l l ,  Kenneth (196 7 ) "Fore ign  C a p i t a l  and Take-Off"  
i n  W.W. Rostow (Ed) The Economics o f  the Take-Off i n t o  
S u s ta in e d  Growth MacMillan, New York.
Bhagw ati ,  J .  ( 196*+) "The Pure Theory o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Trade : A Survey" E:.J . v o l .  7*+, no .  1 .
B rash ,  Donald T. (1966)  American Investm ent  i n  A u s t r a l i a n  
In d u stry  A u s t r a l ia n  N a t io n a l  U .P .  Canberra.
B r i t i s h  P l a s t i c s  (1966)  "U.S.  Stake i h  European P l a s t i c s "  
B r i t i s h  P l a s t i c s  v o l .  *+0, September.
B ro n fe n b r e n n e r , M. (1955)  "The Appeal o f  C o n f i s c a t i o n  i n  
Economic Development" EDCC, v o l .  I l l ,  no .  3 , A p r i l .
B rooke ,  M ichael  Z. and H. Lee Re miners (19 7 0 )  The S t r a t e g y  
o f  M u l t in a t io n a l  E n t e r p r i s e . Longman, London.
Brooke,  M ichael  z .  and H. Lee Reamers (Eds) (1972)
The M u l t i n a t i o n a l  Company i n  E urope . Longman, London.
B u c k le y ,  P e te r  J .  and John H. Dunning (197*0 "The 
I n d u s t r i a l  S tructure  o f  U .S .  D i r e c t  Investment i n  the  
H . P . P . 1 . 1 ,  no .  1 2 ,  March 197^.
B u s i n e s s  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C orporat ion  (1972)  The E f f e c t s  o f  
U .S .  Corporate F o re ig n  Investment 1 9 6 0 - 7 0 * New York.
*+82
By&, Maurice (1968)  " S e l f  F inanced M u l t i t e r r i t o r i a l  
U n it s  and t h e i r  time hor izon" I .E  .P . no .  8 .
Caves,  Richard E. (1971)  "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Corporation"  
Economica v o l .  38 .
Caves,  Richard E. (197*+) " M u l t in a t io n a l  F irm s,  C om peti t ion  
and P r o d u c t i v i t y  i n  Host-Country  Markets" Economica May.
C aves ,  Richard E. and Grant L. Reuber (1 9 71 )  C a p i ta l  
T r a n s fe r s  and Economic P o l i c y  s Canada 1951-62  
Harvard U .P .
Chakravarty ,  S ,  (1961)  "A S t r u c t u r a l  Study o f  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  C a p i t a l  Movements" Economica I n t e r n a z i o n a l e « 
v o l .  1*+, August ,  1961.
Chisholm, M ichael  (1970)  "On the Making o f  a Myth?"
How C a p i t a l  I n t e n s i v e  i s  In d u stry  i n v e s t i n g  i n  the 
Development Areas? Urban S t u d i e s , v o l .  7, no.  35 Oct .  1970.
Cohen, Benjamin I .  (1966) "Measuring the short  run impact  
o f  a c o u n t r y ’ s import r e s t r i c t i o n s  on i t s  exports"  OJE 
1966.
Cohen, Benjamin I .  (1968)  " R e la t iv e  e f f e c t s  o f  f o r e i g n  
c a p i t a l  and l a r g e r  e x p o r t s  on Economic Development"
REAS 1968 .
Cohen, Benjamin I .  (1968)  "The LDCs e x p o r t s  o f  primary  
products" E .J  . 1968.
Cooper, Charles  (Ed) (1973)  S c i e n c e .  Technology and 
Development F r o n t c l a s s  London.
Cooper,  Richard N. (1969)  "Review of  the Hufbauer/Adler  
Report" J . B .L . v o l .  V I I ,  Dec.  1969 ,  pp 120 8 -9 -
C op ith orn e ,  L.W. (1971)  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Corporate  
T ra n sfe r  P r i c e s  and Government P o l ic y "  C.J .E . August 1971-
Corden, W.M. (196*0 "The S tr u c tu r e  o f  a t a r i f f  system  
and the e f f e c t i v e  p r o t e c t i v e  rate"  J .P «B. v o l .  7*+-
Corden, W.M# (1967)  " P r o t e c t i o n  and F o r e ig n  Investment"
E .R .  v o l .  *+3, no.  2 ,  June 1967 .
Corden, W.M. (1971)  "The Balance  o f  Payments E f f e c t s  o f
Corden, V/.M. (197*+) "The M u l t in a t io n a l  E n te r p r i s e  and 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade Theory" i n  Dunning (197*0 (Ed op .  c i t . )
D a n i e l s ,  J . D .  (1971)  Recent F o re ig n  D i r e c t  Manufacturing  
Investment i n  the U n ited  S t a t e s , P ra e g e r ,  New York.
D'Arge,  R, (1 9 6 9 ) "Note on Customs Unions and D i r e c t  
F o r e ig n  Investment" E .J  , June 1969-
D ’Arge, R. (1971)  "Customs Unions and D i r e c t  F o r e ig n  
Investment : A. C o r r e c t io n  and Further  Thoughts" and 
"A Reply" E .J . June 1971-
Deane,  Roderick  S .  (1969)  "Import L i c e n s in g  s A S t im ulu s  
to  F o r e ig n  Investment" E .R .  1969-
Deane,  R oderick  S .  (1970)  F o re ig n  Investm ent  i n  New 
Zealand Manufacturing S t r e e t  & Maxwell ,  W e l l in g t o n ,  K.Z.
Investm ent  t same th e o r y " Unpublished paper
De l a  Torre , Jose  ( J r . )  (1971)  "Exports o f  Manufadtured 
Goods from D eve lop ing  C o u n tr ie s  : Marketing F a c to r s  and 
the Rate of  F o re ign  E n te r p r is e "  J .1 . B . S . Spring 1971*
D e n i s o n , E . (1962)  The Sources  o f  Economic Growth i n  
the U n ited  S t a t e s  Committee f o r  Economic Development  
New York.
Diamond, M. (1967)  "Trends i n  the f lo w  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  1957-65" IMF S t a f f  P a p e r s  1967.
D i x o n - F y l e , S .R .  (1967)  Economic Inducements to  P r iv a t e  
F o r e ig n  Investment i n  Afr ica"  J .D . S . Oct.  1 9 6 7 .
Du B o f f  R .B .  and C.T. N i s b e t  (1971)  " T r a n s fe r r in g  
w e a l th  from underdeveloped to  deve loped  c o u n t r i e s  v i a  
D i r e c t  F o r e ig n  Investment" S .E . J . June 1971*
Dunning, John H. (19 5 8 )  American Investment i n  B r i t i s h  
Manufacturing I n d u s t r y . A l l e n  and Unwin, London.
Dunning,  John H. (1963)  "American Investm ent i n  Europe" 
Aspect  December 1963*
Dunning, John H. (1966)  "U.S.  S u b s i d i a r i e s  i n  B r i t a i n  
and t h e i r  U.K. com p et i tors"  B .R. Autumn 1 9 6 6 .
Dunning, John H. (1969)  "The r o l e  o f  American Investment  
i n  the B r i t i s h  Economy" P .E .P .  London
Dunning, John H. (1970a)  "S t u d ie s  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
In v es tm en t" A l le n  & Unwin, London.
Dunning, John H. (1970b) "Technology,  U n ited  S t a t e s  ' 
Investment and European Economic Growth" i n  K in d leberger  
(Ed) (1 97 0 )  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Corporat ion  M .I .T .  Press*
Dunning, John H. (1971)  (Ed) The M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e , 
A l l e n  & Unwin, London.
Dunning, John H. (1973a)  The L o c a t io n  of  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Firms i n  an Enlarged EEC, Manchester S t a t i s t i c a l
Dunning, John  H. (1973b)  "The D eterm inants  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Production" 0 . E . P . Nov. 1973*
Dunning, John H. (1 9 7 3 c )  " M u l t in a t io n a l  E n t e r p r i s e s  and 
Dom est ic  C a p i t a l  Formation" Manchester S c h o o l . S e p t .  1973*
Frank, A.G. ( 1 9 6 9 ) C a p i ta l i s m  and Underdevelopment i n  
L a t i n  America P e l i c a n  Harmondsworth.
Franko, Lawrence G. (19 7 1 )  J o i n t  Venture S u r v iv a l  i n  
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t io n s . P ra eg er ,  New York.
Friedman, W.G. ana J .  Kalmonoff (Eds) (19-61) J o i n t  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  B u s in e s s  V e n t u r e s . Columbia U .P .  New York.
Friedman, W.G. and J . P .  B egu in  (1971)  J o i n t  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
B u s i n e s s  Ventures  i n  D ev e lo p in g  C o u n tr ie s  Columbia U .P .
New York.
F u ld a ,  C.H. and W.P. Schwartz (1970)  R e g u la t io n s  o f  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade and Investment F oundat ion  P r e s s ,  Mineda.
Gennard, J .  (1972)  M u l t in a t io n a l  C orporat ion s  and 
B r i t i s h  Labour s A Review o f  A t t i t u d e s  and Responses  
B r i t i s h - N o r t h  American Committee, London.
Girvan,  Norman (1967)  The Caribbean B a u x ite  I n d u s t r y . 
U n i v e r s i t y  o f  West I n d i e s .
Girvan, N. (1972)  F o r e ig n  C a p i t a l  and Economic Under­
development i n  Jamaica I n s t i t u t e  o f  S o c i a l  & Economic 
R esearch ,  K in g sto n ,  J am aica .
Gray, H. (1972)  F o r e ig n  D i r e c t  Investment i n  Canada, 
Ottowa, Queen’s P r i n t e r s .
Gray, H .P .  (1972)  The Economics o f  B u s i n e s s  Investment  
Abroad. MacMillan, London.
Green, J .  and M.G. Duerr (1968)  Intracompany T r a n s a c t io n s  
i n  the M u l t in a t io n a l  Firm Conference Board,  New York.
G r i f f i n ,  K e i th  (1970)  ’’F o r e ig n  C a p i t a l ,  Domestic  S a v in g s  
and Development” Bov i s  v o l .  32 May.
G r i f f i n ,  K e i t h ,  C.P.  Kennedy and A. T h i r w a i l ,  Frances  
Stewart and Eprime Eshag (1971)  ’’F o r e ig n  C a p i ta l  Dom estic  
Savings  and Economic Development -  Three Comments and a 
R eply” B o v i s  May 1971*
Gruber W.D.,  D. Mehta and R. Vernon (1 96 7 )  "The R &D  
f a c t o r  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n v e s t ­
ment o f  U .S .  I n d u s t r i e s ” J . P . E . 75} n o .  1 .
Gunter, M. (Ed) (1972)  T r a n sn a t io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s , 
MacMillan, London.
**87
H a lo ,  H . P . ,  J .G .  Smith and R.W. Wright (1 9 7 3 )  N a t io n a l i sm  
and the M u l t in a t io n a l  E n t e r p r i s e ;  L e g a l « Economic and 
M anageria l  A s p e c t s , Oceana, Dobbs Ferny.
Hays,  R .D . ,  C.M. Korth and M. Roudiani  (19 7 2 )  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
B u s i n e s s :  An I n t r o d u c t io n  to  the world o f  the M u l t i ­
n a t i o n a l  Firm P r e n t i c e  H a l l ,  Englewood C l i f f s .
H e l l e i n e r  G.K. (1973)  f?Manufactured E x p o rts  from LDCs and 
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  Firms” E .J . March.
Dunning, John H. (1973d) U .S .  In du stry  i n  B r i t a i n .
F i n a n c i a l  Times,  London.
Dunning, John H. (197J+a) (Ed) Economic A n a ly s i s  and the  
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e ” A l l e n  & Unwin, London.
Dunning, John H. (197^b) ’'M u lt in a t io n a l  E n t e r p r i s e s  and 
the Trade Flows of  L ess  Developed C o u n t r ie s ” World 
Development v o l .  2 ,  no.  2 ,  Feb. 197*+.
Dunning, John H. (197*+c) ’’The Future o f  the  M u l t in a t io n a l  
E n t e r p r i s e ” Lloyds Bank R ev iew , J u ly  197^, no.  113«
Dunning, John H. and P e te r  J .  Buckley  (197M  ’’I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
P ro d u c t io n  and A l t e r n a t i v e  Models of Trade” R . B . P . 1 . 1 .  
no .  1 6 ,  September.
Dunning, John H. and R.D. Pearce (1 9 7 0 )  ’’The World’ s 
L a r g es t  E n t e r p r i s e s :  A S t a t i s t i c a l  P r o f i l e ” B .R .
I s su e  Three .
1*88
Dunning, John H. and M. S te u e r  ( 1 9 6 9 ) ’’The e f f e c t  o f  
U .S .  D i r e c t  Investment i n  B r i t a i n  on B r i t i s h  Technology” 
Moorgate & Wall S t r e e t , Autumn 19&9.
D r y s d a le ,  P.  (Ed) 1972 D i r e c t  F o re ig n  Investment i n  As.ia 
and the P a c i f i c  A u s t r a l i a n  N a t io n a l  U . P . ,  Canberra.
D u e r r , M. G. (1970)  R & D i n  the M u l t i n a t i o n a l  Company 
N a t io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  Conference Board.
Eastman, H.C. and S .  S t y k o l t  (I.9 6 7 ) The t a r i f f  and 
c o m p e t i t i o n  i n  Canada MacMillan, T oronto .
Eitman, David K. and Arthur I .  S t o n e h i l l  (1973)  
M ult in a t io n a l .  B u s in e s s  F i n a n c e , A d dison -W es ley , New York
Ekhaus, R .S .  (1955)  ’’The F a c t o r - P r o p o r t io n s  problem i n  
Underdeveloped Areas” A.E .R * S e p t .  1955*
Emery, R .F .  (1967)  ’’The R e l a t i o n  of  E x p o rts  and Economic 
Growth” Kvklos 20 196?•
Farmer, Richard N. (1968)  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Management 
D ic k en so n ,  Belmont C a l i f o r n i a .
Farmer, Richard N. and B.M. Richman ( 1 9 6 6 ) I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
B u s i n e s s  ; An O perat iona l  Theory. Richard Ir w in ,  New York
Farmer, Richard N, R.W. S te v en s  and J .  Sealhammer (Eds)
(1972)  Readings i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B u s i n e s s  D ie k e n so n , 
C a l i f o r n i a .
Fernando, L .E .N . (1971)  Some A spects  o f  P r iv a t e  F o r e ig n  
E n te r p r is e  In C ev lon . Unpublished Ph.D. t h e s i s  H ul l  
U n i v e r s i t y  Dec.  1971*
F o r s y t h ,  David J .C .  (19 7 2 )  U .S .  Investment in  S co t land  
P ra e g er ,  New York,
Heilman, Rainer (1970)  The c h a l le n g e  to  U .S .  dominance 
o f  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C orp o ra t io n  D u n e l i e n  New York.
H irsh  S .  (1967)  L o c a t io n  o f  In du stry  and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
C o m p e t i t iv e n e s s  Oxford U .P .
Hirshman, A. 0 .  (1958)  The s t r a t e g y  o f  Economic- D e v e lo p -  
ment Yale U .P .
Hirshman, A.O. (1969)  How t o  D iv e s t  i n  L a t in  America 
and Why P r in c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  E ssays  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
F in a n c e , No. 76 .
Hogan, W.P. ( 1 9 6 6 ) " B r i t i s h  Manufacturing S u b s i d i a r i e s  
i n  A u s t r a l i a  and Export F ran ch ises"  Economic Papers  
No. 2 2 ,  J u l y .
Hogan, W.P. ( 1 9 6 9 ) "Economic E f f e c t s  o f  the A u s t r a l ia n  
P r o t e c t i o n  System" E .R .  Ju n e .
H o r s t ,  Thomas 0 .  (1 9 6 9 ) A t h e o r e t i c a l  and e m p ir ic a l  
a n a l y s i s  o f  American e x p o r t s  and d i r e c t  in v e s t m e n t s " 
Unpublished Ph.D. d i s s e r t a t i o n ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  R o c h e s t e r .
H o r s t ,  Thomas 0 .  (1971)  "The th eo ry  o f  the M u l t i n a t i o n a l  
Firm Optimal behaviour  under d i f f e r e n t  T a r i f f  and Tax 
r a t e s " ,  J .P .E .  79, 5 .
H o r s t ,  Thomas 0 .  (1972a)  "The I n d u s t r i a l  com p o s i t io n  o f  
U .S .  e x p o r t s  and s u b s id ia r y  s a l e s  to  the Canadian Market"
A.E . R . v o l .  62 ,  no .  2 ,  March*
^90
H o r s t ,  Thomas 0 .  (1972b) "Firm and In d u stry  Determ inants  
o f  the d e c i s i o n  to  I n v e s t  Abroad j an E m p ir ica l  Study"
R*B «A «S » August,
Hu* Y .S ,  (1973)  The Impact o f  U .S .  Investment i n  
Europe,  P ra e g er ,  New York,
Hufbauer, G.C. (1965)  S y n t h e t i c  M a t e r i a l s  and the Theory  
o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade , Duckworth, London.
Hufbauer, G.C. (1970)  "The Impact o f  N a t io n a l  Charact­
e r i s t i c s "  i n  R. Vernon (Ed) The Technology F actor  i n  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade Columbia U .P .  New York,
Hufbauer,  G.C. and M.H. Adler  (196?)  Overseas Manufact­
uring Investment and the  Balance  of  Payments U .S .
Treasury D ept .
Hughes, H elen  ( 1 9 6 7 ) " A u s tr a l ia n s  as  F o r e ig n  I n v e s t o r s s  
A u s t r a l i a n  Investment i n  Singapore and M alays ian  Manu­
f a c t u r i n g  I n d u s t r i e s " ,  A u s t r a l i a n  Economic Papers June 
1 9 6 7 * n o ,  8 .
Hughes, H elen  and You Poh Seng (Eds) ( 1 9 6 9 ) F o re ig n  
Investment and I n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  in  S in g a p o r e , U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  W isc o n s in ,  Madison,
Hymer, S tephen ( i 9 6 0 ) The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O perat ions  o f  
N a t io n a l  Firms : A study o f  D ir e c t  Investment Unpublished  
d o c t o r a l  d i s s e r t a t i o n  M .1 ,T .
Hymer, S tephen (1966)  "D irec t  F o re ig n  Investment and the 
N a t io n a l  I n t e r e s t "  i n  P.  R u s s e l l  (Ed) N a t ion a l i sm  i n  
.Canada,
Hymer, Stephen (1970)  ”The E f f i c i e n c y  ( c o n t r a d i c t i o n s )  
of  M u l t i n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t io n s” A.E«R. 60 May*
Hymer, S tephen (1972)  ”The M u l t in a t io n a l  Corporat ion  
and the Law o f  Uneven Development”i n  J *N . Bhagwati (Ed) 
Economics and World Order World Law Fuhd, MacMillan.
Hymer, Stephen & H. Rovthorne (1970)  ’’M u l t in a t io n a l  
C orporat ion s  and I n t e r n a t i o n a l  O l ig o p o ly  : The Non- 
American C h a l le n g e ” i n  C.P.  K in d leb erger  (Ed) (1970)
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C orporat ion  M ,L T «  P r e s s •
I l l e t t ,  J .  (1 9 6 7 ) ’’Inducements f o r  I n d u s t r i a l  D e v e lo p ­
ment s Are they W orthwhile” Yorkshire  B u l l e t i n  November.
I n d u s t r i a l  P o l i c y  Group (1970)  The case  f o r  Overseas  
D i r e c t  I n v e s tm e n t* I n d u s t r i a l  P o l i c y  Group Paper No. k ,  
London.
Jaequemin,  Alex P. (197^) S i z e  S tr u c tu r e  and Performance  
o f  the l a r g e s t  European f i r m s  Three Banks Review no. 102 ,  
J u n e .
J o h n s ,  B .L .  ( 1 9 6 7 ) ’’P r iv a t e  Overseas Investment i n  
A u s t r a l i a  : P r o f i t a b i l i t y  and M o t i v a t i o n ” E*R. *+3 
June 1967*
Johnson ,  H.G. (1956)  ’’The t r a n s f e r  problem and exchange  
s t a b i l t y ” JP.P .B « v o l  6*+.
Johnson ,  H.G. (1958)  ’’The balance  o f  payments” Pabaston  
Economic J ou r n a l  V III  no.  2 Ju n e ,  195 8 .
k92
Johnson ,  H.G. (1968)  Comparative Cost and Commercial 
P o l i c y  Theory f o r  a D ev e lo p in g  World Economy A l o v i s t  
and W i k s e l l ,  Stockholm.
J ohn son ,  H.G. (1970)  ’’The e f f i c i e n c y  and w e l fa r e  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o rp o ra t io n ” i n
C. K in d le b e rg e r  (Ed) The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Corporat ion  
M .I .T .  P r e s s .
Johnson ,  H.G. and Chiu (19 6 8 )  ’’The S a v in g s - In v es tm en t  
R e l a t i o n  i n  Underdeveloped and Developed Economies”
B . J .  1968 .
Johnson ,  L .L .  (196*7) ’’Problems o f  Import S u b s t i t u t i o n  :
The C h i le a n  Automotive In d u s t r y ” B .D .C .C . June 1 9 6 7 .
J o h n s t o n e ,  A.W. (1965)  U .S .  D i r e c t  Investm ent  i n  France  
M .I .T .  P r e s s  Cambridge, Mass.
J o n e s ,  R.W. ( 1 9 6 7 ) ’’I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C a p i t a l  Movements and 
the Theory o f  T a r i f f s  and Trade” Q,. J . E . v o l .  81 .
J o n e s ,  R.W. (1970)  ’’The r o l e  o f  Technology i n  the th eo ry  
of  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade” i n  R. Vernon (Ed) The Technology  
F a cto r  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade Columbia U .P .
J ud ,  G. Donald (1973)  ”An e m p ir ic a l  s tudy of  the I n d u s t r i a l  
Com posit ion  o f  U .S .  Exp orts  and F o r e ig n  S u b s id ia r y  S a l e s ” 
Unpublished Paper.
Kamen, A. (Ed) Western European Labour and the American 
Corporat ion  Bureau o f  N a t io n a l  A f f a i r s ,  Washington D.C.
Katrak,  Homi (1973)  ’’Human S k i l l s ,  H & D and s c a l e  
economies i n  the e x p o r ts  o f  the U.K. and U . S . ” 0 . E . P ♦ 
v o l . 2 5 ,  no .  3 ,  Nov. 1973*
K e e s in g ,  D .B .  (1965)  ’’Labour s k i l l s  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
trade : e v a lu a t in g  many trade f lo w s  w i t h  a s i h g l e  measuring  
d e v i c e ” R .13.A. S . 1965*
K e e s in g ,  D .B. (1968)  ’’I n d u s t r i a l  Development : Some 
ev id en ce  from trade p a t t e r n s ” A.E.R. June 1 9 6 8 .
Kemp, M.C. (1962a)  ’’F o r e ig n  Investment and the N a t io n a l  
Advantage” E .R .  v o l .  3 8 , March 1962 .
Kemp, K.C. (1962b) ’’The b e n e f i t s  and c o s t s  o f  P r iv a te  
Investment from abroad : Comment” E . R . v o l .  3 8 , March, 1962 .
Kemp, M.C. ( 1 9 6 6 ) ’’The g a in s  from I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade 
and Investment : A Neo-H ecksher-O hlin  Approach A .E .R . 
v o l .  56.
Kemp, M.C. ( 1 969 ) The Pure Theory o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade 
and Investment P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Englewood C l i f f s .
Keynes,  J .K .  (192*0 ’’F o r e ig n  Investm ent-and the N a t io n a l  
Advantage” The Nation  and Atheneum 192k.
K idron ,  M. (1965)  F o re ig n  Investment i n  I n d i a < Oxford U .P .
Kidron,  M. (1970)  ’’Pearson  on P r iv a te  F o r e ig n  In v es tm en t” 
Columbia. Conference on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic Development,  
Docrmient no .  28 .
K i l l i c k ,  Tony ’’The B e n e f i t s  o f  F o r e ig n  D i r e c t  Investment  
and i t s  A l t e r n a t i v e s ” J . D . S . v o l .  9 no .  2 .
Kimm, Seung Mee (1970)  F o r e ig n  C a p ita l  f o r  Economic 
Development s A Korean Case Study P r a e g er ,  New York.
K in d le b e r g e r ,  C.P. (1966)  "European I n t e g r a t i o n  and 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o r p ora t ion ” C .J ,W«B 0 v o l .  1 1 9 6 6 *
K in d le b e r g e r ,  C.P.  ( 1 9 6 7 ) ”The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Firm and 
the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C a p i t a l  Market” S .E . J . v o l .  3k 1967 - 8 .
K in d le b e r g e r ,  C.P. (1969)  American B u s i n e s s  Abroad,
Yale U .P .
K in d le b e r g e r ,  C.P.  (19 7 0 )  (Ed) The In tern a t io -n a l  
C o rporat ion  M .I .T .  P r e s s  Cambridge, Mass.
K in d le b e r g e r ,  C.P. and Andrew S h o n f ie ld  ■ (Eds) (1971)
North American and Western European Economic P o l i c i e s  
MacMillan London,
K nickerbocker ,  F .T .  (19 7 3 )  "O l i g o p o l i s t i c  R e a ct io n  and 
the M u l t in a t io n a l  E n t e r p r i s e ” Harvard U .P .
K o ld e , E .J  . ( 1 9 6 8 ) I n t e r n a t i o n a l  B u s i n e s s  E n te r p r i s e  
P r e n t i c e - H a l l , Englewood C l i f f s .
K r a n s t e in ,  M. (1971)  ’’M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e s  and 
R e s t r i c t i v e  P r a c t i c e s "  i n  J . B . Heath (Ed) I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Conference on M o n o p o l ie s , Mergers and R e s t r i c t i v e  P r a c t i c e s
D . T . I .
K ravis  (1970a)  "Trade as  the handmaiden o f  growth" E .J . 
1970.
K rav is  (1970b)  ’’E x te rn a l  Demand i n  I n t e r n a l  Supply F a c t o r s  
i h  LDCs export  performance" B .N .L .Q .R .  2 3 ,
K rueger,  Anne 0 .  (1966)  "Some Economic C osts  o f  Exchange 
Control  : The Turkish Case" J .P JS» v o l .  7*+, O ctober,  1966 ,
Krueger,  Anne 0 .  (1972)  "Evaluat ing  R e s t r i c t i o n i s t  Trade 
Regimes : Theory and Measurement" J .P*E. J a n . / F e b ,  1972 .
Kujawa D. (1971)  I n t e r  net,Iona 3., LakQU£__Mla t io n s  Manageme nt  
i n  the Automotive In du stry  ; A comparative study of  
C h r y s le r ,  Ford and General Motors ,  P r a e g e r ,  New York,
L a l l ,  Sanjaya (1973)  "Transfer  P r i c i n g  by M u l t in a t io n a l  
M anufacturing Firms" B o v i s  v o l .  35 ,  no ,  3 ,  August.
L a l l ,  Sanjaya and A. E iek  (1971)  Bal ance o f  Payments and 
lD c o m e _ E f f e c t s _ ^ J l r iy ^ e J b ^
u r i n g , Case S t u d ie s  o f  In d ia  and Iran UNCTAD Trade and 
Development Board Geneva.
L a n c a s t e r ,  K .J .  (1 9 6 6 ) "A new approach to  consumer theory"  
J . P . B . 1966 .
Layton ,  C. (1966)  T r a n s - A t l a n t i c  In v es tm en ts  A t l a n t i c  
I n s t i t u t e  B o l o g n e - s u r - S e i n e .
Layton ,  C. ( 1 9 6 9 ) European Advanced Technology ; A 
Programme f o r  I n t e g r a t i o n  A l l e n  & Unwin London.
Layton ,  C. (1971)  Cross F r o n t i e r  Mergers i n  Europe 
Bath U .P .
Lazar ,  Alan E r ic  ( I 96H) The E f f e c t s  on Trade o f  D i r e c t  
M anufacturing Investment Abroad Unpublished Ph.D. t h e s i s  
Columbia U n i v e r s i t y .
^96
Lecomber,  Richard (1971)  "Overseas In v es tm en t:  The 
Reddaway Report and Economic Theory" E . J . Sept* 1973..
L ee ,  J .K .  (1971)  "Exports and the p r o p e n s i t y  to  save  
i n  LDCs" E . J . Jane 1971 .
L e v in so n ,  Charles  (1971)  C a p i t a l .  I n f l a t i o n  and the  
M u l t in a t io n a l s *  A l l e n  & Unwin, London.
L e v in so n ,  Charles  (1972)  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade Unionism  
A l l e n  & Unwin, London.
L i t t l e ,  I .M .D.  and J . A .  M ir r l e e s  (1 96 8 )  Manual o f  
I n d u s t r i a l  P r o j e c t  A n a ly s i s  i n  D ev e lo p in g  C ountr ies  
v o l .  I I  S o c i a l  Cost B e n e f i t  A n a ly s i s  O.E.C.D. P a r i s .
L i t t l e ,  I .M .D.  and J . A .  M ir r l e e s  (1 9 72 )  "Further  
R e f l e c t i o n s  on the O.E.C.D. Manual o f  P r o j e c t  A n a ly s i s  
i n  D ev e lo p in g  Countries" i n  Ranis (Ed) The Gap between  
Rich and Poor N a t i o n s * MacMillan, London.
L i t t l e ,  I .M.D. Tibor S c i t o v s k y  and M.F. S c o t t  (1970)  
Ind u s tr y  and Trade i n  some D eve lop ing  C o u n t r i e s * 
Development Centre O.E.C.D. Oxford U .P .
L i t v a k ,  J . A .  and C .J .  Maule (Eds) (1 97 0 )  F o re ig n  Investmer  
The E xper ience  of Host C o u n t r i e s , P r a e g er ,  New York.
MacDougall,  G.D.A. ( I 9 6 0 )  "The B e n e f i t s  and Costs  o f  
P r iv a t e  Investment from Abroad : A T h e o r e t i c a l  Approach" 
B o v i s  v o l .  2 2 ,  n o .3 .
Machiup F, U . S .  S a le n t  and L. T a r sh is  (Eds) (1972)  
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M o b i l i t y  and Movements.
7
Manser,  W.A.R. (1973)  The F in a n c ia l  Role o f  M u l t in a t io n a l  
E n t e r p r i s e s , C a s s e l l ,  London..
Mason, R.M. (1971)  The T ra n s fe r  o f  Technology and the  
F acto r  P ro p o r t io n s  Problem : The P h i l i p i n e s  and Mexico  
UN (U n itar  Research Report No. 10)  New York.
M a sse l ,  B .F .  (196*+) "Exports ,  C a p ita l  Imports and 
Economic Growth" Kyklas 17*
May, R .S .  (1965)  "D irect  P r iv a t e  Investm ent  i n  N i g e r i a ”
S .J  . P . E . Nov. 1965*
May, R .S .  ( I 9 6 7 ) "Earnings of  U.K. and U .S .  D ir e c t  
In ves tm en ts  i n  the LDCs 1959-6*+" S .J  . P . E . Nov. 1967*
May, R .S .  (1968)  "D irect  Investment i n  the LDCs:
B r i t i s h  and American In ves tm en ts  1968-6*+" J . D . S .
A p r i l  196 8 .
M cFarlane , B .J . and I .  Gordijew (1965)  "O b sta c les  to  
P r iv a t e  F o r e ig n  Investment i n  India" E . R « 1965.
M i k e s e l l ,  R .F .  (Ed) (1962)  United  S t a t e s  P r iv a t e  and 
Government Investment Abroad U n i v e r s i t y - o f  Oregan P r e s s .
Mishan, E . J .  (1 9 6 7 ) The C osts  o f  Economic Growth 
S t a p l e s  P r e s s ,  London.
M o f f a t ,  G.C. ( 1 9 6 7 ) "The F o r e ig n  Ownership and Balance  
o f  Payments E f f e c t s  o f  D i r e c t  Investment from Abroad" 
A u s t r a l i a n  Economic Papers No. 8 June 1967*
Moore, John R. and Frank A. Padovano (196?)  U . S .
Investment i n  L a t in  American Food P r o c e s s in g  P ra eger ,
New York.
Mayer, Reed (1971)  "Performance o f  U .S .  O perat ions  i n  
B r i t a i n "  J . I . B . S .  F a l l .
M uller  R. and R.D. Morgens t e r n  (197*+) M u l t i n a t i o n a l  
C o rp o ra t io n s  and Balance o f  Payments Impact i n  LDCs 
K v k lo s .
Munde1 1 ,  R.A. (1957)  " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade and F ac to r  
M o b i l i ty "  A .E «R. b? .
M undell ,  R.A. (1961)  "A Theory o f  Optimum Currency Areas" 
A.E.R, 51 .
Munk, Bernard (1970)  "The Welfare C o s ts  o f  Content  
P r o t e c t i o n  : The Automotive In du stry  i n  L a t i n  America"
J . P . S .
Murray, Robin (1972)  "Underdevelopment, i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f i r m s  and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  d i v i s i o n  o f  labour" i n  Jan  
Tinbergen  (Ed) Towards a New World Economy Rotterdam U .P .
Musgrave, P ,B . ( 1 9 6 9 ) U n ited  S t a t e s  T a x a t io n  o f  F o r e ig n  
Investment Income Harvard U .P .
M y in t , Hla (1970)  "Dualism and the I n t e r n a l  I n t e g r a t i o n  
o f  the Underdeveloped Economies" B .N.L .Q .R. no .  93 ,  J u n e .
M yin t ,  Hla (1 9 7 1 ) .Economic Theory and the Underdeveloped  
C o u n t r ie s ,  Oxford U .P .
N e g i s h i ,  T. (1965)  "Foreign Investment and the Long-  
run N a t io n a l  Advantage" E ,R .  Dec.  1965 .
N ehrt ,  L .C .  (1970)  The P o l i t i c a l  Climate f o r  F ore ign  
Investment * P raeger ,  New York.
N ehrt ,  L .C .  (Ed) (1973)  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  F inance f o r  
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  B u s in e s s  I n t e r t e x t  Books London.
Nurke, R. (195*0 " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Investment Today i n  
the l i g h t  o f  N in e tee n th  Century Exper ience"  E .J . 
v o l .  6 0
O.E.C.D. ( v a r i o u s )  Economic Survey : I r e l a n d . P a r i s .
O.E.C.D. (1968)  Gaps i n  Technology : General R e p o r t . P a r i s .
0 .E .C .D . ( 1 9 6 9 a ) Gaps i n  Technology : P h a r m a c e u t i c a l s , 
P a r i s .
O.E.C.D. (1969h) Gaps i n  Technology : P l a s t i c s . P a r i s .
0 .E .C .D . (197*+) In ter im  Report o f  t h e  In d u stry  Committee 
on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e s , P a r i s .
P a q u e t , G i l l e s  (1972)  The M u l t in a t io n a l  Firm and the  
N a tio n  S t a t e  C o l l i e r -M a c M i l la n ,  Canada.
Parker ,  J . E . S .  (1973)  D i f f u s i o n  and the M u l t in a t io n a l  
E n t e r p r i s e  Unpublished Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  
E x e t e r .
Parry ,  T.G. (1973)  "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Firm and n a t i o n a l  
economic I s su e s "  E«J . December 1973 .
P a v i t t ,  K. (1970)  " M u l t in a t io n a l  E n t e r p r i s e  and the 
T r an sfer  o f  Technology" i n  J .H. Dunning (Ed) The 
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e  A l l e n  & Unwin, London.
P earson ,  L e s t e r  B. e t  a l  (1969)  P a r tn er s  i n  Development  
(Report o f  the Commission on I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Development)  
P ra e g e r ,  New York.
P en ro se ,  E .T .  (1956)  "Fore ign  Investment and the Growth 
o f  the Firm" E . J . 66 .
P en ro se ,  E .T .  (1959)  The Theory o f  the Growth o f  the Firm 
W itey ,  New York.
P en r o s e ,  E .T .  ( 1 9 6 8 ) The Large I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Firm i n  
D evelop in g  C ou ntr ies  : The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Petroleum  
In d u stry  A l l e n  & Unwin, London.
P en ro se ,  E . T .  ( 1 9 6 9 ) "Problems A s s o c ia t e d  w i th  the Growth 
of  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Firms" Rhodesian J ou r n a l  o f  Bcohomics  
D ec .  1969*
P en ro se ,  E .T ,  (1973)  "Patent p r o t e c t i o n  and the LDCs"
E .J  . S e p t .  1973.
r
P e r k in s ,  J .O .N .  (1 9 6 6 ) "The Vernon R e p o r t , Overseas  
In v es tm en t ,  Trade P o l i c y  and the B alance  o f  Payments"
E .R .  *+2, 1966 .
P e r k in s ,  J .O .N .  ( 1 9 6 7 ) "The Reddaway Report and A u s tr a l ia "  
A u s t r a l i a n  Economic Papers No. 9 Dec ,  1 9 6 7 .
P h i l i p p s ,  E .A .  (196*0 The Long Han I m p l i c a t io n s  o f  D i r e c t  
F o re ig n  Investment f o r  the Uni ted S t a t e s  Balance  of  
Payments Unpublished Ph.D. t h e s i s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  I l l i n o i s ,  
Urbana.
Polk*. J ,  I .W . M eisto  and L.A.  V e i t  (1 9 66 )  U .S .  P ro d u c t io n  
Abroad and the Balance o f  Payments N a t io n a l  I n d u s t r i a l  
Conference Board,  New York.
P o sn er ,  M.V. (1961)  ’’I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade and T e c h n ic a l  
Change” O .E .P .  v o l .  1 3 , 1 9 6 1 .
R a g a z z i ,  G io rg io  (1973)  ’’T h e o r ie s  o f  the D eterm inants  
o f  D i r e c t  F o r e ig n  In v es tm en t” IMF S t a f f  Papers  
v o l .  XX, no .  2 ,  J u l y .
Rahman ( 1 9 6 8 ) ’’F o re ig n  C a p i t a l  and D om est ic  S a v in g s” 
R .B .A .S .
Ranis  (Ed) (1972)  The Gap between Rich and Poor N a t io n s  
MacMillan, London.
Reddaway, W.B. e t  a l  (1 96 7 )  The E f f e c t s  o f  U.K. D i r e c t  
Inves tm ent Overseas : An In ter im  R e p o r t , Cambridge U .P .
Reddaway, W.B. e t  a l  (1968)  The E f f e c t s  o f  U.K. D i r e c t  
Investment Overseas ; F in a l  R e p o r ts Cambridge U .P .
Reuber, G. (1973)  P r iv a t e  F o re ig n  Investment i n  
Development Clarendon P r e s s ,  Oxford.
Rhomberg, R. ( 1 9 6 6 ) ’’P r i v a t e  C a p i ta l  Movements and 
Exchange R ates  i n  D eve lop in g  C o u n tr ie s” IMF S t a f f  Papers  
March 1966 .
502
Robbins ,  S.M. and R.B. Stobaugh (197*0 Money i n  the  
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e , Longmans, London.
Robock, S .H .  and K. Simmonds (1973)  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
B u s in e s s  and M u l t in a t io n a l  E n t e r p r i s e , I r w in ,  New York*
R o l f e ,  S .  (1969)  The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o r p o r a t io n * I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Chamber of  Commerce, P a r i s .
R o sen b lu th ,  G* (1972)  "The R e l a t i o n  betw een F o re ig n  
Control  and C o n ce n tr a t io n  i n  Canadian Industry" C*J «B* 
v o l .  I l l ,  1 Feb.  197 2 .
Rowthrone, R* w i th  S.  Hymer (1971)  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Big  
B u s i n e s s  195 7 -6 7  A s tudy  i n  Comparative Growth U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  Cambridge , Department o f  Applied Economics O cc a s ion a l  
Paper No* 2*+*
S a f a r i a n ,  A.E.  ( 1 9 6 6 ) F o r e ig n  Ownership o f  Canadian
S a f a r i a n ,  A.E. ( 1 9 6 9 ) The Performance o f  F o re ig n  Owned 
Firms i n  Canada Canadian-Ainerican Committee, Washington  
DC and M ontrea l .
S a l t e r ,  W.E.G. ( i 9 6 0 ) P r o d u c t i v i t y  and T e c h n ic a l  Change 
Cambridge U .P .
Sampson, Anthony (1973)  The S ov e r e ig n  S t a t e  -  The S e c r e t  
H is t o r y  of  ITT Hodder and S toughton ,  London.
S c a p er la n d a ,  A.E. and L .J . Mauer ( 1 9 6 9 ) "The D eterm inants  
o f  US D i r e c t  Investment i n  the EEC A >E«R» v o l .  59 a l s o  
(1972)  "Reply" A.E.R. v o l .  6 2 *
McGraw-Hill,  Toronto  
503
Scapa lan da ,  A.E, a n d E .  R e i l i n g  (1971)  "A comment on a 
note  on Customs Unions and D i r e c t  F o r e ig n  Inves tm ent”
E . J .  June 1971 .
Schydlowsky,  D a n ie l  M. (1 9 70 )  B e n e f i t - C o s t  A n a ly s i s  
of  F o r e ig n  Investment P r o p o s a l s .  The Viev/point o f  the  
Host Country Panel  on F o r e ig n  Investment i n  L a t in  
America Working Paper No. 5 ,  M ed le in ,  Columbia,  June 1970 .
Schydlowsky, D an ie l  M. (1972)  ’’L a t in  American Trade 
P o l i c i e s  i n  the 1970s 2 A P r o s p e c t iv e  A p p r a i s a l”
Q ,J «B. May 1972 .
S e e r s ,  D. ( 1 9 6 3 ) ’’B ig  Companies and L i t t l e  C o u n tr ie s” 
K v k lo s . v o l .  2 6 , no.  k ,
S e r v a n - S c h r e i b e r , J .J . (19 6 9 )  The American Challenge  
P e l i c a n ,  Harmondsworth.
Shulman, James A. (1966)  T ra n sfer  P r i c i n g  i n  M u l t i ­
n a t i o n a l  B u s i n e s s Unpublished Ph.D. t h e s i s .  Harvard 
U n i v e r s i t y  Graduate Schoo l  o f  B u s in e s s  A d m in i s tr a t io n  
Cambridge Mass.
S in g e r ,  H.W. (1950)  ’’The D i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  Gains between  
I n v e s t in g  and Borrowing C o u n tr ie s” A .B .R . May 1950 .
S i n g e r ,  H.W. (1970)  ’’Dualism R e v i s i t e d  s A New Approach 
to  the Problems of the Dual S o c i e t y  i n  D eve lop ing  
C o u n t r ie s ” J . D . S . v o l .  7, no.  1 ,  October 1970 .
S p i t a l l e r ,  E.  (1971)  "A Survey of Recent Q u a n t i t a t iv e  
S t u d ie s  o f  Long-term C a p i ta l  Movements” IMF S t a f f  Papers  
v o l .  18
50**
S t e v e n s ,  G. (1967)  F ixed  Investment Expenditure  of  
F o re ig n  Manufacturing; A f f i l i a t e s  o f  U .S .  F ir m s: 
T h e o r e t i c a l  Models and E m p ir ic a l  E v id e n c e " Unpublished  
Ph.D. t h e s i s  Yale U n i v e r s i t y .
S t e v 6 n s ,  G. ( 1 9 6 9 ) "Fixed Investment E x p en d i tu r es  o f  
F o re ig n  Manufacturing A f f i l i a t e s  o f  U . S .  Firms s 
T h e o r e t i c a l  Models and E m p ir ic a l  Evidence" Yale  
Economic E s s a y s  v o l .  9 , no .  1 .
S t e u e r ,  M and J .  Gennard (1971)  " I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s ,  
Labour D i s p u t e s  and Labour U t i l i s a t i o n  i n  F o re ig n  Owned 
Firms i n  the U.K." i n  J . H .  Dunning (Ed) The M u l t i ­
n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e , A l l e n  & Unwin, London.
S te w a r t ,  Frances  (1970)  " P riva te  Overseas Investment :
A H o s t i l e  View" Venture v o l .  22 ,  no.  3? March 1970 .
Stobaugh, R.B. (1970)  "Financing F o r e ig n  S u b s i d i a r i e s  
o f  U .S .  C o n tr o l le d  M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e s "  J .1.33 . S . 
Summer 197 0 .
S to p f o r d ,  J .M. and L .T .  W ells  (1972)  Managing the 
M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e , Longman, London.
Strassm an,  W.P. ( 1 9 6 8 ) T e c h n o lo g ic a l  Change and Economic 
Development,  C orne l l  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  I t h a c a ,  New York.
S t r e e t o n ,  P (1970)  "The Role of  P r iv a te  Investment"  
Venture v o l .  2 2 ,  no.  1 ,  January 1970 .
S t r e e t o n ,  P. and S. L a l l  (1973)  Me t h o d o l ogy used i n  
S t u d i e s  on P r iv a te  F o re ig n  Investment. In s e l e c t e d  
D e v e lo p in g  C o u n tr ie s ,  UNCTAD, Geneva, J u l y  1973 .
505
S u b e n i t s k y ,  F r a n k  (1970)  A m er ic an  D i r e c t  I n v e s t m e n t  
i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  i n d u s t r y  : A S u rv e y  of  t h e  Y e a r  1 9 6 6 , 
R o t t e r d a m  U . P .
Sutchj  W.B. (1972)  Takeover key Zealand A.H. and 
A.W. Reed, W e l l in g to n .
S w artzen berger ,  G. ( 1 9 6 9 ) F o r e ig n  In ves tm en ts  and 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law, P r a e g er ,  Nev; York.
T a y lo r ,  C hris topher  (197b)  ’’Overseas Investment %
A Comment on Mr. Lecamber’ s Note” E .J  . S e p t .  1971 .
Thomas, G. Richard (1973)  F o r e i g n  I n v e s t m e n t  and 
R egiona l  D ev e lo p m en t  : The T h e o ry  and P r a c t i c e  of  
Investment I n c e n t i v e s  w i t h  a Case S t u d y  o f  Belgium  
P ra e g er ,  New York.
T h o r e l l i ,  H.B. (Ed) (1 9 73 )  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Marketing  
S t r a t e g y . Pengiun,  Karmondsworth.
Time Magazine (1972)  ”The Japanese  i n  Europe” Time 
M agazine , European E d i t i o n  August 1973*
T in b erg en ,  J a n .  (1972)  (Ed) Towards a New World Economy 
Rotterdam U .P .
Tugendhat,  Christopher  (1971)  The M u l t i n a t i o n a l s  
Eyre and S p o t t i s w o o d e , London.
U r i ,  P ie r r e  (Ed) (1971)  Trade and Investment P o l i c i e s  f o r  
the S e v e n t i e s  ; Hew c h a l l e n g e s  f o r  the A t l a n t i c  Area and 
J anan. P r a e g er ,  New York.
506
V a i t s o s  C.V. (19?*+) "Income D i s t r i b u t i o n  and Welfare  
C o n s id e ra t io n s"  in  J . H .  Dunning (Ed) Economic A n a ly s i s  
and M u l t i n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e , A l l e n  & Unwin, London.
Vaupel ,  J .W. and J . P .  Curhan ( 1 9 6 9 ) The Making o f  the 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e , Harvard B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l ,
B o s t o n ,  Mass.
Vaupel ,  J.W. and J . P .  Curhan (1973)  The W orld 's  M u l t i - '  
n a t i o n a l  E n t e r p r i s e s , Harvard B u s in e s s  S c h o o l ,  B o s to n ,
Mass.
Vernon R. (1 9 66a) " I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Investm ent  and I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Trade i n  the Product Cycle" Q.J . E . v o l .  80 .
Vernon R. ( 1966b )  "Fore ign  Owned E n t e r p r i s e  i n  the  
D ev e lo p in g  Countries" P u b l ic  P o l i c y  XV 1966 .
Vernon R. (1968a)  " C o n f l i c t  and R e s o l u t i o n  between  
F o re ig n  D i r e c t  I n v e s t o r s  and LDCs" P u b l i c  P o l i c y  XVII 
1 9 6 8 .
Vernon R. (1968b) Manager in  the I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economy 
P r e n t i c e  H a l l ,  Englewood C l i f f s .
Vernon R. (Ed) (1970)  The Technology F a c to r  i n  I n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  Trade , Columbia U .P .
Vernon R. (1971)  S o v e r e ig n t y  at  Bay B a s i c  Books,  New York.
Vernon R. (1972)  "United S t a t e s  E n te r p r i s e  i n  the L e ss  
Developed C ou ntr ies  : E v a l u a t i o n  of  Cost and B e n e f i t "  
i n  Ranis (Ed) The Gap between Rich a nd Poor N a t io n s ,  
MacMillan, New York.
50?
W atkins ,  M. (1970)  F o r e ig n  Ownership and the S tructure  
o f  C a n a d i a n  Industry  Queen's P r i n t e r s  O ttova .
W e l l s ,  L ou is  T. (19&9) " T ests  o f  a Product Cycle  
Model o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Trade : U .S .  E xp o rts  o f  Cohsumer 
D u ra b le s” Q . J  . E . 83*
W e l l s ,  Lou is  T .  (Ed) (1972)  The Product L i f e  Cycle and 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  T r a d e , Harvard B u s in e s s  S c h o o l ,  B o s to n .
W ertheimeir  H. (1971)  "The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  f irm  and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a s p e c t s  o f  p o l i c i e s  on m erg ers” i n  
J  «B . Heath (Ed) I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Conference on M o n o p o l ie s v 
Mergers and R e s t r i c t i v e  P r a c t i c e s , Cambridge U .P .
Whitman, Marina von Neumann (1965)  Government Risk  
Sharing i n  F ore ig n  I n v e s t m e n t , P r i n c e t o n ,  U .P .
Whitman, Marina von Neumann (1967)  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  and 
I n t e r r e g i o n a l  Payments Adjustment • A S y n t h e t i c  V iew , 
P r in c e t o n  S t u d ie s  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Finance no.  1 9 .
W i lk in s ,  Mira (1970)  The Em ergence  of  M u l t in a t io n a l  
E n t e r p r i s e  : American B u s i n e s s  Abroad from the C o lo n ia l  
Era t o  IQ l1! . Harvard U. P.
W i ls o n ,  T, R. P.  S inha ,  J . R .  Castree  ( I 9 6 9 ) "The Income 
Terms' o f  Trade o f  Development and D e v e lo p in g  Economies”
GM/68/805 contd.
My reason for requesting restricted access is as follows:
KvxcV <5^ V>> Ab VJV
K<2jc>c ,
/-) — _
c  1C l J £ /\j £ / /^ ~ 7 2 r? ') T* ~7- c? ~ ~?y
G M /6 8 /8 0 5  *  ^  BT/y
THE UNIVERSITY OF LANCASTER
RESTRICTED ACCESS TO THESIS:
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR OF THESIS AND BY HEAD 
OF APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENT
Name of Author ftgTfefc s> &’OCVivjevf_____________
Title of thesis £fPe:C_T pg -^cRglQrt
-3L & £U \< m O _____________________________________ _____________
Submitted for the degree of ^ \ \  . .
in the department of ^LCof^QfrWCLg
In submitting this thesis to the University of Lancaster for deposit in 
the University Library, I wish access to the thesis to be subject to the fol­
lowing conditions:-
1. For a period of Afr.  years from the date of submission,
the thesis is to be
(i) withheld from public use,
(ii) ma4e available forjDyblicrTIse”only f delete whichever does 
with tHe^ ossfiat^ ofThe head of the [ not apply 
department in whichThirwork was 
carfied out.
2. After the above-name period, the thesis may be made available for 
public use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library 
for the time being in force, subject to any copyright that may be vested 
in the work not being affected thereby.
*
A thesis may not be withheld from public use for more than five years 
from the date of its submission.
Signature of author r -  ^
Date ^W a. V^Tg
with the approval of 
Signature of head of department
Date 2. u- » (  ' ~~J___________
N.B. The reason for requesting retricted access should be indicated overleaf.
